NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 16 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JULIUS WEYPITE, No. 23-3341 Agency No. Petitioner, A201-757-264 v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 11, 2024** Las Vegas, Nevada
Before: BEA, BENNETT, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Julius Weypite, a native and citizen of Cameroon, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order which dismissed his
appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his applications for
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”). Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount
them here. The petition is denied.
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. This court reviews the BIA’s
decision and those parts of the IJ’s decision upon which the BIA relied. Shrestha v.
Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010). We review credibility findings under
the “substantial evidence” standard. Turcios v. I.N.S., 821 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir.
1987). “[A]dministrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B).
An alien seeking asylum bears the burden of proof of demonstrating his
eligibility. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B). An alien seeking relief from removal bears
the burden of proof that he satisfied the applicable eligibility requirements. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(4)(A)(i). The IJ makes a credibility determination based on the totality
of the circumstances. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(C). In determining credibility, the IJ
may consider the applicant’s demeanor, candor, and responsiveness; the inherent
plausibility of the applicant’s account; the internal consistency of his statements; the
consistency of his statements with other evidence; and any inaccuracies or
falsehoods in each statement. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (applications for
asylum); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(C) (applications for relief from removal).
2 23-3341 To qualify for protection under the Convention Against Torture, a petitioner
must “establish that ‘it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if
removed to the proposed country of removal.’” Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d
1026, 1033 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)).
1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s adverse
credibility finding. Here, the IJ based her finding of adverse credibility on
Petitioner’s demeanor, his inaccurate testimony regarding his travel documents, and
the implausibility of his account of events.
Demeanor. “[A]n IJ’s determination regarding demeanor is given special
deference.” Kin v. Holder, 595 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 2010). The IJ must provide
“specific examples of a petitioner’s demeanor that would support this basis for an
adverse credibility determination.” Id. Here, the IJ based her adverse credibility
determination on the fact that “on no less than five different occasions, [Petitioner]
broke into a display of sobbing and crying” but shed no tears. On “at least two
occasions,” Petitioner so cried even though the discussion did not appear to be
particularly emotional. The IJ opined that Petitioner’s sobbing was an attempt to
showcase his earnestness. Petitioner argues that the IJ did not sufficiently tether her
assessment of Petitioner’s demeanor to specific points in the hearing transcript, but
the IJ was not required to interrupt proceedings to narrate Petitioner’s crying to
pinpoint when exactly in the hearing it occurred. See Manes v. Sessions, 875 F.3d
3 23-3341 1261, 1264 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that “the IJ [need not] conduct a running
commentary on the alien’s credibility”). The IJ specifically described the elements
of Petitioner’s demeanor that contributed to an adverse credibility determination.
Petitioner’s demeanor was thus a permissible adverse credibility factor.
Inaccurate Testimony. In making a credibility determination, the IJ may
consider the consistency of the alien’s statements with other evidence of record and
“any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(C).
The IJ noted that Petitioner had previously submitted false documents but that at the
hearing he denied having done so. The BIA found that it was not Petitioner’s past
attempt to attain a visa through fraudulent means that supported the IJ’s finding of
adverse credibility, but rather his “inaccurate testimony in Immigration Court about
having fraudulently obtained a visa in the past.” Although Petitioner points to
portions of the record in which his testimony is consistent, that consistency is
insufficient to compel a positive credibility finding. Petitioner’s inaccurate
statement that he had not previously submitted fraudulent documents is a permissible
adverse credibility factor.
Implausible Testimony and Omission. The IJ found that parts of Petitioner’s
testimony “did not make a lot of sense in terms of plausibility.” As the BIA noted,
the IJ “found it implausible that [Petitioner] would not attempt to notify the military
after he was arrested that he was victimized by a conman and did not send money to
4 23-3341 support the separatists, particularly because he was arrested for supporting the
separatists.” The BIA is correct that “[t]he Immigration Judge was not required to
accept [Petitioner’s] explanation” that he did not tell the military about the conman
because he did not think that they would believe him, especially given that the
alleged conman was incarcerated with Petitioner. The IJ further found that
Petitioner’s failure to mention that the person extorting him was a conman and not a
separatist in his asylum interview and in his sworn declaration was a “simply
amazing and significant omission.” Petitioner argues that these details were merely
“collateral and ancillary,” and thus that their omission did not suggest that he had
“fabricated his claim.” But whether Petitioner was genuinely involved with the
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 16 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JULIUS WEYPITE, No. 23-3341 Agency No. Petitioner, A201-757-264 v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 11, 2024** Las Vegas, Nevada
Before: BEA, BENNETT, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Julius Weypite, a native and citizen of Cameroon, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order which dismissed his
appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his applications for
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”). Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount
them here. The petition is denied.
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. This court reviews the BIA’s
decision and those parts of the IJ’s decision upon which the BIA relied. Shrestha v.
Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010). We review credibility findings under
the “substantial evidence” standard. Turcios v. I.N.S., 821 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir.
1987). “[A]dministrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B).
An alien seeking asylum bears the burden of proof of demonstrating his
eligibility. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B). An alien seeking relief from removal bears
the burden of proof that he satisfied the applicable eligibility requirements. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(4)(A)(i). The IJ makes a credibility determination based on the totality
of the circumstances. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(C). In determining credibility, the IJ
may consider the applicant’s demeanor, candor, and responsiveness; the inherent
plausibility of the applicant’s account; the internal consistency of his statements; the
consistency of his statements with other evidence; and any inaccuracies or
falsehoods in each statement. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (applications for
asylum); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(C) (applications for relief from removal).
2 23-3341 To qualify for protection under the Convention Against Torture, a petitioner
must “establish that ‘it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if
removed to the proposed country of removal.’” Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d
1026, 1033 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)).
1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s adverse
credibility finding. Here, the IJ based her finding of adverse credibility on
Petitioner’s demeanor, his inaccurate testimony regarding his travel documents, and
the implausibility of his account of events.
Demeanor. “[A]n IJ’s determination regarding demeanor is given special
deference.” Kin v. Holder, 595 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 2010). The IJ must provide
“specific examples of a petitioner’s demeanor that would support this basis for an
adverse credibility determination.” Id. Here, the IJ based her adverse credibility
determination on the fact that “on no less than five different occasions, [Petitioner]
broke into a display of sobbing and crying” but shed no tears. On “at least two
occasions,” Petitioner so cried even though the discussion did not appear to be
particularly emotional. The IJ opined that Petitioner’s sobbing was an attempt to
showcase his earnestness. Petitioner argues that the IJ did not sufficiently tether her
assessment of Petitioner’s demeanor to specific points in the hearing transcript, but
the IJ was not required to interrupt proceedings to narrate Petitioner’s crying to
pinpoint when exactly in the hearing it occurred. See Manes v. Sessions, 875 F.3d
3 23-3341 1261, 1264 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that “the IJ [need not] conduct a running
commentary on the alien’s credibility”). The IJ specifically described the elements
of Petitioner’s demeanor that contributed to an adverse credibility determination.
Petitioner’s demeanor was thus a permissible adverse credibility factor.
Inaccurate Testimony. In making a credibility determination, the IJ may
consider the consistency of the alien’s statements with other evidence of record and
“any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(C).
The IJ noted that Petitioner had previously submitted false documents but that at the
hearing he denied having done so. The BIA found that it was not Petitioner’s past
attempt to attain a visa through fraudulent means that supported the IJ’s finding of
adverse credibility, but rather his “inaccurate testimony in Immigration Court about
having fraudulently obtained a visa in the past.” Although Petitioner points to
portions of the record in which his testimony is consistent, that consistency is
insufficient to compel a positive credibility finding. Petitioner’s inaccurate
statement that he had not previously submitted fraudulent documents is a permissible
adverse credibility factor.
Implausible Testimony and Omission. The IJ found that parts of Petitioner’s
testimony “did not make a lot of sense in terms of plausibility.” As the BIA noted,
the IJ “found it implausible that [Petitioner] would not attempt to notify the military
after he was arrested that he was victimized by a conman and did not send money to
4 23-3341 support the separatists, particularly because he was arrested for supporting the
separatists.” The BIA is correct that “[t]he Immigration Judge was not required to
accept [Petitioner’s] explanation” that he did not tell the military about the conman
because he did not think that they would believe him, especially given that the
alleged conman was incarcerated with Petitioner. The IJ further found that
Petitioner’s failure to mention that the person extorting him was a conman and not a
separatist in his asylum interview and in his sworn declaration was a “simply
amazing and significant omission.” Petitioner argues that these details were merely
“collateral and ancillary,” and thus that their omission did not suggest that he had
“fabricated his claim.” But whether Petitioner was genuinely involved with the
separatists goes directly to the credibility of his fear of reprisal, so the IJ was justified
in finding the omissions “significant.” Petitioner’s implausible testimony is a
permissible adverse credibility factor.
For the foregoing reasons, the record does not compel a contrary adverse
credibility finding. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s
denial of Petitioner’s application for asylum and withholding of removal.
2. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s denial of
protection under the Convention Against Torture. The BIA analyzed the country
conditions evidence and found that while it describes “violent conflict,” it does not
show that torture of Anglophones is so widespread that Petitioner will more likely
5 23-3341 than not be tortured if he returns. The BIA also found that Petitioner had not credibly
established that he was a separatist or that the Cameroonian government perceived
him as a separatist.
Here, Petitioner did not provide evidence sufficient to conclude that the record
compelled a contrary finding. As the government noted, much of the violence
described in the country report and other supporting documents either does not meet
the definition of torture under the CAT or does not show that Petitioner faces a
particularized risk of torture. To the extent that Petitioner points to documents
suggesting a risk of violence against all Anglophones, those documents are
insufficient to compel a contrary finding in light of the voluminous reports that
describe violence only against separatists. The government is correct that the
instances in which torture is reported is insufficient to show that Petitioner is more
likely than not to be tortured upon return to Cameroon. Because the record does not
compel a finding that Petitioner would be more likely than not to face torture upon
his return to Cameroon, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s affirmance of the
IJ’s denial of Petitioner’s application for CAT protection.
PETITION DENIED.
6 23-3341