COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA UNPUBLISHED
Present: Judges Fulton, Causey and Bernhard Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
WAYNE CHRISTOPHER MINNS, SOMETIMES KNOWN AS CHRISTOPHER WAYNE MINNS MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 2071-23-1 JUDGE DORIS HENDERSON CAUSEY JULY 15, 2025 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF WILLIAMSBURG AND COUNTY OF JAMES CITY Holly B. Smith, Judge
Charles E. Haden for appellant.
Andrew T. Hull, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Wayne Christopher Minns entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled
substance, possession of a firearm and a controlled substance, and driving under the influence. The
plea agreement preserved Minns’s right to appeal the circuit court’s order denying his motion to
suppress. On December 1, 2023, the circuit court entered its final sentencing order, sentencing
Minns to 15 years imprisonment, with 9 years suspended, as well as 12 months in jail and a $500
fine. On appeal, Minns argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence as the result of a traffic stop because the officer did not observe any traffic violations
before the stop. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
BACKGROUND
On March 11, 2022, Williamsburg Police Officer Steve Roberts, Jr., heard a radio call
reporting that officers had attempted to stop a green Acura sedan. No description of the driver was
* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). given. The vehicle was registered to Yolanda Pickett, a woman unknown to Officer Roberts, who
had a suspended license. Roberts saw an Acura parked at a 7-Eleven, ran its license plate number,
and confirmed it was registered to Pickett. Roberts saw an individual get out of the car through the
front passenger door, go into the store, and return. It was dark and rainy at the time, so Roberts
could neither identify the individual nor determine how many people were in the car.
Officer Roberts followed the vehicle after it left the store to attempt to identify the driver.
Roberts activated his lights and siren, but the car drove past two parking lots before finally pulling
into a hotel parking lot. Roberts saw a person, later identified as Minns, move from the driver’s seat
and “rapidly” exit from the front passenger door. Roberts was concerned that Minns might flee,
both because of the unusual way he left the car and the way he positioned himself as he stood. As
Roberts approached Minns, he observed that Minns had bloodshot eyes and noticed an odor of
alcohol.
Minns disregarded several commands to return to the car and gave various names when
asked to identify himself. Roberts observed additional signs of intoxication. Minns failed to pass
any of the administered field sobriety tests. Roberts arrested Minns for driving under the influence.
During Roberts’s search of Minns, Roberts found cocaine, methamphetamine, and a firearm.
At the suppression hearing, Minns argued that any reasonable officer should have known
that he was a man upon observing him exit the Acura and enter the convenience store, making it
unreasonable to believe he was the car’s registered owner, Yolanda Pickett. Thus, Roberts lacked
reasonable suspicion to believe that Pickett was driving the car. Therefore, the asserted lack of
reasonable suspicion invalidated the stop, arrest, and search of Minns. The circuit court rejected
these arguments, holding that Roberts had a reasonable suspicion for the stop, search, and seizure
incident to Minns’s arrest. The court also held that Roberts lacked sufficient information about the
-2- driver at the convenience store to nullify the “common sense inference” that the driver of the car
was the owner.
On appeal, Minns argues that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to suppress
where Officer Roberts did not possess the requisite articulable suspicion under the Fourth
Amendment to justify the traffic stop and seizure of Minns. We disagree.
ANALYSIS
“In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we consider the facts in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.” Aponte v. Commonwealth, 68
Va. App. 146, 156 (2017) (quoting Hairston v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 552, 560 (2017)). “It
is the appellant’s burden to show that when viewing the evidence in such a manner, the trial court
committed reversible error.” Id. (quoting Hairston, 67 Va. App. at 560). In conducting our review,
we are “bound by the trial court’s factual findings unless those findings are plainly wrong or
unsupported by the evidence”; however, we review “the trial court’s application of the law de
novo.” Malbrough v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 163, 168-69 (2008). “While we are bound to review
de novo the ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause, we ‘review findings of
historical fact only for clear error and . . . give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by
resident judges and local law enforcement officers.’” Long v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 700,
712 (2021) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S.
690, 699 (1996)).
Minns relies on the assertion that the arresting officer did not have probable cause to make
his arrest; thus, the subsequent search of his person and seizure of drugs and a gun were per se
unreasonable and violative of the Fourth Amendment. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357
(1967); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). Under the Fourth Amendment, “an officer who stops
and detains a person for investigative questioning ‘must be able to point to specific and articulable -3- facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion.’” United States v. Sprinkle, 106 F.3d 613, 617 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). To determine the validity of an investigatory stop, a court is required to
examine the facts using a totality of the circumstances analysis. Reed v. Commonwealth, 31
Va. App. 262, 266 (2000). The facts and circumstances relied upon by the officer to have a
“particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing” must have been available to
him at the time of the stop, not after the investigatory process has commenced. United States v.
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22.
Minns argues that the circuit court erred because Officer Roberts should have recognized
that Minns was a male before the stop. Therefore, Minns was not and could not have been the
owner of the Acura. According to Minns, Officer Roberts had dispelled—or reasonably should
have dispelled—concerns that the driver and sole occupant of the car was Yolanda Pickett when
Officer Roberts observed Minns at close range exiting and getting back into the car in the parking
lot of the 7-Eleven. Given this, Minns argues that Officer Roberts possessed no probable cause or
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COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA UNPUBLISHED
Present: Judges Fulton, Causey and Bernhard Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
WAYNE CHRISTOPHER MINNS, SOMETIMES KNOWN AS CHRISTOPHER WAYNE MINNS MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 2071-23-1 JUDGE DORIS HENDERSON CAUSEY JULY 15, 2025 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF WILLIAMSBURG AND COUNTY OF JAMES CITY Holly B. Smith, Judge
Charles E. Haden for appellant.
Andrew T. Hull, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Wayne Christopher Minns entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled
substance, possession of a firearm and a controlled substance, and driving under the influence. The
plea agreement preserved Minns’s right to appeal the circuit court’s order denying his motion to
suppress. On December 1, 2023, the circuit court entered its final sentencing order, sentencing
Minns to 15 years imprisonment, with 9 years suspended, as well as 12 months in jail and a $500
fine. On appeal, Minns argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence as the result of a traffic stop because the officer did not observe any traffic violations
before the stop. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
BACKGROUND
On March 11, 2022, Williamsburg Police Officer Steve Roberts, Jr., heard a radio call
reporting that officers had attempted to stop a green Acura sedan. No description of the driver was
* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). given. The vehicle was registered to Yolanda Pickett, a woman unknown to Officer Roberts, who
had a suspended license. Roberts saw an Acura parked at a 7-Eleven, ran its license plate number,
and confirmed it was registered to Pickett. Roberts saw an individual get out of the car through the
front passenger door, go into the store, and return. It was dark and rainy at the time, so Roberts
could neither identify the individual nor determine how many people were in the car.
Officer Roberts followed the vehicle after it left the store to attempt to identify the driver.
Roberts activated his lights and siren, but the car drove past two parking lots before finally pulling
into a hotel parking lot. Roberts saw a person, later identified as Minns, move from the driver’s seat
and “rapidly” exit from the front passenger door. Roberts was concerned that Minns might flee,
both because of the unusual way he left the car and the way he positioned himself as he stood. As
Roberts approached Minns, he observed that Minns had bloodshot eyes and noticed an odor of
alcohol.
Minns disregarded several commands to return to the car and gave various names when
asked to identify himself. Roberts observed additional signs of intoxication. Minns failed to pass
any of the administered field sobriety tests. Roberts arrested Minns for driving under the influence.
During Roberts’s search of Minns, Roberts found cocaine, methamphetamine, and a firearm.
At the suppression hearing, Minns argued that any reasonable officer should have known
that he was a man upon observing him exit the Acura and enter the convenience store, making it
unreasonable to believe he was the car’s registered owner, Yolanda Pickett. Thus, Roberts lacked
reasonable suspicion to believe that Pickett was driving the car. Therefore, the asserted lack of
reasonable suspicion invalidated the stop, arrest, and search of Minns. The circuit court rejected
these arguments, holding that Roberts had a reasonable suspicion for the stop, search, and seizure
incident to Minns’s arrest. The court also held that Roberts lacked sufficient information about the
-2- driver at the convenience store to nullify the “common sense inference” that the driver of the car
was the owner.
On appeal, Minns argues that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to suppress
where Officer Roberts did not possess the requisite articulable suspicion under the Fourth
Amendment to justify the traffic stop and seizure of Minns. We disagree.
ANALYSIS
“In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we consider the facts in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.” Aponte v. Commonwealth, 68
Va. App. 146, 156 (2017) (quoting Hairston v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 552, 560 (2017)). “It
is the appellant’s burden to show that when viewing the evidence in such a manner, the trial court
committed reversible error.” Id. (quoting Hairston, 67 Va. App. at 560). In conducting our review,
we are “bound by the trial court’s factual findings unless those findings are plainly wrong or
unsupported by the evidence”; however, we review “the trial court’s application of the law de
novo.” Malbrough v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 163, 168-69 (2008). “While we are bound to review
de novo the ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause, we ‘review findings of
historical fact only for clear error and . . . give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by
resident judges and local law enforcement officers.’” Long v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 700,
712 (2021) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S.
690, 699 (1996)).
Minns relies on the assertion that the arresting officer did not have probable cause to make
his arrest; thus, the subsequent search of his person and seizure of drugs and a gun were per se
unreasonable and violative of the Fourth Amendment. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357
(1967); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). Under the Fourth Amendment, “an officer who stops
and detains a person for investigative questioning ‘must be able to point to specific and articulable -3- facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion.’” United States v. Sprinkle, 106 F.3d 613, 617 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). To determine the validity of an investigatory stop, a court is required to
examine the facts using a totality of the circumstances analysis. Reed v. Commonwealth, 31
Va. App. 262, 266 (2000). The facts and circumstances relied upon by the officer to have a
“particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing” must have been available to
him at the time of the stop, not after the investigatory process has commenced. United States v.
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22.
Minns argues that the circuit court erred because Officer Roberts should have recognized
that Minns was a male before the stop. Therefore, Minns was not and could not have been the
owner of the Acura. According to Minns, Officer Roberts had dispelled—or reasonably should
have dispelled—concerns that the driver and sole occupant of the car was Yolanda Pickett when
Officer Roberts observed Minns at close range exiting and getting back into the car in the parking
lot of the 7-Eleven. Given this, Minns argues that Officer Roberts possessed no probable cause or
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity when he demanded that Minns get back in the
car and produce identification. Lastly, Minns argues that the circuit court should have granted the
motion to suppress evidence derived from an illegal warrantless search conducted in the absence of
probable cause or a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
Overall, Minns argues that the arresting officer conducted an unconstitutional stop, search,
and seizure because he never saw a crime being committed by Minns, never had reasonable
suspicion that Minns was involved in any crime, and thus had no probable cause to make the arrest
and subsequent search and seizure.
In Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 234, 249 (2021), this Court found that a
defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied because the arresting officer had reasonable, -4- articulable suspicion to initiate a stop of defendant’s vehicle where the officer found that: (1) the
vehicle’s owner was subject to a warrant and (2) the driver matched the descriptors of the vehicle’s
owner. Therefore, it is permissible for an officer to execute a stop and seizure if the officer can
demonstrate “at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an
automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure
for violation of the law[.]” Id. at 246 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). “[A]n officer’s
belief that the registered owner [of a suspect vehicle] is the driver of the car is a ‘commonsense
inference . . . , which provide[s] more than reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop[]’ under the
Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 249 (second, third, fourth, and fifth alterations in original) (quoting
Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1188 (2020)).
Even though a suspected suspended license alone can rise to the level of reasonable
suspicion for a lawful seizure, a totality of the circumstances analysis is still required. Id. (quoting
Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1191). “Accordingly, if facts known to an officer negate the commonsense
inference that the registered owner is in the car, the fact that the registered owner is subject to
seizure does not provide an officer with sufficient reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop the
vehicle.” Id. at 249-50. Minns argues that Officer Roberts had no reason to stop him because the
officer should have known he was not the true owner of the car (Yolanda Pickett). However, the
circuit court concluded that the knowledge Officer Roberts had available to him at the time was
sufficient to initiate the stop and execute the search. The circuit court concluded that all the factors
in combination gave Officer Roberts the reasonable suspicion to execute the stop and subsequent
seizure: (1) a green Acura had successfully evaded the police in the area and a call to be on the
lookout for a vehicle matching this description; (2) he had seen a vehicle matching the description
and ran the tags to confirm it was the same vehicle; (3) he had been unable to ascertain who or how
many occupants were in the vehicle and, thus, followed the vehicle; (4) the same vehicle had evaded -5- police; (5) the identity of the driver was not known until after the stop; (6) the vehicle passed several
parking lots until it arrived at a hotel, at which time the occupant in the driver’s seat (Minns) quickly
exited the vehicle through the passenger side door and ignored initial commands from the officer to
stop; and, (7) Roberts smelled alcohol on Minns’s breath.
The circuit court heard this evidence and determined Officer Roberts’s testimony was
credible. Here, “when conducting appellate review on [a] question of fact, . . . the trial court’s
[finding] must be affirmed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Sheppard v.
Commonwealth, 250 Va. 379, 387 (1995). Due to the weather conditions and time of night when
Officer Roberts observed Minns enter and exit the 7-Eleven, he could not identify Minns’s gender,
appearance, or the number of individuals in the vehicle. Following the valid stop, the officer
observed that Minns had signs of intoxication (bloodshot eyes, scent of alcohol, slurred speech).
Minns submitted to field sobriety tests, which he failed. The officer made an arrest based on
probable cause that Minns was driving under the influence. Jones v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 52,
59-60 (2010).1 Thus, we cannot say the circuit court erred in admitting the drugs and gun
discovered during the search incident to arrest. See Burgess v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App.
1018, 1023 (1992). The circuit court, therefore, did not err in denying Minns’s motion to suppress.
As we have reached the threshold question of whether the initial stop and subsequent search,
arrest, and seizure were all valid, we need not address further arguments of when an officer’s
investigatory duties cease by deciding the case on the best and narrowest grounds is a doctrine of
judicial restraint an appellate court must follow. Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va. 411, 419 (2017).
1 Probable cause exists “when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.” Buhrman v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 501, 505 (2008) (quoting Taylor v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 816, 820 (1981)); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 26, 40 (2007); Parker v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 96, 106 (1998). -6- CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
Affirmed.
-7-