IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-1491 Filed November 21, 2023
WENDY DISHMAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, David Porter, Judge.
The State of Iowa seeks interlocutory review following the district court’s
denial of its motion for summary judgment. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Samuel P. Langholz (until withdrawal)
and Job Mukkada, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant State.
Matthew S. Brick and Michael W. Heilman of Brick Gentry, P.C., West Des
Moines, for appellee.
Heard by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Buller, JJ. Langholz, J., takes no part. 2
AHLERS, Judge.
The facts related to the issues in this appeal are largely undisputed. Wendy
Dishman worked for the Iowa Department of Inspections and Appeals. Her job
duties included directing work related to investigating alleged fraud in Iowa’s public
assistance program and Medicaid fraud by health-care providers. Dishman’s
employment was terminated in 2015. She sought new employment in the Medicaid
industry. Dishman received and accepted a job offer from Truven Health Analytics
(Truven) in May 2016. Around the time Dishman applied for the job, Truven was
in the process of taking over the Iowa Medicaid Enterprises Program Integrity
contract. Truven’s contract with the State gave the State authority to determine
whether to approve Truven’s hiring of key personnel. Initially the State approved
Dishman’s hiring at Truven. But after Dishman had completed some of the
on-boarding, the State informed Truven it no longer approved Dishman’s hiring.
As a result, Dishman was not hired by Truven.
Dishman brought this action against the State of Iowa; individual state
employees, Rod Roberts, Charles Palmer, Mikki Stier, and Donald Gookin; and a
state contractor, Thomas Mologiannes. Her second amended petition asserted
four claims. Count I asserted a claim for intentional interference with contractual
relations. Count II asserted a claim for intentional interference with a prospective
contractual or business relationship. Count III asserted a claim for blacklisting in
violation of Iowa Code chapter 730 (2018). Count IV asserted a claim for violation
of her procedural and substantive due process rights guaranteed by article I,
section 9 of the Iowa Constitution. 3
The defendants filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss. They argued
Dishman’s claims in counts I through III were barred by sovereign immunity under
Iowa Code section 669.14(4), a section of the Iowa Tort Claims Act, and argued
count IV should be dismissed because it failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.
The district court granted the defendants’ motion in part and denied it in
part. It granted the motion regarding counts I and III against the State, but it denied
the motion regarding those counts against the individually named defendants,
finding there was a question whether the individual defendants acted within the
scope of their employment. As to count II, the district court dismissed the claim in
its entirety because it concluded the claim was barred by sovereign immunity under
section 669.14(4) with respect to all defendants due to Dishman’s allegation that
the named defendants’ allegedly tortious conduct was done within the scope of
their employment. As to count IV, the court denied the motion to dismiss,
concluding it was a claim on which relief could be granted. For those scoring at
home, the result of the ruling on the motion to dismiss was that counts I and III
remained against the individual defendants and count IV remained against all
defendants. All other claims were dismissed.
Following the court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss, State employees Rod
Roberts, Charles Palmer, Mikki Stier, and Donald Gookin filed a motion pursuant
to Iowa Code section 669.5(2) seeking to substitute the State as the named
defendant and remove themselves as named parties. At the same time, the Iowa
Attorney General’s Office filed a notification of certification of scope of employment, 4
in accordance with section 669.5(2)(a),1 certifying that Rod Roberts, Charles
Palmer, Mikki Stier, and Donald Gookin were acting within the scope of their
employment at all relevant times and conceding the State must be substituted for
those named defendants. Dishman did not challenge the certification or the
substitution of parties. The district court granted the motion to substitute,
effectively dismissing the individual defendants from the suit and replacing them
with the State.2
The State moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims. Dishman
resisted. The district court denied the motion for summary judgment, reasoning
fact questions remained as to the individuals’ personal motivations for their
conduct. The State applied for interlocutory appeal. The supreme court granted
the application and transferred the case to this court.
I. Standard of Review
We review summary judgment rulings for legal error. Garrison v. New
Fashion Pork LLP, 977 N.W.2d 67, 76 (Iowa 2022). In doing so, we “(1) view the
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and (2) consider on behalf
of the nonmoving party every legitimate inference reasonably deduced from the
1 Section 669.5(2)(a) provides,
Upon certification by the attorney general that a defendant in a suit was an employee of the state acting within the scope of the employee’s office or employment at the time of the incident upon which the claim is based, the suit commenced upon the claim shall be deemed to be an action against the state under the provisions of this chapter, and if the state is not already a defendant, the state shall be substituted as the defendant in place of the employee. 2 The individual defendants to whom we refer are the State-employed individual
defendants. Contractor Thomas Mologiannes was also named a defendant. He was not subject to the substitution order because he is not a State employee. He is not involved in this appeal. 5
record.” Id. (citation omitted). Summary judgment is only proper when there is no
issue of material fact “and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Id. (citation omitted).
II. Analysis
We start by addressing the district court’s ruling on count I (intentional
inference with contractual relations) and count III (blacklisting). During oral
argument, Dishman conceded that summary judgment should have been granted
on those counts. We agree. See Iowa Code § 669.14(4) (recognizing the State
retains sovereign immunity against claims relating to interference of contract
rights). We reverse the district court’s denial of the State’s motion for summary
judgment on those counts.
The only remaining claim is count IV, seeking damages for alleged violations
of Dishman’s procedural and substantive due process rights guaranteed by
article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution—known as a constitutional tort claim or
Godfrey claim. Godfrey v. State created a standalone cause of action for money
damages for violations of the Iowa Constitution.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-1491 Filed November 21, 2023
WENDY DISHMAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, David Porter, Judge.
The State of Iowa seeks interlocutory review following the district court’s
denial of its motion for summary judgment. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Samuel P. Langholz (until withdrawal)
and Job Mukkada, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant State.
Matthew S. Brick and Michael W. Heilman of Brick Gentry, P.C., West Des
Moines, for appellee.
Heard by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Buller, JJ. Langholz, J., takes no part. 2
AHLERS, Judge.
The facts related to the issues in this appeal are largely undisputed. Wendy
Dishman worked for the Iowa Department of Inspections and Appeals. Her job
duties included directing work related to investigating alleged fraud in Iowa’s public
assistance program and Medicaid fraud by health-care providers. Dishman’s
employment was terminated in 2015. She sought new employment in the Medicaid
industry. Dishman received and accepted a job offer from Truven Health Analytics
(Truven) in May 2016. Around the time Dishman applied for the job, Truven was
in the process of taking over the Iowa Medicaid Enterprises Program Integrity
contract. Truven’s contract with the State gave the State authority to determine
whether to approve Truven’s hiring of key personnel. Initially the State approved
Dishman’s hiring at Truven. But after Dishman had completed some of the
on-boarding, the State informed Truven it no longer approved Dishman’s hiring.
As a result, Dishman was not hired by Truven.
Dishman brought this action against the State of Iowa; individual state
employees, Rod Roberts, Charles Palmer, Mikki Stier, and Donald Gookin; and a
state contractor, Thomas Mologiannes. Her second amended petition asserted
four claims. Count I asserted a claim for intentional interference with contractual
relations. Count II asserted a claim for intentional interference with a prospective
contractual or business relationship. Count III asserted a claim for blacklisting in
violation of Iowa Code chapter 730 (2018). Count IV asserted a claim for violation
of her procedural and substantive due process rights guaranteed by article I,
section 9 of the Iowa Constitution. 3
The defendants filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss. They argued
Dishman’s claims in counts I through III were barred by sovereign immunity under
Iowa Code section 669.14(4), a section of the Iowa Tort Claims Act, and argued
count IV should be dismissed because it failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.
The district court granted the defendants’ motion in part and denied it in
part. It granted the motion regarding counts I and III against the State, but it denied
the motion regarding those counts against the individually named defendants,
finding there was a question whether the individual defendants acted within the
scope of their employment. As to count II, the district court dismissed the claim in
its entirety because it concluded the claim was barred by sovereign immunity under
section 669.14(4) with respect to all defendants due to Dishman’s allegation that
the named defendants’ allegedly tortious conduct was done within the scope of
their employment. As to count IV, the court denied the motion to dismiss,
concluding it was a claim on which relief could be granted. For those scoring at
home, the result of the ruling on the motion to dismiss was that counts I and III
remained against the individual defendants and count IV remained against all
defendants. All other claims were dismissed.
Following the court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss, State employees Rod
Roberts, Charles Palmer, Mikki Stier, and Donald Gookin filed a motion pursuant
to Iowa Code section 669.5(2) seeking to substitute the State as the named
defendant and remove themselves as named parties. At the same time, the Iowa
Attorney General’s Office filed a notification of certification of scope of employment, 4
in accordance with section 669.5(2)(a),1 certifying that Rod Roberts, Charles
Palmer, Mikki Stier, and Donald Gookin were acting within the scope of their
employment at all relevant times and conceding the State must be substituted for
those named defendants. Dishman did not challenge the certification or the
substitution of parties. The district court granted the motion to substitute,
effectively dismissing the individual defendants from the suit and replacing them
with the State.2
The State moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims. Dishman
resisted. The district court denied the motion for summary judgment, reasoning
fact questions remained as to the individuals’ personal motivations for their
conduct. The State applied for interlocutory appeal. The supreme court granted
the application and transferred the case to this court.
I. Standard of Review
We review summary judgment rulings for legal error. Garrison v. New
Fashion Pork LLP, 977 N.W.2d 67, 76 (Iowa 2022). In doing so, we “(1) view the
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and (2) consider on behalf
of the nonmoving party every legitimate inference reasonably deduced from the
1 Section 669.5(2)(a) provides,
Upon certification by the attorney general that a defendant in a suit was an employee of the state acting within the scope of the employee’s office or employment at the time of the incident upon which the claim is based, the suit commenced upon the claim shall be deemed to be an action against the state under the provisions of this chapter, and if the state is not already a defendant, the state shall be substituted as the defendant in place of the employee. 2 The individual defendants to whom we refer are the State-employed individual
defendants. Contractor Thomas Mologiannes was also named a defendant. He was not subject to the substitution order because he is not a State employee. He is not involved in this appeal. 5
record.” Id. (citation omitted). Summary judgment is only proper when there is no
issue of material fact “and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Id. (citation omitted).
II. Analysis
We start by addressing the district court’s ruling on count I (intentional
inference with contractual relations) and count III (blacklisting). During oral
argument, Dishman conceded that summary judgment should have been granted
on those counts. We agree. See Iowa Code § 669.14(4) (recognizing the State
retains sovereign immunity against claims relating to interference of contract
rights). We reverse the district court’s denial of the State’s motion for summary
judgment on those counts.
The only remaining claim is count IV, seeking damages for alleged violations
of Dishman’s procedural and substantive due process rights guaranteed by
article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution—known as a constitutional tort claim or
Godfrey claim. Godfrey v. State created a standalone cause of action for money
damages for violations of the Iowa Constitution. 898 N.W.2d 844, 874–80 (Iowa
2017). Our supreme court recently overruled Godfrey and expressly stated “we
no longer recognize a standalone cause of action for money damages under the
Iowa Constitution unless authorized by the common law, an Iowa statute, or the
express terms of a provision of the Iowa Constitution.” Burnett v. Smith, 990
N.W.2d 289, 307 (Iowa 2023). Shortly thereafter, our supreme court explicitly
stated, “[D]irect claims for damages under . . . article I, section 9 of the Iowa
Constitution . . . are not available.” Venckus v. City of Iowa City, 990 N.W.2d 800,
812 (Iowa 2023). 6
The holdings in Burnett and Venckus seem to foreclose Dishman’s claim.
But Dishman argues otherwise. Although she acknowledges that Burnett
forecloses pursuing her Godfrey claims after Burnett was filed, she contends her
action was on file before Burnett was decided and there remains a question
whether Burnett applies retroactively. So, she argues, she is entitled to litigate the
retroactivity question, and as a result, the district court properly denied summary
judgment on her Godfrey claims.
We disagree with Dishman that the question of retroactive application of
Burnett remains unanswered. One week after Burnett was decided, the supreme
court issued its ruling in Venckus. Like this case, Venckus involved a Godfrey
claim filed before Burnett was decided. See 990 N.W.2d at 806–07 (describing the
procedural history of the case). Even though Venckus’s claim had been on file
before Burnett was decided, the supreme court summarily affirmed the dismissal
of Venckus’s Godfrey claims, noting such claims “are not available” after Burnett.
Id. at 812. One week after Venckus, the supreme court filed Carter v. State.
No. 21-0909, 2023 WL 3397451, at *1 (Iowa May 12, 2023) (per curiam). As in
Venckus and this case, Carter’s Godfrey claims were on file before Burnett was
decided. Id. Nevertheless, the supreme court affirmed the dismissal of Carter’s
claims. Id. In doing so, it noted that Burnett overruled Godfrey because it was
“demonstrably erroneous and unworkable in practice” and noted “Carter’s
constitutional torts claims therefore cannot proceed.” Id.
We conclude that Venckus and Carter answer the retroactivity question
raised by Dishman. Both cases affirmed the dismissal of Godfrey claims despite
the fact they were on file before Burnett was decided because “such claims are not 7
available.” Venckus, 990 N.W.2d at 812. Applying the holdings in Burnett,
Venckus, and Carter, we conclude Iowa no longer recognizes Godfrey
constitutional tort claims, whether on file before Burnett or not, so the district court
erred in denying the State’s motion for summary judgment on such claims. In
reaching this conclusion, we mean no criticism of the district court, as the district
court did not have the benefit of Burnett, Venckus, and Carter when it ruled on the
motion for summary judgment.
III. Conclusion
The district court erred in denying the State’s motion for summary judgment.
We reverse and remand for entry of an order granting summary judgment in favor
of the State on all remaining counts.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.