Werner v. Commonwealth

206 A.2d 317, 416 Pa. 356, 1965 Pa. LEXIS 690

• Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: January 5, 1965
• Docket: Appeal, 229; Appeal, 45
• Status: Published

Opinions

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Cohen,

Both these cases involve appeals from dismissals by lower courts of exceptions taken to reports filed by boards of viewers in condemnation proceedings. Pursuant to the statutes involved the exceptions in the Werner case were raised in the quarter sessions court, June 1, 1945, P. L. 1242, §§303, 304, 36 P.S. §§670-303, 304 while the exceptions in the Burns case were raised in the court of common pleas, July 15, 1919, P. L. 976, §5, 71 P.S. §1575. In both cases, as was their right under these same statutes, the parties taking exceptions to the viewers’ report also took appeals to courts of common pleas, which appeals are heard de novo. Snyder v. Commonwealth, 112 Pa. 15, 21, 192 A. 2d 650, 653 (1963).

In the Werner case the exception to the report was based upon the viewers’ refusal to make a special finding of fact whether or not certain property was considered by the viewers in determining damages. The exception was dismissed on the ground that the question — whether the unity of use doctrine applied to the property in question — was a mixed one of law and fact and should be raised at the trial of the appeal and not by exception. In the Burns case there were three bases for exceptions: (1) that the condemnation of a mere avigation easement was unlawful because the statute does not permit the condemnor to take less than all the property owner’s interest in the land, (2) that although the facts constituted a taking of the entire fee only an easement was condemned and (3) that the viewers’ report did not contain a schedule of damages, or, if it did, the damage to the property subjacent to the avigation easement was not reflected. The court dismissed exception (1) on the ground that the statute countenanced the condemnation of an easement and (2) and (3) on the ground that the matters raised would be disposed of by the appeal.

The dismissals of the exceptions in both cases were interlocutory orders and therefore these premature appeals must be quashed. In both cases appeals have been taken to the common pleas court from the viewers’¹ reports. The liabilities of the condemnors will not be determined until these appeals are concluded. Under such circumstances the mere dismissal of exceptions cannot be said to constitute a final order or, in any sense, to terminate the litigation between the parties. This has been the rule since Pennsylvania Steel Company’s Appeal, 161 Pa. 571, 29 Atl. 294 (1894). We see no reason to change the rule. When a party has taken both an appeal from and an exception to a viewers’ report, no appeal may be taken from the lower court’s dismissal of exceptions until the conclusion of the appeal. At that time the ruling on exceptions and/or the judgment in the appeal can be reviewed here if the proper party so desires. This is the best way to effect the “policy of the law ... to preclude piecemeal determinations and the consequent protraction of litigation,” Sullivan v. Philadelphia, 378 Pa. 648, 649, 107 A. 2d 854, 855 (1954), and to protect this Court from appeals which the parties might have found unnecessary had they awaited a final order, decree or judgment.

We do not decide what effect the new “Eminent Domain Code” of June 22, 1964 (Special Session), P. L. 84, No. 6, §§515, 516, 517, 523, 26 P.S. §§1-515, 516, 517, 523 may have upon this question; however, the statutes governing these cases do not make the interlocutory orders in question appealable. In the Werner case, the pertinent statute, June 1, 1945, P. L. 1242, §§303, 304, 36 P.S. §§670-303, 304, mentions an appeal to this Court only in respect to the judgment of the court of common pleas. According to the statute applicable to the Burns case, an appeal to this Court may be had “from any judgment of the court of common pleas, either upon exceptions or upon the verdict in the issue framed on . . . appeal.” Act of July 15, 1919, P. L. 976, §6, 71 P.S. §1576. But the statute does not say what the procedure shall be when both an appeal from and exception to the viewers’ report have been taken¹ or whether the appeal from the common pleas court’s judgment on exceptions must be heard before its judgment on the appeal from the viewers’ report has been rendered.²

Appeals quashed.

1 Section 5 of the Act, 71 P.S. §1575, does direct the common pleas court to hear and determine exceptions before the appeal but this has no effect upon the proper procedure for appeals to this Court.

2 In the Burns case appellants contend that, pursuant to the statute quoted in the text, they are appealing- from a “confirmation” of the report of the viewers. But the statute makes it clear that a timely appeal prevents the confirmation of the viewers’ report, July 15, 1919, P. L. 976, §4, 71 P.S. §1574. Appellants in the Burns case also contend that their exceptions raise a question whether the viewers’ report meets the standard required by law, and they are entitled to have this question decided now notwithstanding the fact that they have taken a de novo appeal. In the first place the thrust of the exception in question does not go to the legal adequacy of the report but to the factual question of damages to the property subjacent to the avigation easement. Second, the statute does not say the “schedule” must be included in the report filed in court. July 15, 1919, P. L. 976, §4. The “schedule” was to be exhibited at a hearing set by the viewers to receive exceptions and evidence after they made their decision but before they filed a report in court. Apparently appellants waived this hearing. In any event, we fail to perceive why the dismissal of this exception should be reviewed at this time. It does not raise a question which if decided favorably to the appellant would throw doubt upon the fundamental legality of the proceedings before the viewers. Therefore, until the de novo appeal is concluded, our decision on the question would be premature.