UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
GWENDOLYN WHITE,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 24-cv-0769 (DLF)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Gwendolyn White brings this action to recover attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in
administrative proceedings against the District of Columbia Public Schools under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Before the Court is White’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees,
Dkt. 8. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the motion in part.
I. BACKGROUND
White initiated and prevailed in the administrative process on behalf of her son. Compl.
¶ 5, Dkt. 1. She now seeks attorneys’ fees and costs, Pl.’s Mot. at 2, and post-judgment interest,
Pl.’s Mot. at 20.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under the IDEA, “the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees . . . to
a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I).
An attorney may “recover for work when there is ‘a clear showing that the time was expended in
pursuit of a successful resolution of the case in which fees are being claimed.’” Baylor v. Mitchell
Rubenstein & Assocs., P.C., 735 F. App’x 733, 736 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (quoting Nat’l
Ass’n of Concerned Veterans v. Sec’y of Def., 675 F.2d 1319, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam)). In evaluating a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs, a court must determine (1) whether the party
seeking the fees is a “prevailing party” entitled to fees; and (2) what fees are “reasonable” in terms
of the hours expended and the hourly rate claimed. See Robinson v. District of Columbia, 61
F. Supp. 3d 54, 58 (D.D.C. 2014).
The party requesting fees bears the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness both of the
hourly rate sought and of the hours expended. See Dobbins v. District of Columbia, No. 16-cv-
01789 (DAR), 2017 WL 4417591, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2017); Wood v. District of Columbia,
72 F. Supp. 3d 13, 18 (D.D.C. 2014). A party may satisfy the latter burden “by submitting an
invoice that is sufficiently detailed to permit the District Court to make an independent
determination whether or not the hours claimed are justified.” Wood, 72 F Supp. 3d at 18. If a
party satisfies this burden, the number of hours billed is presumed reasonable, and “the burden
then shifts to the [opposing party] to rebut this presumption.” Dobbins, 2017 WL 4417591, at *3
(citation modified). The district court retains discretion to reduce awards of attorneys’ fees if “the
time spent and legal services furnished were excessive considering the nature of the action or
proceeding.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(F)(iii).
III. ANALYSIS
The District does not dispute that White is a prevailing party entitled to attorneys’ fees
under the IDEA. Def.’s Opp’n at 2 n.1. Instead, the District contests (1) particular time entries
and the cost of White’s expert; (2) the reasonableness of the requested rate; and (3) White’s request
for post-judgement interest. See id. at 3, 6–7, 20.
A. Number of Hours Reasonably Expended
As an initial matter, the Court finds that White has satisfied her burden of demonstrating
the reasonableness of the number of hours expended in this litigation. White’s counsel has
2 provided a detailed invoice describing the nature of and hours dedicated to the billed tasks. See
Invoice, Dkt. 8-1. Counsel also attests that they have maintained accurate and contemporaneous
records of time billed and have exercised sound billing judgment by not billing for time that were
not “reasonable charges in the litigation of this case.” See Ostrem Decl. ¶ 6, Dkt. 8-4; see also
Tyrka Decl. ¶ 7, Dkt. 8-5. The Court has reviewed the invoice and Mr. Ostrem’s and Mr. Tyrka’s
declarations and finds White’s counsel’s billing practices adequate and the time devoted to each
task presumptively reasonable. Accordingly, the District bears the burden of rebutting this
presumption. It presents four grounds for reducing White’s counsel’s hours.
First, the District claims that White’s counsel billed time relating to a non-compensable
resolution session. See Def.’s Opp’n at 4; Pl.’s Ex. 1 at 3–5 (time entries dated Jan. 22, 27, 29,
2021 and Feb. 2, 24, 26, 2021); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B); § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii)–(iii).
White disputes whether a resolution session took place. See Pl.’s Reply at 2–3, Dkt. 12.
As she explains, a resolution session requires the presence of the parents, the “relevant member or
members of the IEP Team who have specific knowledge” of the case, and “a representative of the
agency who has decisionmaking authority.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B); § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii)–(iii).
And if the plaintiff presents “specific, undisputed record evidence” that the required parties are not
present, then the “plaintiff should not have these hours removed from their fee award.” Reed v.
District of Columbia, 843 F.3d 517, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
But the evidence White presented is disputed and far from clear. The Hearing Officer
noted that a resolution meeting was held on February 26, 2021. Hearing Officer Determination at
1–2, Dkt. 8-3. In addition, White’s counsel concedes that one of the District’s attendees “was a
potential member of the student’s IEP team.” Ostrem Supp. Decl. ¶ 6, Dkt. 12-3. And although
“DCPS made no offer of any kind to resolve the case,” White’s counsel provides no specific details
3 to suggest that the administrator present lacked decision-making authority. Id. ¶ 7. In sum,
although the resolution session was unsuccessful, it appears that all parties viewed it as a resolution
session, and the District complied with the statutory requirements by sending two representatives.
Because the February 26, 2021, meeting appears to be a resolution session under the IDEA, the
Court will deduct the 1.9 hours that plaintiff’s counsel expended in attempting to schedule such a
meeting. See Pl.’s Ex. 1 at 3–5 (time entries dated Jan. 22, 27, 29, 2021 and Feb. 2, 24, 26, 2021).
Second, the District argues that White’s counsel spent an excessive 10.6 hours preparing a
motion for summary judgment. Def.’s Opp’n at 4. In support of this proposition, the defendant
cites to Merrick v. District of Columbia, 134 F. Supp. 3d 328, 336 (D.D.C. 2015) and Martini v.
Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, 977 F. Supp. 482, 488 (D.D.C. 1997). In Merrick, the district court found
that counsel’s 24.8 hours of work on five motions to amend filings and other motions to continue
and to expedite were unnecessary. 134 F. Supp. 3d at 337. In addition to noting that those motions
were unsuccessful, the court further found that counsel’s descriptions were “too vague” to justify
otherwise unnecessary motions. Id. In Martini, in contrast, the court allowed counsel to recover
for time spent on a motion to compel because, although it was ultimately unsuccessful, “it was a
motion which had to be litigated by plaintiff” and the issues “were neither clear nor well settled.”
977 F. Supp. 482 at 488.
This case is more like Martini than Merrick. Ostrem attests that the time spent on the
summary judgment motion “significantly reduced the time” spent to prepare for the hearing, and
the hearing officer based his ultimate findings “on almost exactly the same evidence and
testimony” in the motion. Ostrem Supp. Decl. ¶¶ 9–10. Thus, by filing the motion, counsel was
“fully effective in protecting [his] client’s interest.” Martini, 977 F. Supp. at 488. The 10.6 hours
were therefore reasonable.
4 Third, the District takes issue with 16.6 hours billed after the issuance of the Hearing
Officer’s Determination. Pl.’s Opp’n at 5. In response, White concedes that 11.6 of those hours
are better billed to another case. Pl.’s Reply at 7–8.
The remaining entries on May 24, 2022, and June 17, 2022, note work directly related to
the Hearing Officer’s order. In particular, Ostrem attests that he reviewed education records in
order to assess the suitability of the IEP and compensatory education plan that the hearing officer
ordered. Ostrem Supp. Decl. ¶ 11; see Hearing Officer Determination at 13. The District concedes
that work performed after the decision may be reimbursable. Opp’n at 5 (citing McClam v. District
of Columbia, 808 F. Supp. 2d 184, 190 (D.D.C. 2011)). Because the remaining 5 hours are closely
connected to the hearing officer’s order, they were properly included.
Fourth, regarding expert fees, the IDEA itself does not support the recovery of expert fees,
but “under District of Columbia [l]aw, a Court ‘may award reasonable expert witness fees as part
of the costs to a prevailing party,’ in IDEA cases.” Wright ex rel J.J. v. District of Columbia, No.
18-cv-2818 (ABJ), 2019 WL 4737699, at *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2019). The prevailing party bears
the burden of establishing the reasonableness of experts’ rates. Id. A party may meet this burden
by providing documentation that the claimed rates “are based on the rates prevailing in the
community for other experts providing similar services in similar cases.” Id. at *7 (citation
modified). Ostrem stated that the expert fees were “comfortably within market in this
jurisdiction.” Ostrem Decl. ¶ 9. White also submitted a declaration from the expert, establishing
that her $150 per hour rate was standard for her work and in the industry. Dr. Nelson Decl. ¶ 4,
Dkt. 12-5. This detail sufficiently established the reasonableness of the rate. See Pryor v. District
of Columbia, 18-cv-0920 (GMH), 2018 WL 4782322, (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2018), R. & R. adopted,
18-cv-0920 (JDB), 2018 WL 4778928 (D.D.C. Oct. 3, 2018).
5 B. Reasonable Hourly Rate
The District also challenges White’s counsel’s use of Laffey rates and her application of
current rather than historic rates. See Def.’s Opp’n at 6–20. Consistent with this Court’s
precedent, 1 the Court will apply the Fitzpatrick, rather than Laffey matrix because it “offers a
superior measure of the prevailing market rate for complex federal litigation.” J.T. v. District of
Columbia, 652 F. Supp. 3d at 31–36.
The plaintiff bears the initial burden of “justifying the reasonableness of the rates.”
Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Courts consider (1) “the
attorney’s billing practices”; (2) “the attorney’s skill, experience, and reputation”; and (3) “the
prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” Eley v. District of Columbia, 793 F.3d 97,
100 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citation modified). The District only disputes the third prong.
To accomplish the “inherently difficult” task of establishing the prevailing market rate, id.
(citation modified), White must “produce satisfactory evidence—in addition to her attorney’s own
affidavits—that her requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar
services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation,” James v. District
of Columbia, 302 F. Supp. 3d 213, 219 (quoting Eley, 793 F.3d at 104). Plaintiffs have two paths:
(1) A “litigant can show that IDEA litigation fall[s] within the bounds of complex federal
litigation,” meaning the Fitzpatrick matrix presumptively applies, id. (citation modified); or (2) “a
fee applicant can establish the prevailing market rate by providing evidence of the fees charged,
1 Many judges in this district have applied the Fitzpatrick matrix in both IDEA and other cases, even when the plaintiffs ask for the Laffey matrix. See, e.g., Louise Trauma Ctr. LLC v. DHS, No. 20-cv-1128 (TNM), 2023 WL 3478479, at *4 (D.D.C. May 16, 2023); J.T. v. District of Columbia, 652 F. Supp. 3d 11, 31 (D.D.C. 2023); Rawlings, 2025 WL 1432278, at *6 n.1; Brackett v. Mayorkas, No. 17-cv-0988 (JEB), 2023 WL 5094872, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 2023); Alavi v. Bennett, No. 15-cv-2146 (RBW), 2024 WL 5056204, at *13 (D.D.C. Dec. 10, 2024).
6 and received, by IDEA litigators,” id. (citation modified). White pursues, and the District opposes,
both options.
The D.C. Circuit has recognized that some IDEA cases are not entitled to full matrix rates.
D.L. v. District of Columbia, 924 F.3d 585, 594 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (noting that IDEA cases may
“fall within a submarket characterized by below-Laffey rates.”) (citation modified). In particular,
if “individual IDEA plaintiffs litigat[e] non-complex cases primarily before an administrative
body,” courts have declined to apply full matrix rates. Id. White has failed to establish that this
case is complex. Harrell ex rel. J.W. v. District of Columbia, No. 24-cv-3611 (ZMF), 2024 WL
3640033, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2024).
To support her contention that IDEA litigation is complex, White points to six affidavits.
All six are functionally identical and insufficient for the same reasons. The affidavits present two
main arguments. First, they assert that IDEA cases require “specialized non-legal knowledge.”
Tyrka Decl. ¶ 19, Dkt. 8-5; Savit Decl. ¶ 7, Dkt. 8-9; Hecht Decl. ¶ 5, Dkt. 8-10; Moran Decl. ¶ 6,
Dkt. 8-11; Mendoza Decl. ¶ 4, Dkt. 8-12; Hill Decl. ¶ 5, Dkt. 8-13. Second, they assert that such
cases allow for “limited discovery and pretrial exchange.” Tyrka Decl. ¶ 21; Savit Decl. ¶ 8; Hecht
Decl. ¶ 6; Moran Decl. ¶ 7; Mendoza Decl. ¶ 5; Hill Decl. ¶ 6. But many fields require specialized
knowledge without being rendered inherently complex. Reed, 843 F.3d at 525. And limited
discovery actually “may suggest that IDEA cases are not as complex as cases in which discovery
is extensive.” Id. In sum, these are “conclusory” claims routinely advanced in IDEA cases without
sufficient “explanation.” Id.; accord Rawlings v. District of Columbia, No. 25-cv-2122 (SLS),
2025 WL 1432278, at *7 (D.D.C. May 19, 2025).
White also points to two circumstances where non-IDEA lawyers litigated IDEA cases,
billing more than three times what White’s attorneys billed. Mot. for Fees at 14–15. But this
7 illustration merely reframes the previous argument the Court has already rejected—specialized
non-legal knowledge is insufficient to render a case complex. That non-IDEA lawyers required
additional time to compensate for their limited specialized knowledge is unsurprising. But it does
not render IDEA cases categorically complex.
Because White has not established that IDEA litigation is categorically complex, she must
demonstrate the prevailing rate based on rates other IDEA litigators in the community
received. Reed, 843 F.3d at 521. White first presents affidavits from her own attorneys. These
alone are insufficient because she must “produce satisfactory evidence in addition to the attorney’s
own affidavits.” Eley, 793 F.3d at 104 (citation modified). Moreover, neither affidavit is
persuasive. Ostrem attests that his firm always “matched its hourly rates” to the LSI Laffey matrix.
Ostrem Decl. ¶ 7. But he does not attest what rates he received in IDEA cases. See Nat'l Ass'n of
Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1326. Indeed, his declaration undermines his proposed matrix
because it states that he has settled for 100% of the USAO Laffey matrix. Ostrem Decl. ¶ 8.
Although “the amount of fees that the District agrees to pay an attorney as part of a bulk settlement
is not determined by market forces,” Rooths v. District of Columbia, 802 F. Supp. 2d 56, 62
(D.D.C. 2011), this variation serves to undermine Ostrem’s assertion regarding the prevailing rate.
Tyrka’s declaration similarly attests to charging the LSI Laffey matrix but, apart from one instance
in 2021, settling with the District at the USAO matrix. Tyrka Decl. ¶ 8–13. Although Tyrka’s
statement that “several clients pay the firm at the LSI Laffey matrix” fairs slightly better than
Ostrem, id. ¶ 9, information about a few “fortunate case[s]” does not adequately document what
an attorney “actually billed,” Nat’l Ass’n of Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1326.
White also recycles five affidavits submitted by attorneys in two 2016 and 2017 fees cases.
Pl.’s Ex. 6, Dkt. 8-6; Mot. for Fees at 8. But those affidavits encounter the same difficulties already
8 identified. Although they set their rates according to either the LSI or USAO Laffey matrix, only
two even attest that they ever received those rates. Hecht 2016 Decl. ¶ 44; Tyrka 2017 Decl. ¶ 4.
And neither provides any indication as to how many clients paid those rates, how recently they
were paid, or whether those clients are representative of broader patterns. Because the affidavits
fail to “recit[e] the precise fees that attorneys with similar qualifications have received from fee-
paying clients in comparable cases,” Eley, 793 F.3d at 101, White cannot justify her assertion that
the LSI Laffey matrix is the prevailing rate for IDEA cases. Accord Joaquin v. Friendship Pub.
Charter Sch., 188 F. Supp. 3d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2016).
What remains is three cases where courts in this district granted full Laffey rates. Mot. for
Fees at 10–11. But two of those cases did not discuss complexity at all. See U.F. v. District of
Columbia, No. 19-cv-2164 (BAH), 2020 WL 4673418, at *4 n.3 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2020); B.J. v.
District of Columbia, No. 19-cv-2163 (ZMF), 2020 WL 8512639, at *3 n.2 (D.D.C. Nov. 9, 2020).
And the District points to a number of more recent cases applying lower-than Fitzpatrick matrix
rates. See, e.g., Harrell, 2024 WL 3640033, at *4; Bond ex rel. K.M. v. Friendship Pub. Charter
Sch. Bd. of Trs., No. 23-cv-0367 (ZMF), 2023 WL 8710370, at *5 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 2023); see
also James v. District of Columbia, 302 F. Supp. 3d 213, 229 (D.D.C. 2018); Joaquin, 188
F. Supp. 3d at 20; Rawlings, 2025 WL 1432278, at *8 (“The Court thus joins scores of other courts
in this District in applying 75% of the rates in the matrix.”) (collecting cases).
Finally, White argues that the Laffey matrix is a reasonable rate because anything lower
would be insufficient to “induce a capable attorney to undertake the representation.” Perdue v.
Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 552 (2010). White offers declarations from attorneys who state they have
had to turn away viable IDEA parents. See, e.g., Ostrem Decl. ¶ 13; Savit Decl. ¶ 13; Hecht Decl.
¶¶ 9, 12; Mendoza Decl. ¶ 12; Hill Decl. ¶ 10. But most of the problems these attorneys point to
9 relate to the District’s delay in payment, refusal to negotiate fees, and personal reasons such as the
unpleasant nature and inconsistency of fee litigation. See, e.g., Ostrem Decl. ¶ 14; Tyrka Decl.
¶ 28–32; Savit Decl. ¶ 13; Hecht Decl. ¶ 13; Moran Decl. ¶ 13; Mendoza Decl. ¶ 12; Hill Decl.
¶ 13. In addition, one attorney attests he continues to take IDEA work and accept 75% of the
matrix, undermining White’s assertion. See Hill Decl. ¶ 14. White therefore has not met her
burden of demonstrating competent counsel would be discouraged from IDEA litigation.
Because White fails to prove the reasonability of the full matrix rate, the Court will follow
precedent and apply 75% of the Fitzpatrick matrix rate. See Harrell, 2024 WL 3640033, at *5;
Bond, 2023 WL 8710370, at *6 (“An IDEA case that is not particularly complex provides no
reason to depart from the majority of IDEA cases that have found 75% of applicable rates to be
reasonable.”) (citation modified). Although the District has not engaged in dilatory tactics, the
Court will apply the current Fitzpatrick rate since over four years have passed since Ostrem’s
representation began. See Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei, 491 U.S. 274, 282 (1989); McNeil v.
District of Columbia, 342 F. Supp. 3d 156, 162 (D.D.C. 2018); West v. Potter, 717 F.3d 1030,
1034 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
C. Post-Judgment Interest
White requests an award of post-judgment interest in the event that payment from the
District is untimely. See Pls.’ Mot. at 20. The plaintiffs contend that such an award is necessary
given “the District’s long history of ignoring the timelines in orders for payment of IDEA
attorneys’ fees.” Id.; see Ostrem Decl. ¶ 9 (noting the District’s failure to timely reimburse for
reasonable attorneys’ fees); J.T., 652 F. Supp. 3d at 37 (noting that the District’s “poor payment
track record” justifies an award of post-judgment interest); B.J., 2020 WL 8512639, at *5
(imposing post-judgment interest based on the District’s “consistent failures to timely pay
10 judgments”) (collecting cases). Given DCPS’s history of untimely payments to successful IDEA
litigants, Cook v. District of Columbia, 115. F. Supp. 3d 98, 106–07 (D.D.C. 2015) (“[The
District’s] intransigence regarding IDEA attorney’s fees and its regular refusal to reimburse in a
timely fashion is well-documented.”), the Court finds it reasonable to award post-judgment interest
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a), see 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (permitting interest to be ordered on
“any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court . . . from the date of the entry of
the judgment”); see also Bond, 2023 WL 8710370, at *8 (finding that a poor track record is not
even “prerequisite to the award” of post-judgment interest).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees is granted in part. A
separate order consistent with this decision accompanies this memorandum opinion.
________________________ DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH United States District Judge July 22, 2025