Wessel v. Guantanamo Sugar Co.

35 A.2d 215, 134 N.J. Eq. 271
CourtNew Jersey Court of Chancery
DecidedJanuary 5, 1944
DocketDocket 149/475 Docket 149/440
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 35 A.2d 215 (Wessel v. Guantanamo Sugar Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Court of Chancery primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wessel v. Guantanamo Sugar Co., 35 A.2d 215, 134 N.J. Eq. 271 (N.J. Ct. App. 1944).

Opinion

The two cases were heard together. The complainants are owners of shares of 8% cumulative preferred stock of defendant corporation of the par value of $100 each. The defendant was incorporated under the laws of this state in 1905 by certificate which provided for common stock only. The issue of preferred stock was first authorized by amendment to the certificate of incorporation filed March 22d 1922, and the issue was increased by a further amendment to said certificate filed January 2d 1925. As of January 1st, 1943, 20,250 of such shares were authorized, of which 1,903 were owned by defendant, 17,287 were owned by the public including complainants, and 1,060 were in defendant's treasury. Dividends on the preferred stock are in arrear to the extent of $112 a share.

Notice was given stockholders of a special meeting to be held May 27th, 1943, to consider and act on a plan of recapitalization and amendment to the certificate of incorporation, which plan is compulsory and if it becomes effective will accomplish the following:

Retire 1,060 shares of treasury preferred stock and 1,903 shares of preferred stock owned by defendant; change and convert the remaining 17,287 shares of preferred stock, with all dividends and arrearages thereon, by giving each of those shares a $40 principal amount 5% twelve year debenture and 14 shares of new $5 par value capital stock; change and convert each share of outstanding common stock into 2/5 share of new capital stock and thereby decrease the authorized capital stock and capital liability on the books of the company in respect to 405,000 shares of common stock without par value, from $4,050,000 to $810,000, thus creating on the books of the corporation a capital surplus of $2,609,346.95; the certificate of incorporation to be amended to provide for a total authorized capital stock of 404,018 shares of a single class, with $5 par value.

The complainants oppose the plan on the ground that it is inequitable as to them and illegal. On filing the bills of complaint the defendant was restrained by order of the court from executing and filing the proposed amendment to its *Page 273 certificate of incorporation and from putting the proposed plan of recapitalization into effect. The meeting of stockholders was held according to notice, at which 12,816 shares of preferred stock and 308,416 shares of common stock were voted in favor of the recapitalization plan and 1,880 shares of preferred stock and 8,150 shares of common stock were voted against it. Thus although more than 75% of common stockholders voted in favor of the plan, but 74.14% of preferred stockholders in number and amount voted for it.

The questions at issue are whether the defendant has power to adopt the plan, and whether the plan is fair and equitable as it affects complainants. The defendant argues that it has such power under amendment adopted in 1921 to section 27 of the Corporation Act (P.L. 1921 ch. 233, now included in R.S. 14:11-1, subdivs.i and j). That amendatory act authorizes corporations to increase or decrease capital stock, change common stock into one or more classes of preferred stock, create one or more classes of preferred stock, change its preferred stock into one or more classes of common stock and make such other amendment as may be desired. In 1926 the Corporation Act was further amended (P.L.1926 ch. 318 § 7, now included in R.S. 14:11-1, subdiv. n) to authorize corporations to provide for funding or satisfying rights in respect to dividends in arrear by the issuance of stock therefor, "or otherwise."

The complainants purchased their stock from 1937 to early in 1943 and as owners thereof became entitled by contract with defendant to receive all dividends that had accrued thereon since the last dividend payment in 1929, as and when defendant had sufficient earnings or surplus available for payment thereof, before payment of any dividend could be made on the common stock. While under the act of 1921 defendant has power to change its preferred stock into common stock on a just basis, such power does not carry with it the right to destroy the cumulative portion of the contract held by preferred stockholders to be paid their dividend arrears now, or at some future time. Nor has the defendant power under the act of 1926 to fund or satisfy those rights of complainants as preferred stockholders in respect to dividends *Page 274 in arrear, by issuing common stock therefor, or otherwise (even though complainants acquired their stock after the passage of the amendment of 1926), and thus wipe out a vested right in the nature of a debt owing to complainants. Allen v. FranciscoSugar Co., 92 N.J. Eq. 431; Lonsdale, c., Corp. v.International, c., Co., 101 N.J. Eq. 554; Buckley v. CubanAmerican Sugar Co., 129 N.J. Eq. 322; Keller v. Wilson Co. (Del.), 194 Atl. Rep. 115; Johnson v. Consolidated FilmIndustries (Del.), 194 Atl. Rep. 844; affirmed,197 Atl. Rep. 489. The plan here proposed is mandatory and is therefore distinguishable from those reported cases which deal with a plan of merger or consolidation, wherein a change is proposed in preferred stock which includes the elimination of dividend arrearages thereon. In cases of merger or consolidation the terms proposed are not mandatory but preferred stockholders have the right to decline the offered terms and have their stock appraised and to receive cash in payment therefor. I conclude that the plan of recapitalization proposed by defendant is illegal and invalid as against complainants.

The principal purpose for which defendant was incorporated was to produce and deal in sugar and molasses and ever since its organization it has been engaged in that business. It is a large owner of sugar plantations, mills and other properties in Cuba, including a controlling interest in a railroad. For several years prior to 1941 its business was not profitable, apparently because of low prices received for its products, yet it has no funded debt, no bank loans and no creditors except current ones. It is not in need of new capital and the proposed plan does not seek to bring new money into the company. For the past two years its business has been good and the price now received for sugar is much higher than it has been in years. The United States government purchases practically its entire sugar crop and for the current year has agreed to purchase one-third more sugar than for the preceding year. For the year ending September 30th, 1941, the company made a net profit of $294,070.03 and for the year ending September 30th, 1942, it had a net profit of $748,292.86, an amount equal to a dividend of *Page 275 $43.28 on its preferred stock. Figures were not available at the conclusion of the hearing of the causes to show the net profit for the fiscal year ending September 30th, 1943, but the uncontradicted testimony is that for the first ten months of that year a net profit was indicated of $633,370.71. Even if actual net profits for the entire year cannot be determined until sundry adjustments are made which cannot be ascertained until the end of the fiscal year, it seems certain that the 1943 year will end with a substantial profit in excess of the president's estimate of from $250,000 to $300,000, to which estimate must be added the amount the Cuban government will return to defendant from a deposit of at least $100,000 which it was required to make by way of insurance on sugar stocks.

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Bluebook (online)
35 A.2d 215, 134 N.J. Eq. 271, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wessel-v-guantanamo-sugar-co-njch-1944.