Wayne, Jr. v. District of Columbia Government

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedJanuary 2, 2026
DocketCivil Action No. 2025-3537
StatusPublished

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Bluebook
Wayne, Jr. v. District of Columbia Government, (D.D.C. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JESUS A. WAYNE, JR., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03537 (UNA) ) ) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) GOVERNMENT, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and

Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. The Court grants

Plaintiff’s IFP Application, and for the reasons explained below, it dismisses this matter for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction.

The subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth

generally at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under those statutes, federal jurisdiction is available

only when a “federal question” is presented, id. § 1331, or the parties are of diverse citizenship

and the amount in controversy “exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and

costs,” id. § 1332(a). A party seeking relief in the district court must at least plead facts that bring

the suit within the court’s jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Failure to plead such facts warrants

dismissal of the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

Plaintiff, who resides in the District of Columbia, sues the D.C. government, and three

unnamed individual defendants. See Compl. at 1–2. He does not provide full addresses for these

Defendants, stating only that one is located in the District of Columbia, another is located in Virginia, and the last individual is located in Maryland. See id. Plaintiff’s failure to provide full

names and addresses for the Defendants contravenes D.C. LCvR 5.1(c)(1).

The allegations themselves are spare; Plaintiff alleges only that, on September 30, 2025,

the Doe Defendants trespassed at his property, and he supplies certain identifying information for

their purported vehicles. See id. at 4–5. The Complaint is silent as to the involvement, if any, of

the D.C. government. Plaintiff does not plead for any relief, stating “no relief, no lawsuit.” See

id. at 4.

Plaintiff has failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction. First, he has failed to state a

federal question. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. He does not invoke any authority that provides a federal

cause of action, nor can the Court independently discern any basis for federal question jurisdiction

from the facts given in the complaint. See Johnson v. Robinson, 576 F.3d 522, 522 (D.C. Cir.

2009) (per curiam) (“[F]ederal court jurisdiction must affirmatively appear clearly and distinctly.”)

(quoting Bilal v. Kaplan, 904 F.2d 14, 15 (8th Cir.1990) (per curiam)).

Second, Plaintiff has failed to establish diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. It is a

“well-established rule” that the diverse citizenship requirement be “assessed at the time the suit is

filed.” Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991). Therefore, “the

citizenship of every party to the action must be distinctly alleged [in the complaint] and cannot be

established presumptively or by mere inference,” Meng v. Schwartz, 305 F. Supp. 2d 49, 55

(D.D.C. 2004), and an “‘allegation of residence alone is insufficient to establish the citizenship

necessary for diversity jurisdiction,’” Novak v. Capital Mgmt. & Dev. Corp., 452 F.3d 902, 906

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 792 n.20 (D.C. Cir.

1983)). Here, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege the residences of the Defendants, let alone

their respective domiciles or citizenships. Assuming that the Doe Defendants are, in fact, domiciled in the respective locations listed

in the Complaint, see Compl. at 2, Plaintiff still fails to establish diversity jurisdiction, because

both he and one of the Defendants are both located in the District of Columbia, thus defeating

complete diversity. See Bush v. Butler, 521 F. Supp. 2d 63, 71 (D.D.C. 2007) (“For jurisdiction

to exist under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, there must be complete diversity between the parties, which is to

say that the plaintiff may not be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.”) (citing Owen Equip.

& Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373–74 (1978)) (“For jurisdiction to exist under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332, there must be complete diversity between the parties, which is to say that the plaintiff may

not be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.”). Moreover, Plaintiff has not demanded any

damages, let alone alleged that the amount in controversy plausibly exceeds $75,000.

Consequently, this case is dismissed without prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). A

separate Order will issue contemporaneously.

Date: January 2, 2026 /s/_________________________ ANA C. REYES United States District Judge

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Related

Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger
437 U.S. 365 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Freeport-McMoRan Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc.
498 U.S. 426 (Supreme Court, 1991)
Novak v. Capital Management & Development Corp.
452 F.3d 902 (D.C. Circuit, 2006)
Johnson v. Robinson
576 F.3d 522 (D.C. Circuit, 2009)
Bush v. Butler
521 F. Supp. 2d 63 (District of Columbia, 2007)
Meng v. Schwartz
305 F. Supp. 2d 49 (District of Columbia, 2004)

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