IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA 25-376
Filed 4 March 2026
Onslow County, No. 21CVD002254-660
CRAWFORD WHEELER, Plaintiff,
v.
KIYOKA WHEELER, Defendant.
Appeal by Plaintiff from Order entered 16 August 2024 by Judge William P.
Shanahan, III, in Onslow County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16
October 2025.
Hayes Law Offices, PLLC, by Mark L. Hayes, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
No brief filed by Defendant-Appellee.
HAMPSON, Judge.
Factual and Procedural Background
Crawford Wheeler (Plaintiff) appeals from an Equitable Distribution Order
awarding an unequal division of marital property to his ex-wife Kiyoka Wheeler
(Defendant). The Record before us tends to reflect the following:
Plaintiff had a thirty-year career in the military. Defendant is from Japan. The
parties met in Japan, married there in February 2005, and later moved to North
Carolina. Plaintiff retired from the military in 2009.
The parties separated in July 2014. Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Absolute WHEELER V. WHEELER
Opinion of the Court
Divorce on 29 June 2021. Defendant filed an Answer and Counterclaim on 1
September 2021. In the Counterclaim, Defendant stated, “on June 13, 2015[,] the
parties entered into a Separation Agreement[.]” She attached a copy of the Separation
Agreement as an exhibit. Among other provisions, the Separation Agreement
required Plaintiff to pay Defendant $1,000 per month in spousal support. Defendant
requested the Separation Agreement be incorporated into the divorce judgment.
Defendant filed an Amended Counterclaim on 16 September 2021. In this
pleading, Defendant described the action as one for “absolute divorce, post separation
support, alimony[, and] equitable distribution of the marital property[.]” Defendant
sought an unequal division of the marital estate, with “a greater majority of the
assets” going to her. Defendant’s Amended Counterclaim departed from her first
responsive pleading in two pertinent ways: it did not reference the Separation
Agreement or attach it as an exhibit.
Plaintiff made a motion to sever the issue of Absolute Divorce, which the trial
court allowed. The trial court entered a Judgment of Absolute Divorce on 27
September 2021; the Judgment clarified that “all other matters pending in this action
shall remain open for a court to determine at a separate date.”
On 29 March 2023, the trial court entered an order requiring Plaintiff to pay
Defendant $614 per month in spousal support and the “marital share” of his monthly
military retirement pay. The issue of spousal support and military retirement pay
arrears was held open for future orders.
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The trial court held a bench trial on the Equitable Distribution and Alimony
claims on 25 April 2024. Plaintiff introduced the Separation Agreement into evidence
without objection. Plaintiff acknowledged the document was missing a notarized page
containing Defendant’s signature, as is required by statute.1 Plaintiff testified there
once “was [a] second page” containing Defendant’s notarized signature. Plaintiff
asserted the document was “still a valid contract” even without the missing page. In
an opening argument, defense counsel referred to the Separation Agreement as “void
because of the fact it was not notarized.” During cross-examination, defense counsel
asked Plaintiff if the Separation Agreement had required him to “pay [Defendant]
$1,000 per month” in spousal support, which Plaintiff confirmed. At closing, defense
counsel asked the trial court to “consider the fact that [the parties] did have [a
separation] agreement[,]” but asserted it “wasn’t . . . binding.”2
Defendant testified Plaintiff abused alcohol in the years leading up to their
separation, had been verbally and physically abusive, and had made threats to kill
her. Plaintiff disputed Defendant’s testimony alleging alcohol abuse, testifying he
1 To be “legal, valid, and binding,” a separation agreement “must be in writing and acknowledged by both parties before a certifying officer[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52-10.1 (2025). Notaries public are qualified certifying officers. Id. § 52-10(b). 2 Defense counsel also claimed at closing that the Separation Agreement’s non-binding status
had “already been determined.” This appears to have been a suggestion that a prior trial court had determined the Separation Agreement was non-binding. However, at this trial, no evidence was introduced of any prior trial court finding the Separation Agreement invalid. Nor is there any such evidence in the Record. Additionally, “it is axiomatic that the arguments of counsel are not evidence.” Blue v. Bhiro, 381 N.C. 1, 6, 871 S.E.2d 691, 695 (2022) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Thus, we do not consider defense counsel’s assertions about the Separation Agreement during opening or closing arguments as evidence.
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drank alcohol “minimally.” Plaintiff also denied being abusive to Defendant during
their marriage and stated he had never threatened to kill her.
The trial court entered its Order on Equitable Distribution and Alimony on 16
August 2024. The trial court made Findings of Fact regarding the assets and debts
the parties had “jointly identified . . . as property for equitable distribution[.]” It did
not make a Finding addressing the validity of the parties’ alleged Separation
Agreement.
After tallying the assets, the trial court found: (1) $252,018 of the marital
estate was in Plaintiff’s possession; (2) $31,410 of the marital estate was in
Defendant’s possession; and thus (3) “a cash distributive award of $110,304 from
Plaintiff to Defendant would result in an equal distribution of marital property.”
However, the trial court found “[a]n unequal distribution in favor of Defendant
is equitable based on the following factors:”
a. N.C.G.S 50-20(c)(1): The income, property, and liabilities of each party at the time the division of property is to become effective.
i. [Defendant] lost her Social Security benefits in her home country of Japan. ii. [Plaintiff] has income from Veteran’s Affairs Disability, Social Security, and rental income from his home in California. iii. Plaintiff’s rental income from the California home is artificially low given the lack of increases over such a long period of time. iv. Plaintiff has a large separate property estate value because of his ownership of the California home.
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b. N.C.G.S 50-20(c)(3): The duration of the marriage and the age and physical and mental health of both parties.
i. The parties had a 9-year marriage. Plaintiff had health problems throughout the marriage that have worsened since the date of separation and said health problems are in part due to excessive alcohol use.
c. N.C.G.S 50-20(c)(7): Any direct or indirect contribution made by one spouse to help educate or develop the career potential of the other spouse.
i. [Defendant’s] role in the marriage caused her to forgo developing job skills and work history, which limits her earning potential moving forward.
d. N.C.G.S 50-20(c)(12): Any other factor which the court finds to be just and proper.
i. Plaintiff’s excessive alcohol use and Domestic Violence, including taking [Defendant’s] cards, ID, and passport as well as [Plaintiff’s] threat to kill [Defendant] during the marriage.
The trial court concluded, as a matter of law, “an unequal distribution in the
Defendant’s favor . . . is equitable.” It then ordered Plaintiff to pay Defendant a “cash
distributive award” of $250,000 within thirty days.3
Additionally, in a section of the Decree titled “Retirement Benefits,” the trial
court stated Defendant received military retirement pay. In a pertinent part of this
3 The trial court also resolved Defendant’s alimony claim by ordering Plaintiff to pay $21,632
in spousal support arrears within thirty days and provided that once this payment was made, Plaintiff’s “post separation support payments” would be terminated. The trial court also ordered Plaintiff to pay Defendant’s attorney fees. The alimony and attorney fees issues are not before us in this appeal.
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section, the trial court ordered: “Plaintiff shall maintain Survivor Benefit Plan
Coverage with Defendant as the beneficiary of said coverage.”
Plaintiff provided written Notice of Appeal on 6 September 2024.
Issues
The issues on appeal are whether the trial court: (I) erred by failing to make a
Finding of Fact regarding the validity of the alleged Separation Agreement; (II) erred
in its consideration of statutory distributional factors in determining an unequal
division of marital property was equitable; and (III) erred by ordering Plaintiff to
maintain Survivor Benefit Plan Coverage with Defendant as the beneficiary.
Analysis
I. Finding on Separation Agreement
Plaintiff first argues the trial court erred by failing to make a finding about the
validity of the parties’ alleged Separation Agreement. Plaintiff contends the alleged
Separation Agreement raised an issue of ultimate fact on which the trial court was
required to make a finding, because if the document were found to be valid, it would
be “a bar to [Defendant’s] equitable distribution claim.” We disagree.
Under our Rules of Appellate Procedure, “[i]n order to preserve an issue for
appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request,
objection, or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling the party desired the
court to make if the specific grounds were not apparent from the context.” N.C. R.
App. P. 10(a)(1) (2025). “It is well-established that a contention not raised and argued
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in the trial court may not be raised and argued for the first time in the appellate
court.” Smallwood v. Smallwood, 227 N.C. App. 319, 331, 742 S.E.2d 814, 822 (2013)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). The purpose of Rule 10(a)(1) “is to require a
party to call the [trial] court’s attention to a matter upon which [the party] wants a
ruling before [the party] can assign error to the matter on appeal.” Kaylor v. Kaylor,
296 N.C. App. 80, 88, 907 S.E.2d 758, 765 (2024) (citation and quotation marks
omitted). Our Supreme Court “has long held that where a theory argued on appeal
was not raised before the trial court, ‘the law does not permit parties to swap horses
between courts in order to get a better mount in the [appellate courts].’ ” State v.
Sharpe, 344 N.C. 190, 194-95, 473 S.E.2d 3, 5 (1996) (quoting Weil v. Herring, 207
N.C. 6, 10, 175 S.E. 836, 838 (1934)) (other citations omitted).
Additionally, where, as here, a trial court sits without a jury, it must “find the
facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1,
Rule 52(a)(1) (2025). “There are two kinds of facts: . . . . Ultimate facts are the final
facts required to establish the plaintiff’s cause of action or the defendant’s defense;
and evidentiary facts are those subsidiary facts required to prove the ultimate facts.”
Woodard v. Mordecai, 234 N.C. 463, 470, 67 S.E.2d 639, 644 (1951) (citations
omitted).
Rule 52(a)(1) does not require the trial court to recite all of the evidentiary facts; it is required only to find the ultimate facts, i.e., those specific material facts which are determinative of the questions involved in the action and from which an appellate court can determine whether the findings are supported by the
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evidence and, in turn, support the conclusions of law reached by the trial court.
Mann Contractors, Inc. v. Flair with Goldsmith Consultants-II, Inc., 135 N.C. App.
772, 774, 522 S.E.2d 118, 120-21 (1999) (citing Farmers Bank v. Brown Distribs., Inc.,
307 N.C. 342, 298 S.E.2d 357 (1983)).
In the instant case, Plaintiff argues the trial court was required to make a
finding on the validity of the alleged Separation Agreement because it raised an issue
of ultimate fact. Plaintiff accurately states a valid separation agreement can serve as
a bar to an equitable distribution claim. Hagler v. Hagler, 319 N.C. 287, 295, 354
S.E.2d 228, 234-35 (1987). But in the proceeding below, Plaintiff never asserted a
theory that the alleged Separation Agreement barred Defendant’s equitable
distribution claim. Plaintiff’s pleadings did not mention the alleged Separation
Agreement, much less raise it as a defense.4 To the contrary, Plaintiff’s Reply
admitted key allegations in Defendant’s Amended Counterclaim concerning equitable
distribution. Namely, Plaintiff admitted: (1) the parties acquired during the marriage
4 In a related argument, Plaintiff contends “[g]enerally, the invocation of a separation agreement to defeat an equitable distribution claim is an affirmative defense which must be pled,” but even when the defense is not pled, it may be tried by express or implied consent. However, Plaintiff cites no authorities that support this assertion. The cases Plaintiff cites to suggest the issue may have been tried by consent are inapposite. See Miller v. Talton, 112 N.C. App. 484, 487, 435 S.E.2d 793, 796-97 (1993) (affirmative defense of statute of limitations tried by consent). Indeed, in Howell v. Landry, this Court held unpled affirmative defenses of duress and undue influence were tried by consent where the trial court determined those issues as part of its ruling without objection. 96 N.C. App. 516, 526, 386 S.E.2d 610, 616 (1989). On the other hand, the Court held the affirmative defenses of unconscionability, fraud, and inadequate disclosure were neither pled nor litigated, and thus were not properly raised on appeal. Id. (citation omitted). Here, no party sought affirmative relief under the Separation Agreement, and the trial court did not make any determination on the validity of the Separation Agreement.
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marital and divisible property subject to equitable distribution under N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 50-20(b); and (2) “the circumstances of this case and the respective parties . . .
warrant that an unequal division of marital property is equitable.” Furthermore, at
trial, Plaintiff did not contend the alleged Separation Agreement barred Defendant’s
equitable distribution claim. Nor did Plaintiff ask the trial court to rule on this issue.
In fact, Plaintiff acknowledged the Separation Agreement exhibit he introduced was
missing a notarized page containing Defendant’s signature. Plaintiff confirmed he
understood the absence of this page meant the document “didn’t meet the statutory
definition of a separation agreement[.]”
Thus, because Plaintiff did not raise the alleged Separation Agreement as a
defense to Defendant’s equitable distribution claim in his pleadings or his arguments
and evidence at trial, the document did not raise an issue of ultimate fact “required
to establish [his] defense” about which the trial court was required to make a finding.
See Woodard, 234 N.C. at 470, 67 S.E.2d at 644. Therefore, because Plaintiff did not
request a ruling from the trial court on this issue pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1),
this argument is not preserved for our review. Consequently, this argument is
dismissed.
II. Equitable Distribution
Plaintiff next argues the trial court erred in its application of the statutory
distributional factors in determining an unequal division of marital property in favor
of Defendant was equitable.
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N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20 governs the distribution of marital and divisible
property upon divorce. “Equitable distribution is a three-step process requiring the
trial court to (1) determine what is marital [and divisible] property; (2) find the net
value of the property; and (3) make an equitable distribution of that property.”
Kaylor, 296 N.C. App. at 82-83, 907 S.E.2d at 761 (citations and quotation marks
“An equal division of marital property is equitable unless, after considering the
factors listed in [N.C.G.S.] § 50-20(c) that were raised by the evidence, the trial court
finds that an equal division of marital property would not be equitable under the
circumstances.” Id. at 83, 907 S.E.2d at 761 (citing Truesdale v. Truesdale, 89 N.C.
App. 445, 450, 366 S.E.2d 512, 516 (1988)).
If the trial court so finds that an equal division is not equitable, it must make specific findings of fact setting forth the reasons for an unequal division. The trial court need not make exhaustive findings of the evidentiary facts, but must include the ultimate facts considered. The trial court has discretion in determining how much weight to accord to each factor, and a single factor may be sufficient to support an unequal distribution[.]
Id. at 83, 907 S.E.2d at 761-62 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Here, Plaintiff argues the trial court improperly considered factors related to
marital fault and misconduct in deciding to order an unequal division of marital
property in Defendant’s favor. We agree.
In determining whether an unequal division of marital property is equitable,
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the trial court “shall consider”5 the twelve distributional factors listed in N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 50-20(c)(1)-(12). The twelfth factor authorizes consideration of “[a]ny other
factor that the [trial] court finds just and proper.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(c)(12)
(2025).
In Smith v. Smith, our Supreme Court interpreted the Section 50-20(c)(12)
catch-all factor through the lens of the statute’s eleven enumerated factors, all of
which “concern the economy of the marriage, i.e., the source, availability, and use by
a wife and husband of economic resources during the course of their marriage.” 314
N.C. 80, 86, 332 S.E.2d 682, 686 (1985) (footnote omitted); see, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. §
50-20(c)(1) (2025) (the trial court shall consider “[t]he income, property, and liabilities
of each party at the time the division of property is to become effective.”). In keeping
with the economic focus of the enumerated factors, the Court concluded that “under
[Section] 50-20(c)(12), the only other considerations which are ‘just and proper’ . . .
are those which are relevant to the marital economy.” Smith, 314 N.C. at 87, 332
S.E.2d at 687. Therefore, the Court “h[e]ld that marital fault or misconduct of the
parties which is not related to the economic condition of the marriage is not germane
to a division of marital property under [Section] 50-20(c) and should not be
considered” by the trial court. Id. (citations omitted). In other words, “[m]arital fault,
5 While Section 50-20(c) requires consideration of all twelve distributional factors, the trial
court “must only make findings concerning those factors for which evidence was presented.” Tucker v. Miller, 113 N.C. App. 785, 789, 440 S.E.2d 315, 318 (1994) (citation omitted).
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without economic consequences, is not properly considered as a distributional factor.”
Fountain v. Fountain, 148 N.C. App. 329, 341, 559 S.E.2d 25, 34 (2002) (citing Smith,
314 N.C. at 87, 331 S.E.2d at 687).
In the case sub judice, the trial court, expressly citing Section 50-20(c)(12),
stated the following in Finding 21(d): “Plaintiff’s excessive alcohol use and Domestic
Violence, including taking [Defendant’s] cards, ID, and passport as well as
[Plaintiff’s] threat to kill [Defendant] during the marriage.” Finding 21(d) is clearly
improper under Smith v. Smith; alcohol abuse, domestic violence, death threats, and
taking a spouse’s identity documents are examples of marital misconduct that are
“not related to the economic condition of the marriage.” 314 N.C. at 87, 332 S.E.2d at
687. Therefore, because this information is “not germane” to the division of marital
property under Section 50-20(c), the trial court erred by considering it. See id.
The trial court made three other Findings6 in determining “an unequal division
in favor of Defendant is equitable[.]” However, on appellate review, “we cannot
determine the weight assigned by the trial court . . . [to the] inappropriate
distributional factors” stated in Finding 21(d). Fountain, 148 N.C. App. at 342, 559
S.E.2d at 35 (citation omitted). Therefore, we must vacate the Order and remand this
case to the trial court “for a reassessment of its decision to order an unequal division
6 Plaintiff also challenges portions of Findings 21(a), 21(b), and 21(c). Plaintiff argues these
Findings are not supported by competent evidence. We disagree. Upon careful review of the Record, we conclude the challenged Findings are supported by competent evidence. Therefore, we do not address Plaintiff’s challenges to Findings 21(a), 21(b), and 21(c).
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without considering the improper factors.” Id. (citing Becker v. Becker, 127 N.C. App.
409, 412, 489 S.E.2d 909, 912 (1997)).
III. Survivor Benefit Plan
In his final argument, Plaintiff asserts the trial court erred by ordering him to
“maintain Survivor Benefit Plan Coverage with Defendant as the beneficiary of said
coverage.”
This Court has described the Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) as
a plan, managed by the [Department of] Defense Finance and Accounting Service (“DFAS”), available to eligible military retirees whereby some retirement pay is withheld monthly to participate in a plan to provide a surviving spouse, former spouse, or other designate, with monthly benefits upon the death of the participating serviceperson.
Ellison v. Ellison, 242 N.C. App. 386, 387, 776 S.E.2d 522, 523-24 (2015). See also 10
U.S.C. § § 1448-1455 (statutory provisions related to SBP).
Plaintiff first contends no evidence about SBP was introduced at trial, and
therefore the trial court had “no evidentiary basis” on which to classify SBP as marital
property or order Plaintiff to maintain SBP with Defendant as the beneficiary. We
disagree. There is evidence in the Record on Appeal supporting the existence of SBP
coverage as part of Plaintiff’s overall military retirement benefits.
The Record contains a copy of Plaintiff’s military “Retiree Account Statement,”
which lists an effective date of 23 January 2023 (Retirement Statement). The
Retirement Statement references “SURVIVOR BENEFIT PLAN (SBP) COVERAGE”
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and indicates the coverage type as “SPOUSE ONLY.” A sum of $63.49 for “SBP
COSTS” appears to have been deducted from Plaintiff’s gross retirement pay. In a
separate box, labeled “ARREARS OF PAY BENEFICIARY INFORMATION,” the
Retirement Statement lists “WHEELER, KIYOKA” (Defendant) as the sole
beneficiary, and Defendant’s relationship to Plaintiff as “WIFE.” Further, the
Retirement Statement was introduced by defense counsel as “Defendant’s Exhibit
17.”7 Defense counsel cross-examined Plaintiff about Exhibit 17, though he was not
questioned about its references to SBP, and gave no testimony about SBP. Thus, the
Record tends to show that as of January 2023, Plaintiff paid for SBP coverage and
Defendant was the beneficiary. Therefore, we cannot agree with Plaintiff’s claim that
the Record “is devoid of any reference” to SBP.
Next, we consider whether the trial court erred by classifying and distributing
SBP to Defendant as marital property. “Equitable distribution is a three-step process
requiring the trial court to (1) determine what is marital [and divisible] property; (2)
find the net value of the property; and (3) make an equitable distribution of that
property.” Kaylor, 296 N.C. App. at 83, 907 S.E.2d at 761 (citations and quotation
marks omitted). As relevant here, the duty to classify requires the trial court to
7 Defense counsel later moved to introduce “Defendant’s Exhibits 1 through 19,” which would
include the Retirement Statement as Exhibit 17. Plaintiff’s counsel objected on the basis he had “not read all of [Defendant’s exhibits]” and asked the trial court to “keep[ ] it to what the evidence was presented today.” The trial court stated “[i]t’s admitted in terms of the documents supporting the testimony today.” Because Exhibit 17 supported testimony at trial, we consider it as having been admitted into evidence.
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“ascertain upon appropriate findings of fact, what is marital property[.]” Willis v.
Willis, 86 N.C. App. 546, 550, 358 S.E.2d 571, 573 (1987) (citation omitted). Parties
may stipulate to the classification of property. Zurofsky v. Shaffer, 236 N.C. App. 219,
236, 763 S.E.2d 755, 765 (2014) (citation omitted).
Here, the trial court’s Order stated the parties had stipulated that a “marital
portion” of Plaintiff’s “military pension or retired pay . . . is subject to marital property
division.” The trial court therefore found “Defendant is entitled to a share of
Plaintiff’s military retirement benefits, as set out in the Decree below.” In its Decree,
the trial court stated “Plaintiff’s military retired pay constitutes marital property to
the extent it coincided with the marriage and shall be divided as follows: . . . . Plaintiff
shall maintain Survivor Benefit Plan Coverage with Defendant as the beneficiary of
said coverage.”
At trial, neither party specifically raised the status of SBP for the purpose of
classification. In particular, we observe that Plaintiff did not even mention SBP at
trial—much less challenge its status as distributable marital property, as he now
does on appeal. Absent specific arguments by the parties, the trial court appears to
have analyzed SBP using the only evidence it had: Plaintiff’s Retirement Statement.
The Retirement Statement indicates that as of January 2023, money was being
deducted from Plaintiff’s gross military retirement pay to cover the cost of “Spouse
Only” SBP coverage. The trial court, following the parties’ stipulation to classifying
Plaintiff’s military retirement benefits as marital property, found “Defendant is
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entitled to a share of Plaintiff’s military retirement benefits[.]” Finally, in its Decree,
the trial court ordered Plaintiff to maintain SBP coverage with Defendant as the
beneficiary. Thus, we cannot say the trial court, based on the stipulations and
evidence before it, exceeded its authority by classifying SBP as marital property and
ordering Plaintiff to maintain it with Defendant as the beneficiary.
The remaining question is whether this Court should reach the issue of how
SBP—a federally administered benefit for military veterans—should interact with
the North Carolina equitable distribution statute. Our appellate courts have not yet
addressed this issue. In his brief, Plaintiff points us to Ellison v. Ellison, where this
Court observed, “[i]t is unclear that SBP benefits are allocated pursuant to equitable
distribution[.]” 242 N.C. App. at 390, 776 S.E.2d at 525. To be clear, this sentence is
dicta. As the Ellison Court “[did] not recognize the present action as one for equitable
distribution,” it did not analyze the question of SBP in the context of equitable
distribution. Id. Plaintiff next claims “no subsequent decision [after Ellison] has
definitively resolved [the] issue” of SBP’s status vis-a-vis equitable distribution. Our
research does not reveal such a case either. But, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, it
does not follow that this Court should now weigh in on an issue not argued at trial
and barely referenced in the Record with scant briefing. We therefore decline
Plaintiff’s request to conclude the trial court “erred in ordering [Plaintiff] to obtain
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SBP for [Defendant].”8
Instead, on remand, we instruct the trial court to hold a hearing wherein the
parties may present arguments and evidence on the SBP issue. This hearing should
permit arguments regarding the appropriate methods of classification, valuation, and
distribution of SBP, including, but not limited to, the subject of whether SBP should
be considered a component of Plaintiff’s military retirement benefits or as a distinct
asset subject to independent distribution. In its discretion, the trial court may
reconsider whether Plaintiff may be required to “maintain” SBP as part of an
equitable distribution order.
Conclusion
Thus, the trial court erroneously considered improper non-economic factors in
determining an unequal distribution was equitable in this case. Therefore, the trial
court erred in awarding an unequal distribution based on those factors.
Consequently, the trial court’s Order is vacated. Accordingly, for the foregoing
reasons, we vacate the Order and remand this case to the trial court for further
proceedings to reconsider its equitable distribution. In addition, the trial court may
also reconsider the classification, valuation, and distribution of SBP based on
argument and evidence presented by the parties.
8 We note this assertion in Plaintiff’s brief misstates the contents of the Order. The trial court
ordered Plaintiff to “maintain” SBP, not to “obtain” it.
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VACATED AND REMANDED.
Judges CARPENTER and FREEMAN concur.
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