Wendy Schreiber v. State Farm Lloyds

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: April 29, 2015
• Docket: 14-14-00010-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

ACCEPTED 14-14-00010-CV FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 4/29/2015 11:19:20 AM CHRISTOPHER PRINE CLERK

No. 14-14-00010-CV FILED IN 14th COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS In the Fourteenth Court of Appeals 4/29/2015 11:19:20 AM Houston, Texas CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk

WENDY SCHREIBER, Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v.

STATE FARM LLOYDS, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

On Appeal from the 190th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2012-03419

APPELLANT’S SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITIES

TO THE HONORABLE FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS:

Appellant Wendy Schreiber submits these supplemental authorities, both

published within the past few days, in support of her appeal of the trial court’s

judgment.

If there were any doubt about the admissibility or discoverability of the facts

relating to Blevins’s and Deutsch’s bias, prejudice, and reputations for truthfulness,

the Texas Supreme Court has put that to rest: Relevance also governs the scope of cross-examination in Texas, as the rules allow witnesses to be cross-examined “on any matter relevant to any issue in the case.” Tex. R. Evid. 611(b). And it is well established that “any fact which bears upon the credit of a witness would be a relevant fact, ... whether it goes to his indisposition to tell the truth, his want of opportunity to know the truth, his bias, interest, want of memory, or other like fact.” Evansich v. Gulf, C. & Santa Fe R.R. Co., 61 Tex. 24, 28 (1884).

JLG Trucking, LLC v. Garza, No. 13–0978, --- S.W.3d ----, 2015 WL 1870072 (Tex.

April 24, 2015) (emphasis added) (attached at Tab A). The trial court thus committed

error.

The ability to demonstrate bias, prejudice, and lack of truthfulness is especially

important in situations where, as here, the witness wears two hats:

Once he or she has qualified as an expert, and explained fire science to the jury, the members of the jury are likely to perceive anything the investigator says as scientific fact, even when that is not the case. Particularly in a case where there is one individual serving as both the scientist and the law enforcement investigator or case agent, there exists a risk of confusion if the two roles are not distinguished.

A fire investigator’s core competency is determining where the fire started. Recent studies have shown that the error rate for this important task may be shockingly high. And knowledge that the homeowner was behind his or her mortgage or recently had an argument with his or her spouse are facts that are not the least bit relevant to the task.

John J. Lentini, Contextual Bias in Fire Investigations: Scientific vs. Investigative

Data, THE BRIEF, v. 44, no. 3 at 41 (Spring 2015) (published by the Tort Trial &

-2- Insurance Prac. Sec. of the Am. Bar Ass’n) (emphasis in original) (attached at Tab B).

The trial court’s error was thus harmful.

KELLY, DURHAM & PITTARD, L.L.P.

By: /s/ Peter M. Kelly Peter M. Kelly, Lead Counsel State Bar No. 00791011 1005 Heights Boulevard Houston, Texas 77008 Telephone: 713.529.0048 Facsimile: 713.529.2498 Email: pkelly@texasappeals.com

DOYLE RAIZNER LLP

/s/ Michael Patrick Doyle Michael Patrick Doyle State Bar No. 06095650 Andrew P. Slania State Bar No. 24056338 2402 Dunlavy Street, Suite 200 Houston, Texas 77006 Telephone: 713.571.1146 Facsimile: 713.571.1148 Email: mdoyle@doyleraizner.com

Counsel for Wendy Schreiber

-3- CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Relying on the word count function in the word processing software used to produce this document, I certify that the number of words in this supplemental (excluding any caption, signature, proof of service, and certificate of compliance) is 384.

This document complies with the typeface requirements of TRAP 9 because:

WordPerfect X6 in 14-point Aldine401 BT.

/s/ Peter M. Kelly Peter M. Kelly

-4- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A true and correct copy of this Appellant’s Supplemental Authorities has been forwarded to all counsel of record on April 29, 2015, by electronic service:

M. Micah Kessler mkessler@NCK-Law.com Kathleen Crouch kcrounch@NCK-Law.com NISTICO, CROUCH & KESSLER, P.C. 1900 West Loop South, Suite 800 Houston, Texas 77027

Linda J. Burgess lburgess@winstead.com Elliot Clark eclark@winstead.com WINSTEAD PC 401 Congress Ave., Suite 2100 Austin, Texas 78701

Counsel for State Farm Lloyds

-5- TAB A Page 1 --- S.W.3d ----, 2015 WL 1870072 (Tex.) (Cite as: 2015 WL 1870072 (Tex.))

NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.

JLG Trucking, LLC, Petitioner, v. Lauren R. Garza, Respondent NO. 13–0978 Supreme Court of Texas. Argued February 26, 2015 OPINION DELIVERED: April 24, 2015 ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS JUSTICE LEHRMANN delivered the opinion of the Court. *1 This case requires us to review the trial court's exclusion of evidence on relevance grounds. The plaintiff was involved in two car accidents approximately three months apart. After the second accident, she sued the opposing driver in the first accident and alleged that this collision caused her injuries. The defendant sought to present two alternative defensive theories. First, the defendant presented expert testimony that the plaintiff's injuries were de- generative and thus not trauma-related at all. Alternatively, the defendant contended that the second accident caused her injuries. On the plaintiff's pretrial request, and because of the lack of expert testimony supporting the defendant's alternative theory, the trial court excluded all evidence of the second accident on relevance grounds. The trial court rendered judgment on the jury's verdict for the plaintiff, and the court of appeals affirmed. We hold that evidence of the second accident was relevant to the central issue of whether the defendant's negligence caused the plaintiff's damages. We further hold that the trial court committed harmful error in excluding the evidence, and particularly in refusing to allow cross-examination of the plaintiff's expert on the subject. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment and remand the case for a new trial. I. Background On July 16, 2008, Lauren Garza was traveling south on U.S. Highway 83 in Zapata County when an 18–wheeler driven by a JLG Trucking, LLC employee rear-ended her truck. An ambulance was called to the scene but did not transport Garza to the hospital. Instead, Gar- za testified that her aunt took her to a nearby emergency clinic where x-rays were taken, al- though the record contains no medical records from the clinic regarding that visit. Five days later Garza saw an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Guillermo Pechero, complaining of neck and back pain. An x-ray showed some straightening of the lordotic curve, which Dr. Pechero concluded

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was associated with muscle spasms in the neck. Dr. Pechero prescribed physical therapy, which Garza underwent for roughly eleven weeks. On October 9, 2008, shortly after ceasing physical therapy, Garza was involved in a second car accident. She was taken by ambulance from the scene of the accident to a hospital on an immobilization board with a hard collar to prevent movement in her neck. At the hospit- al, Garza complained of pain in her head, neck, and chest. On October 31, Garza returned to Dr. Pechero for a follow-up visit, complaining of continuous pain in her neck that radiated in- to her shoulders. Dr. Pechero ordered an MRI, which revealed that Garza had two herniated discs in her neck. Dr. Pechero began a conservative treatment of primarily medication in hopes of avoiding surgery, but a March 2009 nerve study revealed that a nerve at the site of the herniations had become compressed, and a second MRI in August 2011 showed two addi- tional herniated discs in her neck. Garza underwent spinal fusion surgery in January 2012. The surgery was successful, and at the time of trial Garza was “doing well.” However, Garza lives with a scar on her neck, reduced neck mobility, the permanent presence of hardware from the surgery, and the possibility of future surgery. *2 Garza sued JLG, alleging that the employee driver's negligence proximately caused her injuries and seeking damages for past and future medical expenses, loss of earning capacity, physical pain, mental anguish, physical impairment, and disfigurement.FN1 Garza's treating physician, Dr. Pechero, served as her expert witness to testify that the July 2008 accident caused the herniated discs. JLG designated Dr. Bruce Berberian, a neuroradiologist, as its ex- pert witness to testify that Garza was suffering from degeneration of her discs, and not a trauma-related injury at all. JLG also intended to introduce evidence of the October accident as an alternative cause of Garza's injuries, although JLG did not designate an expert to testify in support of that theory. FN1. Garza named the employee as a defendant, but it appears that he was never served with citation. Garza also asserted claims against JLG for negligent entrustment and gross negligence, but those claims were not submitted to the jury. Garza filed a pretrial motion to exclude any evidence of the second accident on the grounds that such evidence was not relevant, or that its probative value was substantially out- weighed by the unfair prejudice or confusion it would cause the jury, because “there is no causal connection between the injuries [Garza] is complaining of and the subsequent colli- sion.” After a hearing, the trial court granted Garza's motion to exclude. Dr. Pechero testified by deposition at trial that the July accident caused Garza's injuries. He noted that Garza exhibited neck pain after that accident and that the October MMI revealed injuries consistent with a rear-end collision. One portion of the deposition played to the jury contained the following exchange between Dr. Pechero and Garza's counsel: Q. Now, up to this point in the treatment of her you took a history, correct? A. Correct. Q. And Lauren indicated to you that she had not had any or been involved in any other ac-

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cidents other than the one from July—July 16th of 2008; is that correct? A. I don't think I asked her one way or the other on that. .... Q. Well, you took a history, correct? A. Correct. Q. All right. And let's take a look at the July 21st note real quick. A. Okay. Are you referring to the October note, or the July note? Q. The July note. A. Oh, okay. In the July note, she did not have any other history of injury. Taking the position that this testimony opened the door to questions concerning the second accident, JLG renewed its objection to the exclusion of all mention or evidence of that acci- dent. The trial court upheld its earlier exclusion ruling, and JLG submitted an offer of proof as to the testimony that would have been elicited from Dr. Pechero and the evidence that would have been presented in support of the second accident as an alternative cause. JLG's offer of proof included the police report regarding the second accident, photos of Garza's vehicle after the second accident, medical records documenting Garza's emergency treatment after that ac- cident, and Dr. Pechero's testimony that he had not reviewed those medical records. Garza re- sponded with an offer of proof consisting of Dr. Pechero's testimony that he had relied on Dr. Berberian's testimony that the second accident did not cause Garza's injuries to rule out that possibility. The jury found that JLG's employee's negligence proximately caused the July acci- dent and awarded her $1,166,264.48 in damages. FN2 FN2. The jury awarded $108,135.48 for past medical expenses, $110,000.00 for future medical expenses, $583,693.00 for future loss of earning capacity, $42,048.00 for past physical pain, $252,288.00 for future physical pain, $5,000.00 for past physical impairment, $57,600.00 for future physical impairment, and $7,500.00 for future dis- figurement. The jury awarded $0 for past loss of earning capacity, past and future men- tal anguish, and past disfigurement. *3 JLG appealed the trial court's judgment on the verdict, arguing that evidence of the second accident was relevant and that its exclusion amounted to harmful error because it pre- vented JLG from holding Garza to her burden of proving that JLG caused her injuries. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of the second accident because “expert testimony would be required to establish any ... causal link between the second collision and Garza's injuries.” ––– S.W.3d ––––,–––– (Tex.App.–San Antonio 2013). II. Analysis We review a trial court's exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Interstate

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Northborough P'ship v. State, 66 S.W.3d 213, 220 (Tex.2001). Erroneous exclusion of evid- ence is reversible only if it probably resulted in an improper judgment. Id.; TEX. R. APP. P.P. 44.1(a)(1). In this case, the disputed evidence was excluded as irrelevant, and so the rules of evidence governing relevance are the starting point of our analysis. A. Evidence of the Second Accident Is Relevant to the Issue of Causation Rule 401 broadly defines relevant evidence to include “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” TEX. R. EVID. 401. Evid- ence that is not relevant is inadmissible, while relevant evidence is admissible unless other- wise excluded by law. TEX. R. EVID. 402. Relevance also governs the scope of cross- examination in Texas, as the rules allow witnesses to be cross-examined “on any matter relev- ant to any issue in the case.” TEX. R. EVID. 611(b). And it is well established that “any fact which bears upon the credit of a witness would be a relevant fact, ... whether it goes to his in- disposition to tell the truth, his want of opportunity to know the truth, his bias, interest, want of memory, or other like fact.” Evansich v. Gulf, C. & Santa Fe R.R. Co., 61 Tex. 24, 28 (1884). Finally, relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially out- weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” TEX. R. EVID. 403. JLG argues that evidence of the second accident is relevant to the causation element of Garza's negligence claim. We agree. Establishing causation in a personal injury case requires a plaintiff to “prove that the conduct of the defendant caused an event and that this event caused the plaintiff to suffer compensable injuries.” Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex.1995). For example, when an accident victim seeks to recover medical expenses, she must show both “what all the conditions were” that generated the expenses and “that all the conditions were caused by the accident.” Guevara v. Ferrer, 247 S.W.3d 662, 669 (Tex.2007). Further, “expert testimony is necessary to establish causation as to medical condi- tions outside the common knowledge and experience of jurors.” Id. at 665. Finally, we have held that “if evidence presents ‘other plausible causes of the injury or condition that could be negated, the [proponent of the testimony] must offer evidence excluding those causes with reasonable certainty.’ ” Transcontinental Ins. Co. v. Crump, 330 S.W.3d 211, 218 (Tex.2010) (quoting Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 720 (Tex.1997) (alteration in Crump ) (emphasis in Crump omitted)); see also Harris v. Belue, 974 S.W.2d 386, 393–94 (Tex.App.–Tyler 1998, pet. denied) (rejecting the argument that the plaintiff failed to negate other probable causes of her injury in light of the lack of factual support in the record for those proposed causes). *4 In this case, Garza sought to prove that the negligence of JLG's employee caused the July accident. She also sought to prove by expert testimony from Dr. Pechero that this acci- dent caused the herniated discs in her neck along with all of the associated pain, medical ex- penses,FN3 loss of earning capacity, impairment, and disfigurement. JLG sought to under- mine Garza's theory and Dr. Pechero's testimony by presenting evidence of the October 2008 accident as an alternative cause of those injuries. Garza argues that the record does not sup- port a connection between the October accident and her injuries, rendering the evidence prop- erly excluded.

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FN3. Garza did not seek to recover medical expenses associated with her emergency treatment immediately after the second accident. Garza relies in part on Farmers Texas County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Pagan, 453 S.W.3d 454 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). In Pagan, the plaintiff alleged that vari- ous neck and shoulder injuries were caused by a March 2008 car accident. Id. at 458. The de- fendant sought to introduce evidence of an April 2009 “horse incident,” FN4 which the trial court excluded. Id. at 459–60. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court “could reasonably conclude that informing the jury about a horse incident with no apparent connection to the lasting injuries at issue in this case would confuse the issues and mislead the jury.” Id. at 463. The court noted in pertinent part that (1) the interrogatory response in which Pagan identified the horse incident did not mention any resulting neck or shoulder injuries, (2) the medical records associated with the incident noted only “contusions” resulting from the fall, and x-rays showed that her spine and shoulders were normal, and (3) records from Pa- gan's family doctor indicating that she complained of neck and shoulder pain at a visit after the horse incident did not reference the incident itself. Id. FN4. The evidence of the facts surrounding that incident is inconsistent. Some evid- ence indicates that Pagan fell off a horse, other evidence indicates that she was “trampled,” and still other evidence indicates that she fell while leading the horse on foot. 453 S.W.3d at 459–60. Regardless of whether Pagan was correctly decided, which we need not address, the evid- ence of a connection between the proposed alternative cause and the plaintiff's injuries that the court found lacking in Pagan is present in this case. JLG's offer of proof indicates that, as a direct result of the second accident, Garza was transported to a hospital on an immobilization board and constrained with a hard c-collar around her neck, she complained of neck pain once she arrived, and she returned to Dr. Pechero three weeks later for the first time since the con- clusion of her physical therapy with complaints of continuous pain in her neck radiating into her shoulder. At that time, the MRI revealed the herniated discs. The circumstances surround- ing the second accident and its aftermath provide the necessary factual support to present the second accident as a “plausible cause” of Garza's injuries.FN5 FN5. Certainly, expert testimony in support of the alternative cause would lend support to its plausibility. And in some cases, expert testimony may in fact be necessary to el- evate a proposed alternative cause from theoretically possible to plausible. But this is not that case. Significantly, the exclusion of the second accident curtailed JLG's ability to probe Dr. Pechero's conclusions about causation by asking him to explain why he discounted the second accident as an alternative cause. JLG's offer of proof shows that, in formulating his opinion, Dr. Pechero did not review the records from Garza's emergency treatment after the second ac- cident, which included the statements reflecting that Garza was experiencing neck pain in its wake. According to Garza's responsive offer of proof, Dr. Pechero's only explanation for rul- ing out the second accident as the cause of the herniations was that he relied on Dr. Berberi- an's testimony to that effect. But Dr. Berberian concluded that neither accident caused Garza's

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injuries, calling into question the credibility of the methods underlying Dr. Pechero's ap- proach. Cf. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 559 (Tex.1995) (upholding the exclusion of expert testimony when the expert failed to “carefully consider [and rule out] alternative causes”);FN6 see also TEX. R. EVID.. 607 (“The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party....”). JLG could not adequately cross-examine Dr. Pechero on those methods without discussing the improperly excluded evidence. FN6. JLG did not move to exclude Dr. Pechero's testimony in the trial court. We cite Robinson because it highlights the significance of alternative causes when a plaintiff must prove causation by expert testimony. B. The Court of Appeals Erroneously Conflated Relevance and Evidentiary Sufficiency *5 The court of appeals held that the trial court correctly excluded evidence of the second accident because “no expert testimony was proffered to establish that the second collision caused any of Garza's injuries.” ––– S.W.3d at ––––. As support for its holding, the court of appeals relied on a line of cases addressing the necessity of expert medical testimony to prove causation in the personal-injury context. As discussed below, in doing so the court of appeals conflated the concepts of relevance and evidentiary sufficiency and improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. Principal among the cases cited by the court of appeals was Guevara v. Ferrer, 247 S.W.3d 662 (Tex.2007). That case, like this one, involved a car accident that a jury found the defendant caused. Id. at 663, 665. The plaintiff, who had a complicated medical history that included hypertension, heart disease, and kidney failure, complained of stomach pains and re- ceived emergency treatment, including abdominal surgery, immediately after the accident. Id. at 663–64. Following that surgery, he spent three-and-a-half months in the hospital, two weeks in a continuing care facility, and two more weeks in another medical facility. Id. at 664. His family sought to recover all the medical bills generated by his stays at the hospital and both facilities, which exceeded $1 million, but did not present expert medical evidence to prove that the accident caused those expenses to be incurred. Id. at 664–65. We held that, while “the evidence [was] legally sufficient to support a finding that some of his medical ex- penses [such as those associated with his post-accident treatment in the emergency room] were causally related to the accident,” it was “not legally sufficient to prove what the condi- tions were that generated all the medical expenses or that the accident caused all of the condi- tions and the expenses for their treatment.” Id. at 669–70 (emphases added). In Guevara, we applied the well-established general rule, cited above, that “expert testi- mony is necessary to establish causation as to medical conditions outside the common know- ledge and experience of jurors.” Id. at 665 (citing cases). And we did so in the context of con- sidering the legal sufficiency of non-expert evidence to support a finding of causation. But we did not hold that the lack of expert testimony rendered any of the evidence irrelevant or other- wise admissible. In fact, relevance was not at issue in Guevara.FN7 In this case, although the court of appeals was purporting to analyze relevance, in effect it was improperly analyzing whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support a finding that the second accident caused Garza's injuries. But JLG did not have the burden to prove causation; Garza did. It was Garza's burden to prove that the first accident caused her injuries, and, as discussed above, the

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record in this case sufficiently demonstrates that the second accident is at least relevant to that inquiry even without an expert proponent. FN7. We did confirm in Guevara that “evidence of temporal proximity ... between an event and subsequently manifested conditions” is not irrelevant to causation, although “temporal proximity ... does not, by itself, support an inference of medical causation.” 247 S.W.3d at 667–68. Further, JLG did not rule out the relevance of the second accident by presenting expert testimony that Garza's injuries were degenerative and not trauma-induced. Parties may plead conflicting claims and defenses in the alternative so long as they have a “reasonable basis in fact [and] law.” Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 615 (Tex.2007). In turn, parties may present evidence of alternative, and even inconsistent, theories of relief, leaving to the jury to “choose the theory that it believes based upon its resolution of the conflicting evidence.” Wilson v. Whetstone, No. 03–08–00738–CV, 2010 WL 1633087, at *10 (Tex.App.–Austin April 20, 2010, pet. denied) (mem.op.) (holding that the plaintiff's claim and evidence of the parties' ac- quiescence to the alleged property boundary line were not fatal to her adverse possession claim, even assuming that the claims were mutually exclusive); see also In re Arthur Ander- sen LLP, 121 S.W.3d 471, 482 n.32 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding) (noting that a defendant could deny liability for conspiracy while simultaneously alleging that third parties were also liable for conspiracy). But the burden still falls on the plaintiff to estab- lish the elements of her cause of action. *6 In this case, as explained above, the burden was on Garza, the plaintiff, to establish both that JLG caused the July 2008 accident and that this accident caused her injuries. Part of that burden was to exclude with reasonable certainty other plausible causes of her injuries supported by the record. Crump, 330 S.W.3d at 218. JLG's decision to present Dr. Berberian's testimony in support of its theory that Garza's injuries were degenerative–which the jury ap- parently found unpersuasive–did not relieve Garza of that burden. The defendant's responsibil- ity “is not that of proving, but the purely negative one of repelling or making ineffective the adversary's attempts to prove.” James B. Thayer, The Burden of Proof, 4 HARV. L. REV. 45, 56 (1890). In its efforts to repel Garza's attempts to prove her case, JLG was entitled to present evidence of the second accident to the jury, which was relevant to Garza's theory of causation irrespective of Dr. Berberian's testimony. The trial court therefore abused its discre- tion in excluding that evidence. C. Reversible Error The trial court's error in excluding evidence of the second accident is reversible only if it probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. TEX. R. APP. P.. 44.1(a)(1). We have declined to establish any “specific test” for determining whether evidentiary error resulted in an improper judgment, but we have held that the appellate court must review the entire record, “considering the state of the evidence, the strength and weakness of the case, and the verdict.” Reliance Steel & Aluminum Co. v. Sevcik, 267 S.W.3d 867, 871 (Tex.2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We explained in Sevcik that “if erroneously admitted or excluded evidence was crucial to a key issue, the error was likely harmful.” Id. at 873. “By contrast, ad- mission or exclusion is likely harmless if the evidence was cumulative, or if the rest of the

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evidence was so one-sided that the error likely made no difference.” Id. In this case, the evid- ence of the second accident was crucial to whether JLG's negligence caused Garza's injuries, and the harm in its exclusion was compounded by JLG's curtailed cross-examination of Dr. Pechero. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court's exclusion of evidence regarding the second accident was reversible error requiring a new trial.FN8 FN8. JLG did not contest on appeal the finding that its negligence caused the first acci- dent. It asserted only that the erroneously excluded evidence tainted the findings as to the damages caused by that accident. However, because liability was contested in the trial court, both liability and damages must be remanded. Estrada v. Dillon, 44 S.W.3d 558, 562 (Tex.2001) (per curiam) (applying TEX. R. APP. P.P. 44.1(b)). III. Conclusion The trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of the second accident, which was relevant to whether JLG's negligence caused Garza's damages. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial in accord- ance with this opinion.

Tex., 2015 JLG Trucking, LLC v. Garza --- S.W.3d ----, 2015 WL 1870072 (Tex.) END OF DOCUMENT

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. Date of Printing: Apr 28, 2015 KEYCITE JLG Trucking, LLC v. Garza, --- S.W.3d ----, 2015 WL 1870072 (Tex., Apr 24, 2015) (NO. 13-0978) History Direct History

1 JLG Trucking LLC v. Garza, 2013 WL 5570823 (Tex.App.-San Antonio Oct 09, 2013) (NO. 04-13-00043-CV), review granted (Jan 30, 2015) Judgment Reversed by => 2 JLG Trucking, LLC v. Garza, --- S.W.3d ----, 2015 WL 1870072 (Tex. Apr 24, 2015) (NO. 13-0978)

Court Documents Appellate Court Documents (U.S.A.)

Tex. Appellate Petitions, Motions and Filings 3 JLG TRUCKING, LLC, Petitioner, v. Lauren R. GARZA, Respondent., 2014 WL 470789 (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) (Tex. Jan. 13, 2014) Petition for Review (NO. 13-0978) 4 JLG TRUCKING, LLC, Petitioner, v. Lauren R. GARZA, Respondent., 2014 WL 2472337 (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) (Tex. May 21, 2014) Response of Lauren R. Garza to Petition for Review of JLG Trucking, LLC (NO. 13-0978) 5 JLG TRUCKING, LLC, Petitioner, v. Lauren R. GARZA, Respondent., 2014 WL 2761642 (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) (Tex. Jun. 4, 2014) Reply in Support of Petition for Review (NO. 13-0978)

Tex. Appellate Briefs 6 JLG TRUCKING, LLC, Petitioner, v. Lauren R. GARZA, Respondent., 2014 WL 4185526 (Appellate Brief) (Tex. Aug. 20, 2014) Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (NO. 13-0978)

Tex.App.-San Antonio Appellate Briefs 7 JLG TRUCKING, LLC, Appellant, v. Lauren GARZA, Appellee., 2013 WL 7090037 (Appellate Brief) (Tex.App.-San Antonio Apr. 25, 2013) Brief of Ap- pellant (NO. 04-13-00043-CV)

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. All rights reserved. 8 JLG TRUCKING, LLC, Appellant, v. Lauren GARZA, Appellee., 2013 WL 7090038 (Appellate Brief) (Tex.App.-San Antonio Jun. 25, 2013) Brief of Ap- pellee, Lauren Garza (NO. 04-13-00043-CV)

Tex. Oral Arguments 9 JLG Trucking, LLC, v. Lauren R. Garza., 2015 WL 1359407 (Oral Argument) (Tex. Feb. 26, 2015) Oral Argument (NO. 13-0978)

Dockets (U.S.A.)

Tex. 10 JLG TRUCKING, LLC v. LAUREN R. GARZA, NO. 13-0978 (Docket) (Tex. Dec. 9, 2013)

Tex.App.-San Antonio 11 JLG TRUCKING LLC v. LAUREN R. GARZA, NO. 04-13-00043-CV (Docket) (Tex.App.-San Antonio Jan. 17, 2013)

Expert Court Documents (U.S.A.)

Tex. Appellate Petitions, Motions and Filings 12 JLG TRUCKING, LLC, Petitioner, v. Lauren R. GARZA, Respondent., 2014 WL 470789 (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) (Tex. Jan. 13, 2014) Petition for Review (NO. 13-0978) 13 JLG TRUCKING, LLC, Petitioner, v. Lauren R. GARZA, Respondent., 2014 WL 2472337 (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) (Tex. May 21, 2014) Response of Lauren R. Garza to Petition for Review of JLG Trucking, LLC (NO. 13-0978) 14 JLG TRUCKING, LLC, Petitioner, v. Lauren R. GARZA, Respondent., 2014 WL 2761642 (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) (Tex. Jun. 4, 2014) Reply in Support of Petition for Review (NO. 13-0978)

Tex. Appellate Briefs 15 JLG TRUCKING, LLC, Petitioner, v. Lauren R. GARZA, Respondent., 2014 WL 4185526 (Appellate Brief) (Tex. Aug. 20, 2014) Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (NO. 13-0978)

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. All rights reserved. TAB B Contextual Bias in Fire Investigations Scientific vs. Investigative Data BY JOHN J. LENTINI C ontextual bias is an issue that has come to the not scientifically valid. The introduction of expectation forefront of forensic science in the last few bias into the investigation results in the use of only that years, and nowhere is contextual bias mo re data that supports this previously formed conclusion and likely to influence scientific determinations than in often results in the misinterpretation and/or the discard- fire investigation. This is largely because many fire ing of data that does not support the original opinion. investigators also serve simultaneously as law enforce- Investigators are strongly cautioned to avoid expectation ment offi cers. bias through proper use of the scientific method.' This article will explore the different duties, responsi- bilities, and ethical requirements of the scientist and the The question then becomes, what constitutes "all of law enforcement officer. What data constitute scientific the relevant data"? Relevant to what ? Relevant to a evidence and what constitute investigative information ? reliable sc ientific determination, or relevant to the Can the two be separated? Should they be separated? correct law enforcement conclusion? The two are not How does the science suffer when the scientist is influ- necessarily the same. enced by contextual bias? How does law enforcement When fire investigators testify as expert witnesses, suffer when a fire investigator is unable to classify a fire they are allowed the privilege of expressing an opinion based on the physical evidence? to a jury, as long as that testimony meets these criteria: There are no easy answers to these questions. In one case, the ethical and valid response may be obvious, (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized while in the next case, a fire investigator attempting to knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand assist the jury to understand the physical evidence can the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; easily cross the line and conflate valid, but domain irrel- (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; evant, invest igative data with scientific proof. It is up to (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles counsel to help the expert witnesses delineate between and methods; and information that can potentially bias the interpretation (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles of the physical evidence, and information that is neces- and methods to the facts of the case. 2 sary for its objective evaluation. Whether the situation is a proper one for the use of "Scientific" Knowledge vs. expert testimony is to be determined on the basis of "Investigative" Knowledge assisting the trier of fact. The fire investigation profession some time ago com- mitted itself to conducting scientific investigations. "There is no more certain test for determining when The resu lt has been a significant improvement in the experts may be used than the common sense inquiry reliability of origin and cause determinations. In the whether the untrained layman would be qualified to intervening years, the "relevant investigative com- determine intelligently and to the best possible degree munity," represented by the National Fire Protection the particular issue without enlightenment from those Association (NFPA) Technical Committee on Fire having a specialized understanding of the subject Investigations, has tried to root out those practices involved in the dispute." 3 that make arri v ing at a valid scientifi c conclus ion about the origin and cause of the fire more difficult. Once he or she has qualified as an expert, and O ne of the obstacles to reaching a valid conclusion is explained fire science to the jury, the members of the cognitive bias. jury are likely to perceive anything the investigator says The concept of expectation bias was first introduced as scientific fact, even when that is not the case. Partic- to NFPA 921: Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations ularly in a case where there is one individual serving as in the 2008 edition, when the following caution about both the scientist and the law enforcement investigator expectation bias was added. or case agent, there exists a risk of confusion if the two roles are not distinguished. 4.3.8 Expectation Bias. Expectation bias is a well-estab- A fire investigator's core competency is determining lished phenomenon that occurs in scientific analysis where the fire started. Recent studies have shown that when investigator(s) reach a premature conclusion with- the error rate for this important task may be shockingly out having examined or considered all of the relevant high. 4 And knowledge that the homeowner was behind data. Instead of collecting and examining all of the data on his or her mortgage or recently had an argument with in a logical and unbiased manner to reach a scientifically his or her spouse are facts that are not the least bit rel- reliable conclusion, the investigator(s) uses the prema- evant to the task. ture determination to dictate investigative processes, In Michigan MiUers Mutual Insurance Corp. v. Benfield, analyses, and, ultimately, conclusions, in a way that is one of the fi rst reliability challenges to a fire investigator

41 TORT TRIAL & INS URANCE PRACTICE SECTION THE BRIEF • SPRING 2015 0 TIP When working with experts, serv ing in the role of the scientist, it was argued that a law enforce- The Holistic Approach beware of the Eleventh Circuit Court of ment officer crossed the line when In 2009, two ATF-certified fire mixing fact Appeals expounded on the spec ial he attempted to put an "expert investigators, Steven Avato and testimony aura of reliability that surrounds gloss" on what wou ld otherwise be Andrew Cox, published an inter- with opinion "scientific testimony": admissible fact witness testimony: esting and provocative article in testimony, or the Fire arul Arson Investigator enti- your expert The use of "science" to explain "Interpretations" of unambiguous tled "Science and Circumstance: may lose how something occurred has the words or phrases that are plainly Key Components in Fire Investiga- that "aura potential to carry great weight within the jury's understand- tion." They provide two scenarios of special with a jury, explaining both why ing are unlikely to be admissible of a fire that resulted in identical reliability." counsel might seek to couch an under Rule 702. Expert testi- physical evidence. In the first sce- expert witness's testimony in mony does not assist where the nario, Mr. mith says "Hello" to his terms of science, as well as why jury has no need for an opinion secretary, goes into his office, and the trial judge plays an important because it easily can be derived closes the door. He then lights a role as the gate-keeper in moni- from common sense, common candle and discards the match in a toring the evidentiary reliability experience, the jury's own per- trash can. He receives a phone call of such testimony. See Daubert, ceptions, or simple logic. and immediately leaves the office, [509 u.s. 579,590 (1993)]. closing the door behind him. A fire Because of the manner in which . . . The witness's dual role erupts in the trash can. In the sec- this expert's testimony was pre- might confuse the jury, or a jury ond scenario, Mr. Smythe angrily sented to the jury, we find no might be smitten by an expert's storms past his secretary ranting, "I'll error by the trial court in deter- "aura of special reliability" and fix them. They'll pay for firing me." mining Daubert applied to the therefore give his factual tes- He then enters the office, slams the testimony at issue.5 timony undue weight. Experts door behind him, and throws a lit famously possess an "aura of spe- match into the trash can. He ex its The Benfield decision was cial reliability" surrounding their the office and closes the door and handed down in May 1998, about testimony. And it is possible shouts "Sic semper tyrannis!'>9 a year before the Supreme Court that the glow from this halo may The authors argue that classifying found that Daubert and the Fed- extend to an expert witness's fact the second fire as "undetennined" is eral Rules of Evidence apply to all testimony as well, swaying the a result of disregarding relevant data, expert testimony, not just scien- jury by virtue of his perceived and state, "This approach is not only tific testimony. ln Kumho Tire Co. expertise rather than the logi- a willful departure from scientifically v. Carmichael, the Supreme Court cal force of his testimony. Or, the based problem solving, but it is also held that the federal rules did not jury may unduly credit the opin- a dangerous methodology that has distinguish between "scientific," ion testimony of an investigating most certainly led to erroneous ori- "technical," or "other specialized" officer based on a perception gin and cause determinations." 10 But knowledge. 6 Expert testimony is that the expert was privy to facts what are the data relevant to? Cer- expert testimony, and the court sys- about the defendant not pre- tainly, the jury is entitled to learn all tem relies on it in most cases that sented at trial. Alternatively, of the facts uncovered during the go to trial today. the mixture of fact and expert investigation of this fire, but does Problems can arise when expert testimony could, under some cir- that allow the investigator, using testimony is comingled with other cumstances, come close to an his or her expertise as a fire scien- investigative information. This expert commenting on the ulti- tist, to conclude based on the scene problem was recently highlighted mate issue in a criminal matter. 7 examination that he or she has "sci- in a case decided by the Seventh entifically" determined that the fire C ircuit Court of Appeals, in which The court went on to admonish was intentional? judges to instruct juries about what The second fire was certainly testimony is expert testimony and intentionally set, but no expert anal- John J. Lentini is the president of what is not, and it further stated ysis or opinion is required to reach Scientific Fire Analysis, LLC. He that prosecutors shou ld structure that conclusion. The jury requires corulucts, supervises, arul reviews fire, their examination of a witness to no assistance in determining what arson, explosion, and asphyxiation allow for a separation of the expert happened here. Sometimes the sci- investigations, arul provides expert testimony from the fact testimony ence is not useful, nor is it necessary. testimony on the results. He can be when the law enforcement officer In fact, presenting a perfectly logi- reached at scientific. fire@yahoo. com. testifies in a dual role. 8 cal and correct conclusion under the

42 THE BRIEF • SPRING 2015 TORT TRIAL & INSURANCE PRACTICE SECTION color of "science" might be consid- A. The defendant poured gaso- Ethical Considerations ered disingenuous. line on the victim, and then Ethics can be defined as the science Avato and Cox set up several he ignited it. of human duty in it broadest sense. scenarios that do not de cribe how B. The defendant poured gaso- If we change the word "human" to anyone investigates fires, but they line on the victim, and then "professional" we can define eth- correctly state that it is the inves- the victim ignited it. ics for every profe sion, but those tigator's responsibility to find the C. The victim poured gaso- ethics are different for each . cien- "demarcation" between relevant line on herself, and then she tists must live by a different set of sc ientific data and data that are not ignited it. rules than law enforcement officers. relevant. No matter how that line Prosecutors mu t live by a different is drawn, it surely travels through a Scientific evaluation of the physical set of rules than defen e attorneys. domain called "witness statements." evidence was of no help. One hopes that all of the players in Statements that describe observa- In another case, the owner of a the criminal justice system behave tions about the fire, or knowledge retail establishment that sold ski- ethically. ing equipment in the winter and One of the mo t respected forensic swimming pool supplies in the sum- The inherent mer solicited several individuals to cientists on the planet, Dr. Douglas Lucas, spent more than 20 year as tension between burn the store down so she could collect on her insurance policy. Find- chairman of the Ethics Committee in the American Academy of Foren- the goals and ing no takers, the woman declared she would do it herself, and when sic Sciences. Dr. Luca has written and spoken exten ively on the sub- n1ethods of her boyfriend challenged her, she wagered $500 that she would, in fact, ject of ethics. He tate that one of the major causes of pressure on tho e science and those bum the store down. And bum it did. who serve as expert witne es i the It burned so completely, in fact, adversary system of justice because of litigation that an investigative team consist- of the inherent tension between the ing of five certified fire investigators, goal and method of science and puts significant an electrical engineer, a fire pro- the goals and methods of litigation. tection engineer, a chemist, and a Thi is so even though both make pressure on expert canine team who pent three days on sen e, and both serve vital social the scene were unable to determine functions. In describing the different witnesses. either the origin or the cause. It took ethical obligations of scientists and more than five years to bring the law enforcement officers, Dr. Lucas of the arrangement of furniture, case to trial, and the lack of a dem- writes: or when the electricity was dis- onstrated origin and cause troubled connected clearly belong in the the jury. In the end, however, they For a law enforcement officer, act- relevant scientific data column. did not find that there was reason- ing on information received from Statements about motive, means, able doubt about the store owner's another officer is quite proper. and opportunity are not relevant guilt, and they convicted her. The For a scientist, however, arriv- to an origin or cause determina- investigators did the right thing by ing at a conclusion in the absence tion, and NFPA 9 21 specifically declaring, even knowing how many of proper scientific data, is qu ite states that such "data" should only times the woman had solicited oth- unethical. This distinction is be considered after the origin and ers to commit arson, that the origin particularly important, and some- cause have been determined. and cau e were undetermined. The times difficult, for scientists who This author was requested to jury would not have been helped by are part of a law enforcement examine the evidence in the case having an expert opine that the fire agency, and especially for those where a defendant was accu ed of was intentionally set. They were able who are also sworn officers.11 pouring gasoline on his girlfriend to come to that conclusion them- and setting her on fire. The prose- selves, ba ed on common sense and The tension between cience cutor had heard several versions of investigative information. Thi is and the law was recognized by ]u - the event and wanted an indepen- yet another case where the scientific tice Blackmun in the Daubert dent evaluation of the evidence. evaluation of the evidence was of no decision, when he wrote: Based on the phy ical ev idence, help. The defendant got a fair trial, however, three scenarios were and had no grounds to appeal the [T)here are important differences equally supported: admission of expert testimony. between the quest for truth in

43 TORT TRIAL & INSURANCE PRACTICE SECTION THE BRIEF • SPRING 2015 the courtroom and the quest for cord had been found in a garbage Scientific truth in the laboratory. Scien- container near the defendant's tific conclusions are subject to re idence. testimony is perpetual revision. Law, on th e At lea t partly as a result of the other hand, must resolve di putes devastating cross-examinatio n of expected to be fin ally and quickly. The scientific Rudolph at the trial, the defen- project is advanced by broad and dant was acquitted. The United real science, wide-ranging conside ration of a State attorney wa not happy. In multitude of hypotheses, for those a four-page complaint to the FBI independent Laboratory director, he wrote: that are incorrect will eventu- ally be shown to be o, and that of other field in itself is an advance. Conjec- tures that are probably wrong are The first deficiency in Rudolph's analysis eems obviou . Rely- information. of little use, however, in the proj- ing on the hearsay views of field ect of reaching a quick, fin al, and agents in rendering an opinion as ociated with the defendants, and binding legal judgment-often of as to the presence of a chemi- it would take 1,200 pounds of the great consequence-abo ut a pa r- cal compound seems obviously explosive to cause the damage to the ticular set of events in the pa t. wrong-headed. The FBI chemist is building. The OIG a ked Williams We recognize that, in practice, being asked to independently ascer- to ju tify his testimony, and he could a gatekeeping role fo r the judge, tain the existence of a substance not. It was based entirely on con- no matter how flex ible, inevita- not just regurgitate information he textual bias. The OIG report stated, bly on occasion will prevent the ha received from the field. ec- "William failed in his re pon ibility jury from learning of authentic ondly, the information from the to provide the court with an objec- insights and innovations. That, field agents may be wrong or so tive, unbiased expert opinion."15 nevertheless, is the balance that speculative as to be accorded lit- In general, the OIG inve tiga- is struck by Rules of Evidence tle weight. Finally, using any bas is tion fo und very few problems with designed not for the exhausti ve other than instrumental analysis the FBI's approach to science. But search for cosmic unde rstand ing for an opinion as to the presence becau e a very few examiners but for the particularized resolu- of a chemical or compound leads, behaved in an unethical manner in a ti on of legal dispute .12 as in this case, to insuffic ient relatively small number of cases, over instrumental testing. 13 3,000 major criminal case were cast Dr. Lucas served on the Office of into doubt, and the otherwise well- In pector G eneral' (OIG's) com- Because scientific testimony has de erved excellent reputation of a mis ion convened in the mid-1990s the potential to carry great weight fine organization was tarnished. to investigate allegations of irreg- with the jury, courts have a right to ularities in the FBI Laboratory' expect that testimony presented as Other Examples of Explosives Unit. At that time, the science is based on real science that Context Bias testifying experts were required to is independent of other field infor- Dr. Itiel Dror i one of the world's be field agent as well as cienti ts, mation. The OIG report stated, "We leading experts on contextual bia . and unfortunately, some of them conclude that Rudolph's performance After the Brandon Mayfield fin- confu ed the two role . in Psinakis was wholly inadequate gerprint fiasco, 16 Dror conducted In one in tance, a chemist by and unprofessional." 14 The commis- an experiment to test the effect of the name of Rudolph conducted a sion did not, however, find a factual context bias on five fingerprint exam- preliminary examination of a us- basi to conclude that he inten- iners. A different pair of fingerprints pee ted explos ive, and got results tionally overstated or biased his was prepared for each of the expert "consistent with" PETN , the explo- conclusions. participants. Each pair of prints had sive used in detonator cord. He The OIG also l oked into the been previously identified a a match testified positively at the trial of analysis of evidence in the first by that same expert five years ear- a su peered terrorist that he was World Trade Center bombing in lier, within the normal course of as sure a he could be that he had 1993. In that case, an FBI chem- his or her work. The latent finger- identified PETN, but on cro -exam- ist named W illiams opined that prints had been obtained from the ination, he had to admit that he was the main charge wa 1,200 pounds crime scenes and were all presented using a combination of "scientific" of urea nitrate, not because it was again to the experts in their origi- and "investigative" information to found at the scene, but because nal format. They were told that the reach his conclu ion . Detonator it was found at a bomb factory pair of prints was the one that was

44 THE BRIEF • SPRING 2015 TORT TRIAL & INSURANCE PRACTICE SECTION erron eously match ed by the FBI as b ias in fire cases by separa ting the AN INVESTIGATION INTO LABORATORY the M adrid bom ber, thus c reating an dut ies of the principa l invest igator PRACTICES AND ALLEG ED MISCONDUCT extraneous context th at the prints fro m the fire scen e an alyst . This meth- IN ExPLOSIVEs- RELATED AN D OTHER we re a n onmatch . Three of the fi ve odo logy, which involves protecting CAsEs pt. 3.A .II .A. (1 997) [here inaf- examiners ch an ged thei r identifi ca- th e scen e investigator from potentially ter FBI LABORATORY INvESTIGATION t io n to "n onma tch ." O ne ch an ged to biasing information , h as been applied REPORT). available at www.justice.gov/ "inconclusive," and o nly on e he ld to successfully. 21 Law e nfo rce ment offi- o ig/ pecial/9704a/. th e o riginal "m atch " determin ation . 17 cers can use scien ce to a id in the 14. FBI LABORATORY INVESTIGA- T h e Texas Fo ren sic Scien ce search for just ice, but if the scien ce is TION REPORT, supra note 13, at pt. C o mm issio n (FSC) spent three to be used fa irly and effectively, it is 3.A.Il. B.5. years (2008-20 11) st udy ing th e sci- important that scientific evidence be 15. /d. at pt. 3.C.Il.B. e n ce, a nd the lack thereof, tha t reliable and independent. • 16. Brandon Mayfield, an O regon contributed to the exoneratio n of attorney, was erroneously linked to the Ernest Ray Willis a nd the wron gful Notes 2004 Madrid train bombings based on executio n of Cameron Todd Will- 1. N FPA 92 1: Gu m E FOR FmE AND a fingerprint fo und on a bag of detona- ingh am in 2004.18 In April 20 11, ExPLOSION INVESTIGATIONs 20 (20 14 ). tors. Invest igators also knew he was a the FSC issued its report, which d is- 2. FEn. R. Evm. 702. Muslim and advertised his legal serv ices c ussed the cogn itive b iases to which 3. FEn. R. Ev m. 702 advisory com- in a publication owned by a suspected fire investigators (and all fo ren - mittee's note (quoting Mason Ladd, terrorist. See OFFICE OF THE INSPEC- sic scie ntists) are subj ect . The FSC Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REv. 414, TOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T oF JusTICE, A sta ted , "cogniti ve biases a re n o t the 4 18 ( 1952 )) . REviEw oF THE FBI's H ANDLING o F result of ch aracte r fl aws; instead , 4. Steven W. Carman , Pape r THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE (2006 }, th ey are commo n featu res of deci- Presented at the lnterscience Com- available at www.j ustice.gov/oig/special/ sio n -ma king."19 O n e of th e key munications 2009 Fire and Materi als s0601/final. pdf. recommenda tions, of 17 m ade by Confe rence, San Francisco, Cal.: Pro- 17. ltiel E. Dror et al. , Contextual th e FSC, was enhan ced admissibil- gressive Burn Pattern Development in Information Renders Experts Vulnerable ity h earings in all arson cases. It is Post-Flashove r Fires (Dec. 2008), avail- to Making Erroneous Iden tifications, ! 56 at such a h earing tha t th e poten- able at www.carmanfi rein vestigations. FoRENSIC Sc 1. lNT'L 74 (2006). t ia lly b ias ing "data" that may h ave com/publications.htm l. 18. Ernest Ray Wi llis and Cameron influen ced the investigator's dete r- 5. 140 F.3d 9 15,920 {11th C ir. Todd Willingham were convicted of m in atio n of arson can be exp lored. 20 1998 ). murder by arson . The Innocence Proj- Fo r an a tto rney o n e ither side of 6. 526 U .S. 137 (1 999). ect urged the FSC to review both cases an arson case, this report sh o uld be 7. U nited States v. C hristian , 673 after an independent report concluded required reading. F.3d 702, 710-12 (7th C ir. 20 12) (cita- that neither fi re was arson. See ARsoN tions omitted) (internal quotation REV IEW CoMM., INNOCENCE PROJECT, Conclusion marks omitted ). REPORT ON THE PEER REVIEW OF THE La w e nfo rcem ent is a n important 8. /d. at 71 2- 13. ExPERT TESTIMONY IN THE CASES OF and h o n o rab le professio n . It p lays 9. Steven J. Avato & A ndrew T. STATE OF TExAs v. CAMERON ToDD a ce ntra l ro le in keeping a c iv i- Cox, Science and Circumstance: Key WI LLING HAM AND STATE OF TEXAS lized socie ty c iv ilized. Bu t it is n ot Components in Fire Investigation, 59 FIRE v. ERNEST RAY WILLIS (2006), avail- sc ie n ce. Lawyers a re a lso n o t sci- & A RSON INvEsTIGATOR {Int'l Ass'n of able at www.innocenceproject.org/files/ e nt ists. All h ave d ifferent e th ical A rson Investigators), no. 4, Apr. 2009 , imported/arsonreviewreport-4.pdf. o b liga tio n s. Legal "proof" a nd sc i- at 47, 47 . 19. TEx. FoRENSIC Sci. CoMM'N, e nt ifi c "proof' are diffe re nt. N o r 10. /d. WI LLI NG HAM/WILLIS INVESTIGATION 37 is t h e p roble m of find ing o r fa ilin g 11 . Douglas Lucas, Presentation to (20 11 ), available at www.fsc. texas.gov/ to find the de m a rcat ion between the Canadian Association of Foren- sites/default/files/FIN AL_ l .pdf. scie ntific a nd in vestigative da ta sic Scient ists, Toronto, O nt.: Forensic 20. /d. at 48-49. confined to fire investigators or to Science and Ethics-An Essential 2 1. John Lentini, Paper Presented law enfo rcem en t. Cogn iti ve biases Association (Dec. I , 20 10). at the 3rd International Symposium on a re a hum a n condi t io n that affli ct 12. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Fire Investigations Science and Tech - both th e public and the private Inc., 509 U.S. 579,596-97 (1 993). no logy (!SF!) , Sarasota, Fla.: Towa rd sector, a n d bo th prosec utio n a nd 13. Letter from Ben Burch , Assis- a More Scientific Determination : defen se a ttorneys. tant U.S. A ttorney, to John Hicks, Min imizing Expectation Bias in Fire This a utho r h as previo usly sug- FBI Lab. Dir. (July 8, 1989}, quoted in Investigations (2008), available at www. gested means to minimize expectatio n USDOJ/OIG, TH E FBI LABORATORY: fi rescientist.com/publications.php.

45 TORT TRIAL & INSU RANCE PRACTICE SECTION TH E BRIEF • SP RING 2015