Wein v. City of New York

80 Misc. 2d 894, 365 N.Y.S.2d 955, 1975 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2280
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 12, 1975
StatusPublished

This text of 80 Misc. 2d 894 (Wein v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wein v. City of New York, 80 Misc. 2d 894, 365 N.Y.S.2d 955, 1975 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2280 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1975).

Opinion

Hyman Korn, J.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (subd. [a], par. 3) and CPLR 3211 (subd. [a], par. 7) is disposed of as follows:

This taxpayer’s action brought pursuant to section 51 of the General Municipal Law seeks a declaratory judgment that: (1) The New York City Stabilization Reserve Corporation Act (SRCA) (Public Authorities Law, tit. 26, as added by L. 1974, ch. 594) violates article VIII and article X of the Constitution of the State of New York; and (2) $700,000,000 in bonds and notes including $260,000,000 in bonds and notes of the Stabilization Reserve Corporation (SRC) to be issued pursuant to the SRCA constitutes a debt of the defendant City of New York [896]*896and will exceed the debt limit as set forth in article VIII of the Constitution.

Plaintiff further seeks permanent injunctive relief against the sale of said bonds and notes by the defendants and to restrain the defendants from contracting other debts in violation of article VIII.

Defendants move to dismiss the complaint alleging that plaintiff lacks the capacity to bring suit and that the complaint fails to state a cause of action.

In support of their contention of plaintiff’s lack of standing, defendants characterize the complaint as directed essentially against the State of New York, and the SRC in challenging the validity of the SRC and claiming the bonds and notes of the SRC are debts of the city. Defendants allege that the State is a necessary party herein but cannot be joined since plaintiff does not allege the requisite violation of a personal right. Defendants further assert that the SRC cannot be joined in this action since it is a public benefit corporation, not subject to suit under section 51 of the General Municipal Law.

A fair reading of the complaint herein demonstrates that it is directed against the named defendants, the City of New York, the Mayor and the Comptroller, to prohibit the alleged illegal expenditure of municipal funds resulting in an alleged unconstitutional exceeding of the debt limit through the mechanism of the SRC as created by the SRCA.

Section 51 of the General Municipal Law is remedial in nature and to be liberally construed for the protection of taxpayers. (Holton v Board of Supervisors of County of Monroe, 245 App Div 144; Meinhardt v Bretting, 10 Misc 2d 757; Queens County Water Co. v Monroe, 83 App Div 105.)

Under this section, plaintiff has a preventive right of action resting solely on illegal official action. Plaintiff need not demonstrate any individual interest other than the taxpayer’s presumed direct and immediate interest to challenge the expenditure of municipal funds. (Massachusetts v Mellon, 262 US 447; Ofenloch v Gaynor, 66 Misc 2d 185, affd 35 AD 2d 913; Bush v Coler, 60 App Div 56, affd 170 NY 587; Hansen v Ludera, 67 Misc 2d 574; New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. v City of Plattsburg, 168 Misc 597, mod on other grounds 256 App Div 732, mod 281 NY 450, rearg den 282 NY 682.)

Although a section 51 right of action cannot be extended to include wrongful acts of officers and agents of the State [897]*897without a showing of personal right (St. Clair v Yonkers Raceway, 13 N Y 2d 72), this does not immunize the State from a challenge that it has acted beyond its constitutional authority. (Bloom v Mayor of City of N. Y., 35 A D 2d 92, affd 28 NY 2d 952.)

Thus, the complaint may not be dismissed for lack of standing.

Defendants’ major contention, that the complaint fails to state a cause of action is well founded. The crux of the complaint is that the structure and funding of the SRC as created by the SRCA establishes that the bonds and notes of the SRC are in reality the debts of the defendant, the City of New York, and, as such, the city’s debt is raised beyond the limit set forth in article VIII of the Constitution.

No facts are alleged by the plaintiff in support of this premise. Rather, plaintiff relies on speculative conclusions drawn solely from the provisions of the SRCA. Plaintiff claims that the SRCA requires that the city pay the expenses and debt service of the SRC (Public Authorities Law, § 2540, subd. [a]); that the city pay funds into the general reserve fund of the SRC (Public Authorities Law, § 2537); that if the city should not maintain the fund, the State is to maintain it out of various State aid funds (Public Authorities Law, § 2540, subds. [b], [c]), and this without more, establishes that the City of New York has pledged its funds as security for the obligations of the SRC in violation of section 5 of article X of the Constitution prohibiting the city from assuming liability for the debts of a public corporation, and in violation of article VIII in that the city has not pledged its faith and credit as required for all city debts.

Plaintiff further alleges that the SRC is not a valid entity but a sham, a conduit created solely to permit the City of New York to evade its constitutional debt limit.

However, an examination of the provisions of the SRCA as well as the official statement and notice of sale clearly demonstrates that this speculative conclusion on the part of the plaintiff is invalid. Under the statute, the SRC is established as a public benefit corporation (§ 2532, subd. [a]) for an explicit purpose, to assist the City of New York to provide essential services on a sound financial basis during a period of unprecedented fiscal crisis. (§2533.) It is well established that the motives of the lawmakers inducing legislative action are not subject to judicial review. (Hansen v Ludera, 67 Misc 2d 574, [898]*898supra; Gaynor v Rockefeller, 21 A D 2d 92.) This is particularly pertinent herein where the purpose is so clearly set forth.

The SRCA authorizes the Mayor to certify to the SRC an amount up to $150,000,000 for the fiscal year 1973-1974 and $370,000,000 for the year 1974-1975 (§ 2538). Upon said certification the SRC is authorized to sell $520,000,000 of its own bonds and notes and to pay over the sale proceeds to the Comptroller for deposit in the city’s general fund (§ 2536). The SRCA expressly states that these SRC bonds and notes are SRC obligations payable solely from SRC revenues and that they are neither the debts of the City of New York nor the debts of the State of New York (§ 2542).

The payment of the principal of the notes is to be made out of the bond proceeds and the interest payments out of the capital reserve fund which is to be maintained by the city provided that the city shall have first appropriated funds for such purpose or provided that funds are otherwise made available to the city (§2537, subd. 1, par. [a]). The city is to pay the operating expenses and debt service of the SRC within the appropriations available (§ 2540, subd. [a]). Under section 2540, if the city does not make appropriations, the State will maintain the fund out of State aid to New York City funds.

These payments from the city or the State are permissive and not mandatory regardless of the practical or moral obligation of the city to make the necessary appropriations. The money can only be provided by the city if it is appropriated out of current revenues. The city is not authorized to issue its own obligations to maintain the SRC fund. Neither is the city the guarantor of the SRC notes or bonds.

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Related

Massachusetts v. Mellon
262 U.S. 447 (Supreme Court, 1923)
Levy v. . McClellan
89 N.E. 569 (New York Court of Appeals, 1909)
New York State Electric & Gas Corp. v. City of Plattsburgh
24 N.E.2d 122 (New York Court of Appeals, 1939)
Bush v. Coler
60 A.D. 56 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1901)
Queens County Water Co. v. Monroe
83 A.D. 105 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1903)
Holton v. Board of Supervisors
245 A.D. 144 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1935)
New York State Electric & Gas Corp. v. City of Plattsburgh
256 A.D. 732 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1939)
New York State Electric & Gas Corp. v. City of Plattsburg
168 Misc. 597 (New York Supreme Court, 1938)
Bush v. Coler
170 N.Y. 587 (New York Court of Appeals, 1902)
Salzman v. Impellitteri
113 N.E.2d 543 (New York Court of Appeals, 1953)
Comereski v. City of Elmira
125 N.E.2d 241 (New York Court of Appeals, 1955)
Bloom v. Mayor
271 N.E.2d 919 (New York Court of Appeals, 1971)
Gusdore Corp. v. Michaels
8 A.D.2d 663 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1959)
Gaynor v. Rockefeller
21 A.D.2d 92 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1964)
Meinhardt v. Britting
10 Misc. 2d 757 (New York Supreme Court, 1958)
Gusdore Corp. v. Michaels
13 Misc. 2d 762 (New York Supreme Court, 1958)
Schreiber v. Wagner
37 Misc. 2d 985 (New York Supreme Court, 1962)
Sweeney v. Farrington
38 Misc. 2d 882 (New York Supreme Court, 1963)
Ofenloch v. Gaynor
66 Misc. 2d 185 (New York Supreme Court, 1970)
Hansen v. Ludera
67 Misc. 2d 574 (New York Supreme Court, 1971)

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80 Misc. 2d 894, 365 N.Y.S.2d 955, 1975 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2280, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wein-v-city-of-new-york-nysupct-1975.