Whitaker v. Tesla Motors, Inc.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: May 15, 2020
• Docket: 3:19-cv-01193
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BRIAN WHITAKER, Case No.: 19-CV-01193-AJB-BLM

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 13 v. TESLA, INC.’S MOTION DISMISS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 14 TESLA MOTORS, INC., a Delaware STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM Corporation; and DOES 1-10, 15 Defendants. (Doc. No. 10) 16

18 Before the Court is Defendant Tesla, Inc.’s (“Defendant”) motion to dismiss Plaintiff 19 Brian Whitaker’s (“Plaintiff”) complaint, or in the alternative, strike Plaintiff’s claim. 20 (Doc. No. 10.) Plaintiff opposes the motion submitted by Defendant. (Doc. No. 12.) For 21 the reasons discussed herein, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Plaintiff suffers from a C-4 spinal cord injury and uses a wheelchair for mobility. 24 (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 1.) Tesla owned the dealership located at or about 7007 Friars Road, San 25 Diego, California in June 2019, and currently owns the dealership (the “Dealership”). (Id. 26 ¶ 2–3.) The Dealership is open to the public. (Id. ¶ 9.) 27 Plaintiff went to the Dealership in June 2019 with the intention to avail himself of 28 its goods, motivated in part to determine if Defendants comply with the disability access 1 laws. (Id. ¶ 8.) According to Plaintiff, Defendants failed to provide accessible service 2 counters. (Id. ¶¶ 11–13.) The failure to provide accessible facilities created difficulty and 3 discomfort for Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff is further deterred from availing himself of 4 Tesla’s goods because of his knowledge of the existing barriers. (Id. ¶ 17.) However, 5 Plaintiff will return to Defendant to avail himself of its goods and to determine compliance 6 with the disability access laws once it has represented to him that Defendant and its 7 facilities are accessible. (Id.) 8 On June 26, 2019, Plaintiff filed a complaint with this Court. (Doc. No. 1.) 9 Subsequently, on August 30, 2019, Defendant filed its motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 10 complaint. (Doc. No. 10.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendant’s motion to 11 dismiss, (Doc. No. 12), and Defendants filed their reply, (Doc. No. 13). 12 II. LEGAL STANDARD 13 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s 14 complaint and allows a court to dismiss a complaint upon a finding that the plaintiff has 15 failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 16 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “[A] court may dismiss a complaint as a matter of law for (1) lack 17 of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal claim.” 18 SmileCare Dental Grp. v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., 88 F.3d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1996) 19 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, a complaint will survive a 20 motion to dismiss if it contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 21 its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In making this 22 determination, a court reviews the contents of the complaint, accepting all factual 23 allegations as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. 24 Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Nat’l League of Postmasters of U.S., 497 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 25 2007). 26 Notwithstanding this deference, the reviewing court need not accept “legal 27 conclusions” as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). It is also improper for a 28 court to assume “the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged.” Associated 1 Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 2 (1983). 3 III. DISCUSSION 4 First, the Court will address Defendant’s request for judicial notice. Next, the Court 5 will address Defendant’s motion to dismiss. 6 A. Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice 7 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts may take judicial notice of a “fact that 8 is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s 9 territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose 10 accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Specifically, matters of 11 public record and judicial proceedings in other courts have been recognized as acceptable 12 facts the court may judicially notice. See Wheeler v. Premiere Credit of North America, 80 13 F. Supp. 3d 1108, 1112 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (stating a federal appellate opinion was a matter 14 of public record and was capable of accurate and ready determination, and therefore the 15 court could take judicial notice of the opinion); Rosales-Martinez v. Palmer, 753 F.3d 890, 16 894 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating the court may take judicial notice of judicial proceedings in 17 other courts) (citing Dawson v. Mahoney, 451 F.3d 550, 551 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006))); U.S. ex 18 rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 19 1992). 20 Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following documents: 21 (1) Order to Show Cause Re Supplemental Jurisdiction, issued by the Honorable Judge 22 Fitzgerald in the Central District of California, Case No. 2:19-cv-06605-MWF-E, ECF Dkt. 23 No. 9, dated August 9, 2019; (2) Declaration of Plaintiff Brian Whitaker, filed in response 24 to the August 9, 2019 OSC issued by the Honorable Judge Fitzgerald in the Central District 25 of California, Case No. 2:19-cv-06605-MWF-E, Dkt. No. 12-1, dated August 21, 2019; 26 and (3) list of Plaintiff’s Central District complaints as listed on the court’s docket. (Doc. 27 No. 10-2 at 2.) 28 1 A “court may take judicial notice of court records in another case.” United States v. 2 Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 876 fn.1 (9th Cir. 2004). However, “[w]hile the authenticity and 3 existence of a particular order, motion, pleading or judicial proceeding, which is a matter 4 of public record, is judicially noticeable, veracity and validity of its contents ... are not.” 5 United States v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 300 F. Supp. 2d 964, 974 (E.D. Cal. 2004). 6 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s request for judicial notice for the stated 7 purpose that these documents exist. 8 B. The Americans with Disabilities Act 9 The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) bars discrimination against an 10 individual “on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, 11 facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public 12 accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public 13 accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). A restaurant or other establishment that serves 14 food or drink is a “public accommodation” under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(B). 15 Prevailing on an ADA claim requires a plaintiff to prove that (1) he or she has a 16 disability, as defined under the ADA; (2) the defendant leases, owns, or operates a place of 17 public accommodation; and (3) the defendant denied public accommodations to the 18 plaintiff because of plaintiff’s disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(a)–(b); see Molski v. M.J. 19 Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007). Furthermore, a plaintiff is not required to 20 show “intentional discrimination in order to make out a violation of the ADA.” Lentini, 21 370 F.3d at 846. The available remedy under the ADA does not include recovery of 22 damages, but instead provides only injunctive relief. Schutza v. Cuddeback, 262 F. Supp. 23 3d 1025, 1029 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (quoting Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 24 2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1))). 25 As to the third element—whether Plaintiff was denied public accommodations by 26 Defendant because of his disability—Defendant contends the assertions in the complaint 27 are conclusory and thus fail to plausibly allege it denied Plaintiff public accommodation 28 based on his disability. (Doc. No. 10-1 at 5.) Plaintiff does not provide sufficient factual 1 allegations as to how he was denied accommodation because he is in a wheelchair. Plaintiff 2 does not identify which counter or counters in the Dealership failed to accommodate 3 Plaintiff’s needs. Further, the Complaint does not state the manner in which the counters 4 were inaccessible. As Plaintiff’s allegations are only “naked assertions devoid of further 5 factual enhancement, and the Court need not accept “legal conclusions” as true, the Court 6 finds Plaintiff’s allegations for this element of an ADA claim insufficient. Ashcroft, 556 7 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 8 In conclusion, the Court holds that Plaintiff’s Complaint lacks sufficient facts to 9 support a cognizable ADA claim. 10 C. Unruh Civil Rights Act Claim and Supplemental Jurisdiction 11 Defendant also urges the Court to decline to exercise supplement jurisdiction over 12 Plaintiff’s cause of action for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”). (Doc. 13 No. 10-1 at 5.) Plaintiff argues there is no basis for the Court to decline supplemental 14 jurisdiction over the claim. (Doc. No. 12 at 11.) The Court agrees with Defendant. 15 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, a district court may decline to exercise supplemental 16 jurisdiction over a state law claim if: (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of state 17 law; (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the 18 district court has original jurisdiction; (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over 19 which it has original jurisdiction; or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other 20 compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The decision to decline 21 supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) should be informed by the values 22 of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 23 U.S. 715, 726 (1996). 24 Plaintiff’s state law claim arises under California’s Unruh Act. The Unruh Act 25 provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no 26 matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical 27 condition, genetic information, marital status, or sexual orientation are entitled to the full 28 and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business 1 establishments of every kind whatsoever.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b). “A violation of the right 2 of any individual under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (P.L. 101– 3 3361) shall also constitute a violation of this section.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f). “A violation 4 of the Unruh Act may be maintained independent of an ADA claim where a plaintiff pleads 5 ‘intentional discrimination in public accommodations in violation of the terms of the Act.” 6 Earll v. eBay, Inc., 5:11–cv–00262, 2011 WL 3955485, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2011) 7 (quoting Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 46 Cal. 4th 661, 668 (2009)). 8 Defendant presents two arguments as grounds to decline supplemental jurisdiction. 9 First, Defendant contends that because Unruh Act claims allow damages of $4,000 per 10 violation, whereas the ADA only permits injunctive relief, the California claim 11 predominates over the ADA claim. (Doc. No. 10-1 at 8–10.) And for the second ground, 12 Defendant argues Plaintiff’s inclusion of his Unruh Act claim constitutes impermissible 13 forum shopping because it is an end-around to California’s heightened pleading standards 14 requiring disability access plaintiffs to verify their complaints in state court. (Id. at 10–11.) 15 As to Defendant’s first argument, the Court agrees with Defendant’s argument that 16 state law issues predominate over ADA claim issues. If the Court exercises supplemental 17 jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim, (1) Defendant’s intent, (2) monetary damages, and 18 (3) Plaintiff’s emotional distress would be extraneous issues that would have to be litigated 19 and yet not relevant to the federal claim. As such, given these additional elements necessary 20 for an Unruh Act claim, the Court will decline to exercise jurisdiction over the state law 21 claim. See Feezor v. Tesstab Operations Grp., Inc., 524 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1224 (S.D. Cal. 22 2007) (“Given the disparity in terms of comprehensiveness of the remedy sought, state law 23 claims substantially predominate over the ADA for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2).”). 24 Lastly, the Court agrees and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction out of 25 deference to California’s heightened pleading requirements for disability lawsuits, and in 26 the interest of comity, as California courts should interpret the state’s disability laws. 27 Indeed, the Court will join other California district courts that have identified these factors 28 as a “compelling reason” to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over disability 1 ||claims arising under the Unruh Act. See Schutza, 262 F. Supp. 3d at 1030-31 (“[A]s a 2 ||matter of comity, and in deference to California’s substantial interest in discouraging 3 ||unverified disability discrimination claims, the Court declines supplemental jurisdiction A Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim.”); Molski v. Hitching Post I Restaurant, Inc., No. 04-cv- 5 || 1077-SVWRNBX, 2005 WL 3952248 at *9 (C.D. Cal. May 25, 2005) (“Because the 6 || California courts should be given an opportunity to interpret California’s disability laws, 7 || because the calculated effort to avoid having California courts decide issues of California 8 || law is to be discouraged, and because the parties themselves are entitled to a surer-footed 9 || interpretation of California’s disability laws, the Court finds that compelling reasons exist 10 |/to decline supplemental jurisdiction over [Plaintiff’s] state law claims.”’). 11 Thus, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's Unruh 12 || Act claim. 13 IV. CONCLUSION 14 In light of the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. As 15 Plaintiff fails to adequately plead an ADA violation, Plaintiff's ADA claim is 16 || DISMISSED. But appearing that amendment would not be futile, the Court GRANTS 17 Plaintiff leave to amend his ADA claim. Lastly, Plaintiff's Unruh Act claim is 18 || DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 19 || Plaintiff is to file an amended complaint consistent with this order within thirty 30) days 20 || of this Order. 21 22 || IT ISSO ORDERED. 23 34 Dated: May 15, 2020 gt Meet las 25 Hon. Anthony J.@Battaglia United States District Judge 26 27 28