Wayne v. Wayne

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: January 2, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-3781
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JESUS A. WAYNE, JR., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03781 (UNA) ) ) CHARLENE WAYNE, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and

Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2. The Court grants Plaintiff’s IFP

Application, and for the reasons explained below, it dismisses this matter for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

The subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth

generally at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under those statutes, federal jurisdiction is available

only when a “federal question” is presented, id. § 1331, or the parties are of diverse citizenship

and the amount in controversy “exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and

costs,” id. § 1332(a). A party seeking relief in the district court must at least plead facts that bring

the suit within the court’s jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Failure to plead such facts warrants

dismissal of the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

Plaintiff Jesus A. Wayne Jr., who resides in the District of Columbia, sues a single

Defendant, Charlene Wayne, who also resides somewhere in the District, although Plaintiff fails

to provide an address for the Defendant, in contravention of D.C. Local Civil Rule 5.1(c)(1). See

Compl. at 1–2. Plaintiff contends that he is a “Mission Impossible Agent,” and that Defendant is a “Mission Impossible Supervisor.” See id. at 2, 4. The allegations themselves are spare: Plaintiff

alleges only that, on October 6, 2025, to date, Defendant abandoned him at his current address,

when she was instead supposed to pick him up. See id. at 4. Plaintiff does not plead for any relief,

stating “no relief, no lawsuit.” See id.

Plaintiff has failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction. First, he has failed to state a

federal question. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff does not invoke any authority that provides a

federal cause of action, nor can the court independently discern any basis for federal question

jurisdiction from the facts given in the complaint. See Johnson v. Robinson, 576 F.3d 522, 522

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“[F]ederal court jurisdiction must affirmatively appear clearly and

distinctly.” (quoting Bilal v. Kaplan, 904 F.2d 14, 15 (8th Cir.1990) (per curiam)).

Second, Plaintiff has also failed to establish diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

It is a “well-established rule” that the diverse citizenship requirement be “assessed at the time the

suit is filed.” Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991). Therefore,

“the citizenship of every party to the action must be distinctly alleged [in the complaint] and cannot

be established presumptively or by mere inference,” Meng v. Schwartz, 305 F. Supp. 2d 49, 55

(D.D.C. 2004), and an “‘allegation of residence alone is insufficient to establish the citizenship

necessary for diversity jurisdiction,’” Novak v. Capital Mgmt. & Dev. Corp., 452 F.3d 902, 906

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 792 n.20 (D.C. Cir.

1983)). Here, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege the residence of the Defendant, let alone

her domicile or citizenship.

Assuming that Defendant is a citizen of the District of Columbia, where she appears to be

located, Plaintiff has still failed to establish diversity jurisdiction, because both he and Defendant

are ostensibly citizens of the District, thus defeating complete diversity. See Bush v. Butler, 521 F. Supp. 2d 63, 71 (D.D.C. 2007) (“For jurisdiction to exist under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, there must be

complete diversity between the parties, which is to say that the plaintiff may not be a citizen of the

same state as any defendant.”). Moreover, Plaintiff has not demanded any damages, let alone

alleged that the amount in controversy plausibly exceeds $75,000.

Finally, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s allegations, to the extent that they can even be

identified, are largely frivolous, and the Court cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a

frivolous complaint. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (“Over the years, this Court

has repeatedly held that the federal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within

their jurisdiction if they are ‘so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit.’”)

(quoting Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 579 (1904)); Tooley v.

Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (examining cases dismissed “for patent

insubstantiality,” including where the plaintiff allegedly “was subjected to a campaign of

surveillance and harassment deriving from uncertain origins”). A court may dismiss a complaint

as frivolous “when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible,”

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). The instant allegations regarding a purported

“Mission Impossible” agenda fall squarely into this category.

Consequently, this case is dismissed without prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). A

separate Order will issue contemporaneously.

Date: January 2, 2026 /s/_________________________ ANA C. REYES United States District Judge