Wells, by Gillig v. Attorney General of the United States

201 F.2d 556, 1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 3492

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: January 22, 1953
• Docket: 4515_1
• Status: Published

Opinions

BRATTON, Circuit Judge.

The appeal in this proceeding in habeas corpus presents a question respecting which there is a dearth of controlling landmarks. An indictment was returned in the United States Court for Kansas charging Joe Wells, hereinafter referred to as petitioner, with the crime of transporting in interstate commerce a stolen motor vehicle, knowing it to have been stolen. Petitioner was arrested and subsequently taken before the court. After a hearing, the court found that there was reasonable cause to believe that petitioner was mentally incompetent and that he should be transported to the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners at Springfield, Missouri, for observation and treatment, and for the making of a report of psychiatric findings. An order was entered accordingly, and petitioner was transported to the Medical Center. The psychiatric examination there made was reduced to writing and filed with the court. Petitioner’s condition was diagnosed as schizophrenia, catatonic type; and it was said in the report that he was mentally incompetent. Petitioner was returned to the custody of the court. A second hearing was had, at which a psychiatrist from the Medical 'Center testified that the condition of petitioner had been properly diagnosed as schizophrenia of catatonic type; that he was mentally incompetent; and that he was completely unable to cooperate with counsel. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that petitioner was mentally incompetent, did not know right from wrong, and was unable to cooperate with counsel. But no finding was made in respect to whether such mental condition was temporary or permanent. An order was entered committing petitioner to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized representative until he became mentally competent to stand trial or until the charge against him was disposed of according to law. While confined in the local county jail pursuant to such order, and before being transferred elsewhere, petitioner — appearing by and through his next friend; — instituted this proceeding in habeas corpus in.which he challenged the validity of the order and his confinement thereunder on the broad ground that the United States was not empowered to detain and incarcerate him for an indefinite period of time, perhaps for life, in advance of trial of the criminal charge, merely because he was insane. The court denied the petition, and this appeal followed.

Section 4244, Title 18, United States Code, provides that whenever after arrest and prior to the imposition of sentence there is reasonable cause to believe that the person charged with an offense may be presently insane or otherwise so mentally incompetent as to be unable to understand the proceedings- against him or properly to assist in his own defense, the court shall cause him to be examined in respect to his mental condition by at least one qualified psychiatrist, who shall report to the court. The statute further provides that for the purpose of the examination the accused may be committed for such reasonable period as the court may determine to a suitable hospital or other facility to be designated by the court. And the statute further provides that if the report of the psychiatrist indicates a state of present insanity or such mental incompetency of the accused, the court shall hold a hearing, upon due notice, at which evidence concerning the mental condition of the accused may be submitted, including the report of the psychiatrist, and that the court shall make a finding in. respect thereto. Section 4245 provides that whenever the Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall certify that a person convicted of a criminal offense has been examined by the board of examiners referred to in 18 U.S.C.A. § 4241, and that there is probable cause to believe that such person was mentally incompetent at the time of his trial, provided the issue of mental competency was not raised and determined before or during the trial, the Attorney General shall transmit the report and the certificate to the clerk of the court in which the conviction was had. The section further provides that upon the report and certificate being lodged with the clerk, the court shall hold a hearing to determine the competency of the accused in accordance with the provisions of section 4244; that on such hearing the certificate of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall be prima facie evidence of the facts and conclusions certified therein; and that if the court shall find that the accused was mentally incompetent at the time of his trial, the judgment of conviction shall be set aside and a new trial granted. Section 4246 provides:

“Whenever the trial court shall determine in accordance with sections 4244 and 4245 of this title that an accused is or was mentally incompetent, the court may commit the accused to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized representative, until the accused shall be mentally competent to stand trial or until the pending charges against him are disposed of according to law. And if the court after hearing as provided in the preceding sections 4244 and 4245 shall determine that the conditions specified in the following section 4247 exist, the commitment shall be governed by section 4248 as herein provided.”

Section 4247 relates to alternate procedure on the expiration of a sentence; and section 4248 deals with the termination of custody by release or transfer. Neither has material bearing here.

The several states in their character as parens patriae have general power and are under the general duty of caring for insane persons. The prerogative is a segment of police power. In the exercise of such power, insane persons may be restrained and confined both for the welfare of themselves and for the protection of the public. And if the exactions of due process are met, such restraint and confinement do not violate any constitutional right of the individual. In re Dowdell, 169 Mass. 387, 47 N.E. 1033; Sporza v. German Savings Bank, 192 N.Y. 8, 84 N.E. 406; McMahon v. Mead, 30 S.D. 515, 139 N.W. 122; State v. Saffron, 146 Wash. 202, 262 P. 970; Ex parte Perry, 137 N.J.Eq. 161, 43 A.2d 885; People v. Janssen, 263 Ill.App. 101; Shapley v. Cohoon, D.C., 258 F. 752.

While the care of insane persons is essentially the function of the states in their sovereign capacity as parens patriae, and while the federal government has neither constitutional nor inherent power to enter the general field of lunacy, Congress has the power to make provision for the proper care and treatment of persons who become temporarily insane while in custody of the United States awaiting trial upon criminal charges, and to make provision for the care and treatment of federal prisoners who become mentally incompetent during their incarceration after conviction. Estabrook v. King, 8 Cir., 119 F.2d 607; Jones v. Pescor, 8 Cir., 169 F.2d 853.

Petitioner does not challenge the sower of Congress to make provision for the proper care and treatment of persons who become temporarily insane while in custody awaiting trial upon criminal charges, or to make like provision for the care and treatment of federal prisoners who become mentally incompetent after conviction and while serving their sentences. He contends that he has not been tried and convicted ; that he is permanently insane; that he has been committed to‘ the custody of the Attorney General until he regains his mental competency; that he will never again be mentally competent; that in substance and effect, he has been committed for the remainder of his life; and that if section 4246 be construed to authorize such commitment, it violates his constitutional rights. In Higgins v. McGrath, D.C., 98 F.Supp. 670, the constitutional validity of the statute was challenged on the ground' that the United States has no power to detain a person merely because he is insane. But the broad contention presented was not determined. The court construed the order or judgment of commitment as merely committing the accused for a reasonable period of time until he was restored to sanity; and' it was the view of the court that a statute authorizing detention for that period and purpose was not of doubtful constitutionality. The court was of the further view that since being committed, the accused had apparently regained his sanity to such an extent that he could stand trial on the criminal charge pending against him; and that he should be returned to the court having jurisdiction of the criminal case for the final determination of that question. In Dixon v. Steele, D.C., 104 F.Supp. 904, it affirmatively appeared that the petitioner for the writ was permanently insane, and it was held that his detention under section 4246 violated his constitutional rights. In approaching the question whether the statute authorizes the commitment of a person who becomes permanently incompetent while detained awaiting trial on a criminal charge, and if so whether it violates the constitutional rights of such person, it is appropriate to bear in mind the widely recognized cardinal rule of construction that a statute should be construed in a manner which will preserve it against attack on constitutional grounds if it can be done without violating the plain language or clear intendment of the statute. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893, 108 A.L.R. 1352; Chippewa Indians v. United States, 301 U.S. 358, 376, 57 S.Ct. 826, 81 L.Ed. 1156. And it is also appropriate to bear in mind the somewhat related rule that in the enactment of a statute Congress is presumed to act with knowledge of controlling constitutional limitations or proscriptions and with an intent and purpose to avoid their contravention. Becker Steel Company of America v. Cummings, 296 U.S. 74, 56 S.Ct. 15, 80 L.Ed. 54; United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 67, 56 S.Ct. 312, 80 L.Ed. 477.

Viewed in the light of the rules of construction to which reference has 'been made, the textual content of the statute is persuasive that it was not intended to authorize the commitment of one who was permanently insane at the time of his arrest or who suffers permanent mental incompetency while awaiting trial upon a criminal charge, and that therefore it is not open to attack on the ground of constitutional invalidity. The words in the státute that the court may commit the accused until he “shall be mentally competent to stand trial or until the pending charges against him are disposed of according to law” presuppose temporary as distinguished from permanent mental incompetency. 'It is implicit in the quoted language that the concern of Congress was to make provision for the care and treatment of persons whose return to mental competency at some time in the future is reasonably to be expected, not' those hopelessly insane and whose restoration to mental competency is never to'be expected. Furthermore, to'construe the statute as authorizing the United States tó detain and incarcerate perhaps during the remainder of their lives persons who were permanently and hopelessly insane at the time of their arrest on criminal charges or who become so while awaiting trial on criminal charges and for that reason will never be tried is to ascribe to Congress an effort to clothe the United States with power to assume the role of parens patriae and enter the general field of lunacy in respect to persons in that condition. Neither the language of the statute nor its legislative history compels that construction. Instead, it is fairly clear that in the enactment of the statute the intent and purpose of Congress was to go no further than to make humane provision for the care and treatment of persons who were temporarily incompetent at the time of their arrest or who become so before trial on criminal charges and whose restoration to competency may be reasonably expected at some time in the future and therefore whose trial on the criminal charges at some time in the future may reasonably be expected. That construction does not violate the language of the statute. It does not run afoul of the legislative history of the statute. And it preserves the statute against the present attack of invalidity on constitutional grounds.

The evidence adduced on the hearing in the criminal case, and that adduced upon the trial of this proceeding in habeas corpus, clearly showed that petitioner was. then presently in a condition of mental incompetency, but there was no evidence in the form of expert opinion or otherwise in respect to whether such mental condition was temporary or permanent. All of the evidence will be searched in vain for any medical or psychiatric expression in respect to the mental condition of petitioner being temporary or otherwise. So far as the-record reflects, his condition may have been only temporary with reasonable prospect of its termination and his ability to stand trial on the criminal charge, or it may have been, hopelessly permanent .with no reasonable-prospect of him ever being tried on the-criminal charge. If his mental incompe•tency was temporary, he was subject to-commitment.under the statute; if hopelessly permanent, he was not. The question should have been explored and a specific-finding made in respect to the character of his mental- condition as to being temporary or permanent.

The judgment denying the petition for the writ of habeas corpus -is vacated and the cause is remanded with directions to order the return of petitioner to the United States-Court for Kansas for a hearing and finding in the criminal case as to whether the mental incompetency of petitioner is temporary or permanent, and for further proceedings in respect thereto not in conflict with the views herein expressed.