Werner v. New York County, NYC

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 26, 2024
Docket1:24-cv-04186
StatusUnknown

This text of Werner v. New York County, NYC (Werner v. New York County, NYC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Werner v. New York County, NYC, (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK BRADLEY A. WERNER, JR., Plaintiff, -against- NEW YORK COUNTY, NYC; MYLES 24-CV-4186 (LTS) ASHONG, ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY, NEW YORK COUNTY; ALVIN BRAGG, ORDER TO AMEND DISTRICT ATTORNEY; ERIC ADAMS, MAYOR; MICHAEL WIGDOR, ASST. CHIEF INVESTIGATOR NEW YORK COUNTY DA’S OFFICE, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who currently is incarcerated at Groveland Correctional Facility, brings this action, pro se, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his rights. By order dated June 3, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

BACKGROUND The following facts are drawn from the complaint, which names as Defendants New York City Mayor Eric Adams; New York County; the New York County District Attorney’s Office; New York County District Attorney Alvin Bragg; New York County Assistant District Attorney Myles Ashong; and New York County District Attorney Office Chief Investigator Michael Wigdor (the last four collectively referred to as the “DA Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges that he was falsely arrested on March 27, 2023, and “unlawfully remanded on another inmate[’]s charge on Rikers Island.” He also claims that he was assaulted nine times while at Rikers, but he does not say by whom. (ECF 1 ¶ V.) According to Plaintiff, an individual named Raushan Assembayeva filed a “false report incident.” (Id. ¶ VI.) On December 7, 2023, a jury found Plaintiff not guilty of the “manufactured charges,” however, a “second indictment . . . happened out of ‘entrapment’” and other unlawful procedures. (Id.) It is unclear when exactly Plaintiff was convicted. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant District Attorney’s Office “is a hideous place shredding the fabric of American constitutional law and rights,” and that the conviction is on appeal. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks money damages for “308 days of illegal remanded incarceration” and to have his sentence overturned. (Id. ¶ VI.) Plaintiff has also filed an application for the Court to appoint pro bono counsel. (ECF 4.) DISCUSSION A. Challenge to conviction Plaintiff seeks to have his conviction overturned. Plaintiff may not obtain such relief, however, in a Section 1983 action; instead, he can only obtain such relief by appealing the conviction and then bringing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78-82 (2005) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973)) (noting that writ of habeas corpus is sole remedy for prisoner seeking to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement). An individual who seeks release from state custody may do so by filing a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Section 2254 is the proper vehicle to use in challenging the constitutionality of an individual’s custody, after an individual has been convicted in a state court and sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment pursuant to a judgment of conviction. See Cook v. New York State Div. of Parole, 321 F.3d 274, 278 (2d Cir. 2003). The Court declines to recharacterize Plaintiff’s allegations seeking release as a petition brought under Section 2254 because Plaintiff indicates that the conviction is on appeal, and thus he has not shown that he has exhausted his state court remedies. Exhaustion of state court remedies is required under Section 2254. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c);2 see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991) (“[A] state prisoner’s federal habeas petition should be dismissed if the prisoner has not exhausted available state remedies as to any of his federal claims.”). Insofar as Plaintiff seeks to challenge his conviction, he must first exhaust his state court remedies, and if he is unsuccessful in the state courts, he may return to federal court and file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under Section 2254.

2 Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which modified the habeas corpus statutes, a person in state custody must generally file a Section 2254 petition within one year from the latest of four benchmark dates: (1) when the judgment of conviction becomes final; (2) when a government-created impediment to making such a motion is removed; (3) when the constitutional right asserted is initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if it has been made retroactively available to cases on collateral review; or (4) when the facts supporting the claim(s) could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). B. Civil rights claims for damages Unlawful imprisonment Plaintiff seeks damages for his allegedly unlawful imprisonment.

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Bluebook (online)
Werner v. New York County, NYC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/werner-v-new-york-county-nyc-nysd-2024.