Whitaker v. Tesla Motors, Inc.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: January 29, 2021
• Docket: 3:19-cv-01193
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BRIAN WHITAKER, Case No.: 19-cv-01193-AJB-BLM

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT 13 v. TESLA, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT 14 TESLA MOTORS, INC., a Delaware MATTER JURISDICTION Corporation; and DOES 1-10, 15 Defendants. (Doc. No. 24) 16

18 Before the Court is Defendant Tesla, Inc.’s (“Defendant”)1 motion to dismiss 19 Plaintiff Brian Whitaker’s (“Plaintiff”) complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 20 (Doc. No. 24 at 5.)2 Plaintiff filed an opposition, to which Defendant replied. (Doc. Nos. 21 27, 31.) For the reasons set forth, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Plaintiff suffers from a C-4 spinal cord injury and uses a wheelchair for mobility. 24 (Doc. No. 21 ¶ 1.) Tesla owned the dealership located at or about 7007 Friars Road, San 25 Diego, California in June 2019, and currently owns the dealership (the “Dealership”). (Id. 26 27 28 1 Defendant asserts in its brief that its correct corporate name is Tesla, Inc.—not Tesla Motors, Inc. 1 ¶ 2–3.) The Dealership is open to the public and has service counters for its patrons. (Id. at 2 ¶ 8–9.) 3 In June 2019, Plaintiff went to the Dealership with the intention of availing himself 4 of its goods, and motivated in part to determine if Defendant complies with the disability 5 access laws. (Id. ¶ 7.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant failed to provide accessible service 6 counters. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s showroom had three tables with bar 7 stools and computers, which were utilized as service counters. (Id. ¶ 11.) They were 40 8 inches high, with no lowered portions for persons in wheelchairs. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff claims 9 that by failing to provide lowered service counters, Defendant denied him, as a wheelchair 10 user, full and equal access. (Id. ¶ 14.) 11 Plaintiff states that he is currently deterred from returning to the Dealership because 12 of his knowledge of the existing barriers, but he intends to return once it is represented to 13 him that Defendant and its facilities are accessible. (Id. ¶ 17.) 14 II. LEGAL STANDARD 15 A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) tests 16 whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction. While lack of “statutory standing” 17 requires dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), lack of Article 18 III standing requires dismissal for want of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 19 12(b)(1). See Nw. Requirements Utilities v. F.E.R.C., 798 F.3d 796, 808 (9th Cir. 2015) 20 (“Unlike Article III standing, however, ‘statutory standing’ does not implicate our 21 subject-matter jurisdiction.”) (citing Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 22 572 U.S. 118, 128 n.4 (2014)); Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011). 23 “A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual.” Safe Air for 24 Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). “In a facial attack, the challenger 25 asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke 26 federal jurisdiction.” Id. The court “resolves a facial attack as it would a motion to dismiss 27 under Rule 12(b)(6): accepting the plaintiff’s allegations as true and drawing all reasonable 28 inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, the court determines whether the allegations are 1 sufficient as a legal matter to invoke the court’s jurisdiction.” Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 2 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014). 3 “[I]n a factual attack,” on the other hand, “the challenger disputes the truth of the 4 allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for 5 Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. In resolving such an attack, unlike with a motion to dismiss 6 under Rule 12(b)(6), a court “may review evidence beyond the complaint without 7 converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Id. Moreover, the 8 court “need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations.” Id. Once the 9 defendant has moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), 10 the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the court's jurisdiction. See Chandler v. State 11 Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010). 12 III. DISCUSSION 13 In its motion, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged “an 14 ‘injury-in-fact coupled with an intent to return,’ or alternatively ‘deterrence from returning 15 to the premises’” as required to establish Article III standing pursuant to Chapman v. Pier 16 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 946 (9th Cir. 2011). (Doc. No. 31 at 6.) Subsequent to 17 the parties’ briefings and the Court taking this matter under submission, the Ninth Circuit 18 Court of Appeal published Whitaker v. Tesla Motors, Inc., an ADA case identical to the 19 one before this Court, but originating from the Central District of California. --- F.3d ---, 20 No. 19-56497, 2021 WL 235777 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2021). 21 There, the Ninth Circuit considered the issue of standing and reiterated its adherence 22 to “the Supreme Court’s instruction to take a ‘broad view’ of standing in civil rights 23 complaints.” Id. at *5 (citing Chapman, 631 F.3d at 954; Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. 24 Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972)). The Ninth Circuit then reasoned: 25 Here, Whitaker’s complaint alleges that he uses a wheelchair for mobility, that 26 he visited the defendant’s premises, that he personally encountered a barrier related to his disability—inaccessible service counters—and that the barrier 27 deters him from returning. These allegations are sufficient to establish 28 injury-in-fact for purposes of standing. 1 || Jd. The same is true in this case.° 2 Here, Plaintiff alleges that he uses a wheelchair for mobility, that he visited 3 ||Defendant’s premises in June 2019, personally encountered barriers related to his 4 || disability—namely, service counters that are too high and the unavailability of lowered 5 ||ones—and that knowledge of the existing barriers deter him from returning to the 6 || Dealership. See supra § I. As Plaintiffs allegations are virtually identical to those the Ninth 7 || Circuit found to be sufficient for Article II standing, the Court similarly finds that Plaintiff 8 pled facts sufficient to establish standing in this ADA case. Whitaker, Inc., --- F.3d ---, 9 ||No. 19-56497, 2021 WL 235777 at *5. See also (Doc. Nos. 21, 24-7 (containing the 10 |}complaints in the two actions). 11 IV. CONCLUSION 12 Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to 13 || dismiss. (Doc. No. 24.) 14 IT ISSO ORDERED. 15 ||Dated: January 29, 2021 16 Hon. Anthony J.Battaglia 17 United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 3 Indeed, Defendant noted that “[t]his action is one of two substantively identical complaints brought by 26 |! Plaintiff against Tesla” and requested the Court to take judicial notice of the action and complaint in the 7 Central District of California. (Doc. No. 24-6 at 2.) Because a “court may take judicial notice of court records in another case,” the Court grants Defendant’s request. United States v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 2g || 876 fn.1 (th Cir. 2004). The other requests for judicial notice need not be considered as they are not consequential to the resolution of the motion.