Weiler v. Boncher

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Oklahoma
DecidedJanuary 5, 2023
Docket4:22-cv-00487
StatusUnknown

This text of Weiler v. Boncher (Weiler v. Boncher) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Weiler v. Boncher, (N.D. Okla. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

GREGORY A. WEILER, II, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) Case No. 22-CV-0487-CVE-JFJ ) WARDEN BONCHER, ) ) Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER This matter is before the Court on petitioner Gregory A. Weiler, II,’s motion for writ filed December 12, 2022 (Dkt. # 4); petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 filed December 21, 2022 (Dkt. # 5); and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed December 21, 2022 (Dkt. # 6).1 Based on representations in the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court finds that petitioner lacks sufficient funds to pay the $5 filing fee. The Court therefore grants the motion and authorizes petitioner to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee. However, for the following reasons, the Court dismisses the petition for writ of habeas corpus and denies the motion for writ. A. Petition for writ of habeas corpus This Court must “promptly examine” a habeas petition and dismiss the petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States

1 Petitioner initiated this action by filing a handwritten petition for writ of habeas corpus. In an order filed December 8, 2022 (Dkt. # 3), the Court found that pleading deficient and directed petitioner to file a second petition using the court-approved form, as required by this Court’s local rules. Petitioner complied with that directive on December 21, 2022. The Court therefore declares moot the petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 filed November 1, 2022 (Dkt. # 1). District Courts; see Boutwell v. Keating, 399 F.3d 1203, 1210 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting district courts have discretion to apply Habeas Rule 4 when petitioners seek relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241). Because petitioner appears without counsel, the Court liberally construes his filings. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).

Petitioner presently is detained in federal custody at FMC Devens, in Massachusetts, pursuant to an order of this Court, entered in 2014, committing him to the custody of the Attorney General, under 18 U.S.C. § 4243(e), following this Court’s finding that petitioner was not guilty only by reason of insanity of criminal charges filed against him in N.D. Okla. Case No. 13-CR- 0018-CVE. Dkt. # 5, at 1-2; see also Dkt. ## 48, 62, N.D. Okla. Case No. 13-CR-0018-CVE. Petitioner states that he brings this action to challenge “being deemed dangerous to society w/o sitting in or being present in the risk assessment, thus being unable to stand up for [him]self in both 2019 & 2020.” Dkt. # 5, at 2. He identifies four claims to support his assertion that he is being held in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. First, he alleges a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due process, claiming that he has been denied

representation for purposes of the “risk panel.” Id. at 6. Second, he alleges a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, claiming he “had no assistance of counsel in [his] risk hearing” because he was “pro se and wasn’t present at it” and was not “offered a sit-in representative.” Id. Third, he alleges a violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, claiming that he has been detained without due process. Id. Fourth, he alleges a Sixth Amendment violation, claiming that because he was not present for his “risk panel,” he could not “obtain witnesses in [his] favor in federal court” and “was absolved of [the] right to protest.” Id. at 7. In his request for relief, petitioner asks this Court to order his release and states that he “expect[s] filings against staff to stand as legal if at all possible as [petitioner] repeatedly told them [he] didn’t need forced medication hence it is assault.” Dkt. # 5, at 7. The Court liberally construes the petition as challenging the legality of petitioner’s current confinement and as seeking his immediate release. A person committed to confinement under 18 U.S.C. § 4243 may seek relief through a § 2241 petition, see 18 U.S.C. § 4247(g), and may ask

the committing court to grant his or her request to be released from confinement, see Archuleta v. Hedrick, 365 F.3d 644, 649 (8th Cir. 2004). However, the Court finds that the petition shall be dismissed because it is plainly apparent, for two reasons, that petitioner is not entitled to relief. First, none of petitioner’s claims is timely. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) (providing that habeas petitioner has one year to file habeas petition commencing on the date a reasonably diligent petitioner could have discovered the factual predicate of his or her claims). As previously stated, petitioner brings this action to challenge alleged constitutional deficiencies related to his 2019 and 2020 annual risk assessments. Dkt. # 5, at 2. He alleges his Fifth Amendment right to due process and Sixth Amendment right to counsel were violated because he was “denied representation” and “had no assistance of counsel” during these assessments (claims one and two); that the alleged

violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due process also necessarily violates his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment (claim three); and that his Sixth Amendment right to “obtain witnesses” was violated because he was not present for, or able to “obtain witnesses” for, these risk assessments (claim four).2 Id. at 6-7. But there are no allegations in the petition to explain why petitioner could not have discovered these purported constitutional

2 The Court acknowledges that some of petitioner’s allegations appear to also refer to a lack of representation at a “risk hearing” and an inability to present witnesses “in federal court.” Dkt. # 5, at 7. But petitioner clearly states in the petition that he brings this action to challenge risk assessments that were conducted in 2019 and 2020. Id. at 2. The Court thus finds it reasonable to construe all of petitioner’s claims as referring to alleged constitutional deficiencies in the risk assessments that occurred in 2019 and 2020. violations in 2019 and 2020, when they allegedly occurred,3 or why petitioner waited until November 2022 to present his claims in a § 2241 petition.4 Second, even disregarding petitioner’s delay in asserting the claims that appear related only to the 2019 and 2020 risk assessments, petitioner does not identify any plausible constitutional

claims. Petitioner appears to base his claims on his belief that he is entitled to certain constitutional rights in the context of an annual risk assessment performed by a facility director under 18 U.S.C. § 4247(e).

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Related

Slack v. McDaniel
529 U.S. 473 (Supreme Court, 2000)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Boutwell v. Keating
399 F.3d 1203 (Tenth Circuit, 2005)
United States v. Copar Pumice Company
714 F.3d 1197 (Tenth Circuit, 2013)

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Bluebook (online)
Weiler v. Boncher, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/weiler-v-boncher-oknd-2023.