White Major Subdivision Application

CourtVermont Superior Court
DecidedJuly 29, 2008
Docket237-11-07 Vtec
StatusPublished

This text of White Major Subdivision Application (White Major Subdivision Application) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Vermont Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
White Major Subdivision Application, (Vt. Ct. App. 2008).

Opinion

STATE OF VERMONT

ENVIRONMENTAL COURT

} In re: White Major Subdivision } Docket No. 237-11-07 Vtec Application } }

Decision and Order on Cross-Motions for Partial Summary Judgment

Appellants Richard and Linda White appealed from a decision of the Development

Review Board (DRB) of the Town of Norwich, denying Appellants’ application for a major

subdivision. Appellants are represented by Paul S. Gillies, Esq.; the Town of Norwich is

represented by Frank H. Olmstead, Esq. The Town of Norwich has since adopted the

procedures for on-the-record review of the decisions of its DRB; this application, however,

predates that change, so that the appeal of this decision remains de novo.

The parties have each moved for summary judgment on Question 1: whether

Appellants “should qualify for” a waiver of § 3.3(D)(2) of the Subdivision Regulations

(Regulations) for the proposed access road to Lots 4 and 5 of the subdivision, pursuant to §

2.1(D) of the Regulations. The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

Appellants applied for a five-lot subdivision. Neither party has provided a copy of

the proposed site plan, so that the following descriptions are taken from the statements of

undisputed facts. Appellants now propose to access Lots 4 and 5 by a shared driveway or

access road on an existing old logging road. The old logging road crosses a hill that has a

slope exceeding 25%. The construction of the driveway would involve cutting some trees,

and some earth moving (both cutting and filling) to create the roadway and shoulders, and

the associated ditching and culverts.

When construing municipal regulations, the Court applies the ordinary rules of

statutory construction. In re Casella Waste Mgmt., Inc., 2003 VT 49, ¶ 6, 175 Vt. 335, 337.

1 The Court must first determine if the plain meaning of a regulation can resolve the

interpretative conflicts without doing violence to the municipal regulatory scheme, “always

bearing in mind that the paramount function of the court is to give effect to the legislative

intent.” Id. (quoting Lubinsky v. Fair Haven Zoning Bd., 148 Vt. 47, 49 (1986)) (internal

quotation marks omitted). If the plain meaning is in doubt, the Court must determine that

legislative intent through consideration of the entire regulatory scheme. Murdoch v. Town

of Shelburne, 2007 VT 93, ¶ 5. The Court seeks to create a harmonious whole, and to avoid

construing any part of the regulation as ineffective or superfluous. Id. (citing Ran-Mar, Inc.

v. Town of Berlin, 2006 VT 117, ¶ 5, 181 Vt. 26, 29 and In re L.A., 2006 VT 118, ¶ 11, 181 Vt.

34, 39).

Section 2.1(D) of the Regulations gives the DRB1, and hence this Court in this de

novo appeal, the authority to waive the following two categories of subdivision

requirements: either (i) the subdivision application requirements and the preliminary plat

review and associated public hearing requirements, or (ii) the Article 3 development review

standards. Section 2.1(D) sets out different considerations for each of these two categories

of waiver. For waiver of any of the Article 3 standards, the applicant is required to

establish:

that due to the special circumstances of a particular site, the requirements of the development review standards for which waiver is sought will create an unreasonable hardship or adversely affect significant natural resources, rural character, or aesthetics[,] and that granting the waiver will be consistent with the purposes of [the subdivision] regulations. Regulations § 2.1(D). Section 2.1(D) goes on to require the DRB (and hence this Court in

this de novo appeal), before granting a waiver of any of the Article 3 standards, to make

1 The Subdivision Regulations still contain references to the Planning Commission rather than to the DRB, which has taken over the Planning Commission’s permit-issuing functions since the adoption of the Regulations. This decision will refer to the DRB throughout.

2 affirmative findings on all four of the following requirements, including the rationale for

each finding:

• [t]hat the development review standards for which the waiver is sought will create an unreasonable hardship or adversely affect significant natural resources, rural character, or aesthetics[;] and • [t]hat granting the waiver will be consistent with the purposes of [the subdivision] regulations[;] and • [t]hat, in consultation with the fire and police chiefs, granting the waiver will not adversely affect public safety[;] and • [t]hat granting the waiver will not adversely affect the character of the neighborhood. Id.

Article 3 of the Regulations sets out the “Planning and Design Standards” applicable

to subdivisions. The standards in § 3.3 deal with the suitability of land for subdivision and

the protection of fragile features and natural and cultural resources. Section 3.3(D)of the

Regulations provides that “[s]ubdivision boundaries, lot layout and [d]evelopment

[e]nvelopes shall be located and configured to minimize adverse impacts to slopes greater

than 15%, to avoid disturbance to slopes in excess of 25%, and to avoid the placement of

structures on prominent knolls and ridgelines” and provides “[m]ethods for avoiding such

impacts,” including but not limited to seven methods that may be referred to as §§ 3.3(D)(1)

through (7).

The method described in § 3.3(D)(2) is that “[e]xcavation, filling[,] and development

on slopes in excess of 25% shall be avoided.” The method described in § 3.3(D)(6) is that

“[a]ccess roads, including the conversion of logging roads to private roads or driveways,

and utility corridors, shall use or share existing accesses and rights-of-way where feasible;

follow existing contours to achieve angled ascents, and avoid areas of steep slope.”

Whether a waiver is required

At the outset, Appellants question whether the phrase “shall be avoided” in

3 Regulations § 3.3(D)(2) is an outright prohibition on development on slopes in excess of

25%. If it is not, Appellants assert there is no need for a waiver.

As the “methods” provided in §§ 3.3(D)(1) through (D)(7) are by their terms a non-

exclusive list of methods to achieve the protection established in § 3.3(D), the proper

inquiry is instead whether the paragraph at the beginning of § 3.3(D) contains an outright

prohibition on development on slopes in excess of 25%.

With regard to slopes,2 that paragraph distinguishes between slopes greater than

15% (but less than or equal to 25%), on the one hand, and slopes in excess of 25%, on the

other. Section 3.3(D) requires that subdivision boundaries, lot layout, and development

envelopes “shall be located and configured to minimize adverse impacts” to slopes greater

than 15% (but less than or equal to 25%). (Emphasis added.) Section 3.3(D) requires that

subdivision boundaries, lot layout, and development envelopes “shall be located and

configured . . . to avoid disturbance“ to slopes in excess of 25%. (Emphasis added.) Thus,

with regard to slopes greater than 15% (but less than or equal to 25%), the plain language of

§ 3.3(D) only requires impacts to be minimized, while with regard to slopes greater than

25%, the plain language of § 3.3(D) requires disturbance to be avoided. The plain language

of Section § 3.3(D) prohibits disturbance of slopes that exceed 25%; as proposed,

Appellants’ subdivision plan therefore requires a waiver of (or variance from) this

provision.

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Related

In Re Appeal of Casella Waste Management, Inc.
2003 VT 49 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 2003)
Lubinsky v. Fair Haven Zoning Board
527 A.2d 227 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1986)
In re L.A.
2006 VT 118 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 2006)
Murdoch v. Town of Shelburne
2007 VT 93 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 2007)
Ran-Mar, Inc. v. Town of Berlin
2006 VT 117 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 2006)

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