West v. King

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: November 27, 2024
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-2847
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

) LEO WEST, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-02847 (UNA) ) ANGUS KING, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) ___________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s pro se complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and

application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. The Court grants Plaintiff’s

IFP application and, for the reasons explained below, it dismisses this matter without prejudice.

The complaint is difficult to follow. Plaintiff sues several United States senators and

representatives, contending that the [sic] “government is not affair a affair is not a job an jobs.”

See Compl. at 2–4. As best understood, Plaintiff goes on to broadly allege, without detail or

context, that “false statements” have been made regarding veterans’ access to housing. See id. at

4. He demands $1 million from each Defendant resulting from alleged “turmoil” at his current

veteran’s shelter, related to headaches caused by “fuss” and loud “voices.” See id.

First, pro se litigants must comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure. Jarrell v. Tisch, 656

F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a complaint to

contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction [and] . . . (2) a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). The Rule 8 standard ensures that

defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). Here, as

presented, neither the Court nor the Defendants can reasonably be expected to identify Plaintiff’s

claims, and the allegations fall well short of stating a plausible claim.

Second, even if his claims could be understood, Plaintiff fails to establish subject-matter

jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), citing only to 18 U.S.C. § 1001, see Compl. at 3, a

criminal statute that “does not create a private cause of action,” Lee v. United States Agency for

Int’l Develop., 859 F.3d 74, 78 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (per curiam); see Prunte v. Universal Music

Group, 484 F. Supp. 2d 32, 42 (D.D.C. 2007) (“[The] Supreme Court has refused to imply a private

right of action in a bare criminal statute.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted);

Rockefeller v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 248 F. Supp. 2d 17, 20 (D.D.C. 2003)

(same) (collecting cases).

For these reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice. A separate Order accompanies

this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: November 27, 2024 /s/_________________________ ANA C. REYES United States District Judge