Welch Group, Inc. v. Creative Drywall, Inc.

576 A.2d 153, 215 Conn. 464, 1990 Conn. LEXIS 219
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
DecidedJune 26, 1990
Docket13844
StatusPublished
Cited by42 cases

This text of 576 A.2d 153 (Welch Group, Inc. v. Creative Drywall, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Welch Group, Inc. v. Creative Drywall, Inc., 576 A.2d 153, 215 Conn. 464, 1990 Conn. LEXIS 219 (Colo. 1990).

Opinion

Covello, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment that denied the plaintiffs application for an injunction restraining the defendant from proceeding with arbitration. The parties disagreed as to whether their dispute was arbitrable. The sole issue presented is whether the arbitrability of the dispute was to be determined [465]*465by the arbitrator or by the trial court. We conclude that arbitrability, absent the parties’ clear agreement to the contrary, is a factual question to be determined by the trial court. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the matter for further proceedings.

Examination of the record discloses the following factual and procedural history that is not in dispute. On February 15,1989, the plaintiff, The Welch Group, Inc., signed a contract with the defendant, Creative Drywall, Inc., whereby the defendant was to perform certain services for the plaintiff in connection with a construction project known as Bigelow Commons, Phase II, in Enfield. The parties’ agreement incorporated by reference the terms of an earlier agreement between the plaintiff and Bigelow Construction Corporation, the general contractor for the project.

The incorporated text contained two paragraphs concerning disputes. The first of such paragraphs stated: “All claims, disputes and other matters in question . . . arising from or relating to this Agreement or breach thereof shall be decided by any court having jurisdiction thereof. . . -”1 The second paragraph pro[466]*466vided: “All claims, disputes and other matters in question not involving more than the sum of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000) arising out of, or relating to, this Agreement or the breach thereof . . . shall be decided by arbitration . . . unless the parties mutually agree otherwise. ...”

On May 9, 1989, the defendant filed eight separate demands for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association claiming in each instance that: “It is owed money for base contract work and for numerous separate items of extra work. . . . The amount of money involved in this demand is less than $100,000.” The plaintiff filed the instant action claiming: (1) that the disputed amount for “base contract work” was $367,198.22; (2) that the disputed amount for “extra work” was $355,891.21; and (3) that the matter was therefore not subject to arbitration since the claims were in excess of $100,000.

On September 11,1989, following a contested hearing, the trial court concluded that the threshold issue of the arbitrability of this dispute was to be determined [467]*467by the arbitrator. The trial court therefore rendered judgment denying the plaintiffs application for an injunction. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court. We thereafter transferred the matter to ourselves pursuant to Practice Book § 4023.

“Whether a particular dispute is arbitrable is a question for the court, unless, by appropriate language, the parties have agreed to arbitrate that question, also.” Frager v. Pennsylvania General Ins. Co., 155 Conn. 270, 274, 231 A.2d 531 (1967). “The intention to have arbitrability determined by an arbitrator can be manifested by an express provision or through the use of broad terms to describe the scope of arbitration, such as ‘all questions in dispute and all claims arising out of the contract or ‘any dispute that cannot be adjudicated.’ ” Board of Education v. Frey, 174 Conn. 578, 581, 392 A.2d 466 (1978).

Further, “[t]he ‘positive assurance’ test of arbitrability ... is the law in this state. . . . ‘Under the positive assurance test “. . . [a]n order to arbitrate the particular [dispute] should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.” ’ Board of Education v. Frey, supra, 582.” (Emphasis in original.) John A. Errichetti Associates v. Boutin, 183 Conn. 481, 488-89, 439 A.2d 416 (1981).

The defendant relying on what it characterizes as the “broad terms” of the arbitration clause, asks us to focus on the language “[a]ll claims, disputes and other matters in question . . . arising out of, or relating to, this Agreement or the breach thereof . . . shall be decided by arbitration.” The defendant argues that this language is nearly identical to the “broad terms” specifically identified in Board of Education v. Frey, supra, [468]*468and that under the “positive assurance test,” it is entitled to a construction of the contract in favor of a determination of arbitrability by the arbitrator. We do not agree for two reasons.

First, the defendant’s characterization of this paragraph as containing the “broad terms” found in Board of Education v. Frey, supra, overlooks the limiting or qualifying language contained in the same sentence, i.e., “not involving more than One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000).” Second, the defendant’s argument does not address the unqualified language of Paragraph 18.1 that “[a]ll claims, disputes and other matters in question between the parties to this Agreement arising from or relating to this Agreement or the breach thereof shall be decided by any court having jurisdiction thereof ” (Emphasis added.) Thus, when viewed in its totality, the contract expresses the intent that all claims and disputes are to be decided in the first instance by a court, subject to a limited exception for those matters in dispute that are less than $100,000.

We conclude that the trial court should have determined the issue of the arbitrability of this dispute. We therefore remand this case for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the dispute involved separate claims each less than $100,000 or one large claim in excess of $100,000 that has been divided into smaller parts for the purpose of meeting the arbitration threshold.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

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Bluebook (online)
576 A.2d 153, 215 Conn. 464, 1990 Conn. LEXIS 219, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/welch-group-inc-v-creative-drywall-inc-conn-1990.