Wendy Baez v. Mi Pueblo Corp., Lucy Pelaez, and Aridio Santos

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedSeptember 15, 2025
Docket1:23-cv-02097
StatusUnknown

This text of Wendy Baez v. Mi Pueblo Corp., Lucy Pelaez, and Aridio Santos (Wendy Baez v. Mi Pueblo Corp., Lucy Pelaez, and Aridio Santos) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wendy Baez v. Mi Pueblo Corp., Lucy Pelaez, and Aridio Santos, (E.D.N.Y. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ---------------------------------------------------------------- x WENDY BAEZ, : : Plaintiff, : : REPORT & -against- : RECOMMENDATION : MI PUEBLO CORP., LUCY PELAEZ, and ARIDIO : 23-CV-2097 (RER)(MMH) SANTOS, : : Defendants. : : ---------------------------------------------------------------- x MARCIA M. HENRY, United States Magistrate Judge: Plaintiff Wendy Baez brings this wage and hour “collective” action against Defendants Mi Pueblo Corp. (“Mi Pueblo”), Lucy Pelaez, and Aridio Santos, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (the “FLSA”), and the New York Labor Law, Art. 6 §§ 190 and 650 et seq. (the “NYLL”). (See generally Am. Compl., ECF No. 8.)1 The Court denied Plaintiff’s first default judgment motion based on procedural and substantive deficiencies. See generally Baez v. Mi Pueblo Corp., No. 23-CV-2097 (RER)(MMH), 2024 WL 4093473 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2024) (“Baez I”), adopted by 2024 WL 4648138 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2024) (“Baez II”). Before the Court is a declaration by Plaintiff’s counsel, labeled as a “Request for Sum Certain Default Judgment” (the “Renewed Motion”), purportedly submitted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(1). (See generally Renewed Mot., ECF No. 23.) The Honorable Ramon E. Reyes, Jr. construed the request as a

1 All citations to documents filed on ECF are to the ECF document number and pagination in the ECF header unless otherwise noted. Citations to the Local Civil Rules are to the Rules effective July 1, 2024, the rules in effect when the instant motion was filed. renewed motion for default judgment and referred the Renewed Motion for report and recommendation. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court respectfully recommends that Plaintiff’s

Renewed Motion should be denied with prejudice. I. BACKGROUND The Court assumes familiarity with Plaintiff’s factual allegations and this case’s procedural history as set forth in prior orders. See Baez I, 2024 WL 4093473, at *1–2; Baez II, 2024 WL 4648138, at *1. The Court mentions them here only as relevant to the instant motion. Plaintiff sued her former employers “Mi Pueblo (DBA Don Poli Market)” and Pelaez

in March 2023, alleging violations of the FLSA and NYLL. (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 47–64.) After amendment, the operative pleading asserts claims against Mi Pueblo, Pelaez, and Santos for failure to pay minimum wage under the FLSA and the NYLL and failure to provide wage statements and wage notices under the NYLL. (See generally Am. Compl., ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff timely served the Amended Complaint but no defendant answered or otherwise responded. (See Aff. of Service, ECF No. 12; Oct. 4, 2023 Order; Aff. of Service, ECF No. 16.) The Clerk of Court entered default against all Defendants on December 5, 2023,

per Plaintiff’s request. (Entry of Default, ECF No. 18.) Plaintiff filed her first motion for default judgment on January 25, 2024 (the “First Motion”), seeking unpaid wages, liquidated damages, statutory damages, pre-judgment interest, attorneys’ fees, and costs. (See Mem., ECF No. 19-1 at 15–17.) Judge Reyes referred the First Motion for report and recommendation. (Jan. 26, 2024 Order Referring Mot.) In a Report and Recommendation issued on September 5, 2024, the Court recommended that the First Motion should be denied without prejudice because Plaintiff did not comply with the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (“SCRA”) or Local Civil Rule 55.2(b) and failed to plausibly allege an FLSA violation. See Baez I, 2024 WL 4093473, at *3–6. The Court also

recommended that there should be no supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s NYLL claims, and that Plaintiff should be given 30 days to further amend the pleadings to address the identified deficiencies. See id. at *6–7. Plaintiff did not object to the Report and Recommendation. On September 30, 2024, Judge Reyes adopted the Report and Recommendation in its entirety. See Baez II, 2024 WL 4648138, at *1. On November 18, 2024—more than 30 days after Judge Reyes adopted the Report and Recommendation—Plaintiff’s counsel filed a declaration captioned “Declaration . . . in

Support of Request for Default Judgment by Clerk of the Court Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1)” (Renewed Mot., ECF No. 23 at 1), attaching a declaration executed by Plaintiff (Pl. Decl., ECF No. 23-1) and a proposed judgment (ECF No. 23-2). Judge Reyes construed the filing as a renewed motion for default judgment and referred it for report and recommendation. (See Nov. 19, 2024 Order Ref. Mot.) II. DISCUSSION A. Default Judgment Standard Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictates a two-step process for a party

to obtain a default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)–(b); New York v. Green, 420 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2005); Nam v. Ichiba Inc., No. 19-CV-1222 (KAM), 2021 WL 878743, at *2 (E.D.N.Y Mar. 9, 2021). First, when a party uses an affidavit or other proof to show that a party has “failed to plead or otherwise defend” against an action, the clerk shall enter a default. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). If a claim is for “a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by computation,” the clerk can enter judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1). Second, and “[i]n all other cases, the party must apply to the court for a default judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2); Gonzalez v. Victoria G’s Pizzeria LLC, No. 19-CV-6996 (DLI)(RER), 2021 WL 6065744, at

*5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2021). To “enter or effectuate judgment” the Court is empowered to “(A) conduct an accounting; (B) determine the amount of damages; (C) establish the truth of any allegation by evidence; or (D) investigate any other matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). The decision to grant or deny a default motion is “left to the sound discretion of a district court.” Shah v. New York State Dep’t of Civ. Serv., 168 F.3d 610, 615 (2d Cir. 1999) (cleaned up). The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the movant. Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2009). However, “‘[a] default . . . only establishes a

defendant’s liability if those allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action against the defendant.’” Double Green Produce, Inc. v. F. Supermarket Inc., 387 F. Supp. 3d 260, 265 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Taizhou Zhongneng Imp. & Exp. Co., Ltd. v. Koutsobinas, 509 F. App’x 54, 56 (2d Cir. 2013)); see also Nielsen v. J.C. Penny Co., Inc., No. 23-CV-5619 (JGLC)(JLC), 2024 WL 3518523, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.

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Bluebook (online)
Wendy Baez v. Mi Pueblo Corp., Lucy Pelaez, and Aridio Santos, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wendy-baez-v-mi-pueblo-corp-lucy-pelaez-and-aridio-santos-nyed-2025.