Wheeler v. New Times, Inc.

49 S.W.3d 471, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 3272, 2001 WL 534156
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMay 21, 2001
DocketNo. 05-00-00704-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 49 S.W.3d 471 (Wheeler v. New Times, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wheeler v. New Times, Inc., 49 S.W.3d 471, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 3272, 2001 WL 534156 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001).

Opinion

OPINION

WRIGHT, Justice.

Thomas L. Wheeler, Jr. (Wheeler), Wheeler Management Company, Inc., Industrial Building Corporation, Inc., Lamar Development Company of Dallas, Inc., and Wheeler, Ltd. appeal the summary judgments granted in favor of New Times, Inc. d/b/a Dallas Observer and Denise McVea. Appellants sued appellees for defamation after New Times published an article written by McVea.1 In two issues with multiple subparts, appellants contend the trial court erred by granting appellees’ motions [473]*473for summary judgment because (1) the article was not substantially true, and (2) it was reasonably capable of conveying a defamatory meaning. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Factual and Procedural Background

Appellants own numerous residential rental properties in Dallas. On November 2, 1995, New Times published an article in the Dallas Observer about urban rehabilitation and building code enforcement in certain poor minority neighborhoods. A portion of the article featured Wheeler. After the article was published, appellants sued appellees for defamation. Appellants’ original petition alleged the article was defamatory because it (1) disseminated false information about the issuance of city code violations to Wheeler for his rental properties; and (2) implied that Wheeler had committed bribery and used improper influence to avoid the issuance of city code violations and demolition orders.

New Times filed a motion for summary judgment alleging it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the article did not state or imply that Wheeler engaged in bribery or used improper influence and, therefore, was not defamatory. Séveral months later, the trial court signed an order granting New Times’s motion for summary judgment “as to any claim for defamation or libel arising out of an alleged implication that [appellants] committed bribery or exercised unlawful influence.” The order denied the motion “in all other respects.” New Times filed an interlocutory appeal in this Court, contending the trial court erred by denying, in part, its motion. We concluded the trial court granted all of the relief requested by New Times in its motion and dismissed the interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction. New Times, Inc. v. Wheeler, No. 05-97-01756-CV, slip op. at 3, 1998 WL 205865 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1998, pet. denied) (not designated for publication).

Several months after New Times filed its motion for summary judgment, but before the trial court ruled on the motion, appellants filed an amended petition alleging that, in addition to implying bribery and improper influence, the article defamed Wheeler by implying he (1) does not keep his word, (2) is a “scofflaw,” (3) fraudulently misrepresented himself and his intentions to gain special privileges, and (4) is racially bigoted and exploits minority tenants. After we remanded the case to the trial court, McVea filed a motion for summary judgment alleging, among other things, she was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the article is not defamatory. Thereafter, New Times filed a second motion for summary judgment. In that motion, New Times alleged, among other things, that (1) the complained-of statements are not defamatory, and (2) the alleged implications from the article are not reasonable or defamatory. The trial court granted the motions “as to any and all claims and causes of action” because “the statements and/or implications contained in the article in question are not defamatory and are not reasonably capable of a defamatory meaning as a matter of law.” This appeal followed.

Standard of Review

This Court reviews a summary judgment de novo to determine whether a party’s right to prevail is established as a matter of law. Foreness v. Hexamer, 971 S.W.2d 525, 527 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1997, pet. denied). When reviewing a traditional summary judgment, we apply well known standards. See Tex.R.App.P. 166a(e); McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex.1993); Black v. Victoria Lloyds Ins. Co., 797 S.W.2d 20, 23 [474]*474(Tex.1990); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., Inc., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985). The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing no genuine issue of material fact exists and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Tex.R.App.P. 166a(c); Swilley v. Hughes, 488 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex.1972).

Defamation

Whether a publication is capable of a defamatory meaning is initially a question of law to be determined by the court. Turner v. KTRK Television, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 103, 114 (Tex.2000). We construe the allegedly defamatory publication as a whole, in light of the surrounding circumstances, based upon how a person of ordinary intelligence would perceive it. Id. An article is defamatory if it “tends to injure a living person’s reputation and thereby exposes the person to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or financial injury or to impeach any person’s honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation.” Gaylord Broad. Co. v. Francis, 7 S.W.3d 279, 283 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1999, pet. denied). If the publication is of ambiguous or doubtful import, a jury must determine its meaning. Turner, 38 S.W.3d at 114; Gaylord, 7 S.W.3d at 283.

Discussion

Because the threshold question in any defamation case is whether the complained-of article or statements are reasonably capable of a defamatory meaning, we begin our analysis by determining whether the article defamed Wheeler. See Musser v. Smith Protective Servs., 723 S.W.2d 653, 655 (Tex.1987). If the article or statements are not reasonably capable of a defamatory meaning, then summary judgment is proper. See Gaylord, 7 S.W.3d at 283. Moreover, if we determine that neither the article nor the complained-of statements is reasonably capable of a defamatory meaning, we need not determine whether the complained-of statements are substantially true. See Huckabee v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 19 S.W.3d 413, 429 (Tex.2000) (holding statement was not defamatory regardless of its falsity and thus any alleged knowledge of its falsity was irrelevant).

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49 S.W.3d 471, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 3272, 2001 WL 534156, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wheeler-v-new-times-inc-texapp-2001.