McGINLEY, Judge.
Philip M. White (White), James Green (Green), Richard Graves (Graves), and Eric Smith (Smith) (collectively, Appellants) appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (common pleas court) that granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings on behalf of the City of Philadelphia (City) and City police officers Mark Itzko (Itzko) and Joseph Krone (Krone). We affirm.
On April 5, 1988, Itzko and Krone were engaged in a high speed vehicular chase with James Wagstaff (Wagstaff), who was suspected of operating a stolen motorcycle. At the intersection of Broad and Clearfield Streets in the City, Wagstaff disregarded the traffic signal and struck a motor vehicle occupied by Appellants. As a result of the collision, White, Green, Graves and Smith sustained serious and disfiguring injures.
On February 9, 1990, Appellants instituted a civil action against Wagstaff, Moto Laverda (S.R.L.), the motorcycle manufacturer, and Slater Brothers, its distributor, the City and Officers Itzko and Krone. The claim against the City was based on the assertions that the police officers who engaged in the chase were careless, reckless and otherwise negligent in conducting the pursuit. On November 6, 1991, the City and Officers Itzko and Krone filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings contending that Appellants failed to allege in their complaint facts sufficient to establish that a special relationship existed between the City and Appellants. On January 28, 1992, the common pleas court granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings.
In its decision, the common pleas court determined that Appellants did not establish that the police owed a duty of care to third persons injured in a collision with the pursued motorcycle.
The common pleas court applied the “special relationship” test first announced in
Chapman v. City of Philadelphia,
290 Pa.Superior Ct. 281, 434 A.2d 753 (1981), and followed by this Court in
Yates v. City of Philadelphia,
134 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 282, 578 A.2d 609 (1990). The common pleas court determined that Appellants failed to allege facts sufficient to establish the existence of a protected special relationship between Appellants and Officers Itzko and Krone and concluded that Appellants failed to assert an occurrence whereby either the City or the officers owed a duty of care to Appellants. Opinion of the Common Pleas Court, June 8, 1992, at 6.
After Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration, which was not ruled upon by the common pleas court, Appellants filed a notice of appeal to this Court on February 21, 1992. Appellants contend that the common pleas court erred in granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings because Section 8542(b)(1) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(1),
clearly imposes liability upon the police for the negligent operation of their vehicles, and that Section 3105 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3105,
imposes an express duty
of care owed to all persons by the police while engaged in the vehicular pursuit of a violator of the law. Our scope of review over a grant or denial of judgment on the pleadings is limited to determining whether the has been an error of law or an abuse of discretion.
Baker v. Hawks,
127 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 92, 94, 560 A.2d 939, 940 (1989).
In support of their position, Appellants rely on our decisions in
Baker
and
Dickens v. Upper Chichester Township,
123 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 226, 553 A.2d 510 (1989),
reversed sub nom Dickens v. Horner,
531 Pa. 127, 611 A.2d 693 (1992). In
Baker
the injured victim was a passenger in a vehicle being pursued by police, which crashed as the driver attempted to flee at a high rate of speed instead of pulling over as requested. In
Baker
we reviewed previous appellate decisions that held that tort liability for accidents resulting from vehicular pursuit by police should not be denied as a matter of law,
and we held that where a plaintiff raises theories of recovery recognized at common law, that plaintiff must be permitted the opportunity to develop that theory beyond the pleadings, without being stymied by governmental immunity as a matter of law.
Id.
at 95-96, 560 A.2d at 940-41.
In
Dickens
the plaintiffs vehicle was involved in a collision with a vehicle pursued by police in a high-speed chase. We noted that there is no requirement that a vehicle operated by a local government agent must physically collide with the
injured party for liability to attach.
Id.
at 229, 553 A.2d at 512. Citing our decision in
Bickerb,
we held that the plaintiff (Dickens) had sufficiently pleaded a cognizable theory of liability based on allegations of a high-speed pursuit through a residential neighborhood and failure to exercise due care.
Id.
123 Pa.Cmwlth. at 230-31, 553 A.2d at 512-13. Accordingly, we held that the common pleas court in
Dickens
did not err or abuse its discretion in concluding that the plaintiffs allegations raised factual questions as to the degree of care exercised by the police officer involved in the high-speed pursuit.
Id.
However, our decision in
Dickens
was appealed and later reversed by our Supreme Court in
Dickens v. Horner,
531 Pa. 127, 611 A.2d 693 (1992), which we conclude is controlling in the present case. In
Dickens
the Court cites its decision in
Mascaro v. Youth Study Center,
514 Pa. 351, 523 A.2d 1118 (1987), for the proposition that acts of third parties are specifically excluded in the general immunity section of Section 8542 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542, and may not be imputed to the local agency or its employees.
Id.
531 Pa. at 127-28, 611 A.2d at 693. The Court further noted that
Mascaro
is consistent with the general principle of law “that the criminal and negligent acts of third parties are superseding causes which absolve the original actor from liability for the harm caused by such third parties.”
Id.
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McGINLEY, Judge.
Philip M. White (White), James Green (Green), Richard Graves (Graves), and Eric Smith (Smith) (collectively, Appellants) appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (common pleas court) that granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings on behalf of the City of Philadelphia (City) and City police officers Mark Itzko (Itzko) and Joseph Krone (Krone). We affirm.
On April 5, 1988, Itzko and Krone were engaged in a high speed vehicular chase with James Wagstaff (Wagstaff), who was suspected of operating a stolen motorcycle. At the intersection of Broad and Clearfield Streets in the City, Wagstaff disregarded the traffic signal and struck a motor vehicle occupied by Appellants. As a result of the collision, White, Green, Graves and Smith sustained serious and disfiguring injures.
On February 9, 1990, Appellants instituted a civil action against Wagstaff, Moto Laverda (S.R.L.), the motorcycle manufacturer, and Slater Brothers, its distributor, the City and Officers Itzko and Krone. The claim against the City was based on the assertions that the police officers who engaged in the chase were careless, reckless and otherwise negligent in conducting the pursuit. On November 6, 1991, the City and Officers Itzko and Krone filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings contending that Appellants failed to allege in their complaint facts sufficient to establish that a special relationship existed between the City and Appellants. On January 28, 1992, the common pleas court granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings.
In its decision, the common pleas court determined that Appellants did not establish that the police owed a duty of care to third persons injured in a collision with the pursued motorcycle.
The common pleas court applied the “special relationship” test first announced in
Chapman v. City of Philadelphia,
290 Pa.Superior Ct. 281, 434 A.2d 753 (1981), and followed by this Court in
Yates v. City of Philadelphia,
134 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 282, 578 A.2d 609 (1990). The common pleas court determined that Appellants failed to allege facts sufficient to establish the existence of a protected special relationship between Appellants and Officers Itzko and Krone and concluded that Appellants failed to assert an occurrence whereby either the City or the officers owed a duty of care to Appellants. Opinion of the Common Pleas Court, June 8, 1992, at 6.
After Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration, which was not ruled upon by the common pleas court, Appellants filed a notice of appeal to this Court on February 21, 1992. Appellants contend that the common pleas court erred in granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings because Section 8542(b)(1) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(1),
clearly imposes liability upon the police for the negligent operation of their vehicles, and that Section 3105 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3105,
imposes an express duty
of care owed to all persons by the police while engaged in the vehicular pursuit of a violator of the law. Our scope of review over a grant or denial of judgment on the pleadings is limited to determining whether the has been an error of law or an abuse of discretion.
Baker v. Hawks,
127 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 92, 94, 560 A.2d 939, 940 (1989).
In support of their position, Appellants rely on our decisions in
Baker
and
Dickens v. Upper Chichester Township,
123 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 226, 553 A.2d 510 (1989),
reversed sub nom Dickens v. Horner,
531 Pa. 127, 611 A.2d 693 (1992). In
Baker
the injured victim was a passenger in a vehicle being pursued by police, which crashed as the driver attempted to flee at a high rate of speed instead of pulling over as requested. In
Baker
we reviewed previous appellate decisions that held that tort liability for accidents resulting from vehicular pursuit by police should not be denied as a matter of law,
and we held that where a plaintiff raises theories of recovery recognized at common law, that plaintiff must be permitted the opportunity to develop that theory beyond the pleadings, without being stymied by governmental immunity as a matter of law.
Id.
at 95-96, 560 A.2d at 940-41.
In
Dickens
the plaintiffs vehicle was involved in a collision with a vehicle pursued by police in a high-speed chase. We noted that there is no requirement that a vehicle operated by a local government agent must physically collide with the
injured party for liability to attach.
Id.
at 229, 553 A.2d at 512. Citing our decision in
Bickerb,
we held that the plaintiff (Dickens) had sufficiently pleaded a cognizable theory of liability based on allegations of a high-speed pursuit through a residential neighborhood and failure to exercise due care.
Id.
123 Pa.Cmwlth. at 230-31, 553 A.2d at 512-13. Accordingly, we held that the common pleas court in
Dickens
did not err or abuse its discretion in concluding that the plaintiffs allegations raised factual questions as to the degree of care exercised by the police officer involved in the high-speed pursuit.
Id.
However, our decision in
Dickens
was appealed and later reversed by our Supreme Court in
Dickens v. Horner,
531 Pa. 127, 611 A.2d 693 (1992), which we conclude is controlling in the present case. In
Dickens
the Court cites its decision in
Mascaro v. Youth Study Center,
514 Pa. 351, 523 A.2d 1118 (1987), for the proposition that acts of third parties are specifically excluded in the general immunity section of Section 8542 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542, and may not be imputed to the local agency or its employees.
Id.
531 Pa. at 127-28, 611 A.2d at 693. The Court further noted that
Mascaro
is consistent with the general principle of law “that the criminal and negligent acts of third parties are superseding causes which absolve the original actor from liability for the harm caused by such third parties.”
Id.
The Court noted that this interpretation is consistent with the legislative directive of Section 8542 that the criminal acts of municipal employees acting within the scope of their duties do not subject the local government unit to liability. Further, it is incongruous to recognize that Section 8542 shields a municipality from the crimes of its employees, and at the same time hold that this section leaves a municipality exposed to liability for the criminal acts of someone who chooses to defy a lawful police order. This is so “because the legislative scheme of immunity consistently excludes all criminal acts from liability....”
Id.
In
Dickens v. Horner
the Court also holds that liability cannot be imposed upon a pursuing police officer because of
the superseding criminal acts of the fleeing suspect.
Id.
531 Pa. at 130-32, 611 A.2d at 695. Accordingly, liability cannot be imposed in the present case upon Officers Itzko and Krone for pursuing Wagstaff after he refused their request to stop his motorcycle. In view of
Dickens v. Horner
we conclude that the common pleas court correctly entered judgment in favor of Officers Itzko and Krone, as well as for the City.
The order of the common pleas court is affirmed.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 6th day of January, 1993, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in the above-captioned case is affirmed.