White v. FCA US LLC

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: September 20, 2024
• Docket: 5:22-cv-00954
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION 6 7 MICHELLE J. WHITE, Case No. 22-cv-00954-BLF

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 9 v. DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES, 10 FCA US LLC, COSTS, AND EXPENSES 11 Defendant. [Re: ECF No. 57]

12 13 Before the Court is Plaintiff Michelle J. White’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, 14 Costs, and Expenses (“Motion”) along with a corresponding bill of costs. ECF 57. Defendant FCA 15 US LLC (“Defendant”) has opposed the Motion. ECF 60. Plaintiff has replied. ECF 61. For the 16 following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees, Costs, and Expenses is GRANTED IN 17 PART and DENIED IN PART. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 Plaintiff filed this case in this Court on February 16, 2022. ECF 1. As relevant here, Plaintiff 20 alleged that Defendant violated the Song-Beverly Act by knowingly selling her a vehicle with 21 defects that violated its express and implied warranties. See generally id. On October 11, 2023, the 22 parties notified the Court that they settled this case. ECF 45. On April 4, 2024, Plaintiff notified the 23 Court that full terms of the settlement had not yet occurred. ECF 53. Although Defendant had paid 24 Plaintiff the full settlement amount and Plaintiff had surrendered his vehicle to Defendant, the 25 parties could not agree upon an amount of attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses to be paid by 26 Defendant. See id. This Motion followed. ECF 57. 27 1 2 II. LEGAL STANDARD 3 Because this Court exercises diversity jurisdiction in this case, “state law governs both the 4 right to recover attorney's fees and the computation of their amount.” Collado v. Toyota Motor Sales, 5 U.S.A., Inc., 550 F. App'x 368, 369-70 (9th Cir. 2013). Under California Civil Code Section 1794 6 (“Section 1794”), the “prevailing buyer” in a Song-Beverly Act “shall be allowed by the court to 7 recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including 8 attorney’s fees based on the actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably 9 incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such an action.” 10 Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d). This fee provision was designed to provide “injured consumers strong 11 encouragement to seek legal redress in a situation in which a lawsuit might not otherwise have been 12 economically feasible.” Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., 17 Cal. 4th 985, 994 (1998). 13 Courts calculate attorneys’ fees under Section 1794(d) using the “lodestar adjustment 14 method.” Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of Cal., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 785, 818 (2006). 15 The lodestar method requires a trial court to first determine “a lodestar figure based on a careful 16 compilation of the actual time spent and reasonable hourly compensation for each attorney.” Id. 17 Under the Song-Beverly Act, actual time spent “is limited to actual hours both expended and 18 determined by the court to be reasonably incurred.” Reynolds v. Ford Motor Co., 47 Cal. App. 5th 19 1105, 1112 (2020). “Reasonable hourly compensation is based on ‘prevailing hourly rates’ in the 20 community, thereby ‘anchoring the calculation’ to an objective standard.” Id. (citing Ketchum v. 21 Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1132 (2001)). Once the lodestar figure (reasonable number of hours 22 expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly compensation) has been ascertained, it may be 23 adjusted by applying a multiplier based on factors including: “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the 24 questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of 25 the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee 26 award.” Reynolds, 47 Cal. App. 5th at 1112. 27 “In order for the trial court to determine a reasonable rate and a reasonable number of hours 1 Buffet, Inc., 57 Cal. App. 5th 221, 237 (2020). The prevailing party bears “the burden of showing 2 that the fees incurred were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable 3 in amount.” Robertson, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 817–18. If the prevailing party meets his initial burden, 4 “[t]he party opposing the fee award can be expected to identify the particular charges it considers 5 objectionable.” Gorman v. Tassajara Dev. Corp., 178 Cal. App. 4th 44, 101 (2009). “A reduced 6 award might be fully justified by a general observation that an attorney overlitigated a case or 7 submitted a padded bill or that the opposing party has stated valid objections.” Id. 8 III. DISCUSSION 9 The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees under Section 1794 as 10 the prevailing party in this case. Here, Plaintiff requests an award of fees per Section 1794(d) under 11 the “lodestar” method in the amount of $56,895.00, (2) a “lodestar” multiplier of 1.5, in the amount 12 of $28,477.50, for a total award of $85,342.50 in fees; and (3) for an award of actual costs and 13 expenses incurred in the amount of $11,393.55. ECF No. 61 at 6. Defendant contends that the 14 lodestar figure requested by Plaintiff is excessive and that a positive multiplier is not warranted in 15 this case. ECF 60. The Court will address each one of Plaintiff’s requests in turn. 16 A. Attorneys’ Fees Request 17 To assess the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s requested amount of attorneys’ fees, the Court 18 will first consider the reasonableness of the number of hours expended by Plaintiff’s attorneys, then 19 address the reasonableness of the attorneys’ hourly rates, and finally consider whether a positive 20 lodestar multiplier is warranted. 21 1. Reasonableness of Number of Hours Expended 22 To determine the reasonableness of the number of hours expended, the Court must first 23 determine the actual time expended, and then “ascertain whether, under all the circumstances of the 24 case, the amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge being made for the time expended 25 are reasonable.” Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor Am., 31 Cal. App. 4th 99, 104 (1994). In doing so, 26 the Court may consider factors such as “the complexity of the case and procedural demands, the 27 skill exhibited, and the results achieved.” Id. The prevailing party “must affirmatively demonstrate 1 of San Bernardino, 235 Cal. App. 4th 1179, 1186 (2015). “The evidence should allow the court to 2 consider whether the case was overstaffed, how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, 3 and whether the hours were reasonably expended.” Christian Rsch. Inst. v. Alnor, 165 Cal. App. 4th 4 1315, 1320 (2008). Once the prevailing party satisfies its initial burden, the party challenging the 5 reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees must “point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient 6 argument and citations to the evidence.” Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Cal. Ins. Guarantee Ass'n, 7 163 Cal. App. 4th 550, 564 (2008). “General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, 8 or unrelated” are not sufficient to satisfy the challenging party's burden. Id. “If the time expended 9 or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all the 10 circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” 11 Nightingale, 31 Cal. App. 4th at 104. 12 The Court points out that there are discrepancies in Plaintiff’s motion and the exhibits 13 attached therein. Compare ECF 57 at 2-3 (stating 6.0 hours was expended on pleadings and 8.7 14 hours was expended on motion to compel deposition) with ECF 57-1, Declaration of Amy R. 15 Rotman (“Rotman Decl.”), Ex. 1 (stating 6.5 hours was expended on pleadings and 6.7 hours was 16 expended on motion to compel deposition); see also ECF 57-1, Rotman Decl., Ex. 1 (total hours 17 does not match with the sum of the itemized hours listed in column “Hours”). These discrepancies 18 are relatively minor and have not been objected to by Defendant. ECF 60. Thus, for the purpose of 19 this Order, the Court reviews the expended hours based on the declaration (“Wirtz Decl.”) submitted 20 by Mr. Richard M. Wirtz (“Mr. Wirtz”), the managing attorney of Plaintiff’s law firm. ECF 57-2. 21 Here, Mr. Wirtz attests under penalty of perjury that 151.5 hours has been expended by four 22 attorneys and two paralegals. ECF 57-2, Wirtz Decl. He also attaches a copy of the invoice detailing 23 how the hours were expended. Id., Ex. 1. Among the 151.5 hours, Attorney Rotman billed 60.7 24 hours, Attorney Underwood billed 35.8 hours, Attorney Friday billed 0.3 hours, Attorney Mellgren 25 billed 8.4 hours, Paralegal Evans billed 40.7 hours, and Paralegal Vitanatchi billed 5.6 hours. See 26 id. Among the 151.5 hours, 29.1 hours were billed for internal communication for which Plaintiff 27 does not seek payment. See id. at Ex. 9; ECF 57 at 1 (“There is no charge for the time Plaintiff’s 1 communications, Attorney Rotman billed 13.2 hours, Attorney Underwood billed 6.3 hours, 2 Attorney Mellgren billed 0.9 hours, Paralegal Evans billed 7.7 hours, and Paralegal Vitanatchi billed 3 1.0 hour. See ECF 57-2, Wirtz Decl., Ex. 1 at 25, Ex. 9. Thus, Plaintiff is seeking fees for 122.4 4 hours expended by her attorneys and paralegals. Among the 122.4 hours sought, Attorney Rotman 5 billed 47.5 hours, Attorney Underwood billed 29.5 hours, Attorney Friday billed 0.3 hours, Attorney 6 Mellgren billed 7.5 hours, Paralegal Evans billed 33.0 hours, and Paralegal Vitanatchi billed 4.6 7 hours. See ECF 57-2 Wirtz Decl., Ex. 1 at 25. 8 The Court finds that Plaintiff has met her initial burden of demonstrating that the fees for 9 122.4 hours expended by the attorneys and paralegals in this case are presumably reasonable. See 10 Serrano v. Unruh, 32 Cal. 3d 621, 631 (1982). Defendant contends that the number of hours billed 11 by Plaintiff’s attorneys is unreasonable for several reasons. The Court will address each of 12 Defendant’s arguments in turn. 13 First, Defendant argues that 32.5 hours billed for client communication is excessive because 14 Plaintiff failed to explain how those hours furthered the litigation. ECF 60. In response, Plaintiff’s 15 attorney explains that those hours were needed to fulfill the duty of communication with Plaintiff 16 who “was an unsophisticated litigant.” ECF 61 at 2. Defendant only identified 3.4 hours billed by 17 Paralegal Evans to update Plaintiff after settlement was reached as unreasonable. See id. 18 Additionally, the Court notes that senior attorneys Rotman and Underwood each billed nearly 30% 19 of their time for client communication. See ECF 61-2, Wirtz Decl., Ex. 10 (stating Attorney Rotman 20 billed 14.5 hours and Attorney Underwood billed 10.9 hours, respectively, for client 21 communication). “Work entries are inadequately vague when the district court is unable to discern 22 how the time spent is attributable to the case at hand.” Center for Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. C-08- 23 00484 JSW, 2011 WL 6259891, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2011); see Kries v. City of San Diego, No. 24 17-cv-1464-GPC-BGS, 2021 WL 120830, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Jan 13, 2021) (“Although attorneys owe 25 a duty to their clients to effectively communicate . . . the Court’s mandate is to determine whether 26 the hours were reasonably expended, not whether the time spent was in line with each attorney’s 27 regular practice.”). The Court finds that the client communication hours are excessive in the context 1 recoverable hours by 1.4 hours for Paralegal Evans and by 20% for Attorneys Rotman and 2 Underwood (-2.9 hours for Attorney Rotman and -2.2 hours for Attorney Underwood). 3 Second, Defendant argues that 4.6 hours billed for research is excessive because the research 4 appears to be factual in nature and should be conducted by a paralegal instead of Attorney Rotman, 5 who is Plaintiff’s lead trial attorney. ECF 60 (citing ECF 57-2, Wirtz Decl., Ex. 11). Plaintiff 6 contends that the hours were reasonably billed by Attorney Rotman to investigate the facts when 7 drafting the complaint and to enforce Rule 68 offer when Defendant failed to perform its duty. ECF 8 61. The Court finds that all the individual entries are reasonable for investigating facts for the 9 complaint and for conducting legal research. ECF 57-2, Wirtz Decl., Ex. 11. Thus, the Court finds 10 those hours were reasonably expended and shall be awarded in full. 11 Third, Defendant challenges that 4 hours billed between June and October 2021, which was 12 before the case’s commencement in February 2022, is erroneous because Plaintiff declared that fees 13 from the prior state court proceeding were removed. ECF 60 (citing ECF 57-2, Wirtz Decl., Ex. 11). 14 Plaintiff explains that the hours were billed for engagement and for drafting the complaint that was 15 ultimately filed in this case. ECF 61. The Court finds that, while the challenged entries do not specify 16 if the hours were billed for drafting complaint for the prior state court proceeding or for this case, 17 Defendant failed to meet its burden to prove that those entries were not for time spent on this case. 18 ECF 57-2, Wirtz Decl., Ex. 12 at 1. Thus, the Court finds those hours were reasonably expended 19 and shall be awarded in full. 20 Fourth, Defendant argues that 2 hours billed by Paralegal Evans to draft the cover sheet and 21 summons and to file the complaint is excessive. ECF 60 (citing ECF 57-2, Wirtz Decl., Ex. 12). It 22 is unclear which 2 hours in the invoice Defendant is referring to. Paralegal Evans billed 23 approximately 0.9 hours on February 16, 2022 to draft, review, revise and file summons, civil cover 24 sheet and the complaint. ECF 57-2, Wirtz Decl., Ex. 12. Because Defendant has failed to “point to 25 the specific items challenged,” it has failed to satisfy its burden of showing that the contested 2 26 hours are excessive. Premier Med., 163 Cal. App. 4th at 564 (“In challenging attorney fees as 27 excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to 1 Thus, the Court finds those hours were reasonably expended and shall be awarded in full. 2 Fifth, Defendant argues that hours billed to prepare repair orders should have been 3 performed by a paralegal in lieu of Attorney Rotman. ECF 60 (citing ECF 57-2, Wirtz Decl., Ex. 4 13). Plaintiff argues that the repair order task was billed by Paralegal Evans while Attorney Rotman 5 billed time for drafting and editing the damages chart used in settlement. ECF 61. The Court agrees 6 with Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s invoice states that attorney Rotman billed time to “draft, review, and revise 7 damage spreadsheet” as opposed to Plaintiff’s alleged preparing repair order. ECF 57-2, Wirtz Decl., 8 Ex. 13. Indeed, the sole entry on preparing repair order was billed by Paralegal Evans. Id. Thus, the 9 Court finds those hours were reasonably expended and shall be awarded in full. 10 Sixth, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s bill includes tasks, such as “filing documents, filling 11 out forms, and other routine office/clerical work,” that are “generally not recoverable in a motion 12 for attorney’s fees.’” ECF 60 (citing Messih v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 21-cv-03032-WHO, 13 2023 WL 137466, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2023)). Courts have found that “purely clerical tasks,” 14 such as filing and serving documents and calendaring, “are not recoverable as attorneys’ fees 15 regardless of the nature of the case or who is performing them.” See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project 16 v. Kelly, No. 2:17-cv-01761-JLS-(AFMX), 2017 WL 3263870, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2017); see 17 also Messih, 2023 WL 137466, at * 3 (eliminating billed time for clerical work including 18 downloading, preparing, and/or e-filing documents). But Defendant did not specify the entries it 19 was referring to, thus leaving the Court to rummage through the timesheets to locate clerical tasks. 20 On this basis, the Court finds the Defendant has failed to meet its burden to specify the “items 21 challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.” Premier Med., 163 Cal. App. 22 4th at 564. Thus, the Court finds those hours were reasonably expended and shall be awarded in 23 full. 24 Finally, Defendant argues that nine hours expended on drafting and arguing Plaintiff’s 25 attorneys’ fee motion is unreasonable. ECF 60. The Court disagrees with Defendant because 26 California Supreme Court frequently awards time expended for the attorneys’ fee motion. See, e.g., 27 Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of Calif. Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 785, 817 (2006) (awarding 1 attorneys in obtaining a reasonable fee is justifiably included in the attorneys’ fee application, and 2 in the court’s fee award.”). Thus, the Court finds the hours expended preparing for and drafting this 3 Motion were reasonable and shall be awarded in full. However, because this Motion was submitted 4 without oral argument and the hearing for this Motion was vacated, the Court disallows the 1 hour 5 entry for “Motion for Attorney’s Fees: Attend Hearing on Motion for Attorney’s Fees [Anticipated]” 6 to be billed by Attorney Rotman for the anticipated hearing. ECF 62; ECF 57-2, Wirtz Decl., Ex. 1 7 at 24; ECF 61-1, Wirtz Decl., Ex. 1 at 25. 8 The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s billing records at issue and concludes that, for the most 9 part, the time billed was reasonably incurred in the prosecution of this case. But the Court finds that 10 the 0.3 hours requested for Attorney Friday to “[take] a non-appearance record” are not reasonable. 11 Mr. Friday’s 18 minutes could not possibly have added value to the case. See Alnor, 165 Cal. App. 12 4th at 1320; ECF 57 at 3. Thus, the Court will disallow the 0.3 hours requested by Plaintiff for 13 Attorney Friday. 14 For the above reasons, the Court will include in the lodestar calculation of an attorneys’ fee 15 award the following hours: 16 Time Keeper Hours Requested Hours Awarded 17 Attorney Rotman 47.5 43.6 18 Attorney Underwood 29.5 27.3 19 Attorney Mellgren 7.5 7.5 20 Attorney Friday 0.3 0 21 Paralegal Evans 33.0 31.6 22 Paralegal Vitanatchi 4.6 4.6 23 24 2. Reasonableness of the Hourly Rates to be Applied 25 In awarding the attorneys’ fees under the Song-Beverly Act, the fee applicant is required to 26 “produc[e] satisfactory evidence that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the 27 community for similar services of lawyers of reasonably comparable skill and reputation.” Base v. 1 Plaintiff seeks the following rates for the various lawyers and paralegals involved in this case: 2 Attorneys/Paralegals Requested Hourly Rates 3 Attorney Rotman $550.00 4 Attorney Underwood $550.00 5 Attorney Mellgren $450.00 6 Attorney Friday $400.00 7 Paralegal Evans $300.00 8 Paralegal Vitanatchi $250.00 9 See ECF 57-2, Wirtz Decl., Ex. 1 at 25. In his declaration, Mr. Wirtz describes the experience level 10 and educational background of each of the attorneys and paralegals who worked on this matter. See 11 ECF 57-2, Wirtz Decl. at 5-7. Attorney Rotman has been licensed in California since 2012, has 12 worked on hundreds of Lemon Law cases, and has been second-chair in over twenty-six trials. See 13 id. at 5. Attorney Underwood has been licensed in California since 2015, has workd on hundreds of 14 Lemon Law cases, and has been second-chair in nine Lemon Law jury trials. See id. at 5-6. Attorney 15 Friday earned his Juris Doctor in 2020 and has worked in the legal field since 2019. See id. at 6. 16 Attorney Mellgren earned her Juris Doctor in 2022 and has worked as a legal intern and as a judicial 17 clerk. See id. Paralegal Evans completed the ABA-Approved Paralegal Program in 2015 and has 18 several years of experience in civil litigation. See id. at 7. Paralegal Vitanatchi completed her 19 paralegal certificate in December 2022 and has worked as a paralegal since then. See id. 20 Mr. Wirtz declares that the billing rates of the attorneys and paralegals who worked on this 21 case are “commensurate with the hourly rates charged by other attorneys with comparable 22 experience in consumer rights law” as reported in the United States Consumer Law Attorney Fee 23 Survey Report and have been approved by a number of courts in California. ECF 57-2, Wirtz Decl. 24 at ¶ ¶23-26; Ex. 2-4. Defendant did not challenge the hourly rates requested by Plaintiff. See ECF 25 60; ECF 61 at 4. Absent evidence to the contrary and based on the Court’s experience in considering 26 fee awards, the Court concludes that the hourly rates requested by Plaintiff are reasonable as those 27 rates are repeatedly found reasonable by other courts involving attorneys with similar experience 1 Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Affidavits of the plaintiffs' attorney and other attorneys 2 regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those 3 setting a rate for the plaintiffs' attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.”); 4 ECF 57-2, Wirtz Decl., Ex. 4. 5 3. Lodestar Calculation 6 “The court tabulates the attorney fee touchstone, or lodestar, by multiplying the number of 7 hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar 8 work.” Christian Rsch. Inst. v. Alnor, 165 Cal. App. 4th 1315, 1321 (2008). Based on the number 9 of hours reasonably expended and the hourly rates determined above, Plaintiff’s attorney fee 10 lodestar figures are calculated as follows: 11 Attorney/Paralegals Reasonably Expended Reasonable Hourly Lodestar Figure 12 Hours Rate 13 Attorney Rotman 43.6 $550.00 $23,980.00 14 Attorney Underwood 27.3 $550.00 $15,015.00 15 Attorney Mellgren 7.5 $450.00 $3,375.00 16 Attorney Friday 0 $400.00 0 17 Paralegal Evans 31.6 $300.00 $9,480.00 18 Paralegal Vitanatchi 4.6 $250.00 $1,150.00 19 Total: $53,000.00 20

21 4. Lodestar Multiplier 22 After calculating the lodestar figure, the court may adjust it upward or downward “by 23 applying a positive or negative ‘multiplier’ to take into account a variety of other factors.” Laffitte 24 v. Robert Half Int’l Inc., 1 Cal. 5th 480, 489 (2016). Plaintiff requests the Court to apply a multiplier 25 of 1.5 to the lodestar figure. ECF 57 at 9. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the contingent nature of 26 this case warrants the 1.5 multiplier because the attorneys are not paid at all if they lost the case and 27 there is a delay in payment even if they won. Id. Defendant contends that the lodestar multiplier is 1 not appropriate because the Plaintiff made her request based solely on the fact that counsel took the 2 case on a contingency basis. ECF 60 at 6. 3 The Court agrees with the Defendant. First, Plaintiff’s attorneys specialize in the Song- 4 Beverly Act cases, and there were no novel or particularly difficult questions involved in this case. 5 This was a straightforward case with little discovery and only two substantive motions (to dismiss 6 and to compel deposition) that were resolved without oral argument. See ECF 18; ECF 40. Indeed, 7 as Plaintiff’s attorneys admitted, due to their years of experience with lemon law cases, “a 8 substantial amount of time was saved by not needing to draft each document from scratch and little 9 time was needed to ‘get up to speed.’” ECF 57-2, Wirtz Decl. at ¶9. Second, nothing in the record 10 shows that this case precluded Plaintiff’s attorneys from taking on other work. See Messih, 2023 11 WL 137466, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2023) (rejecting lodestar multiplier request from Plaintiff’s 12 attorneys’ law firm because “[t]here is no indication that the nature of [Song-Beverly Consumer 13 Warranty Act cases] precluded other employment by counsel.”). Third, the contingent nature of this 14 case does not weigh in favor of an upward multiplier because this factor alone is not a proper 15 justification for an upward adjustment under California law. See Glaviano v. Sacramento City 16 Unified Sch. Dist., 22 Cal. App. 5th 744, 757 (“Although the attorney’s fee agreement is relevant 17 and may be considered, the agreement does not compel any particular award.”); see also, e.g., 18 Messih, 2023 WL 137466, at *3 (rejecting lodestar multiplier based solely on contingency because 19 “[t]he hourly rate compensates for the contingent risk of the litigation.”); Covarrubias v. Ford Motor 20 Co., No. 19-cv-01832-EMC, 2021 WL 3514095, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2021) (rejecting lodestar 21 multiplier based solely on contingency because the Plaintiff’s attorney’s own description of the facts 22 suggests the Plaintiff had a strong case). The Court is satisfied that the generous staffing of the case 23 and significant number of hours billed by senior attorneys amply compensates Plaintiff’s counsel 24 for the low degree of risk taken on. Thus, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request for a multiplier. 25 B. Costs and Expenses 26 Section 1794(d) allows the prevailing party to recover both “costs” and “expenses” including 27 those “reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of 1 seeks to recover $11,393.55 in costs and expenses related to generating expert report and processing 2 of Plaintiff's case. ECF 57, Ex. 32. Defendant did not object these costs and expenses. See ECF 60; 3 ECF 61 at 5. The Court finds such costs and expenses to be reasonably incurred. See Heffington v. 4 || FCA US LLC, No. 2:17-cv-00317-DAD-JLT, 2020 WL 5017610, at *11-12 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 5 2020) (finding fees reasonably incurred in a case brought under the Song-Beverly Act). 6 || Accordingly, Plaintiff's request for $11,393.55 in costs will be awarded in full. 7 || IV. ORDER 8 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 9 (1) Plaintiff's motion for attorney’s fees and costs is GRANTED IN PART as follows: 10 Plaintiff SHALL recovery attorneys’ fees in the amount of $53,000.00 and costs in the 11 amount of $11,393.55, for a total award of $64,393.55. 12 (2) This order terminates ECF 57.

14 Dated: September 20, 2024

2 ETH LABSON FREEMAN 16 United States District Judge

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