West v. Knowles

311 P.2d 689, 50 Wash. 2d 311, 1957 Wash. LEXIS 343

• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Decided: May 16, 1957
• Docket: 34043
• Status: Published

Opinions

Mallery, J.

The plaintiff, Bonnie M. West, and defendant, Delmer L. Knowles, lived in a meretricious relationship for ten years, during which time they held themselves out to the world as husband and wife.

In November, 1954, and June, 1955, they quarreled over their property. The defendant refused an accounting on both occasions. They separated in 1955, and this action was commenced to fix their property rights. Both parties have appealed from the property awards made by the trial court.

We find no merit in defendant’s assignments of error directed to the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are supported by the record.

Defendant makes the general contention that the court should have awarded the properties to the parties in whom the title stood at the commencement of the action, and that it erred in attempting to trace title to them from the time they were acquired.

He relies upon Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wn. (2d) 345, 196 P. (2d) 835. It is not in point. As pointed out in Iredell v. Iredell, 49 Wn. (2d) 627, 305 P. (2d) 805, the presumption that the parties intended to dispose of their property, as the title thereto would indicate, arises only when there is an absence of evidence as to intention. In the Creasman case one party was dead and the other silenced by RCW 5.60.030 [cf. Rem. Rev. Stat., § 1211]. That case has been restricted in its application to its own particular facts.

The court was correct in tracing the property in the instant case, because both parties testified in extenso regarding their properties. None of the property ever lost its character as separate property, notwithstanding the mingling thereof, the resulting confusion, and the difficulty of separating it. No presumptions arise as to property which can be traced to one or the other. It belongs to the original owner, in the absence of an overt gift or contract regarding it. Property acquired with contributions from both parties is held as tenants in common, and courts will presume they intended to share the property, in proportion to the amount contributed, where it can be traced, otherwise they share it equally. Iredell v. Iredell, supra.

As to certain specific items of property, the defendant contends for an equal division of the joint savings account in the Spokane Valley Savings and Loan Association, which stood in both their names. The plaintiff was able to trace the source of this account to her separate funds. The court was correct in not awarding defendant any of it.

The defendant contends the parties were tenants in common in the real estate known as the University street property, and that he should have an undivided one-half interest in it because it stood in both their names. Here again, plaintiff traced the acquisition of the property to her separate funds, which had been derived from the sale of her separate real estate in Othello, Washington, her own earnings, which, of course, were separate because no community existed, and her separate postal savings account. The court was correct in awarding her own separate property to her.

Defendant contends that the collection agency business, which the court awarded to him, should not have been encumbered in her favor in the amount of $151.50. The contention is without merit. The plaintiff traced that sum of money from her separate funds directly into the business and is, therefore, entitled to such an encumbrance.

The defendant contends the court erred in not awarding him the 1956 Volkswagon, power saw, lawn mower, garden tractor, hand tools, et cetera. His contention is without merit. He did not successfully trace the purchase price of these articles to his separate funds.

On her cross-appeal, plaintiff contends that she should have one half the value of defendant’s collection agency business, because she had supported him while he built up his business. She did not successfully rebut the presumption that, while they lived as man and wife, her support of defendant was given and received as a gratuity. The same ruling applies to her contention that the court erred in not awarding her judgment for moneys spent in supporting defendant for the last three years they lived together.

The plaintiff contends the court erred in failing to grant her judgment for four hundred dollars expended in medical bills on account of a nervous breakdown caused by the parties quarreling over their property. The contention is without merit. The quarreling was incident to a meretricious relationship, and is covered by the rule of damnum absque injuria.

Neither party contends there was a business partnership between them. In meretricious relationship cases, the court will award the properties before it to the party determined to be the owner thereof. It will not go back to the beginning of the relationship and take an accounting of the earnings and disbursements as if a trust relationship existed.

We therefore find no merit in plaintiff’s contentions that the court erred in not awarding her a judgment (1) for the proceeds of the sale of real estate located in Othello, which were traced into subsequent accounts; (2) for $1,700 on account of rentals on that property collected by defendant before its sale and which he was not shown to still possess; (3) for one half the sale price of $600 for a Willys automobile, which the defendant received and spent; (4) and for $2,750 that was in the Old National Bank of Spokane joint savings account, which was withdrawn and spent.

The judgment is affirmed. Neither party will recover costs.

Hill, C. J., Donworth, Finley, and Ott, JJ., concur.