Wells v. Trump

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedMay 23, 2025
DocketCivil Action No. 2025-1598
StatusPublished

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Wells v. Trump, (D.D.C. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA _________________________________________ ) KELVIN WELLS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 25-cv-01598 (APM) ) DONALD J. TRUMP, ) ) Defendant. ) _________________________________________ ) MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the court on its initial review of Plaintiff’s pro se complaint. For the

reasons set forth below, the court dismisses the complaint without prejudice.

Complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs are held to “less stringent standards” than those

applied to pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), but pro se

plaintiffs must still comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F.

Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Rule 8(a) requires that a complaint contain a short and plain

statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and a demand for the relief sought. Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a). Although this standard “does not require detailed factual allegations,” it does “demand[]

more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In addition, Rule 8(d)

mandates that “[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1).

Taken together, these provisions ensure that defendants receive fair notice of the claim(s) being

asserted so that they can prepare a responsive answer, mount an adequate defense, and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007); Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977).

Plaintiff’s complaint falls far short of the Rule 8 pleading standard. It is entirely devoid of

factual allegations and merely asserts that Black veterans “have served” in President Donald J.

Trump’s “place and many were killed in his place and millions still suffer physical and mental

injuries from their time in service . . . while still suffering discrimination and [disparate]

treatment.” Compl., ECF No. 1, at 1. It seeks “restitution . . . to be made whole by Donald Trump

in his individual and official capacity” and the government “under the doctrine of respondeat

superior.” Id. It is entirely unclear on what grounds this court may assert jurisdiction, nor is it

clear what claim Plaintiff brings against President Trump. In such circumstances, courts have not

hesitated to dismiss the complaint. See, e.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536 (1974)

(“[F]ederal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they

are so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit[.]” (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted)); Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“A complaint

may be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds when it is patently insubstantial, presenting no federal

question suitable for decision.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Crisafi v. Holland,

655 F.2d 1305, 1307–08 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“A court may dismiss as frivolous complaints reciting

bare legal conclusions with no suggestion of supporting facts, or postulating events and

circumstances of a wholly fanciful kind.”); see also Baker v. Dir., U.S. Parole Comm’n, 916 F.2d

725, 725 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (affirming the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of the plaintiff’s

complaint for failure to state a claim).

The miscellaneous exhibits attached to Plaintiff’s complaint cannot cure these deficiencies.

See ECF No. 1-1. As a preliminary matter, it is not clear from the face of these materials how they

2 relate to the instant suit. For example, one of the attachments is a memorandum appointing

Plaintiff as District Deputy Grand Master of St. Andrew Grand Lodge A.F. & A.M., Inc. in 2009.

See id. at 2. In any event, pro se litigants “cannot generally be permitted to shift the burden of

litigating [their] case to the courts.” Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 702 F.2d 1189, 1194 (D.C. Cir.

1983); see Sun v. Dist. of Columbia Gov’t, 133 F. Supp. 3d 155, 168 n.6 (D.D.C. 2015), aff’d, 686

F. App’x 5 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“[I]t is not the Court’s job to canvass the record for documents

supporting a pro se party’s position.”).

As presented, neither the court nor the defendant can reasonably be expected to identify

Plaintiff’s claims. Accordingly, the court dismisses this case without prejudice.

A final, appealable Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Dated: May 23, 2025 Amit P. Mehta United States District Judge

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Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Hagans v. Lavine
415 U.S. 528 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Tooley v. Napolitano
556 F.3d 836 (D.C. Circuit, 2009)
Salvatore G. Crisafi v. George E. Holland
655 F.2d 1305 (D.C. Circuit, 1981)
James J. Dozier v. Ford Motor Company
702 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Circuit, 1983)
Jarrell v. Tisch
656 F. Supp. 237 (District of Columbia, 1987)
Sun v. District of Columbia Government
133 F. Supp. 3d 155 (District of Columbia, 2015)
Sun v. District of Columbia Government
686 F. App'x 5 (D.C. Circuit, 2017)
Brown v. Califano
75 F.R.D. 497 (District of Columbia, 1977)

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