Wayne, Jr. v. District of Columbia Government
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Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JESUS A. WAYNE, JR., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03537 (UNA) ) ) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) GOVERNMENT, et al., ) ) Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and
Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. The Court grants
Plaintiff’s IFP Application, and for the reasons explained below, it dismisses this matter for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.
The subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth
generally at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under those statutes, federal jurisdiction is available
only when a “federal question” is presented, id. § 1331, or the parties are of diverse citizenship
and the amount in controversy “exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and
costs,” id. § 1332(a). A party seeking relief in the district court must at least plead facts that bring
the suit within the court’s jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Failure to plead such facts warrants
dismissal of the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Plaintiff, who resides in the District of Columbia, sues the D.C. government, and three
unnamed individual defendants. See Compl. at 1–2. He does not provide full addresses for these
Defendants, stating only that one is located in the District of Columbia, another is located in Virginia, and the last individual is located in Maryland. See id. Plaintiff’s failure to provide full
names and addresses for the Defendants contravenes D.C. LCvR 5.1(c)(1).
The allegations themselves are spare; Plaintiff alleges only that, on September 30, 2025,
the Doe Defendants trespassed at his property, and he supplies certain identifying information for
their purported vehicles. See id. at 4–5. The Complaint is silent as to the involvement, if any, of
the D.C. government. Plaintiff does not plead for any relief, stating “no relief, no lawsuit.” See
id. at 4.
Plaintiff has failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction. First, he has failed to state a
federal question. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. He does not invoke any authority that provides a federal
cause of action, nor can the Court independently discern any basis for federal question jurisdiction
from the facts given in the complaint. See Johnson v. Robinson, 576 F.3d 522, 522 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (per curiam) (“[F]ederal court jurisdiction must affirmatively appear clearly and distinctly.”)
(quoting Bilal v. Kaplan, 904 F.2d 14, 15 (8th Cir.1990) (per curiam)).
Second, Plaintiff has failed to establish diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. It is a
“well-established rule” that the diverse citizenship requirement be “assessed at the time the suit is
filed.” Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991). Therefore, “the
citizenship of every party to the action must be distinctly alleged [in the complaint] and cannot be
established presumptively or by mere inference,” Meng v. Schwartz, 305 F. Supp. 2d 49, 55
(D.D.C. 2004), and an “‘allegation of residence alone is insufficient to establish the citizenship
necessary for diversity jurisdiction,’” Novak v. Capital Mgmt. & Dev. Corp., 452 F.3d 902, 906
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 792 n.20 (D.C. Cir.
1983)). Here, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege the residences of the Defendants, let alone
their respective domiciles or citizenships. Assuming that the Doe Defendants are, in fact, domiciled in the respective locations listed
in the Complaint, see Compl. at 2, Plaintiff still fails to establish diversity jurisdiction, because
both he and one of the Defendants are both located in the District of Columbia, thus defeating
complete diversity. See Bush v. Butler, 521 F. Supp. 2d 63, 71 (D.D.C. 2007) (“For jurisdiction
to exist under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, there must be complete diversity between the parties, which is to
say that the plaintiff may not be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.”) (citing Owen Equip.
& Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373–74 (1978)) (“For jurisdiction to exist under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332, there must be complete diversity between the parties, which is to say that the plaintiff may
not be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.”). Moreover, Plaintiff has not demanded any
damages, let alone alleged that the amount in controversy plausibly exceeds $75,000.
Consequently, this case is dismissed without prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). A
separate Order will issue contemporaneously.
Date: January 2, 2026 /s/_________________________ ANA C. REYES United States District Judge
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