Western Waterproofing Co. v. Marshall

576 F.2d 139, 6 BNA OSHC 1550, 6 OSHC (BNA) 1550, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 11267
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedMay 9, 1978
DocketNo. 77-1324
StatusPublished
Cited by31 cases

This text of 576 F.2d 139 (Western Waterproofing Co. v. Marshall) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Western Waterproofing Co. v. Marshall, 576 F.2d 139, 6 BNA OSHC 1550, 6 OSHC (BNA) 1550, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 11267 (8th Cir. 1978).

Opinion

STEPHENSON, Circuit Judge.

Appellant, Western Waterproofing Co., Inc. (Western), appeals from an Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (Review Commission) decision finding Western in willful violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 1 (Act).2 In substance, the Review Commission found that Western had willfully failed to comply with construction safety standards requiring employees to be protected by approved safety belts attached to lifelines when working on two-point suspension scaffolds,3 requiring such scaffolds to be securely lashed to the building,4 and requiring such scaffolds to be equipped with toe-boards and midrails.5

The facts surrounding the alleged violations are largely uncontested. On July 11, 1974, Western employees were engaged in sandblasting and finishing operations on the exterior walls of a four-story brick building in Omaha, Nebraska. They were working from two-point suspension scaffolds suspended at various heights ranging from approximately 17 to 47 feet above the ground. The scaffolds were equipped with a guardrail on the platform edge facing away from the building, but had no toe-boards or midrails on any of the sides and were not lashed to the walls of the building. No lifelines had been rigged, and some five employees were working from the scaffolds without safety belts.

Following an inspection by Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) compliance officers, Western was cited for willfully violating the safety belt and lifeline standard,6 the lashing standard,7 and a general scaffolding standard requiring scaffolds to have guardrails and toeboards.8 [142]*142The proposed penalty was $9000. Western timely filed its notice contesting the alleged violations contained in the citation and the proposed penalty as excessive.

The administrative law judge affirmed a willful violation of these three standards and the proposed penalty of $9000. Western timely filed its petition for discretionary review with the Review Commission and review was granted. The Review Commission, Commissioner Moran dissenting, held that Western had willfully violated the safety belt and lifeline standard and the lashing standard. The Review Commission refrained from ruling on whether Western had willfully violated the general scaffolding standard requiring guardrails and toe-boards9 and, instead, sua sponte amended the citation and held that Western had willfully violated the more specific standard requiring midrails in addition to guardrails and toeboards.10 We have jurisdiction to hear Western’s appeal under section 11(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(a), the alleged violations having occurred in Omaha, Nebraska.

The principal issues in this appeal are whether there was substantial evidence to support the finding of the Commission that Western willfully violated the lashing standard, toeboard standard, and the lifeline and safety belt standard and whether the Commission abused its discretion in imposing the $9000 penalty. 29 U.S.C. § 660(a); see Brennan v. OSHRC and Interstate Glass Co., 487 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1973).

Western argues that its failure to install toeboards or to lash the scaffold to the building was not a willful violation of the Act because it met the underlying purpose of the provision through other means.11 In dealing with this argument we must define what constitutes a willful violation under the Act. Although a “willful violation” is not defined in the Act, the Review Commission and the Secretary of Labor have interpreted a willful violation to be “an act done voluntarily with either an intentional disregard of, or plain indifference to, the Act’s requirements.” General Electric Co., [1977] 3 Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) (1977 — 1978 Occup. Safety & Health Dec.) 121,853 (May 19, 1977); Kent Nowlin Constr., Inc., [1977] 3 Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) (1977-1978 Occup. Safety & Health Dec.) 121,550 (Feb. 15, 1977); Williams Enterprises, Inc., [1976— 1977] Occup. Safety & Health Dec. (CCH) 1 21,071 (Sept. 8, 1976). “When faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration.” Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792, 801, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965); Usery v. Godfrey Brake & Supply Service, Inc., 545 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1976).

The Review Commission’s definition is in accord with that adopted by the Fourth, Tenth and First Circuits. In Inter-county Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 522 F.2d 777, 779-80 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. [143]*1431072, 92 S.Ct. 854, 47 L.Ed.2d 82 (1976), the court observed that “[n]o showing of malicious intent is necessary. * * * Regardless of any good-faith belief that the work area remained safe the fact is that the company knowingly chose not to comply with the OSHA regulations and requirements. That decision was a willful action in violation of the law.”

In United States v. Dye Constr. Co., 510 F.2d 78, 81 (10th Cir. 1975), the court approved a jury instruction on willfulness which reads as follows:

The failure to comply with a safety standard under the Occupational Safety and Health Act is willful if done knowingly and purposely by an employer who, having a free will or choice, either intentionally disregards the standard or is plainly indifferent to its requirement. An omission or failure to act is willfully done if done voluntarily and intentionally.

In F. X. Messina Const. Corp. v. OSHRC, 505 F.2d 701, 702 (1st Cir. 1974), the court, in affirming the Commission’s finding of willfulness, observed: “Petitioner, through its foreman, made its choice, a conscious, intentional, deliberate, voluntary decision, which, regardless of a venial motive, properly is described as willful.” Cf. Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. OSHRC, 519 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir. 1974), aff’d en banc, 519 F.2d 1215 (3d Cir. 1975), aff’d on other grounds, 430 U.S. 442, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 51 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977).

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576 F.2d 139, 6 BNA OSHC 1550, 6 OSHC (BNA) 1550, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 11267, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/western-waterproofing-co-v-marshall-ca8-1978.