OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
O’CONNOR, Justice.
We withdraw our earlier opinion and issue this one in its stead. Baker & Botts, [328]*328the appellee, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the grounds the appellant did not timely perfect his appeal. We find that the appellant did not timely file his appeal bond, we grant the motion to dismiss, and we deny the motion for rehearing.
This case involves the deadline to perfect an appeal after an appellant is denied the right to appeal as an indigent. The question is: What is the deadline for the appellant to file an appeal bond after the court of appeals denies him leave to file a mandamus to challenge the trial court’s denial of status as an indigent? There are two possible avenues to resolve this issue. First, we could interpret Tex.R.App.P. 41(a)(2) to give an appellant an additional 10 days to file an appeal bond following the denial of an indigent’s leave to file a petition for mandamus. Second, under the authority of Grand Prairie Independent School District v. Southern Parts Imports, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 499, 500 (Tex.1991), we could hold the affidavit was “a bona fide” attempt to invoke appellate jurisdiction. Once the trial and the appellate courts ruled against the appellant on the affidavit, under Grand Prairie, we could consider it as a defective instrument that may be amended to perfect the appeal.
The dissent believes we should interpret rule 41(a)(2) to give the appellant relief. The majority disagrees with the dissent that a court of appeals has the authority to interpret a rule of procedure to enlarge jurisdiction. The majority believes we are required to narrowly construe our jurisdiction; the dissent believes we should liberally construe our jurisdiction. As to the second option, interpreting the affidavit as a defective instrument that may be amended, the majority believes that we may not apply Grand Prairie because there is a specific rule of procedure that governs the filing of the appeal bond after the trial court sustains the contest. Either solution requires action by the supreme court.
On September 5, 1991, the trial court signed a judgment dismissing White’s suit against Baker & Botts. Before the trial court signed the judgment, the appellant filed a motion for new trial. According to Tex.R.Civ.P. 306c and Tex.R.App.P. 58(a), we deem the appellant’s motion for new trial, which was filed prematurely, was filed timely. When an appellant files a motion for new trial, the appellant must perfect his appeal by filing the appropriate document within 90 days from the date the judgment is signed. Tex.R.App.P. 41(a)(1). The appellant, therefore, was required to perfect the appeal on or before December 4, 1991 (90 days from September 5).
The appellant timely filed his affidavit of inability to give cost bond on October 24, 1991. Tex.R.App.P. 40(a)(3)(A). The district clerk filed a timely contest to the affidavit on November 4, 1991.1 Tex. R.App.P. 40(a)(3)(C). The district court signed a timely order extending the time for the hearing on the contest, on November 8, 1991. Tex.R.App.P. 40(a)(3)(E). The district court held a timely hearing on the contest and timely sustained the contest, on November 18, 1991. Tex.R.App.P. 40(a)(3)(E).
When the trial court sustains a contest to the affidavit of indigency, rule 41(a)(2) gives the appellant an additional 10 days within which to file a bond. With this extension, the appellant was required to file his bond on or before December 2, 1991.2 Because the appellant had 90 days from the date the judgment was signed, the appellant had until December 4, 1991, to perfect his appeal. Tex.R.App.P. 41(a)(1).3
[329]*329On December 4, 1991, the appellant filed a motion for leave to file a petition for writ of mandamus in the Fourteenth Court of Appeals.4 Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to review the trial court’s ruling on an affidavit of indigence. Allred v. Lowry, 597 S.W.2d 353, 354 n. 2 (Tex.1980); Underwood v. Cartwright, 795 S.W.2d 34, 35 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990) (orig. proceeding). The Fourteenth Court of Appeals denied the appellant leave to file the mandamus on December 19, 1991. The appellant then filed a timely motion for rehearing of the denial of the motion for leave to file the mandamus. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals overruled the motion for rehearing on January 23,1992. On January 31, 1992, eight days after the Fourteenth Court of Appeals overruled the motion for rehearing, the appellant filed the appeal bond with the trial court.5
Rule 41(a)(2), which gives the appellant a 10-day extension of time after the trial court sustains the contest to file the appeal bond, provides: Rule 41(a)(2) extends the deadline to perfect an appeal by 10 days when the trial court refuses to permit a party to appeal as an indigent; it makes no mention of a similar extension of time if the appellate court denies the party leave to file a petition for mandamus to review the trial court’s order.
If a contest to an affidavit in lieu of bond is sustained, the time for filing the bond is extended until ten days after the contest is sustained unless the trial court finds and recites that the affidavit is not filed in good faith.
Nothing in rule 41(a)(2) or in any case law that we could find, permits us to interpret the rule to give the appellant an additional 10 days from the date the motion for rehearing was overruled by the Fourteenth Court of Appeals.6 As an intermediate court, we do not have the authority to construe a rule of procedure liberally to enlarge our jurisdiction. Tex.R.App.P. 2(a); see Sifuentes v. Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n, 754 S.W.2d 784, 788 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, no writ) (a court of appeals may not extend its jurisdiction beyond the limit established by law). Only the supreme court can interpret rule 41(a)(2) to enlarge a jurisdictional time limit.
The appellant argues that it is unreasonable to require an indigent to file a petition for mandamus and obtain a ruling by the appellate court within 10 days of the date the trial court ruled he was not eligible to appeal as an indigent.7 The appellant argues that such a requirement would effectively eliminate the review by manda[330]*330mus of the trial court’s order denying an appellant the right to appeal as an indigent, contrary to Allred. We agree that this requirement eliminates appellate review of the case when the appellant is not able to convince the appellate court to permit him to proceed as an indigent.8
The dissent argues that we should interpret rule 41(a)(2) to apply to the appellate courts, and we should hold that the appellant has an additional 10 days from the date the appellate court makes its final order denying leave to file the mandamus. The dissent maintains that we are compelled to give a liberal construction of the rules. By the very terms of rule 41(a)(2), however, it applies only to the court that
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OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
O’CONNOR, Justice.
We withdraw our earlier opinion and issue this one in its stead. Baker & Botts, [328]*328the appellee, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the grounds the appellant did not timely perfect his appeal. We find that the appellant did not timely file his appeal bond, we grant the motion to dismiss, and we deny the motion for rehearing.
This case involves the deadline to perfect an appeal after an appellant is denied the right to appeal as an indigent. The question is: What is the deadline for the appellant to file an appeal bond after the court of appeals denies him leave to file a mandamus to challenge the trial court’s denial of status as an indigent? There are two possible avenues to resolve this issue. First, we could interpret Tex.R.App.P. 41(a)(2) to give an appellant an additional 10 days to file an appeal bond following the denial of an indigent’s leave to file a petition for mandamus. Second, under the authority of Grand Prairie Independent School District v. Southern Parts Imports, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 499, 500 (Tex.1991), we could hold the affidavit was “a bona fide” attempt to invoke appellate jurisdiction. Once the trial and the appellate courts ruled against the appellant on the affidavit, under Grand Prairie, we could consider it as a defective instrument that may be amended to perfect the appeal.
The dissent believes we should interpret rule 41(a)(2) to give the appellant relief. The majority disagrees with the dissent that a court of appeals has the authority to interpret a rule of procedure to enlarge jurisdiction. The majority believes we are required to narrowly construe our jurisdiction; the dissent believes we should liberally construe our jurisdiction. As to the second option, interpreting the affidavit as a defective instrument that may be amended, the majority believes that we may not apply Grand Prairie because there is a specific rule of procedure that governs the filing of the appeal bond after the trial court sustains the contest. Either solution requires action by the supreme court.
On September 5, 1991, the trial court signed a judgment dismissing White’s suit against Baker & Botts. Before the trial court signed the judgment, the appellant filed a motion for new trial. According to Tex.R.Civ.P. 306c and Tex.R.App.P. 58(a), we deem the appellant’s motion for new trial, which was filed prematurely, was filed timely. When an appellant files a motion for new trial, the appellant must perfect his appeal by filing the appropriate document within 90 days from the date the judgment is signed. Tex.R.App.P. 41(a)(1). The appellant, therefore, was required to perfect the appeal on or before December 4, 1991 (90 days from September 5).
The appellant timely filed his affidavit of inability to give cost bond on October 24, 1991. Tex.R.App.P. 40(a)(3)(A). The district clerk filed a timely contest to the affidavit on November 4, 1991.1 Tex. R.App.P. 40(a)(3)(C). The district court signed a timely order extending the time for the hearing on the contest, on November 8, 1991. Tex.R.App.P. 40(a)(3)(E). The district court held a timely hearing on the contest and timely sustained the contest, on November 18, 1991. Tex.R.App.P. 40(a)(3)(E).
When the trial court sustains a contest to the affidavit of indigency, rule 41(a)(2) gives the appellant an additional 10 days within which to file a bond. With this extension, the appellant was required to file his bond on or before December 2, 1991.2 Because the appellant had 90 days from the date the judgment was signed, the appellant had until December 4, 1991, to perfect his appeal. Tex.R.App.P. 41(a)(1).3
[329]*329On December 4, 1991, the appellant filed a motion for leave to file a petition for writ of mandamus in the Fourteenth Court of Appeals.4 Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to review the trial court’s ruling on an affidavit of indigence. Allred v. Lowry, 597 S.W.2d 353, 354 n. 2 (Tex.1980); Underwood v. Cartwright, 795 S.W.2d 34, 35 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990) (orig. proceeding). The Fourteenth Court of Appeals denied the appellant leave to file the mandamus on December 19, 1991. The appellant then filed a timely motion for rehearing of the denial of the motion for leave to file the mandamus. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals overruled the motion for rehearing on January 23,1992. On January 31, 1992, eight days after the Fourteenth Court of Appeals overruled the motion for rehearing, the appellant filed the appeal bond with the trial court.5
Rule 41(a)(2), which gives the appellant a 10-day extension of time after the trial court sustains the contest to file the appeal bond, provides: Rule 41(a)(2) extends the deadline to perfect an appeal by 10 days when the trial court refuses to permit a party to appeal as an indigent; it makes no mention of a similar extension of time if the appellate court denies the party leave to file a petition for mandamus to review the trial court’s order.
If a contest to an affidavit in lieu of bond is sustained, the time for filing the bond is extended until ten days after the contest is sustained unless the trial court finds and recites that the affidavit is not filed in good faith.
Nothing in rule 41(a)(2) or in any case law that we could find, permits us to interpret the rule to give the appellant an additional 10 days from the date the motion for rehearing was overruled by the Fourteenth Court of Appeals.6 As an intermediate court, we do not have the authority to construe a rule of procedure liberally to enlarge our jurisdiction. Tex.R.App.P. 2(a); see Sifuentes v. Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n, 754 S.W.2d 784, 788 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, no writ) (a court of appeals may not extend its jurisdiction beyond the limit established by law). Only the supreme court can interpret rule 41(a)(2) to enlarge a jurisdictional time limit.
The appellant argues that it is unreasonable to require an indigent to file a petition for mandamus and obtain a ruling by the appellate court within 10 days of the date the trial court ruled he was not eligible to appeal as an indigent.7 The appellant argues that such a requirement would effectively eliminate the review by manda[330]*330mus of the trial court’s order denying an appellant the right to appeal as an indigent, contrary to Allred. We agree that this requirement eliminates appellate review of the case when the appellant is not able to convince the appellate court to permit him to proceed as an indigent.8
The dissent argues that we should interpret rule 41(a)(2) to apply to the appellate courts, and we should hold that the appellant has an additional 10 days from the date the appellate court makes its final order denying leave to file the mandamus. The dissent maintains that we are compelled to give a liberal construction of the rules. By the very terms of rule 41(a)(2), however, it applies only to the court that sustains the contest, not one that reviews the ruling on the contest.
In response, the dissent argues that the contest to the affidavit of indigence was not finally sustained until the appellate courts had an opportunity to review and rule on the mandamus. The idea that the trial court’s judgment or order is not final until a motion for leave to file a mandamus is overruled is a novel one, not supported by law. In fact, this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal only because the judgment in this case is final. See Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 51.012 (Vernon 1986), which provides:
In a civil case in which the judgment or amount in controversy exceeds $100, exclusive of interest and costs, a person may take an appeal ... to the court of appeals from a final judgment of the district or county court.
Unless there is a specific exception created by statute, a final judgment is a necessary prerequisite to invoke appellate jurisdiction. Hinde v. Hinde, 701 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Tex.1985); Pelt v. State Bd. of Ins., 802 S.W.2d 822, 826 (Tex.App.—Austin 1991, no writ). Thus, the judgment and all orders signed by the trial court in the case below are final. They became final on November 30, 1991, 30 days after the trial court overruled the motion for new trial on October 31, 1991. Clark & Co. v. Giles, 639 S.W.2d 449, 450 (Tex.1982) (judgment became final when the trial court lost power to change it).
The dissent’s argument that the application for mandamus filed in the Fourteenth Court of Appeals somehow deprived the trial court’s order of finality is even farther off the mark than if she argued the appeal suspended the finality of the judgment. An application for mandamus is not an ordinary appeal; it is an original proceeding, a new cause of action. The finality of the trial court’s ruling in one case cannot depend on whether the appellant files an original action to challenge it.9
There is yet another reason, as an intermediate court, that we should refrain from interpreting rule 41(a)(2) to extend the deadline to perfect an appeal 10 days from the date the court of appeals denies leave to file a mandamus. There is no rule or case law that provides a deadline for filing a mandamus to challenge the trial court’s [331]*331ruling on the affidavit. If the supreme court interprets rule 41(a)(2) or applies Grand Prairie to give an appellant additional time after the mandamus is denied to file an appeal bond, the supreme court must also decide the deadline for filing a mandamus to challenge the order that sustains the contest.
We urge the Texas Supreme Court to resolve this matter by rule amendment or by opinion in this case. The courts and future litigants need to know how to compute the appellant’s time limit to file the appeal bond after the appellant has been denied mandamus to review the trial court’s order denying him permission to appeal as an indigent.
Until the supreme court resolves this issue, an appellant who attempts to challenge by mandamus the trial court’s order denying him leave to appeal as an indigent, should ask the court of appeals to enter a temporary order suspending the time to file the appeal bond under rule 41(a)(2). Such an appellant should be prepared to file the appeal bond within the 10 days permitted by rule 41(a)(2), as suspended by the court of appeals.
We hold that the appellant did not file a timely appeal bond.