Wayne Taylor III v. Leslie A. Barnett

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: April 24, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-02433
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 WAYNE TAYLOR III, ) Case No. CV 25-2433-KK (JPR) ) 13 Plaintiff, ) ) ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED 14 Vv. ) COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND ) 15 LESLIE A. BARNETT, ) ) 16 Defendant. 17 18 On March 17, 2025, Plaintiff, a state prisoner, filed pro se 19 a Complaint labeled “First Amended Civil Rights Complaint,” 29 | alleging violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 21S 1983. On March 24, he filed a First Amended Complaint.* Three 22 23 1 The Complaint and FAC are identical except that the FAC has DA attached to it a 14-page document. (FAC, ECF No. 4 at 17-30 (throughout, the Court uses the pagination generated by its Case 25 || Management/Electronic Case Filing system) .) The attachment is labeled “Civil Rights Complaint.” (Id. at 17.) Although the first 26 || two pages of the attachment differ from the FAC, it is identical to the FAC from the third page on. (Compare id. at 5-16, with id. at 27 19-30.) 28 When Plaintiff filed the FAC, he also filed a request for a

1 days later, the district judge granted his request to proceed 2 without prepayment of the filing fee. 3 Plaintiff sues Leslie A. Barnett, a “court-appointed 4 guardian ad litem” (FAC, ECF No. 4 at 3), apparently for 5 Plaintiff’s mother (id. at 10), in her individual and official 6 capacities. His claims arise from Defendant’s allegedly 7 defamatory remarks at a state-court probate hearing (see id. at 8 4-6, 9, 11, 12), which he claims caused him to be denied letters 9 of support from the community for his upcoming parole hearing 10 (see id. at 5-6). 11 After screening the FAC under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 12 1915A, the Court finds that its allegations fail to state a claim 13 on which relief might be granted. Because at least some of the 14 deficiencies might be cured by amendment, the FAC is dismissed 15 with leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 16 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding that pro se litigant must be 17 given leave to amend complaint unless it is absolutely clear that 18 deficiencies cannot be cured). If Plaintiff desires to pursue 19 any of his claims, he is ORDERED to file a second amended 20 complaint within 28 days of the date of this order, remedying the 21 deficiencies discussed below. 22 ALLEGATIONS OF THE FAC 23 On February 13, 2025, a hearing took place in Los Angeles 24 County Superior Court regarding Plaintiff’s petition for 25 appointment as his mother’s conservator. (See FAC, ECF No. 4 at 26 27 temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. That request remains pending and will be ruled on separately, by the 28 assigned District Judge. 2 1 5, 6, 10, 16.) Defendant, an attorney, was Plaintiff’s mother’s 2 court-appointed guardian ad litem. (See id. at 3, 10, 16.) At 3 the hearing, Defendant stated that Plaintiff was “petitioning 4 [the] court for . . . appointment as probate conservator, for the 5 sole purpose of manipulating the Board of Parole Hearings into 6 granting [Plaintiff] ‘Compassionate Parole’ from his present 7 incarceration.” (Id. at 6.) That statement allegedly caused 8 Plaintiff reputational injury, leading to his being “without 9 letters of support from members of the community” for his May 28, 10 2025 parole-suitability hearing. (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff also 11 alleges that “commencing in November 2024,” Defendant “conspired” 12 with “Superior Court of California Judge Gus T. May” but provides 13 no supporting allegations. (Id. at 12.) 14 Plaintiff claims violations of the 14th Amendment’s due- 15 process and equal-protection clauses and state law. (Id. at 4- 16 13.) He seeks injunctive and declaratory relief; money damages; 17 costs, “including but not limited to, future attorney’s fees and 18 costs for retained counsel, if any”; and any other relief the 19 Court “deems to be appropriate, proper, just and equitable.” 20 (Id. at 14-16.) 21 STANDARD OF REVIEW 22 A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for failure 23 to state a claim when “there is no cognizable legal theory or an 24 absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal 25 theory.” Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 26 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (as amended) (citing Navarro v. Block, 27 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)); accord O’Neal v. Price, 531 28 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2008). In considering whether a 3 1 complaint states a claim, a court must generally accept as true 2 the factual allegations in it. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 3 678 (2009); Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892-93 (9th Cir. 4 2011). The court need not accept as true, however, “allegations 5 that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or 6 unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 7 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Sprewell v. Golden State 8 Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.), amended by 275 F.3d 1187 9 (9th Cir. 2001)); see also Shelton v. Chorley, 487 F. App’x 388, 10 389 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that district court properly 11 dismissed civil-rights claim when plaintiff’s “conclusory 12 allegations” did not support it). 13 Although a complaint need not include detailed factual 14 allegations, it “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 15 as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 16 face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 17 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); Yagman v. Garcetti, 852 F.3d 18 859, 863 (9th Cir. 2017). A claim is facially plausible when it 19 “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 20 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 21 at 678. “A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ 22 and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held 23 to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 24 lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per 25 curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). 26 27 28 4 1 DISCUSSION 2 I. The FAC Fails to Allege that the Private-Party Defendant 3 Acted as a State Agent or Engaged in Any State Action 4 A. Applicable Law 5 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that 6 a defendant acted under color of state law to deprive the 7 plaintiff of a constitutionally protected right. See West v. 8 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988); Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 824 9 (9th Cir. 2001). A person acts under color of state law only 10 when exercising power “possessed by virtue of state law and made 11 possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority 12 of state law.” United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 13 (1941). 14 Generally, action by private parties does not constitute 15 action under color of state law. See Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 16 702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991) (as amended); Sutton v. Providence 17 St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir. 1999). But 18 private parties may act under color of state law if they engage 19 in joint action with state actors or agents. See Sutton, 192 20 F.3d at 835. The joint-action inquiry focuses on “whether the 21 state has so far insinuated itself into a position of 22 interdependence with the private entity that it must be 23 recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity,” 24 Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation 25 omitted), and thus requires “a substantial degree of cooperative 26 action,” Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 27 1989). Joint action may be demonstrated by “proving the 28 existence of a conspiracy or by showing that the private party 5 1 was ‘a willful participant in joint action with the State or its 2 agents.’” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 445 (9th Cir. 2002) 3 (quoting Collins, 878 F.2d at 1154). 4 B. Analysis 5 Generally, court-appointed attorneys, such as public 6 defenders and incompetent persons’ guardians ad litem, are not 7 state actors. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 8 (1981) (holding that public defenders do not act under color of 9 state law when performing traditional functions as counsel in 10 criminal proceedings); Kirtley, 326 F.3d at 1091-92, 1096 11 (private attorney did not act under color of law when appointed 12 by Washington state court to represent minor as guardian ad 13 litem). In Kirtley, the Ninth Circuit looked to the state’s 14 statutory definition of a guardian ad litem, ultimately holding 15 that that role, like that of a public defender, was independent 16 of the state and therefore the defendant was not a state actor. 17 See 326 F.3d at 1092-96. The court highlighted that the main 18 function of the guardian ad litem was to advocate for the minor 19 and represent the minor’s interests. See id. at 1092-94. 20 Although the guardian also acted as an investigator to provide 21 information to the court, that function was more akin to the role 22 of a witness than to an actual extension of the court. See id. 23 Here, Defendant apparently acted as a court-appointed 24 guardian ad litem for Plaintiff’s mother in state-court probate 25 proceedings. (See FAC, ECF No. 4 at 3, 6, 10, 16.) California 26 law describes such a guardian as “represent[ing] the interest of” 27 an individual who lacks the capacity to make legal decisions. 28 Cal. Prob. Code § 1003(a). That role is analogous to the 6 1 guardian ad litem in Kirtley. See 326 F.3d at 1092-94. 2 Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant somehow acted outside 3 that role or was otherwise a state actor. See Hudacko v. Lee, 4 No. 23-cv-05316-SI, 2024 WL 4894292, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 5 2024) (finding that “private attorney appointed by a court to act 6 as counsel for a minor in child custody proceedings” was not 7 state actor for § 1983 purposes); Chambers v. Santa Clara Cnty., 8 No. C 05-3308 SI., 2006 WL 2433413, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 9 2006) (concluding that court-appointed counsel representing minor 10 was not state actor because statutory definition indicated 11 counsel’s primary responsibility was to “advocate for the 12 protection, safety, and physical and emotional well-being of the 13 child,” which was similar to statutory definition of guardian in 14 Kirtley, and thus guardian was sufficiently independent from 15 state (citation omitted)). 16 Plaintiff further contends, without any supporting factual 17 allegations, that Defendant conspired with a “judge who is immune 18 from civil liability[] to violate [P]laintiff’s protection 19 guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause in the Fourteenth 20 Amendment to U.S. Constitution.” (FAC, ECF No. 4 at 12.) Such 21 conclusory allegations are not sufficient to establish a 22 conspiracy. See Simmons v. Sacramento Cnty. Super. Ct., 318 F.3d 23 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (plaintiff’s conclusory allegations 24 that lawyer was conspiring with state officers to deprive him of 25 due process were insufficient to show state action); Ryan v. 26 Cnty. of Imperial, No. 21cv1076-JO-KSC., 2022 WL 4819656, at *6 27 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2022) (dismissing § 1983 claims because 28 plaintiffs “fail[ed] to provide factual, non-conclusory 7 1 allegations against Private Defendants that support a conspiracy 2 or joint action with a state actor”). 3 For these reasons, Plaintiff has not alleged deprivation of 4 a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. 5 II. Defendant Is Likely Entitled to Absolute Immunity 6 Even if Defendant were a state actor or engaged in state 7 action, she would likely be entitled to absolute immunity. 8 Section 1983 claims for monetary damages against individuals 9 for actions taken while performing certain prosecutorial or other 10 quasi-judicial functions are barred by absolute immunity. See 11 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418-24 (1976) (extending 12 absolute immunity from § 1983 liability to prosecutors when they 13 act in capacity as advocate); Webster v. Bronson, 402 F. App’x 14 280, 282 (9th Cir. 2010) (“To the extent [family-court 15 investigator] performed in a quasi-judicial or quasi- 16 prosecutorial function, she had absolute immunity.” (citing 17 Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 898 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc))); 18 see also Miller, 335 F.3d at 897 (to be entitled to absolute 19 immunity for particular action, “official must be performing a 20 duty functionally comparable to one for which officials were 21 rendered immune at common law”). 22 Although the Ninth Circuit has held that guardians ad litem 23 who serve as advocates for minors in child-neglect and 24 delinquency proceedings are absolutely immune from liability 25 “because their participation in the court proceedings is an 26 integral part of the judicial process,” Babcock v. Tyler, 884 27 F.2d 497, 502 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds as 28 recognized by Safouane v. Fleck, 226 F. App’x 753, 762 (9th Cir. 8 1 2007) (as amended), it clarified in Miller that when individuals 2 “make discretionary decisions and recommendations that are not 3 functionally similar to prosecutorial or judicial decisions, only 4 qualified, not absolute immunity, is available,” 335 F.3d at 898. 5 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant made the statement at issue 6 as his mother’s guardian ad litem during a state-court probate 7 proceeding. (See FAC, ECF No. 4 at 3, 5, 6, 10, 16.) As 8 explained above, California law defines a guardian ad litem as 9 “represent[ing] the interest of” an individual who lacks the 10 capacity to make legal decisions. Cal. Prob. Code § 1003(a). 11 Thus, it appears that Defendant’s complained-of statement was 12 made when she was acting as an advocate in a judicial proceeding. 13 See Babcock, 884 F.2d at 502. And Plaintiff has not alleged that 14 Defendant made the statement while engaging in functions outside 15 of prosecutorial or other quasi-judicial ones. See Miller, 335 16 F.3d at 898. 17 For these reasons, Defendant is likely entitled to absolute 18 immunity. See Sigal v. Cnty. of L.A., No. 2:17-CV-04851-RGK-AGR, 19 2017 WL 10560636, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2017) (minor’s court- 20 appointed attorney who was “considered a guardian ad litem under 21 California law” was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity 22 because her duties fell “within the judicial process”); Balthrope 23 v. Sacramento Cnty. Health & Hum. Servs., No. 2:10-cv-3003-JAM- 24 JFM (PS)., 2011 WL 6130903, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2011) 25 (minor’s guardians ad litem were entitled to absolute quasi- 26 judicial immunity because they acted “within the judicial 27 process” by advocating for minor’s best interest and providing 28 information to court), accepted by 2012 WL 260044 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 9 1 26, 2012). 2 III. The FAC Suffers from Numerous Other Deficiencies 3 The FAC suffers from numerous other problems. Among them, 4 it fails to state any due-process claim because Plaintiff’s 5 parole hearing has not yet taken place and thus any harm is at 6 this point purely speculative. See Slaughter v. Cate, No. 7 12–cv–03872–VC, 2014 WL 5474025, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014) 8 (plaintiff’s “concern about future parole hearings” being 9 affected by “allegedly false information” was “speculative” and 10 could not “support a liberty interest”); Stevenson v. Bisbee, 696 11 F. App’x 250, 251 (9th Cir. 2017) (dismissal of plaintiff’s 12 § 1983 claim “relating to potential considerations at a future 13 parole board hearing was proper because [plaintiff] failed to 14 allege facts sufficient to establish an injury as required for 15 Article III standing” (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 16 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992))). 17 The FAC does not state any equal-protection claim. Although 18 Plaintiff contends that Defendant conspired to “violate [his] 19 protection guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause in the 20 Fourteenth Amendment to U.S. Constitution” (see FAC, ECF No. 4 at 21 12), he has alleged no facts supporting his claim (see id. at 1- 22 16). See Ware v. Bitter, No. 1:16-cv-01302-DAD-SAB (PC), 2017 WL 23 1093887, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2017) (plaintiff failed to 24 state cognizable equal-protection clause claim because although 25 he claimed equal protection violation occurred, he failed “to set 26 forth any facts to support an equal protection claim”); see also 27 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78. As an initial matter, he has not 28 alleged that he is a member of any protected class. See Barren 10 1 v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (to state 2 equal-protection claim, plaintiff must allege that defendant 3 acted with intent or purpose to discriminate against plaintiff 4 based on plaintiff’s membership in protected class). 5 IV. The FAC’s State-Law Claims 6 A federal court may decline to exercise supplemental 7 jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims if it has dismissed 8 all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. See 28 9 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 10 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Voigt v. Savell, 70 F.3d 1552, 1565 (9th 11 Cir. 1995). Because the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s federal 12 claims, it declines to address his state-law claims until he has 13 adequately pleaded a federal cause of action. 14 ********************* 15 The Court is skeptical that Plaintiff can state a § 1983 16 claim against Defendant. But it will give him one more chance to 17 try to do so. If he desires to pursue any of his claims, he is 18 ORDERED to file a second amended complaint within 28 days of the 19 date of this order, remedying the deficiencies discussed above. 20 The SAC should bear the docket number assigned to this case, be 21 labeled “Second Amended Complaint,” and be complete in and of 22 itself, without reference to the Complaint, the FAC, or any 23 documents not attached to the SAC. Plaintiff is warned that if 24 he fails to timely file a sufficient SAC, the Court may dismiss 25 26 27 28 11 1} this action on the grounds set forth above or for failure to 2 || diligently prosecute, or for both reasons.* p Raenhlrtl~ 4 DATED: April 24, 2025 JEAN P. ROSENBLUTH 5 U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 * Tf Plaintiff believes this order erroneously disposes of any his claims, he may file objections with the district judge within 21 days of the date of the order. See Bastidas v. Chappell, F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2015) (“When a magistrate judge believes she is issuing a nondispositive order, she may warn the 27} litigants that, if they disagree and think the matter dispositive, they have the right to file an objection to that determination with 2 8 5 + nw the district judge.”). 12