Whitaker v. LL South San Francisco, L.P.

District Court, N.D. California·Decided June 4, 2021·No. 4:21-cv-00632·Unknown

Opinion

BRIAN WHITAKER, Case No. 21-cv-00632-HSG Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS v. Re: Dkt. No. 8 LL SOUTH SAN FRANCISCO, L.P., et al., Defendants. Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff Brian Whitaker’s first amended complaint (“FAC”). Dkt. No. 8 (“Mot.”). The Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition without oral argument, and the matter is deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss WITHOUT LEAVE TO Plaintiff, a quadriplegic who uses a wheelchair for mobility, alleges he “planned on making a trip in January of 2021 to the San Francisco, California, area.” Dkt. No. 15 FAC ¶¶ 1, 12. He allegedly chose Defendants’ Larkspur Landing South San Francisco hotel because it “was at a desirable price and location.” Id. ¶ 13. According to Plaintiff, when he attempted to book an accessible room at that location, he found that “other than the naked claim that this room was ‘wheelchair accessible’ with a roll-in shower, there was no other information about the mobility accessible features for the room on this online reservation system.” Id. ¶ 20. He “was unable to make any specific-room determinations due to the lack of identification, description or details about the particular room he was interested in booking.” Id. ¶ 21. In particular, Plaintiff alleges, the bathroom sinks “were cabinet style sinks or had low hanging aprons that did not provide knee clearance for a wheelchair user to pull up and under or, alternatively, where the plumbing underneath the sink was not wrapped with insulation to protect against burning contact to his knees;” and (3) whether the doorways “are at least 32 inches wide so he can get his wheelchair through.” Id. ¶¶ 22-24. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts two Causes of Action: “Violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990” and “Violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff need only plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when a plaintiff pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts “accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, courts do not “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)). Yet even if the court concludes that a 12(b)(6) motion should be granted, the “court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 In Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, the Ninth Circuit clarified the judicial notice rule and incorporation by reference doctrine. See 899 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2018). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a court may take judicial notice of a fact “not subject to reasonable dispute because it … can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). Accordingly, a court may take “judicial notice of matters of public record,” but “cannot take judicial notice of disputed facts contained in such public records.” Khoja, 899 F.3d at 999 (citation and quotations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has clarified that if a court takes judicial notice of a document, it must specify what facts it judicially noticed from the document. Id. at 999. Further, “[j]ust because the document itself is susceptible to judicial notice does not mean that every assertion of fact within that document is judicially noticeable for its truth.” Id. As an example, the Ninth Circuit held that for a transcript of a conference call, the court may take judicial notice of the fact that there was a conference call on the specified date, but may not take judicial notice of a fact mentioned in the transcript, because the substance “is subject to varying interpretations, and there is a reasonable dispute as to what the [document] establishes.” Id. at 999–1000. Separately, the incorporation by reference doctrine is a judicially-created doctrine that allows a court to consider certain documents as though they were part of the complaint itself. Id. at 1002. This is to prevent plaintiffs from cherry-picking certain portions of documents that support their claims, while omitting portions that weaken their claims. Id. Incorporation by reference is appropriate “if the plaintiff refers exclusively to the document or the document forms the basis of plaintiff’s claim.” Khoja, 899 F.3d at 1002. However, “the mere mention of the existence of a document is insufficient to incorporate the contents” of a document. Id. at 1002. And while a court “may assume [an incorporated document’s] contents are true for purposes of a motion to dismiss … it is improper to assume the truth of an incorporated document if such assumptions only serve to dispute facts stated in a well-pleaded complaint.” Id. A. Judicial Notice As part of its motion, Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of the following documents: 1) A copy of the “Landing page” and Accessibility Tab of Defendants’ website, https://www.casamadrona.com/, https://www.larkspurhotels.com/south-san-francisco, Ex. 1; 2) A copy of the relevant pages from Defendants’ website showing the various accessible room descriptions, Ex. 2; 3) A list of Plaintiff’s cases filed in California federal court from PACER, Ex. 3; 4) The Consent Decree in United States v. Hilton Worldwide Inc., No. 10-cv-1924, ECF No. 5 (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2010), Ex. 4; 5) The order dismissing complaint with prejudice in Arroyo v. JWMFE Anaheim, LLC, Case No. 8:21-cv-00014-CJC-KES (C.D. Cal. February 16, 2021), Ex. 5; 6) A copy of the Accessibility Page of JWMFE Anaheim’s Marriott website addressed in Arroyo v. JWMFE Anaheim,

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Whitaker v. LL South San Francisco, L.P., (N.D. Cal. 2021).

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