West v. Carlisle

199 S.W. 515, 1917 Tex. App. LEXIS 1101
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedDecember 3, 1917
DocketNo. 7466.
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 199 S.W. 515 (West v. Carlisle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
West v. Carlisle, 199 S.W. 515, 1917 Tex. App. LEXIS 1101 (Tex. Ct. App. 1917).

Opinions

This suit was instituted by J. M. West and R. C. Duff against William Carlisle for an alleged breach of the terms of a contract which they (West and Duff) had entered into with him for the purchase of certain securities which gave the control and practically the ownership of a line of railway, known as the Beaumont Great Northern Railway. There was a cross-action by Carlisle, the parties disagreeing as to the meaning and construction of the fourth section of the contract, The cause was tried before the court without a jury, and judgment was rendered for Carlisle on his crossaction, and from such judgment West and Duff have appealed.

The following statement is sufficient for the purpose of fairly presenting the issues involved in the litigation:

The Beaumont Great Northern Railway was a line of railway located principally in Polk and Trinity counties, and incorporated under the statutes of this state. In 1912 the railroad had issued and outstanding 340 shares of capital stock of the par value of $34,000; it also had issued and outstanding 605 5 per cent. bonds, par value $605,000. William Carlisle was the owner of all of the stock and all of the bonds of said railroad, and through this ownership controlled and operated the railroad and dominat-the railroad corporation. On May 20, 1912, Carlisle entered into a contract with J. M. West and R. C. Duff for the sale to West and Duff of these stocks and bonds. The obvious purpose of the transaction was to transfer to West and Duff the control of said railroad property, with its rights, privileges, and appurtenances, etc., in so far as Carlisle could do so. This contract is lengthy, but the following are the salient features:

(a) The contract recites that Carlisle is the owner of the stock and bonds of said railroad company, which stock and bonds are denominated "railroad securities," and he agrees to sell these "railroad securities" to West and Duff for $778,000. If the sale is not consummated until after June 1, 1912, then there shall be added to the purchase *Page 516 price a sum equal to 6 per cent. per annum from June 1, 1912.

(b) They have the right to tender Carlisle this agreed price $778,000, with interest as aforesaid, and to acquire all of the "railroad securities" (except 100 shares of stock) at any time before noon, August 20, 1912.

(c) As an alternative, Carlisle agrees to accept as part of the purchase price the guaranty of a solvent railway company of the principal and interest on his 605 bonds, and to accept (or retain) these 605 bonds guaranteed by some solvent railway company, in lieu of cash.

(d) Article IV of this contract of May 20, 1912, is the one out of which this litigation grows, and is as follows:

"Owner contracts and agrees that effective as of date on which the railroad securities are to be paid and delivered to the purchasers, or their assigns, the railroad shall be delivered to them clear of debt or any incumbrance, except the first mortgage above referred to, which is to say that the current bills and accounts receivable shall suffice to discharge the bills and accounts payable, anti in the event of the failure to do so, the difference shall be made good by the owner, and if there is an excess of cash resulting therefrom, then such excess is to be retained by the owner."

On June 15, 1912, the parties made a further supplemental contract, which stipulated:

"That whereas, the original contract bound Carlisle to accept 605 guaranteed bonds par value in lieu of cash and as a credit upon the agreed purchase price, when guaranteed both as to principal and interest, that he also agrees in this supplement to accept additional bonds to cover the entire purchase price at par, plus the aggregate amount of interest accrued on such bonds up to the time of the consummation of this transaction."

By a further supplement, dated the 21st day of September, 1912, Carlisle agreed to accept $778,000 for all of the stock and all of the bonds, with interest at 6 per cent. from June 1, 1912, the same to be paid in first mortgage gold bonds, of the Beaumont Great Northern Railway Company, guaranteed by the Missouri, Kansas Texas Railway Company; bonds to carry coupons beginning with the coupon maturing January 1, 1913, and to be accepted on the purchase price at par, plus portion of coupon matured to date of settlement. In addition to the bonds sold by Carlisle to West and Duff for the sum of $778,000, Carlisle also sold to them the 100 shares of the stock retained by him in said contract between the parties for the sum of $5,000, which sum added to the $778,000 first mentioned, aggregated the sum of $783,000, which West and Duff agreed to pay Carlisle for all the bonds and all the stock of said railway company.

West and Duff contend: First, that the stipulation in article IV of the original contract by which it was agreed "that the railroad should be delivered to them clear of debt or any incumbrance, except the first mortgage above referred to," did not include within the exception the interest coupons that had accrued on the first mortgage bonds of September 30, 1912, the day that the deal was consummated and the property turned over; that these coupons constituted a debt and incumbrance on the property not included within the exception "except said first mortgage above referred to." The coupons accrued on that date aggregated $7,562.50. These coupons were not due and payable until January 1st following. The trial court disallowed this item, sustaining exceptions to the plaintiff's petition wherein this claim was asserted. Second. They contend that suits for damages for personal injuries and other unliquidated demands, which suits were pending at the time the properties were turned over, and other claims against the railway company upon which no suit had at that time been brought, were incumbrances within the meaning of the contract, and they seek to take credit in the final accounting for attorney's fees, court costs, and amounts paid in settlement of these suits and claims. The amounts involved under this claim aggregated $783.38. Carlisle disputes this contention. The trial trial court disallowed this item. Third. They contend that all taxes for the year 1912 upon the property were incumbrances within the meaning of the contract, and that they should have credit for the full amount of these taxes, they having paid them. Carlisle disputes the contention. The total of these taxes is $3,648.29. The trial court allowed West and Duff $2,736.22 on account of these taxes, upon the theory that three-fourths of the year's taxes had accrued when the sale was consummated, September 30, 1912, but declined to allow them a credit for the full amount of the year's taxes, a difference of $912.07. At the time the sale of the stock and bonds was made, and the property was turned over to West and Duff, on September 30, 1912, the Beaumont Great Northern Railway Company had on hand, deposited to its credit in banks, $7,868.29 in cash collected upon accounts payable, and it had in the possession of its agents and in transit $598.52, of all of which West and Duff took possession and now hold. Carlisle contends that this money was a bill receivable or account receivable within the meaning of clause IV in the contract, and that he is entitled to a judgment against West and Duff for this money, and he seeks to recover it in a cross-action. West and Duff dispute the contention and contend that such funds belong to the railway company. The trial court gave Carlisle judgment therefor. West and Duff further contend that this money was neither an account nor bill receivable within the meaning of the contract, and that in no event is Carlisle entitled to a judgment against them for this money. It is alleged by plaintiffs West and Duff that a settlement was made between them

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Bluebook (online)
199 S.W. 515, 1917 Tex. App. LEXIS 1101, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/west-v-carlisle-texapp-1917.