Webster v. Del Toro

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: September 30, 2024
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2023-2716
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_________________________________________ ) KATRINA L. WEBSTER, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 23-cv-2716 (APM) ) CARLOS DEL TORO, ) ) Defendant. ) _________________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I.

Pro se Plaintiff Katrina Webster, a Black woman, was employed in 2017 as a secretary with

the U.S. Navy’s Strategic Systems Programs (“SSP”). Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 12 [hereinafter

Compl.]. On September 18, 2024, she filed this action against Defendant Secretary of the Navy

Carlos Del Toro in his official capacity, asserting various discrimination claims under Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–16. Although it is difficult to

determine the precise nature of Plaintiff’s claims, she seems to allege that Defendant engaged in

(1) disparate treatment based on her race when SSP failed to promote her in 25 years of

employment, see Compl. ¶ 53; (2) retaliation based on her employer’s disclosure of her protected

Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) activity id. ¶ 63; (3) race discrimination based on that

disclosure, contractor Richard Garland calling her “trouble,” and her lack of promotion, id. ¶ 70;

and (4) harassment based on retaliation-by-disclosure and the fact that Defendant’s May 1, 2018,

anti-harassment policy statement failed to effectively communicate EEO policies and procedures,

id. ¶ 76. Defendant has now moved to dismiss. See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 4, Def.’s Mem.

of P. & A. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 4-1 [hereinafter Def.’s Mem.]. For the reasons that

follow, the court grants Defendant’s motion.

II.

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially

plausible when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 556).

In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept a plaintiff’s factual

allegations as true and “construe the complaint ‘in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the

benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’” Hettinga v. United States,

677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir.

1979)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “[A] pro se plaintiff’s complaint must be held ‘to less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Spence v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 109

F.4th 531, 537–38 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam)).

III.

A. Counts I, III, & IV

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by res judicata. Def.’s Mem. at 6–10.

The court agrees as to Counts I, a portion of III, and IV. “Under the doctrine of res judicata, or

claim preclusion, a subsequent lawsuit will be barred if there has been prior litigation (1) involving

the same claims or cause of action, (2) between the same parties or their privies, and (3) there has

2 been a final, valid judgment on the merits, (4) by a court of competent jurisdiction.” Porter v.

Shah, 606 F.3d 809, 813–14 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Capitol Hill Grp. v. Pillsbury, Winthrop,

Shaw, Pittman, LLC, 569 F.3d 485, 490 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (en banc)).

Plaintiff previously litigated her disparate treatment claim (Count I) in Webster v.

Braithwaite, No. 20-cv-0610 (DLF), 2020 WL 7340058, at *3–4 (D.D.C. Dec. 14, 2020), aff’d in

part sub nom. Webster v. Del Toro, No. 21-5040, 2021 WL 6102269 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 15, 2021), and

aff’d as modified sub nom. Webster v. Del Toro, 49 F.4th 562 (D.C. Cir. 2022). There, Plaintiff

alleged that she suffered retaliatory action when she was not promoted, “forcing her to remain in

[a] low grade Secretarial position for more than 21 years.” Id. at *3 (alteration in original). The

court dismissed that claim on res judicata grounds. Id. The claim here arises out of the same

common nucleus of facts, Apotex, Inc. v. FDA, 393 F.3d 210, 217 (D.C. Cir. 2004), as Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant “failed to promote [her] in 25 years of employment with SSP,” Compl. ¶

53. While in Braithwaite she styled her claim as one of retaliation, that is of no moment, as both

the earlier claim and the present one rest on the same alleged facts and the earlier claim was

litigated to final judgment, 2020 WL 7340058, at *5. See Capitol Hill Grp., 569 F.3d at 490

(stating that “there is an identity of the causes of action when the cases are based on the same

nucleus of facts because it is the facts surrounding the transaction or occurrence which operate to

constitute the cause of action, not the legal theory on which a litigant relies”) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). 1

Plaintiff likewise litigated the same harassment claim (Count IV) in Webster v. Braithwaite

based on the Navy’s antiharassment policy statement. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s

holding that Plaintiff failed to state a harassment claim, 2021 WL 6102269, at *1, which satisfies

1 Plaintiff does not contest that the court was one of competent jurisdiction. See generally, Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 11.

3 the “final judgment on the merits” element. Her harassment claim is thus barred by claim

preclusion. To the extent this claim relies on a retaliation-by-disclosure theory, Plaintiff has failed

to exhaust it, see infra.

Finally, Count III alleges “race discrimination” based on the disclosure of her EEO activity,

the failure to promote, and repeatedly being called “trouble” by Richard Garland. Compl. at 24–

25. The court assumes each of these are discrete claims of disparate treatment, as Plaintiff has not

asserted a hostile work environment claim. The court already has held that the failure-to-promote

theory is barred by res judicata. So, too, is the “trouble” theory, as the court in Braithwaite held

that such an allegation, along with others, could not sustain a hostile work environment claim,

see 2020 WL 7340058, at *4. See Capitol Hill Grp., 569 F.3d at 490. 2

B. Counts II & III

As to Plaintiff’s remaining claims, she has failed to exhaust Count II and that portion of

Count III that focuses on the disclosure of her EEO activity. Title VII requires a federal employee

to “timely exhaust [] administrative remedies before bringing their claims to court.” Bowden v.

United States, 106 F.3d 433, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her

retaliation-by-disclosure claim on failure-to-exhaust grounds. Webster, 49 F.4th at 569. Since

then, Plaintiff has not cured the failure to exhaust, nor does she purport to rely on a different EEO

complaint. See Compl. at 20–24 (relying on complaint No. 17-00030-01579); cf. 2020 WL

7340058, at *3 n.3. These claims are thus dismissed for failure to exhaust.

2 That Garland called her “trouble” also fails to state a claim of disparate treatment.

4 VI.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 7, is granted. A final appealable

order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Dated: September 30, 2024 Amit P. Mehta United States District Court Judge