White Major Subdivision Application
Opinion
STATE OF VERMONT
ENVIRONMENTAL COURT
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In re: White Major Subdivision } Docket No. 237-11-07 Vtec Application } }
Decision and Order on Cross-Motions for Partial Summary Judgment Appellants Richard and Linda White appealed from a decision of the Development Review Board (DRB) of the Town of Norwich, denying Appellants’ application for a major subdivision. Appellants are represented by Paul S. Gillies, Esq.; the Town of Norwich is represented by Frank H. Olmstead, Esq. The Town of Norwich has since adopted the procedures for on-the-record review of the decisions of its DRB; this application, however, predates that change, so that the appeal of this decision remains de novo.
The parties have each moved for summary judgment on Question 1: whether Appellants “should qualify for” a waiver of § 3.3(D)(2) of the Subdivision Regulations (Regulations) for the proposed access road to Lots 4 and 5 of the subdivision, pursuant to § 2.1(D) of the Regulations. The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
Appellants applied for a five-lot subdivision. Neither party has provided a copy of the proposed site plan, so that the following descriptions are taken from the statements of undisputed facts. Appellants now propose to access Lots 4 and 5 by a shared driveway or access road on an existing old logging road. The old logging road crosses a hill that has a slope exceeding 25%. The construction of the driveway would involve cutting some trees, and some earth moving (both cutting and filling) to create the roadway and shoulders, and the associated ditching and culverts.
When construing municipal regulations, the Court applies the ordinary rules of statutory construction. In re Casella Waste Mgmt., Inc., 2003 VT 49, ¶ 6, 175 Vt. 335, 337.
The Court must first determine if the plain meaning of a regulation can resolve the interpretative conflicts without doing violence to the municipal regulatory scheme, “always bearing in mind that the paramount function of the court is to give effect to the legislative intent.” Id. (quoting Lubinsky v. Fair Haven Zoning Bd., 148 Vt. 47, 49 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the plain meaning is in doubt, the Court must determine that legislative intent through consideration of the entire regulatory scheme. Murdoch v. Town of Shelburne, 2007 VT 93, ¶ 5. The Court seeks to create a harmonious whole, and to avoid construing any part of the regulation as ineffective or superfluous. Id. (citing Ran-Mar, Inc. v. Town of Berlin, 2006 VT 117, ¶ 5, 181 Vt. 26, 29 and In re L.A., 2006 VT 118, ¶ 11, 181 Vt. 34, 39).
Section 2.1(D) of the Regulations gives the DRB1, and hence this Court in this de novo appeal, the authority to waive the following two categories of subdivision requirements: either (i) the subdivision application requirements and the preliminary plat review and associated public hearing requirements, or (ii) the Article 3 development review standards. Section 2.1(D) sets out different considerations for each of these two categories of waiver. For waiver of any of the Article 3 standards, the applicant is required to establish:
that due to the special circumstances of a particular site, the requirements of the development review standards for which waiver is sought will create an unreasonable hardship or adversely affect significant natural resources, rural character, or aesthetics[,] and that granting the waiver will be consistent with the purposes of [the subdivision] regulations.
Regulations § 2.1(D). Section 2.1(D) goes on to require the DRB (and hence this Court in
this de novo appeal), before granting a waiver of any of the Article 3 standards, to make
1 The Subdivision Regulations still contain references to the Planning Commission rather than to the DRB, which has taken over the Planning Commission’s permit-issuing functions since the adoption of the Regulations. This decision will refer to the DRB throughout.
affirmative findings on all four of the following requirements, including the rationale for each finding:
• [t]hat the development review standards for which the waiver is sought will create an unreasonable hardship or adversely affect significant natural resources, rural character, or aesthetics[;] and • [t]hat granting the waiver will be consistent with the purposes of [the subdivision] regulations[;] and • [t]hat, in consultation with the fire and police chiefs, granting the waiver will not adversely affect public safety[;] and • [t]hat granting the waiver will not adversely affect the character of the neighborhood.
Id.
Article 3 of the Regulations sets out the “Planning and Design Standards” applicable to subdivisions. The standards in § 3.3 deal with the suitability of land for subdivision and the protection of fragile features and natural and cultural resources. Section 3.3(D)of the Regulations provides that “[s]ubdivision boundaries, lot layout and [d]evelopment [e]nvelopes shall be located and configured to minimize adverse impacts to slopes greater than 15%, to avoid disturbance to slopes in excess of 25%, and to avoid the placement of structures on prominent knolls and ridgelines” and provides “[m]ethods for avoiding such impacts,” including but not limited to seven methods that may be referred to as §§ 3.3(D)(1) through (7).
The method described in § 3.3(D)(2) is that “[e]xcavation, filling[,] and development on slopes in excess of 25% shall be avoided.” The method described in § 3.3(D)(6) is that “[a]ccess roads, including the conversion of logging roads to private roads or driveways, and utility corridors, shall use or share existing accesses and rights-of-way where feasible; follow existing contours to achieve angled ascents, and avoid areas of steep slope.”
Whether a waiver is required At the outset, Appellants question whether the phrase “shall be avoided” in
Regulations § 3.3(D)(2) is an outright prohibition on development on slopes in excess of 25%. If it is not, Appellants assert there is no need for a waiver.
As the “methods” provided in §§ 3.3(D)(1) through (D)(7) are by their terms a non-
exclusive list of methods to achieve the protection established in § 3.3(D), the proper inquiry is instead whether the paragraph at the beginning of § 3.3(D) contains an outright prohibition on development on slopes in excess of 25%.
With regard to slopes,2 that paragraph distinguishes between slopes greater than 15% (but less than or equal to 25%), on the one hand, and slopes in excess of 25%, on the other. Section 3.3(D) requires that subdivision boundaries, lot layout, and development envelopes “shall be located and configured to minimize adverse impacts” to slopes greater than 15% (but less than or equal to 25%). (Emphasis added.) Section 3.3(D) requires that subdivision boundaries, lot layout, and development envelopes “shall be located and configured . . . to avoid disturbance“ to slopes in excess of 25%. (Emphasis added.) Thus, with regard to slopes greater than 15% (but less than or equal to 25%), the plain language of § 3.3(D) only requires impacts to be minimized, while with regard to slopes greater than 25%, the plain language of § 3.3(D) requires disturbance to be avoided. The plain language of Section § 3.3(D) prohibits disturbance of slopes that exceed 25%; as proposed, Appellants’ subdivision plan therefore requires a waiver of (or variance from) this provision.
A comparison of the language used in the non-exclusive list of methods in § 3.3(D)(1) through (D)(7) supports this result. Section 3.3(D)(1) allows development on slopes greater than 15% if necessary to achieve the most desirable subdivision design for a site, with limiting conditions and erosion controls, while the prohibition in § 3.3(D)(2) does
2 It also requires avoidance of the placement of structures on prominent knolls and ridgelines, not at issue in the present case.
not provide for mitigating conditions.
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