Weidner v. Northway Motor & Manfg. Co.

172 N.W. 574, 205 Mich. 583, 1919 Mich. LEXIS 523
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedMay 29, 1919
DocketDocket No. 99
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 172 N.W. 574 (Weidner v. Northway Motor & Manfg. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Weidner v. Northway Motor & Manfg. Co., 172 N.W. 574, 205 Mich. 583, 1919 Mich. LEXIS 523 (Mich. 1919).

Opinion

Steere, J.

On January 5, 1918, Karl Weidner, a laborer in the employ of the Northway Motor & Manufacturing Company, sustained an admitted industrial accident, upon the extent and nature of which the parties are not in harmony.

In the usual course of proceedings under the workmen’s compensation law the accident was reported to the industrial accident board, an agreement for weekly compensation on the basis prescribed by the act, at $8.64 per week during disability, was entered into, filed with and approved by the board, and all required or desired medical care and attendance furnished the injured employee by the company until February 4, 1918; although Dr. Hall, the company’s physician, advised him on January 23, 1918, that he was fully re[585]*585covered from any effects of the accident and able to resume work. He did not, however, report for work until the fore part of March, 1918, following a final settlement for compensation made with him through the defendant insurance company by which the prescribed weekly payment for disability was continued and paid from February 16 to March 4, 1918. A settlement receipt in full, for $70.56, in form prescribed by the accident board was signed by Weidner and filed with the board. A few days later he reported at the motor company’s factory to resume work, where he states they wanted him to run the elevator and he refused the job because he was “scart of an elevator,” and they said they had other work for him but they did not give it to him, and he did not try for work elsewhere because he was “too sick.” Asked, “What is the matter with you?” he replied, “I do not feel good on my left side. Q. In any other place? A. It hurts me to stand long and it hurts me on the right side, but not so much as on the left side.”

A written notice to his employer of claim for injury dated April 18, 1918, using the form prescribed for such purpose, states the “nature of the injury” to be “side of body and chest hurt badly causing dry pleurisy.”

On June 15, 1918, plaintiff filed a petition with the industrial accident board “to reopen his case, closed by reason of a settlement receipt filed by the Zurich Insurance Co., insurers, acknowledging settlement and payment in full of all compensation,” which he claimed he was not able to read and was led to believe was the “ordinary receipt used when compensation is paid.” The petition states the circumstances of the accident, certain of the prior proceedings in relation to it; that he was “crushed and severely injured internally,” and that “he is now suffering from gastroptosis, or the falling of the stomach” and is yet [586]*586unable to work, although he has employed a number of physicians to treat him. Accompanying his petition is. a certificate dated May 14, 1918, signed by ■ Dr. Wetherell, certifying that, “I have this day made a physical examination of Karl Weidner and find him suffering from gastroptosis.”

A hearing was had upon this petition, testimony taken by deposition being submitted -by both parties and considered by the industrial accident board, as it returns, for a double purpose — first, to determine whether the case should be reopened, and, having so determined, second, whether further compensation should be awarded. The board decided both inquiries in the affirmative and without filing any finding of facts or reference to the testimony beyond the statement that it found as a fact “from all the files and testimony in the case” that as a result of the accident sustained January 5, 1918, plaintiff was unable to resume his occupation, or earn wages from the time the settlement receipt was signed, and was therefore entitled to continued compensation at the rate of $8.64 per week in accordance with the terms of the first agreement approved by the board oh February 26, 1918. This was ordered paid up to July 3, 1918, forthwith, and paid weekly thereafter.

Defendants’ counsel contend in their brief that on the petition filed to reopen the case the testimony submitted by the respective parties was directed and limited to that question only, and the board had no power without a further hearing upon the second issue to proceed after reopening the case to a determination of the question whether plaintiff had fully recovered from the effects of his accidental injury and was entitled to additional compensation.

We think that question is disposed of in Curtis v. Slater Construction Co., 194 Mich. 259, where the same course was followed, and see no objection to the [587]*587rule of procedure adopted by the board in such cases. There is no occasion for multiplying pleadings or duplicating proofs if all parties are given ample notice and opportunity to present such evidence as they desire. The major question which is germane to the entire inquiry is whether the applicant is entitled to further compensation because of disability resulting from an industrial accident. In this case ample opportunity and time were given both parties to take and present such testimony as they desired. The application was filed with the board June 15, 1918. Oh July 3,1918, the first depositions were taken for plaintiff, consisting of his own testimony and that of Dr. Wetherell. On July 19, 1918, defendant took the depositions of Dr. Hall and Dr. Panzner. On August 15, 1918, the deposition of Dr. Benmosche was taken at the instance of plaintiff. Each time counsel for the respective parties stipulated as to the method and participated in the examination.

The employer’s report of the accident and injury made to the board shortly after the accident as required by the statute states as follows:

“While he was in the elevator with operator and load of motors, injured claims elevator fell one and one-half floors causing motor to fall and as he tried to stop it he injured himself. Muscle strain of back, possible comminuted fracture lumbar vertebrae.”

Plaintiff similarly described the accident in his testimony and says he “rolled the trucks away and then crawled out on the second floor.” He admitted he resumed work and remained until quitting time, the foreman telling him to use the next elevator. His only description of his injuries or feelings at that time is, “I asked the foreman to go home because I felt weak and my heart went blump, blump, but he said that they were too busy and that I should continue with my work until quitting time. I did so.” [588]*588He did not resume work at defendant’s plant thereafter and it is not questioned that he sustained injuries which incapacitated him for a time, the accident being reported and his incapacity recognized as related.

Dr. H'all, the company’s consulting surgeon, and his assistants cared for plaintiff professionally and rendered him such medical care and services as he required. His complaint then was of pain in his back and lower part of his lungs. Dr.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Batchelor v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
574 F. Supp. 1480 (E.D. Michigan, 1983)
Chelli v. American Boston Mining Co.
285 N.W. 14 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1939)
Richeson v. Wagar
282 N.W. 909 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1938)
Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. Hinson
64 S.W.2d 574 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1933)
Jenkins v. Boise Payette Lumber Co.
287 P. 202 (Idaho Supreme Court, 1930)
Richards v. Rogers Boiler & Burner Co.
234 N.W. 428 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1929)
Sponseller v. Kimball
224 N.W. 359 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1929)
Seem v. Consolidated Fuel & Lumber Co.
209 N.W. 193 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1926)
Fritz v. Rudy Furnace Co.
188 N.W. 528 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1922)
Norbut v. I. Stephenson Co.
186 N.W. 716 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1922)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
172 N.W. 574, 205 Mich. 583, 1919 Mich. LEXIS 523, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/weidner-v-northway-motor-manfg-co-mich-1919.