W.G. Ex Rel. K.G. v. New York City Department of Education

801 F. Supp. 2d 142, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53627, 2011 WL 1900161
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMay 18, 2011
Docket10 Civ. 4099 (LTS)(KNF)
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 801 F. Supp. 2d 142 (W.G. Ex Rel. K.G. v. New York City Department of Education) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
W.G. Ex Rel. K.G. v. New York City Department of Education, 801 F. Supp. 2d 142, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53627, 2011 WL 1900161 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).

Opinion

Opinion and Order

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, District Judge.

Plaintiffs W.G. and M.G. bring this action, individually and on behalf of their minor son, K.G. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), against the New York City Department of Education (“Defendant” or “DOE”), pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. (“the IDEA”). Plaintiffs’ application for reimbursement for tuition paid for their unilateral out-of-state placement of K.G. at Cross Creek Academy, LLC, a residential therapeutic school in Utah (“Cross Creek”), was denied by their local Committee on Special Education (“CSE”). They sought due process review of that decision pursuant to the IDEA and New York State law; on October 27, 2009, the Impartial Hearing Officer (“IHO”) who conducted the “impartial due process hearing” found that K.G. was eligible for special education programs and services as a student with an emotional disturbance, and ordered the school district to reimburse Plaintiffs. The DOE petitioned for further administrative review of the IHO’s decision and, on January 21, 2010, the State Review Officer (“SRO”) reversed the IHO’s decision, finding that K.G. did not meet any of the criteria for eligibility as a student with an emotional disturbance under the IDEA, and was therefore ineligible to receive the special education programs and services provided for by the statute. Plaintiffs were thus denied reimbursement for their costs incurred in connection with the placement of K.G. at Cross Creek.

Plaintiffs’ complaint before this Court seeks review and reversal of the SRO determination. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(i)(2)(A)-(C) (West 2010). Defendant moves for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint. Plaintiffs cross-move for summary judgment, seeking full reimbursement for the tuition costs they incurred, plus attorney’s fees and the costs incurred in bringing this action. The principal disputed issues are whether K.G. qualified as a student with an emotional disturbance under the IDEA, *145 whether the Cross Creek program was an appropriate unilateral placement by Plaintiffs, and whether the equities favor reimbursement. The Court has jurisdiction of this action pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

The Court has reviewed thoroughly all of the parties’ submissions, including the entire administrative record. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and Plaintiffs’ motion is denied.

I. Statutory and Procedural Framework

The IDEA was enacted “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their needs ... [and] to ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and the parents of such children are protected.” 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(d)(l)(A)-(B) (West 2010). “Under the IDEA, states receiving federal funds are required to provide ‘all children with disabilities’ a ‘free appropriate public education.’ ” Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 107 (2d Cir.2007) (quoting IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)). Section 1401 of the statute defines “child with a disability” to mean

a child—
(i) with intellectual disabilities, hearing impairments ..., speech or language impairments, visual impairments ..., serious emotional disturbance (referred to in [the statute] as “emotional disturbance”), orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and
(ii) who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related services.

20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3) (West 2010). Department of Education regulations (and substantially identical regulations adopted by the New York State Education Department in connection with the implementation of the federal statute) define “emotional disturbance” as

a condition exhibiting one or more of the following characteristics over a long period of time and to a marked degree that adversely affects a child’s educational performance:
(A) An inability to learn that cannot be explained by intellectual, sensory or health factors.
(B) An inability to build or maintain satisfactory interpersonal relationships with peers and teachers.
(C) Inappropriate types of behavior or feelings under normal circumstances.
(D) A general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression.
(E) A tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears associated with personal or school problems.

34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(4)(i) (2010). See also N.Y. Comp.Codes & Regs. tit. 8, § 200.1. The regulation goes on to provide that the term emotional disturbance “does not apply to children who are socially maladjusted, unless it is determined that they have an emotional disturbance under paragraph (c)(4)(i) of this section.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(4)(ii) (2010).

The relevant state or local educational agency must conduct an individualized evaluation to determine whether a child is one with a disability, and develop an annual written “individualized education program” (“IEP”) for each child with a disability. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d) (West 2010). The evaluation process can be initiated by the agency or the child’s parent, cannot be commenced without parental consent, and is subject to statutory temporal and procedural requirements. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(a)(1) (West 2010), In New York, IEPs are developed by local “Com *146 mittees on Special Education” (“CSEs”) in conjunction with the disabled student’s parents. N.Y. Educ. L. § 4402(1)(b)(1).

The IDEA requires that parents be provided with an opportunity to present a complaint regarding the identification, evaluation, or placement of their child through the IEP process, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(b)(6)(A) (West 2010). Parents who are dissatisfied with a school district’s disability status determination, or IEP, may unilaterally place their child in a private school, at their own risk, and then seek a retroactive tuition reimbursement from the local school district. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(10)(C) (West 2010).

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801 F. Supp. 2d 142, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53627, 2011 WL 1900161, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wg-ex-rel-kg-v-new-york-city-department-of-education-nysd-2011.