White v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5

9 Henry Eldridge White, II, No. CV-23-02125-PHX-MTL

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 At issue is the denial of Plaintiff Henry Eldridge White, II’s Application for 16 Supplemental Security Income under the Social Security Act. Plaintiff filed a Complaint 17 and an opening brief with this Court seeking review for the denial of benefits. (Docs. 1, 9.) 18 Defendant, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”), 19 submitted a response brief (Doc. 11), and Plaintiff submitted a reply. (Doc. 12.) The Court 20 has reviewed the briefs and administrative record (Doc. 8, “AR”) and now affirms the 21 decision below. 23 Plaintiff filed an application for Title XVI Supplemental Security Income on August 24 13, 2021, alleging disability beginning August 1, 2021. (AR. at 16, 174.) Plaintiff’s 25 application was denied initially on October 18, 2021, (AR. at 16, 62), and upon 26 reconsideration on May 27, 2022. (AR. at 16, 69.) Plaintiff requested a hearing, held on 27 April 4, 2023 (AR. at 29), and the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) issued a decision 28 denying Plaintiff’s application. (AR. at 13.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request 1 for review, and the ALJ’s decision became final. (AR. at 1.) Following the unfavorable 2 decision, Plaintiff filed this appeal. 3 After considering the medical evidence and opinions, the ALJ determined that 4 Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 13, 2021. (AR. at 18.) 5 The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: (1) borderline 6 personality disorder/anxiety/depression; (2) diabetes mellitus; (3) hypothyroidism; and 7 (4) obesity. (AR. at 19.) The ALJ further determined that Plaintiff did not have an 8 impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled an impairment 9 listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (AR. at 20.) 10 In assessing the Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), the ALJ found that 11 Plaintiff’s symptom testimony was not entirely consistent with the evidence of record. (AR. 12 at 22.) With respect to the medical opinions, the ALJ found the conclusion that Plaintiff 13 had no severe mental or physical limitations unpersuasive because the record establishes 14 diabetes mellitus, obesity, and hypothyroidism. (AR. at 24.) Despite this, the ALJ did find 15 that these opinions “support the ultimate finding that the [Plaintiff] is not disabled.” (Id.) 16 The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform medium work except: he can 17 occasionally balance; he can understand, remember and carry out simple instructions and 18 tasks; he can perform work at a normal pace without production quotas; he should not work 19 in a setting which includes constant/regular contact with the general public, and he should 20 not perform work which includes more than infrequent handling of customer complaints. 21 (AR. at 21.) 22 Relying on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff 23 could perform the jobs of cleaner, linen room attendant, or janitor. (AR. at 25.) 24 Consequently, the ALJ determined that the Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id.) 26 The district court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the ALJ’s 27 decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court may set 28 aside the Commissioner’s determination only if it is not supported by substantial evidence 1 or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial 2 evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support 3 a conclusion considering the entire record. Id. To determine whether substantial evidence 4 supports a decision, the Court must consider the entire record and may not affirm simply 5 by isolating a “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). Generally, 6 “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which 7 supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 8 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). The substantial evidence threshold 9 “defers to the presiding ALJ, who has seen the hearing up close.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 10 U.S. 97, 108 (2019); see also Thomas v. CalPortland Co., 993 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 11 2021) (noting substantial evidence “is an extremely deferential standard”). 12 To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 13 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four steps, 14 but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 15 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is presently 16 engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i), (b). If so, the 17 claimant is not disabled, and the inquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether 18 the claimant has a “severe” medically determinable physical or mental impairment which 19 meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. 20 Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii), (d). If so, the claimant is automatically found to 21 be disabled. Id. At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s RFC and determines whether 22 the claimant is still capable of performing past relevant work. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv), (f). 23 If so, the claimant is not disabled, and the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the 24 fifth and final step, where the ALJ determines whether the claimant can perform any other 25 work in the national economy based on the claimant’s RFC, age, education and work 26 experience. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v), (g). If not, the claimant is disabled. Id. 28 Plaintiff raises two arguments for the Court’s consideration: (1) the ALJ erred in 1 providing for functional limitations after rejecting medical opinions, and (2) the ALJ erred 2 in rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. (Doc. 9 at 2.) The Court addresses each 3 argument in turn. 4 A. Functional Limitations 5 Plaintiff does not dispute the ALJ’s rejection of medical opinions inconsistent in the 6 record but argues that the ALJ erred “by calculating [Plaintiff’s] limitations himself based 7 on his lay interpretation of the raw medical data.” (Doc. 9 at 8.) Further, Plaintiff contends 8 that the ALJ “failed to develop the record” by determining that Plaintiff had limitations, 9 yet “failed to obtain medical support for the limitations he assessed.” (Id. at 10.) The Court 10 disagrees. 11 For claims filed after March 27, 2017, the ALJ is required to articulate the 12 persuasiveness of each medical opinion or prior administrative medical finding. See 20 13 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a)–(b). The ALJ “is not required to take medical opinions at face value” 14 and does not “defer or give specific evidentiary weight . . . to any medical opinion(s).” 15 Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1155 (9th Cir. 2020); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a). Instead, an 16 ALJ assesses each opinion and finding based on a variety of factors and can reject opinions 17 if it lacks support or is inconsistent with the overall medical record. 20 C.F.R. 18 § 416.920c(b)(1)–(2). 19 Here, the ALJ found that Drs. Swena, Penner, Dodson, Garland, and Hassman’s 20 opinions were inconsistent with the record, and found those opinions to be unpersuasive. 21 Specifically, the ALJ was “not persuaded” by the findings that Plaintiff had “no severe 22 mental or physical limitations” and that his “impairments were non-severe.” (AR. at 24.) 23 However, the ALJ also found that the “assessments support the ultimate finding that the 24 [Plaintiff] is not disabled.” (Id.) 25 Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ relied on his own “lay interpretation of the raw 26 medical data” is unfounded. (Doc. 9 at 8.) Notably, Plaintiff concedes that RFC limitations 27 do not need to “be based entirely on a medical opinion” and that it is the “ALJ’s duty to 28 evaluate the evidence and determine” the RFC. (Id. at 9.) Here, the ALJ’s analysis is unlike 1 cases where an ALJ interpreted raw medical data to reach a conclusion no other physician 2 had. See, e.g., Howell v. Kijakazi, No. 20-CV-2517-BLM, 2022 WL 2759090, at *7–8 3 (S.D. Cal. July 14, 2022) (holding that an ALJ erred when interpreting raw medical data, 4 such as MRIs, radiology studies, and x-rays, to find the plaintiff’s functional capabilities 5 rather than rely on medical opinions). Rather, the ALJ relied on physician notes when 6 reaching his conclusion. (AR. at 23.) For example, the ALJ considered a May 2022 7 evaluation that noted that Plaintiff could ambulate normally and had normal balance for 8 tandem walking, and could stand on either leg but could not hop. (AR. at 23, 414.) The 9 ALJ also noted that Plaintiff’s mental status exams were normal, and Plaintiff denied mood 10 swings or anxiety. (AR. at 23, 341, 366–67, 369–70, 373–74, 377–78, 384, 387.) Despite 11 this, the ALJ accounted for Plaintiff’s consistent reporting of “history of social difficulties 12 and memory and concentration problems.” (AR. at 22.) None of these determinations 13 require an interpretation of raw medical data akin to x-rays or MRIs. See Howell, 2022 WL 14 2759090 at *7. 15 Furthermore, the ALJ is responsible for “translating and incorporating clinical 16 findings into a succinct RFC.” Rounds v. Comm’n Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1006 17 (9th Cir. 2015). After outlining the Plaintiff’s entire medical record, the ALJ determined 18 that the longitudinal record demonstrated ongoing “chronic conditions” which “support a 19 medium [RFC] assessment.” (AR. at 24.) As Commissioner points out, the ALJ’s findings 20 were more restrictive than the limitations that the doctors assessed. (Doc. 11 at 6–7) No 21 harm exists in the “overinclusion of debilitating factors.” See Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 22 1428,1436 n.9 (9th Cir. 1995) (“However, this overinclusion of debilitating factors is 23 harmless simply because if a person can do a job that requires increased concentration, the 24 claimant is also capable of performing work that requires less concentration.”). Based on a 25 review of the record, the Court finds the ALJ’s RFC finding properly incorporated 26 Plaintiff’s limitations. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) 27 (“This represents the type of credibility determination charged to the ALJ which we may 28 not disturb where, as here, the evidence reasonably supports the ALJ’s decision.”) The ALJ 1 thus had substantial evidence to determine the Plaintiff’s RFC and did not fail to develop 2 the record. 3 B. Symptom Testimony 4 Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ improperly rejected Plaintiff’s subjective 5 complaints. (Doc. 9 at 11–12.) 6 To evaluate a claimant’s symptom testimony, an ALJ engages in a two-step 7 analysis. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014). First, the ALJ evaluates 8 whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an impairment that could 9 reasonably cause a claimant’s symptoms. Lingenfelter v. Astrue 504 F.3d 1028, 1035–36 10 (9th Cir. 2007). If there is no evidence of malingering, an ALJ then may reject a claimant’s 11 symptom testimony “only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” 12 Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014–15. If “the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 13 interpretation” the Court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 14 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) (superseded by statute on other grounds). 15 In his hearing testimony, Plaintiff testified that he has borderline personality 16 disorder, making social interactions difficult, that his diabetes has gotten worse, and that 17 he uses his mom’s cane or a stool for stability. (AR. at 22, 41, 43–44, 48, 206.) Further, 18 Plaintiff testified that he had issues with blurry vision, hearing loss, urinary frequency, 19 dizziness and a lot of depression and anxiety, especially when being around other people. 20 (AR. at 22, 46–48, 50–51.) 21 The ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could 22 reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, but the Plaintiff’s statements 23 concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms were not 24 entirely supported with the evidence of record. (AR. at 22.) Plaintiff contends that the ALJ 25 used an improper legal standard regarding his treatment, and that the ALJ’s discussion of 26 daily activities does not cure this error. (Doc. 9 at 11, 14.) The Court disagrees. 27 As it relates to the first argument, Plaintiff specifically takes issue with the ALJ’s 28 phrasing regarding treatment. (Doc. 9 at 11–12.) The ALJ noted “[g]iven the claimant’s 1 allegations . . . one might expect to see a tremendous level of medical intervention or 2 aggressive treatment options.” (AR. at 22.) From this, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ applied 3 an improper legal standard which required Plaintiff establish evidence of a “tremendous 4 level of medical intervention.” (Doc. 9 at 11–12.) The Commissioner however is correct 5 that Plaintiff “mischaracterizes the ALJ’s evaluation of [Plaintiff’s] treatment history.” 6 (Doc. 11 at 12.) The ALJ specifically notes that Plaintiff has not received any treatment for 7 his hearing loss, and that Plaintiff was non-compliant with taking his medication, and 8 additionally did not return for a follow-up or use any educational materials provided. (AR. 9 at 22, 294, 301.) And while the ALJ does make a comment about a “tremendous level of 10 medical intervention[,]” the ALJ recognizes that the Plaintiff “received essentially 11 conservative care, consisting of medications and therapy.” (AR. at 22.) “[C]onservative 12 treatment is sufficient to discount a claimant’s testimony regarding severity of 13 impairment.” Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2007) (quotations and citation 14 omitted). The Court does not find that the ALJ applied an improper legal standard here. 15 But even if the ALJ did err in discounting symptoms based on treatment records, the error 16 is harmless because the ALJ also found the symptoms conflicted with the evidence in the 17 record and the Plaintiff’s daily activities. (AR. at 22–24.) 18 “When objective medical evidence in the record is inconsistent with the claimant’s 19 subjective testimony, the ALJ may indeed weigh it as undercutting such testimony.” Smartt 20 v Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 500 (9th Cir. 2022). The ALJ noted that Plaintiff was seen for a 21 preventative exam in July 2021 where he denied hearing, vision, and neurological 22 problems, denied having frequent urination, and denied experiencing dizziness, headaches, 23 anxiety and depression. (AR. at 22, 296.) Plaintiff also had a normal psychiatric and 24 monofilament examination. (AR. at 22–23, 301–302.) In Plaintiff’s August 2021 intake, 25 the ALJ recognized that the Plaintiff had a mostly unremarkable mental status exam with 26 some limitations. (AR. at 23, 341.) Later exams demonstrated grossly normal results and 27 Plaintiff denied mood swings or anxiety. (AR. at 23, 370, 378, 384, 387.) Finally, the ALJ 28 noted that Plaintiff had a May 2022 internal medicine evaluation where Plaintiff was 1 examined: he ambulated normally without a limp or complaints of pain; he had normal 2 balance for tandem walking; he was able to kneel while holding onto a chair despite left 3 knee pain; he was independent getting on and off the exam table; he had full range of 4 motion; and he was neurologically intact in all extremities with no instability in his knees 5 or ankles. (AR. at 23, 414–415.) The ALJ provided sufficient objective medical evidence 6 to undercut Plaintiff’s subjective testimony. Smartt, 53 F.4th at 500. 7 The ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s daily activities. An ALJ may properly determine 8 that a claimant’s daily activities detract from a claimant’s credibility if those activities are 9 inconsistent with other testimony, are exaggerated, or indicate capacities that are 10 transferable to a work setting on a sustained basis. See Molina v. Astrue, 674, F.3d 1104, 11 1112–13 (9th Cir. 2012). Even when daily activities “suggest some difficulty functioning, 12 they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the extent that they 13 contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment.” Id. at 1113. The ALJ noted that 14 Plaintiff was independent with activities of daily living, played video games and spent time 15 with others, could ride a bicycle and used public transportation. (AR. at 23–24, 208–210.) 16 Plaintiff argues that these activities do not contradict Plaintiff’s testimony, but the Court 17 disagrees. As the ALJ noted, the Plaintiff’s ability to ride a bicycle would be difficult for 18 someone who suffered from dizziness, and going to his friend’s house, shopping, and to 19 the swimming pool do at least somewhat contradict Plaintiff’s claim that he has difficulty 20 interacting with others. (AR. 19, 20, 209–10.) The ALJ provided sufficient reasons that 21 Plaintiff’s daily activities “contradict claims of totally debilitating impairment.” Molina, 22 674 F.3d at 1113. 23 The Court finds that the ALJ properly considered the objective medical evidence in 24 tandem with Plaintiff’s treatment history and daily activities and did not err in discounting 25 Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. 26 …. 27 …. 28 …. IV. CONCLUSION 2 Accordingly, 3 IT IS ORDERED affirming the August 1, 2023 decision by the Administrative Law Judge and the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. (AR. at □□□□□□□ 5 IT IS ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to enter final judgment consistent 6 || with this Order and close the case. 7 Dated this 12th day of November, 2024. 8 ? Wichal T. Hburde 10 Michael T. Liburdi ll United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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