Wheeler v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Wheeler v. State

898 So. 2d 1052, 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 3525, 2005 WL 596993

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedMarch 16, 2005

DocketNo. 2D04-167

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 898 So. 2d 1052 (Wheeler v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Wheeler v. State, 898 So. 2d 1052, 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 3525, 2005 WL 596993 (Fla. Ct. App. 2005).

Pincite

Opinion

SILBERMAN, Judge.

Carl Wheeler appeals his judgment and prison releasee reoffender (PRR) sentence for aggravated assault and Ms judgment and sentence for improper exhibition of a dangerous weapon. We affirm in all respects but write only to address the issue of the applicability of PRR sentencing for the offense of aggravated assault.

Wheeler’s aggravated assault conviction arose from an incident in which he held a BB gun to the head of a ten-year-old boy. Wheeler contends that he did not qualify for a PRR sentence under section 775.082(9)(a)(l)(j), Florida Statutes (2002), which lists “[aggravated assault with a deadly weapon” as a qualifying offense. The trial court, however, determined that Wheeler’s conviction qualified for PRR sentencing under section 775.082(9)(a)(l)(o) as “[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual.” Wheeler argues that the legislature did not intend this “catch-all” provision to apply to aggravated assault. However,

[[legislative intent must be determined primarily from the language of the statute. “[W]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.”

State v. VanBebber, 848 So.2d 1046, 1049 (Fla.2003) (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984)) (citation omitted); see also Dolly Bolding Bail Bonds v. State, 787 So.2d 73, 74 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

The catch-all provision refers to “[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence.” § 775.082(9)(a)(l)(o) (emphasis added). Here, it is clear that the aggravated assault by placing a BB gun to a child’s head involved the threat of violence against an individual so as to fall within section 775.082(9)(a)(l)(o). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly imposed Wheeler’s PRR sentence for aggravated assault.

Affirmed.

WALLACE, J., and THREADGILL, EDWARD F., Senior Judge, Concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

SILBERMAN, Judge.

Carl Wheeler appeals his judgment and prison releasee reoffender (PRR) sentence for aggravated assault and Ms judgment and sentence for improper exhibition of a dangerous weapon. We affirm in all respects but write only to address the issue of the applicability of PRR sentencing for the offense of aggravated assault.

Wheeler’s aggravated assault conviction arose from an incident in which he held a BB gun to the head of a ten-year-old boy. Wheeler contends that he did not qualify for a PRR sentence under section 775.082(9)(a)(l)(j), Florida Statutes (2002), which lists “[aggravated assault with a deadly weapon” as a qualifying offense. The trial court, however, determined that Wheeler’s conviction qualified for PRR sentencing under section 775.082(9)(a)(l)(o) as “[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual.” Wheeler argues that the legislature did not intend this “catch-all” provision to apply to aggravated assault. However,

[[legislative intent must be determined primarily from the language of the statute. “[W]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.”

State v. VanBebber, 848 So.2d 1046, 1049 (Fla.2003) (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984)) (citation omitted); see also Dolly Bolding Bail Bonds v. State, 787 So.2d 73, 74 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

The catch-all provision refers to “[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence.” § 775.082(9)(a)(l)(o) (emphasis added). Here, it is clear that the aggravated assault by placing a BB gun to a child’s head involved the threat of violence against an individual so as to fall within section 775.082(9)(a)(l)(o). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly imposed Wheeler’s PRR sentence for aggravated assault.

Affirmed.

WALLACE, J., and THREADGILL, EDWARD F., Senior Judge, Concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

898 So. 2d 1052, 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 3525, 2005 WL 596993, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wheeler-v-state-fladistctapp-2005.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack