White Swan, Ltd., an Oregon Corporation v. The Nature Company, a California Corporation, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee

29 F.3d 638, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 26332, 1994 WL 374232
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJuly 15, 1994
Docket93-35213
StatusUnpublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 29 F.3d 638 (White Swan, Ltd., an Oregon Corporation v. The Nature Company, a California Corporation, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
White Swan, Ltd., an Oregon Corporation v. The Nature Company, a California Corporation, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee, 29 F.3d 638, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 26332, 1994 WL 374232 (9th Cir. 1994).

Opinion

29 F.3d 638

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
WHITE SWAN, LTD., an Oregon Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
The NATURE COMPANY, a California Corporation,
Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee.

No. 93-35213.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted June 14, 1994.
Decided July 15, 1994.

Before: GOODWIN, PREGERSON, and RYMER, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM*

OVERVIEW

White Swan, Ltd. appeals the District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of The Nature Company. White Swan Ltd.'s action alleged trademark infringement pursuant to Sec. 32 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1114, unfair competition and false designation of origin pursuant to Sec. 43 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1125(a), and state common law claims of trademark infringement, unfair trade practices, and trademark dilution. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Appellant White Swan, Ltd. ("White Swan") is a wholesale marketer of garden-related products, including flower seeds and decorative garden accessories. White Swan's products are sold nationally at retail outlets and garden shops.

In 1986, White Swan began marketing flower seeds in shaker cans1 based on a concept of "theme gardens." Each can contains selected seed varieties intended for a particular purpose, such as attracting butterflies or hummingbirds, or growing fragrant or low-water use flower gardens. All cans bear the trademarks "WHITE SWAN," "SHAKE SCATTER & GROW," and a particular garden trademark, such as "BUTTERFLY GARDEN." In 1986, White Swan applied to the Registrar of Trademarks to register "HUMMINGBIRD GARDEN" and "BUTTERFLY GARDEN." "HUMMINGBIRD GARDEN" was registered in 1986; the "BUTTERFLY GARDEN" application is still pending,2 awaiting a Cancellation Proceeding.3

Appellee The Nature Company ("Nature Co.") is a retailer that sells nature-related products in its retail stores and mail order catalogue. From 1987 to 1990, Nature Co. bought approximately $570,000 worth of White Swan products, including $180,000 worth of "HUMMINGBIRD GARDEN" and "BUTTERFLY GARDEN" flower seeds, and sold them in Nature Co. retail stores. Beginning in 1988, Nature Co. sold an exclusive line of White Swan seeds under a label bearing both White Swan's and Nature Co.'s trademarks. In 1989, Nature Co. quit ordering White Swan flower seed products. In 1990, it stopped selling these products.

In 1992, Nature Co. began selling the flower seed products with labels that contained the phrases "BUTTERFLY SEED MIX" and "HUMMINGBIRD SEED MIX." The year before, White Swan had sent its wholesale catalogue which included flower seed products to Ivelich at Nature Co. Nonetheless, Nature Co.'s senior buyer, Sandra Ivelich, who was hired in June 1991, stated in her deposition that she was unaware of any other product similar to that which she had developed for Nature Co. She further stated that she was unfamiliar with White Swan's products or trademarks when she developed the flower seed products in shaker cans for Nature Co. Ivelich indicated that she first became aware of White Swan's products at a trade show she attended in February of 1992.

White Swan sent a "cease and desist" letter to Nature Co.'s president and later filed suit against Nature Co. In response, to the suit, Nature Co. proposed to modify its labels from "NATURE GARDEN COLLECTION," "BUTTERFLY SEED MIX" (or "HUMMINGBIRD SEED MIX,") "A Blend of Nine Flower Varieties," to "NATURE GARDEN COLLECTION," "for BUTTERFLIES" (or "for HUMMINGBIRDS,") "A Blend of Nine Flower Seed Varieties to Attract Butterflies" (or "Hummingbirds"). White Swan rejected this suggestion and pressed the current action.

Nature Co. currently sells flower seeds under the modified labels it proposed to settle the suit. In response to White Swan's suit, Nature Co. counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that it had not engaged in unfair competition or trademark violation, and that White Swan's use of "butterfly" and "hummingbird" are descriptive terms without secondary meaning and are therefore not protectable as individual trademarks. Further, Nature Co. seeks a declaration that its modified labels do not violate any rights held by White Swan.

Both White Swan and Nature Co. moved for summary judgment. Following oral argument, the District Court concluded that Nature Co.'s use of "BUTTERFLY SEED MIX" and "HUMMINGBIRD SEED MIX" was descriptive and a fair use. The District Court thus granted summary judgment for Nature Co. on its counterclaim for a declaration that its uses did not infringe upon any rights of White Swan.4 In addition, the District Court concluded that even if Nature Co. used "BUTTERFLY SEED MIX" and "HUMMINGBIRD SEED MIX" as trademarks, there was little likelihood of consumer confusion between Nature Co.'s and White Swan's products. Finally, the District Court granted summary judgment for Nature Co. on its counterclaim for a declaration that the use of its modified packaging would not constitute trademark infringement or unfair competition. As a consequence, the District Court denied all of White Swan's summary judgment motions.

ANALYSIS

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Jones v. Union Pacific R.R., 968 F.2d 937, 940 (9th Cir.1992). Our review is governed by the same standard used by the trial court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). Darring v. Kincheloe, 783 F.2d 874, 876 (9th Cir.1986). We must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir.1992). The District Court's classification of a term as "descriptive" is a factual determination subject to review for clear error. "[W]here a mixed question of law and fact is predominately one of fact, we review the trial court's determination under the clearly erroneous standard." Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir.1986) (quoting United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1203-04 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984).

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