When Clothing Co. v. Commissioner

1 B.T.A. 973, 1925 BTA LEXIS 2726
CourtUnited States Board of Tax Appeals
DecidedApril 8, 1925
DocketDocket No. 428.
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 1 B.T.A. 973 (When Clothing Co. v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Board of Tax Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
When Clothing Co. v. Commissioner, 1 B.T.A. 973, 1925 BTA LEXIS 2726 (bta 1925).

Opinion

[976]*976OPINION.

Trussell:

In its petition and at the hearing of this appeal the taxpayer contended that, in the adjustment of its income and profits tax liability for the years 1919 and 1920, it should have been and should now be allowed the benefit of certain deductions from gross income and certain adjustments of invested capital, all of which have either heretofore been rejected by the Commissioner or are now first presented for consideration. These contentions will be taken up in the following order:

1. Compensation of officers. — The taxpayer claims that it should have the benefit of a deduction from gross income of an amount of $3,000 per year as reasonable compensation of its president who was the principal stockholder and managing officer. It claims this deduction in the amount of $3,000 per year. The record shows no corporate action authorizing the payment of any compensation to the president of the company for the years under consideration. No entry of such compensation has been made upon the books of account, nor any liability therefor accrued upon such books for these years and no compensation has been paid. Upon this record [977]*977we are unable to find any warrant for allowing the deduction claimed and the Commissioner’s decision with respect to this deduction should be approved.

2. Depreciation of advertising signs. — In closing its accounts for the years 1919 and 1920 the taxpayer computed depreciation upon its advertising signs and similar equipment at the rate of 15 per cent of the book value of these properties. We have found that this kind of equipment has a probable life in the absence of frequent repainting and repairs of not to exceed six years. Beginning with the year 1919, the taxpayer discontinued the up-keep of this class of equipment, thus eliminating from its accounts the annual expense items of repairs and repainting of signs. Under these circumstances we are of the opinion that the rate of depreciation claimed by the taxpayer is reasonable and that the deduction should be allowed.

3. Depreciation of trade-marh. — Taxpayer’s trade-mark asset was acquired for stock, the capital value being stated at $29,000. The record of this appeal, however, is wholly silent as to what may have been the actual cash value of this asset at the time taken over by the taxpayer corporation. The fact that stock in the amount of $29,000 was issued for an intangible asset, cannot be accepted as establishing the cash cost of such asset, and there being no other evidence of value in the record taxpayer’s claim for depreciation of this asset should not be allowed.

4. Depreciation of leasehold. — This taxpayer at the time of its organization took over a lease of certain store premises, having a fixed term of ten years with option for renewal. In 1908 it surrendered the original lease and negotiated in lieu thereof a new lease including not only the store premises but the entire building of which the store premises were a part. This latter lease was made for a term of 30 years and on March 1, 1913, still had a probable life of 25 years. The taxpayer never carried either the original or the substituted lease upon its books at any value. The lease originally taken over by the company had, of course, expired prior to March 1, 1913. The new lease was acquired in the ordinary course of business and without any actual capital outlay. If this new lease had on March 1, 1913, any definitely ascertainable capital value the taxpayer might rightfully claim some amount of depreciation of such value. In the record of this appeal there is some testimony to the effect that the terms of this lease were very favorable to the taxpayer; that the annual rental was less in amount than that paid by tenants of other buildings along the same street. This testimony, however, was indefinite and to a considerable extent speculative and furnished no reliable data from which could be evolved a formula for computing the March 1, 1913, value and the taxpayer did not produce any other testimony in support of its own estimate of such value. Upon this record we are unable to find any definite March.l, 1913, value of this leasehold and are forced to the conclusion that we cannot hold the taxpayer to be entitled to any deduction for its exhaustion.

5. Accrued interest on unpaid stoeh subscriptions. — In 1906 the taxpayer opened up accounts with three of its employees, charging to such accounts the par value of certain shares of stock proposed to be purchased by such employees according to the terms of an agreement with them. This account was from time to time charged [978]*978with interest on the unpaid balances and credited with dividends declared upon the stock and some other payments made by the purchasing employees. The taxpayer claims that it should be allowed to deduct the amount of $4,553.34, alleged to be the interest accrued upon these unpaid subscriptions for capital stock purchased by employees. It appears from the record that this amount of interese had been charged on the books against the stock accounts of employees Bonn and Burdell. It also appears that these two accounts had been credited respectively with amounts of dividends and other cash payments, totaling in each case an amount in excess of the amount of interest charged and, while it may be that credits to either account have not been specifically allocated against the accruing interest and the principal of such accounts, it is our opinion that in the keeping of such accounts the credits should be first applied to the extinguishment of the annually accruing interest and the balance of such credits only applied against the principal. Accepting this view we must find that the amount of interest charged to these accounts has been paid and that the deduction claimed by the taxpayer should be disallowed'.

6. Inventory adjustments. — In taking its annual inventories at the end of each of the years 1919 and 1920 the taxpayer wrote down certain of its inventory cost values in the amounts of $8,772.39 for the year 1919 and $5,056 for the year 1920. The taxpayer kept its inventories upon a system of cards, somewhat in the nature of a perpetual inventory system, and at or near the end of accounting periods entered upon some of these cards a percentage reduction of value in various departments of its store. The practice of the taxpayer in this respect does not appear to indicate any consistent method of reducing inventory costs to market value. The changes in inventory values are too infrequent to warrant us in holding that the taxpayer took its closing inventories for the years under consideration at cost or market, whichever is lower. We are thus led to the conclusion that the Commissioner’s action in disallowing these inventory write-downs should be approved.

7. Elimination of stock subscriptions from invested capital. — The three employees’ stock subscription accounts shown in the findings of fact stood on the books of the taxpayer on December 31,1918, with a total debit balance of $15,664.52. So far as we can determine from the record this amount was written off as of January 1, 1919, and the liability of the employees upon such accounts was then canceled. The asset value of these accounts thus disappeared and their elimination from invested capital should be approved.

8. Reduction of invested capital on account of alleged depreciation.

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Related

When Clothing Co. v. Commissioner
1 B.T.A. 973 (Board of Tax Appeals, 1925)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1 B.T.A. 973, 1925 BTA LEXIS 2726, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/when-clothing-co-v-commissioner-bta-1925.