Weisman v. Connors

519 A.2d 795, 69 Md. App. 732, 1987 Md. App. LEXIS 229
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland
DecidedJanuary 13, 1987
Docket522, September Term, 1986
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 519 A.2d 795 (Weisman v. Connors) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Special Appeals of Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Weisman v. Connors, 519 A.2d 795, 69 Md. App. 732, 1987 Md. App. LEXIS 229 (Md. Ct. App. 1987).

Opinion

WILNER, Judge.

In 1981, Arthur Connors was an executive with the Ford Motor Company who had reached the end of his career ladder. He had been passed over for promotion; he had received no salary increase for two years and no bonus for 1980; his staff had been significantly curtailed. Things were bleak, and he was searching around for something better. Fortuitously for Mr. Connors, Frederick R. Weisman, owner of Frederick Weisman Company (FWC), was looking for an automobile executive to oversee FWC’s various subsidiary companies, including its major subsidiary, Mid-Atlantic Toyota (MAT). After extensive arm’s length negotiations, FWC rescued Mr. Connors from his uncertain future at Ford and gave him a three-year contract at a salary substantially in excess of what he was then making. But alas, Mr. Connors did not measure up, and, when Mr. Weisman complained and tried to take corrective measures, Mr. Connors quit, with nine months still to go on his contract.

That is how Mr. Weisman and FWC see this case.

Arthur Connors was a high-level executive at Ford, handpicked in 1976 by Henry Ford II and Lee Iacocca to be vice-president for sales, worldwide. He was chairman of the company’s marketing committee, a member of its product planning and quality committees, and was in line to become vice-president for all of Ford’s European operations. His compensation was substantial. He earned a base salary of $140,000 a year. He also had regularly received annual *736 bonuses averaging about 62% of his salary. In 1977 and 1978, his bonus was $135,000; in 1979, it was $80,000. It was due only to a severe but temporary slump in the industry that he, along with other Ford executives, received no bonus for 1980. In addition to the monetary compensation, he was able to participate in a stock option plan under which he had options on 12,000 shares of Ford stock, a special savings plan where Ford would match a percentage of deferred compensation, and a pension plan that would allow him to retire at 60% of his salary. He had the use of two company cars—one a Lincoln—and the company paid his country club dues and the premiums on a $200,000 life insurance policy. Although he was not happy about the temporary retrenchment measures undertaken by Ford, he was not actively seeking other employment.

Along came an uninvited industrial “headhunter,” who lured him to a meeting with Mr. Weisman. Weisman, a first-class charmer, promised him full managerial control over FWC and its subsidiaries, an equity position in all new ventures undertaken by Weisman relating to the automobile industry, and full compensation for all the perquisites he would forfeit by leaving Ford. Believing Mr. Weisman to be a man of his word, Connors reluctantly severed his 32-year association with Ford and went to work for FWC. Weisman soon changed everything, however; he demoted Connors, failed to provide the bonuses and perquisites promised, and actually hired someone else for the position specified in Connors’ contract. Regarding this as a constructive discharge, Connors left.

That is how Arthur Connors sees this case. It is also how a jury in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County saw the case. At the end of a long trial at which both versions of the relevant events were forcefully presented, it found that Weisman and FWC had not only breached their contract with Mr. Connors but had induced him to enter into it by negligent misrepresentations. To compensate Mr. Connors for his resulting loss, it awarded damages of $2,705,- *737 961—$221,900 for the constructive discharge/breach of contract and $2,484,061 for the negligent misrepresentation.

It goes without saying that Mr. Weisman and FWC are not well pleased with those verdicts, and so they have appealed from the judgments entered on them. Six issues are presented, four dealing with the legal theories underlying Connors’ case, one challenging the method by which the jury calculated damages, and one involving certain expert testimony that apparently provided the basis of the damages award. Finding no reversible error, we shall affirm. 1

I. Theories of Recovery

A. Averments and Evidence

The case proceeded on Connors’ Second Amended Complaint, which contained four counts—breach of a written employment agreement with FWC, breach of a separate oral agreement with Weisman, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud. The court, on motion, dismissed the action based on the alleged oral agreement, and so the jury considered only the other three counts. It found for the defendants on the fraud count, but, as noted, returned a plaintiff’s verdict on the remaining breach of contract and the negligent misrepresentation counts.

The underlying basis for all of the causes of action was set forth in a number of introductory paragraphs in the complaint. We shall skip over how, when, and where the parties met, which is not especially germane, and start with the alleged inducements. Connors pled and in his testimony at trial confirmed the following: 2

*738 (1) Weisman was the owner of FWC, which was essentially a holding company. It had, at the time, a number of subsidiaries, the major one being Mid-Atlantic Toyota (MAT), a major Toyota distributor responsible for five States and the District of Columbia. The general manager of MAT was one Robert McCurry.
(2) Connors made clear that he was not interested in running MAT—that his job with Ford was on a much higher level than that. Weisman responded that he was satisfied with McCurry, although he had a “communication problem” with him, that what he was looking for was someone “to supervise all automotive related operations of FWC and the expansion of FWC into new business ventures.” He stated further that Connors would not be the general manager of the distributorship but would instead be the
“Chief Operating Officer of FWC, would report directly to Weisman, would supervise the general managers of the automotive businesses owned by FWC, including MAT, that he would direct the development of new business ventures for FWC and for Weisman, individually, and that he would share in the ownership of those ventures.”

(Emphasis added.)

(3) The issue of equity participation was important to Connors. He was not interested in leaving Ford simply for a higher salary, as he would be giving up a lot of perquisites that had value to him; and he conveyed that to Weisman. Weisman “gave Connors the assurances he sought.” He represented that “[t]he value of the ownership interests Connors would receive in those ventures ... would surpass the reduction in Connors’ pension benefits from Ford and would compensate him for the intangible losses which would flow from Connors’ leaving Ford.”
(4) As part of the inducement, Weisman reminded Connors, then 56 years old, that, if he remained at Ford, he would have to retire at age 65, but that “with FWC, he *739

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519 A.2d 795, 69 Md. App. 732, 1987 Md. App. LEXIS 229, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/weisman-v-connors-mdctspecapp-1987.