Western Baptist Hospital v. Melissa J. Bullock

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: September 5, 2025
• Docket: 2024-CA-1387
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 5, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-1387-MR

WESTERN BAPTIST HOSPITAL APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM MARSHALL CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE ANDREA L. MOORE, JUDGE ACTION NO. 07-CI-00129

MELISSA J. BULLOCK APPELLEE

OPINION & ORDER DISMISSING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, KAREM, AND MOYNAHAN, JUDGES.

CETRULO, JUDGE: Western Baptist Hospital (“Hospital”) appeals an order of

the Marshall Circuit Court quashing a garnishment order and requiring payment.

As this circuit court order is not final, we do not have jurisdiction to address the

merits and are compelled to dismiss the appeal. BACKGROUND

In July 2007, Hospital obtained a default judgment against Appellee

Melissa J. Bullock (“Bullock”) in Marshall Circuit Court for unpaid medical bills.

In January 2008, the circuit court entered an order of wage garnishment, and

Bullock agreed to pay five dollars per week provided she received a check that

particular week.1 In February 2008, Bullock’s employer informed Hospital that

she left its employment. Hospital did not pursue further collection at that time.

In August 2024, 16 years later, Hospital requested a new garnishment

order. The court granted Hospital’s request, and Bullock’s wages were again

withheld. Yet two months later, in October, Bullock moved the court to quash the

garnishment order arguing that the 15-year statute of limitations within Kentucky

Revised Statute (“KRS”) 413.090(1) time-barred the garnishment. At a subsequent

hearing on Bullock’s motion, the court entered an order quashing the garnishment

and ordering Hospital to refund “all” of Bullock’s withheld wages, pay $1,000 in

damages, and pay an undisclosed amount of attorney fees (“Quash Order”).

Specifically, the Quash Order stated:

7. Within 15 days of the date of this order, [Hospital] shall:

a. Refund to [Bullock] all sums withheld from her wages;

1 The restaurant where she worked closed for some holidays.

-2- b. Pay actual damages to [Bullock] in the amount of $1,000.00 in accordance with 15 U.S.C.[2] 1692k; and

c. Pay [Bullock’s] attorney fee in the amount of $___________ expended for the defense of this action.

Concerningly, it appears that the circuit court electronically signed a

tendered document with a plethora of missing information, law, and analysis.3 The

Quash Order appears to refund “all” the wages withheld, even the 2008 wages.

The Quash Order did not explain how or why damages were appropriate, what

types of damages the court was awarding, if those damages were duplicative of the

refund and/or attorney fee award, or how the court arrived at that $1,000 total.

This order did not indicate the amount of the attorney fee award, did not explicitly

reserve on attorney fees, did not contain any findings regarding the reasonableness

of attorney fees, and did not state upon which statute the trial court relied for that

attorney fee award. The Quash Order did not state it was final and appealable, nor

indicate there was no just reason for delay.

2 United States Code. 3 The court’s intentions on finality are unclear considering the gaping voids in the Quash Order paired with the lack of finality language and the court’s failure to address the motion to reconsider. More than just the absent attorney fee award defeats the Quash Order’s finality. See, by example, Mo-Jack Distributor, LLC v. Tamarak Snacks, LLC, 476 S.W.3d 900, 907 (Ky. App. 2015) (discussing entitlement to compensatory and/or punitive damages); KRS 453.040(1)(a) (allowing a successful party to recover costs, unless otherwise prohibited by law); Harris v. Camp Fire Protection Dist., 303 S.W.3d 479, 481 (Ky. App. 2009) (citations omitted) (stating CR 54.04 allows for the recovery of costs by a prevailing party with submission of an itemized bill); Supreme Court of Kentucky Rule 3.130(1.5) (prohibiting lawyers from collecting unreasonable fees or expenses); Reed v. Rhodes, 179 F.3d 453, 471 (6th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted) (stating reasonableness is the “guiding principle” in awarding attorney fees).

-3- The next day, Hospital moved the court to reconsider the Quash

Order. Hospital asserted that it recorded a judgment lien in August 2022, which

acted as an execution upon the judgment and thereby stayed the time constraints

within KRS 413.090. This motion failed to cite precedent supporting its argument

or clarify the procedural rule upon which the motion was based. Bullock

responded and argued that if Hospital’s motion was based upon Kentucky Rule of

Civil Procedure (“CR”) 60.02, it was not properly supported (as there was no

evidence of mistake or excusable neglect), and the garnishment was time-barred

because a judgment lien was not an “execution” extending the 15-year time limit.

The court did not rule on Hospital’s motion to reconsider, and Hospital appealed

the Quash Order.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Hospital challenges the circuit court’s application of the

statute of limitations within the Quash Order. However, before this Court is able

to address the merits of Hospital’s appeal, we must determine if the Quash Order is

final and appealable. “[A] court must have jurisdiction before it has authority to

decide a case.” Wilson v. Russell, 162 S.W.3d 911, 913 (Ky. 2005). In fact, we

have an independent duty4 to determine whether we have jurisdiction to reach the

4 Bullock did not file an appellate brief, but that failure does not relieve us of our duty. See Cent. Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram Assocs., 622 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Ky. App. 1981) (citing Hook

-4- merits of an appeal. Huff v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 454 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Ky. 1970)

(citing Peters v. Bd. of Educ. of Hardin Cnty., 378 S.W.2d 638, 639 (Ky. 1964)).

“Jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo.” McGaha v. McGaha,

664 S.W.3d 496, 500 (Ky. 2022) (citation omitted).

The Quash Order does not adjudicate all the rights of all the parties

because it left the attorney fee award amount blank. This missing award raises

questions of finality. “[I]f an order entered in a cause does not put an end to the

action, but leaves something further to be done before the rights of the parties are

determined, it is interlocutory and not final.” Hubbard v. Hubbard, 197 S.W.2d

923, 924 (Ky. 1946) (citation omitted). Generally, this Court has jurisdiction only

over final judgments and orders issued by our circuit courts. KRS 22A.020(1). “A

final or appealable judgment is a final order adjudicating all the rights of all the

parties in an action or proceeding . . . .” CR 54.01. Stated another way, “[a] final

adjudication is a judgment that conclusively determines the rights of the parties in

regard to that particular phase of the proceeding.” Watson v. Best Fin. Servs., Inc.,

245 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Ky. 2008) (citation omitted).

v. Hook, 563 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Ky. 1978)) (an appellate court is “required” to ascertain finality even if the issue was not raised on appeal).

-5- Under some circumstances, an order can reach finality – on a specific

claim – despite not adjudicating all the rights of all the parties. This exception is

found in CR 54.02(1):

When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may grant a final judgment upon one or more but less than all of the claims or parties only upon a determination that there is no just reason for delay. The judgment shall recite such determination and shall recite that the judgment is final. In the absence of such recital, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates less than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of less than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is interlocutory and subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.

Hence, in order to determine finality, we must determine if this action

involves one claim or multiple claims. Id. “[T]he determination of whether the

judgment is final when the amount of the attorney fees has not been resolved

should rest on whether attorney fees were part of the claim or whether they were

collateral to the merits of the action. . . .” Francis v. Crounse Corp., 98 S.W.3d

62, 67 (Ky. App. 2002) (emphasis added). Therefore, our first question is whether

the attorney fee was part of the garnishment claim or collateral to the garnishment

claim. See id.

-6- By way of example, in Francis, supra, this Court “found that the

plaintiff’s claim for attorney fees was part of his civil rights violation claim, made

by the same claimant and not collateral, because it was pled by the plaintiff in his

complaint and made pursuant to a statute that required reasonable attorney fees to

be awarded.” Mitchell v. Mitchell, 360 S.W.3d 220, 223 (Ky. 2012) (citing

Francis, 98 S.W.3d at 67) (emphasis added).

Conversely, in Mitchell, supra, a former husband sought a reduction

of maintenance but lost. Mitchell, 360 S.W.3d at 221. Thereafter, the former wife

requested an award of attorney fees. Id. Our Supreme Court determined that the

request for attorney fees was “made in an entirely separate motion by a party

opposed to the initial action” and therefore, the request for attorney fees was

collateral and “more akin to a counterclaim.” Id. at 223-24.

Similarly, we can turn to BDT Products, Inc. v. Higgs, Fletcher &

Mack, LLP, for a collateral attorney fee example. No. 2011-CA-001088-MR, 2013

WL 6571671 (Ky. App. Dec. 13, 2013).5 BDT initiated a trade-secret action

against Lexmark and eventually, that action was dismissed. Id. at *2. Thereafter,

Lexmark moved for an award of costs and attorney fees. Id. This Court

determined that attorney fees were collateral to the underlying trade-secret action

5 As BDT Products is unpublished, we cite to it merely as persuasive, not binding. Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”) 41.

-7- because they were sought “sanctions by way of a separate motion filed after the

trade-secret action had concluded.” Id. at *6.

Here, Bullock first requested attorney fees in her motion to quash the

garnishment order. The attorney fee request was separate from the underlying

default judgment and garnishment order. The attorney fee request was made in a

separate motion by a party opposed to the initial action sanction. Therefore – in

the context of finality – there are two claims because the attorney fee claim was

collateral to (not part of) the garnishment claim. See Francis, 98 S.W.3d at 67; see

also Mitchell, 360 S.W.3d at 223.

Despite there being two claims, the circuit court could have granted

finality of one claim (garnishment) while reserving on the other claim (attorney

fees) by following the CR 54.02 guidelines. CR 54.02 permits a court to grant

final judgment upon one or more of the claims (while reserving on others) by

including specific finality language. The specific finality language – that an order

is “final and appealable” and with “no just reason for delay” – clearly relays the

court’s intention to finally resolve one claim. Id.; Watson, 245 S.W.3d at 726-28.

Without this expression of finality, the judgment is presumed to be “interlocutory

and subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the

claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.” CR 54.02.

-8- Interestingly – within an action with multiple claims and/or parties –

inclusion of this specific finality language does not, by itself, guarantee finality.

See Tax Ease Lien Invs. 1, LLC v. Brown, 340 S.W.3d 99, 101 (Ky. App. 2011)

(citing Hale v. Deaton, 528 S.W.2d 719, 722 (Ky. 1975)). However, failure to

include such language will have a “lethal effect” on finality in these situations:

These [CR 54.02] recitations on the part of the trial court are mandatory: For the purpose of making an otherwise interlocutory order final and appealable, the trial court is required to determine “that there is no just reason for delay,” and the judgment must recite this determination and also recite that the judgment is final. CR 54.02(1). The omission of one of these requirements is fatal.

Hampton v. Intech Contracting, LLC, 581 S.W.3d 27, 31-32 (Ky. 2019) (emphasis

added) (quoting Hale, 528 S.W.2d at 722).

Here, the action included two claims, and the circuit court could have

adjudicated finality on the claims separately. However, as the order did not finally

resolve all the claims of all the parties, and as the CR 54.02 finality language was

absent, the Quash Order is interlocutory and not final. Id. As the Quash Order is

not final, jurisdiction did not transfer to this Court upon filing of the notice of

appeal. RAP 2(A)(2); Russell, 162 S.W.3d at 913; KRS 22A.020(1).

-9- CONCLUSION

Therefore, this Court is without jurisdiction to consider the merits of

the appeal. Under these circumstances, we are compelled to DISMISS this appeal

and REMAND the matter for entry of a final and appealable order.

ALL CONCUR.

ENTERED: ___09/04/2025___ JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.

Jon V. Connor Cincinnati, Ohio

-10-