White v. Drug Enforcement Administration

626 F. App'x 493
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 25, 2015
Docket14-60832
StatusUnpublished

This text of 626 F. App'x 493 (White v. Drug Enforcement Administration) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
White v. Drug Enforcement Administration, 626 F. App'x 493 (5th Cir. 2015).

Opinion

PER CURIAM: *

Dr. Michael White petitions for review of a Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) decision to revoke his certificate of registration authorizing him to dispense controlled substances in his medical practice. We DENY the petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In November 2011, the Mississippi State Board of Medical Licensure (the “Medical Board”) instituted disciplinary proceedings against petitioner Dr. Michael White. The Medical Board acted after a DEA investigation exposed misconduct related to White’s medical weight-loss practice. Evidence from the investigation revealed, among other things, that White prescribed phentermine, a schedule IV controlled substance, to multiple patients without performing a thorough physical examination, documenting properly their medical history, and verifying that they had made efforts to lose weight without the aid of controlled substances. Several of the patients were not obese or overweight when *495 White authorized use of phentermine; some gained weight during treatment, but White never discontinued their use.

The Medical Board decided that White failed to comply with its rules and regulations as well as applicable state statutes governing the prescription and dispensing of the medication. It imposed a stayed six-month suspension of “White’s medical license in January 2012. 1 Additionally, the Medical Board permanently barred him from practicing or prescribing controlled substances in the area of weight loss. The Medical Board also required White to attend continuing medical education courses. He failed to timely complete the courses, which prompted a second hearing before the Medical Board.

In March 2012, following the Medical Board’s decision, White voluntarily surrendered his DEA certificate of registration. Several days later, he applied for a new certificate. The DEA Deputy Assistant Administrator issued an order to show cause why White’s application should not be denied because registration would be inconsistent with the public interest under 21 U.S.C. §§ 823(f) and 824(a)(4). White was granted a hearing. The DEA called three witnesses including an investigator who participated in the investigation of White’s practice, the executive director of the Medical Board, and a medical expert in weight loss and bariatrics. White also testified. Documents were introduced into evidence.

The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found, among other deficiencies, that White failed to conduct an examination or document the medical history of the patients to whom he prescribed phentermine. Thus, he had not established a bona fide doctor-patient relationship with them, and had thereby violated multiple statutes and regulations. The ALJ also said that White failed to submit mitigating evidence showing he could be trusted with a new certificate. Although at the hearing White admitted he engaged in some misconduct, the ALJ found he denied that his underlying actions were improper, blamed subordinates, criticized applicable laws and regulations, was angry at the Medical Board for disciplining him, and attributed the initial investigation to being unfairly targeted by the DEA.

In the final agency decision on White’s application, the DEA Deputy Administrator adopted the ALJ’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation, explaining that there was “more than ample evidence to support the conclusion that [White] poses a potential danger to the public.” White petitions for review of the decision.

DISCUSSION

In reviewing the denial of an application, deference is given to the Deputy Administrator’s exercise of discretion. See Noell v. Bensinger, 586 F.2d 554, 558 (5th Cir.1978). An agency decision will only be set aside if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an ábuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law.” See Williams v. Admin. Review Bd., 376 F.3d 471, 475 (5th Cir.2004) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Factual findings are sustained if they are supported by substantial evidence, which is “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Id. at 476.

The Controlled Substances Act created a “regulatory system making it unlawful to ... dispense ... any controlled substance” unless authorized by the statute. Gon *496 zales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 13, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 162 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005). Persons in the lawful distribution chain must be registered with the DEA pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 823. In carrying out its responsibilities related to registration, the DEA Deputy Administrator may deny a practitioner’s application for a certificate if issuing it would be inconsistent with the public interest. Id. § 824(a)(4). Five factors have bearing on this determination: (1) the recommendation of a state licensing board; (2) “[t]he applicant’s experience in dispensing, or conducting research with respect to controlled substances”; (3) the applicant’s criminal history related to controlled substances; (4) the applicant’s compliance with state, federal, and local laws related to controlled substances; and (5) “other conduct which may threaten the public health and safety.” Id. § 823(f).

Where the government has established a prima facie case that the public interest would be harmed in issuing a certificate, the DEA requires an applicant to submit “mitigating evidence to assure the Administrator that [he] can be entrusted with the responsibilities]” that accompany registration. See Med. Shoppe —Jonesborough, 73 Fed.Reg. 364, 387 (Drug Enft Admin. Jan. 2, 2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Such evidence includes acceptance of responsibility and a demonstration that the applicant “will not engage in future misconduct.” Id.; see also, e.g., Hoxie v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 419 F.3d 477, 482-83 (6th Cir.2005); MacKay v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 664 F.3d 808, 820-21 (10th Cir.2011) (finding that an applicant’s self-reproach may indicate whether he will transgress again, a “consideration ... vital to whether ... registration is in the public interest”).

White’s only argument now is that the Deputy Administrator erred in determining that White failed to accept responsibility for his actions.

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626 F. App'x 493, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/white-v-drug-enforcement-administration-ca5-2015.