White v. CoreLogic Rental Property Solutions, LLC

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

DAVID WHITE, Plaintiff Civil No. 3:22-cv-00072 (JBA) v. ,

June 13, 2023

CORELODGefIeCn NdaAnTtI ONAL BACKGROUND DATA, LLC,

. ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Plaintiff moves for reconsideration [Doc. # 41] of this Court’s order granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. # 39]. Plaintiff argues that when denying transfer of this case to the District of Maryland, this Court erred in failing to evaluate the possibility of transfer to another district court – in particular, the District of Delaware. (Mot. to Recon. at 2.) Although Plaintiff never requested or raised the possibility of transfer to the District of Delaware in the briefing on the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff now argues this Court was permitted to trIadn.sfer to a district even if not requested by the Plaintiff, and it improperly failed to do so. Defendant responds [Doc. # 43] that a motion for reconsideration is not a Ip.r oper Lveeghaicll Set faonr doabrtdai ning relief not previously sought. “Motions for reconsideration shall not be routinely filed and shall satisfy the strict standard applicable to such motion. Such motions will generally be denied unless the movant can point to controlling decisions or data that the Court overlooked in the initial decision or order.” D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7(c)(1). The major grounds justifying reconsideration are “an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” ., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992) (internal quotations omitted). Reconsideration “is not a vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case under new theSoerqieusa, Csoercpu.r vin. Gg BaJ rCeohreparing on the merits, or otherwise taking a ‘second bite at the apple.’” II. ., 1D5i6s cFu.3sds i1o3n6 , 144 (2d Cir. 1998). See The Court assumes familiarity with the factual background of this case. ( Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss [Doc. # 39].) Plaintiff argues that because it is “undisputed that the District of Delaware is an appropriate venue with general jurisdiction over Defendant, and the Court had authority to order a transfer there,” that this Court should have transferred the case to Delaware. (Mot. at 2-3.) Defendant argues the motion fails because Plaintiff failed to request transfer to Delaware in his opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss, and instead only requested transfer to the DistricMt ionfn Metatrey vla. Tnidm, we Whiachrn tehris Court denied. (Defs.’ Opp’n at 2-3.) Plaintiff relies on , in which the Second Circuit transferred a case on appeal even though transfer to that particMulianrn deitstterict had not been sought in the distrpircot sceourt. 997 F.2d 1023, 1026 (2d Cir. 1993). In , the plaintiff filed a Title VII action and asserted that “she filed her action in the Western District of New York after the court clerk there informed her that she could file her claim in that district,I da.nd that if venue was improper, the court would transfer her case to the proper venue.” The Second Circuit deemed it appropriate “to exercise [its] statutory and inherent authority to transfer this case to the Eastern District of Virginia in the interIde.st of justice,” noting that the appellant would be time-barred from iniMtiiantninegtt ae new action. at 1026-27. MPilnaninetttifef analogizes p troo t sheis case because he too may be time-barred. But unlike in , here Plaintiff is not , and has in fact engaged in extensive forum shopping. Mr. White re-filed this case in the District of Connecticut after originally filing in the Eastern District of Virginia, then sought transfer to Maryland, and now tries to transfer to a venue in which all parties concede jurisdiction is proper—in other words, he was well aware of the need to ensure proper jurisdiction prior to filing, and what the consequences would be if he did not choose a suitable v eUn.Su. ee. x rel. Smith v. Yale Univ. Plaintiff also points to , in which the district court treated plaintiff’s post-dismissal motion for transfer as a motion for reconsideration, because plaintiff’s case would now otherwise be time-barred and transfer was in the interests of jusStmiceit.h No. 3:02CV1205(PCD), 2006 WL 1168446, at *4 (D. Conn. Apr. 28, 2006). But unlike in , here transfer would not beB inla tkheely i nv.t eLreewsts of justice, in light of Plaintiff’s repeated forum shopping. This is reflected in , in which the plaintiff had brought suit in the Southern District of New York but unsuccessfully sought transfer to the District of Columbia. 607 F. App'x 15, 18 (2d Cir. 2015). In affirming the district court’s denial of transfer, the Second Circuit stated that given that the appellant had previously sought to litigate the case in the Eastern District of Michigan prior to bringing suit in New York, it was within the discretion of the district court to determine that allowing the appellant Itdo. bring suit in yet another jurisdiction would constitute impermissible forum shopping. Here, after seeking to litigate in Virginia, Connecticut, and Maryland, Plaintiff is seeking an unwarranted fourth bite at the jurisdictional apple. III. Conclusion For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration [Doc. # 41] is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED.

____________________________/s/________________

Janet Bond Arterton, U.S.D.J. Dated at New Haven, Connecticut this 13th day of June, 2023