JUSTICE GARMAN
delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff, the Wauconda Fire Protection District (District), sought declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants, Lake County, Illinois (County), and Stonewall Orchards, LLP (Stonewall), after the County approved new construction by Stonewall despite Stonewall’s noncompliance with a District ordinance. Defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the circuit court of Lake County granted. The District appealed, and the appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the cause to the circuit court. 343 Ill. App. 3d 374. We granted leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. The issues now before us are whether this court has jurisdiction to hear the matter before it and, if so, whether the District’s ordinance is enforceable against Stonewall. We hold that jurisdiction is proper, and that the District’s ordinance is enforceable. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which remanded the cause for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
Stonewall, a private entity, operates a golf course located within the common boundaries of unincorporated Lake County and the District. In November 1999, Stonewall submitted plans to the County and the District for construction of a clubhouse on the golf course. The initial plans provided for a sprinkler system. A revised version of the plans did not. The County approved the revised plans and issued a building permit to Stonewall in October 2001.
During construction of the clubhouse, the District informed Stonewall that a District fire protection ordinance required the clubhouse to have a sprinkler system. The ordinance provides:
“An automatic fire sprinkler system, approved by the Wauconda Fire Protection District, shall be installed in all new construction of buildings of the following use groups as defined by the BOCA Building Code, 1993 Edition; Assembly, Business, Education, Factory and Industrial, High Hazard, Institutional, Mercantile, Residential Rl, R2, R3, and Storage.” Wauconda Fire Protection District Fire Sprinkler Ordinance, No. 98 — 0—5 (eff. November 27, 1998).
Unlike the District’s sprinkler ordinance, the County’s building code does not require the installation of a sprinkler system in the clubhouse. According to the County’s code, structures such as the clubhouse, which fall into the “Assembly” use group, are only required to contain an “automatic fire suppression system” where the “fire area exceeds 10,000 square feet.” BOCA National Building Code 1999, § 904.2, as amended by Lake County Ordinance Adopting the BOCA National Building Code 1999 (eff. August 8, 2000).1
In June 2002, around the time the clubhouse was nearing completion, the District filed a complaint in the Lake County circuit court seeking to enjoin the County from issuing Stonewall a temporary occupancy permit for the clubhouse, and to enjoin Stonewall from occupying the clubhouse, until Stonewall installed a sprinkler system. The District cited section 11 of the Fire Protection District Act (Act) (70 ILCS 705/11 (West 2002)) as the basis for its authority to adopt and enforce its fire protection ordinance.
The County and Stonewall filed motions to dismiss. They argued the District had no authority under section 11 to adopt or enforce its sprinkler ordinance. Section 11 states:
“The board of trustees of any fire protection district incorporated under this Act has the power and it is its legal duty and obligation to provide as nearly adequate protection from fire for all persons and property within the said district as possible and to prescribe necessary regulations for the prevention and control of fire therein. The board of trustees may provide and maintain life saving and rescue equipment services and facilities, including an emergency ambulance service. Except in cities having a population of 500,000 or more inhabitants and except in municipalities in which fire prevention codes have been adopted, the board of trustees has the express power to adopt and enforce fire prevention codes and standards parallel to national standards.” (Emphasis added.) 70 ILCS 705/11 (West 2002).
Specifically, the County and Stonewall argued the County is a municipality for purposes of section 11, and because the County has adopted a fire prevention code, the County’s code, not the District’s ordinance, applies to Stonewall. Alternatively, the County argued it could not be compelled to enforce the District’s ordinance by withholding permission to occupy the clubhouse from Stonewall, because section 11 does not provide fire protection districts with the authority to require other governmental entities to enforce district regulations.
While the proceedings were pending against the County and Stonewall, the County issued Stonewall a temporary occupancy permit. Thereafter, the District filed an amended complaint. The District sought to enjoin the County from issuing a final certificate of occupancy to Stonewall. In addition, it sought a declaratory judgment that the District has the authority to enact regulations within unincorporated Lake County, and that the District’s sprinkler ordinance is enforceable against Stonewall.
The circuit court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss, and the District filed notice of appeal. On appeal, the appellate court, with one justice dissenting, affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the cause for further proceedings. 343 Ill. App. 3d 374, 380. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the circuit court as to the injunctive relief sought against Stonewall and the declaratory relief sought against both defendants. It held that the District’s sprinkler ordinance is enforceable against Stonewall, because the County is not a municipality for purposes of section 11. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 379. The court reasoned that other sections of the Fire Protection District Act use the word “municipality” to refer to cities, villages, and incorporated towns, not counties, and that the definition of “municipalities” adopted by the Statute on Statutes (Statute) (5 ILCS 70/1.27 (West 2002)) is consistent with that understanding of the term. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 378-79. As to the injunctive relief sought against the County, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding that the District must enforce its ordinance against Stonewall without seeking enforcement by the County. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 380. The appellate court noted that while section 11 gives fire protection districts the authority to enact and enforce fire prevention regulations, the statute does not indicate that the legislature intended a fire protection district to have the power to require a county to withhold an occupancy permit. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 380.
The County filed an “affidavit of intent” to file a petition for leave to appeal to this court with the appellate court on October 22, 2003, 20 days after entry of the appellate court’s judgment. On November 6, 2003, within 35 days after entry of the judgment, the County filed its petition for leave to appeal with this court’s clerk. The same day, the clerk informed the County its petition could not be accepted by the court because the October 22, 2003, “affidavit of intent” had not been sworn and subscribed by a notary public. The County immediately filed a motion seeking leave to file its petition for leave to appeal instanter. On November 19, 2003, an order was entered granting the County’s motion, the effect of which was to extend the County’s deadline for filing its petition for leave to appeal to November 6, 2003, despite the invalidity of its affidavit of intent. We later granted the County’s petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.
ANALYSIS
The County challenges the appellate court’s interpretation of section 11. Before addressing the statutory interpretation issue on the merits, we must consider the District’s argument that this court does not have jurisdiction to hear this matter because the County failed to file a timely petition for leave to appeal.
I. Supreme Court Rule 315
At the time the County filed its “affidavit of intent” to file a petition for leave to appeal to this court,2 Supreme Court Rule 315(b) stated, in part:
“[A] party seeking leave to appeal must file the petition for leave in the Supreme Court within 21 days after entry of the judgment of the Appellate Court, or within the same 21 days file with the Appellate Court an affidavit of intent to file a petition for leave, and file the petition within 35 days after the entry of such judgment. *** The Supreme Court, or a judge thereof, on motion, may extend the time for petitioning for leave to appeal, but such motions are not favored and will be allowed only in the most extreme and compelling circumstances.” 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(b).
In the past, we have referred to this familiar rule in jurisdictional terms. See, e.g., A.J. Maggio Co. v. Willis, 197 Ill. 2d 397, 403-04 (2001); Roth v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 202 Ill. 2d 490 (2002). In A.J. Maggio, we held we did not have jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs appeal because the plaintiff failed to file a petition for leave to appeal within 21 days of the entry of the appellate court’s judgment on rehearing. A.J. Maggio, 197 Ill. 2d at 403-04. Likewise, in Roth, citing A.J. Maggio, we dismissed the cause before us on the ground that leave to appeal was improvidently granted. Roth, 202 Ill. 2d at 497. There, because the defendant’s affidavit of intent had no legal effect, it was insufficient to extend the defendant’s time for filing a petition for leave to appeal, and without the extension, the defendant’s petition was untimely. Roth, 202 Ill. 2d at 497.
The District now contends that because the County’s “affidavit of intent” was defective, and therefore had no legal effect, the County’s deadline for filing its petition for leave to appeal expired 21 days after the appellate court entered its October 22, 2003, judgment. Accordingly, the District argues this court had no authority to grant the County an extension for filing its petition for leave to appeal outside the applicable 21-day filing period.
The concept of jurisdiction encompasses a broad array of specific doctrines that define and limit the power of courts. See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 867 (8th ed. 2004) (defining various types of jurisdiction). In a general sense, jurisdiction refers to “[a] court’s power to decide a case or issue a decree.” Black’s Law Dictionary 867 (8th ed. 2004). For this court, as well as the appellate court and the circuit courts, the basis of that power is the Illinois Constitution.
According to the Illinois Constitution, circuit courts have original jurisdiction in “all justiciable matters,” except when the supreme court has original and exclusive jurisdiction. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9. The appellate court may exercise original jurisdiction when necessary to complete the determination of any case on review. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6. Appeals to the appellate court from final judgments of the circuit courts are a matter of right, except when a case is directly appealable to the supreme court or the judgment in question is a judgment of acquittal after a trial on the merits in a criminal case. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6. As to the jurisdiction of the supreme court, the Constitution provides that the supreme court may exercise original jurisdiction in cases relating to revenue, mandamus, prohibition, or habeas corpus (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 4(a)), and that it has original and exclusive jurisdiction over actions concerning the redistricting of the General Assembly (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV § 3(b)) and the ability of the Governor to serve or resume office (Ill. Const. 1970, art. V § 6(d)). Appeals to the supreme court from circuit court judgments imposing the death penalty are a matter of right. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 4(b). In addition, appeals to the supreme court from the appellate court are a matter of right if a federal or state constitutional question arises for the first time in and as a result of the action of the appellate court, or if the appellate court certifies that a case decided by it involves a question of such importance that the supreme court should decide the case. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 4(b).
The Constitution also vests the supreme court with supervisory authority over all courts. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 16. As part of this supervisory authority, the supreme court may promulgate rules governing the proceedings of the courts of this state. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 16. The Constitution specifically enables the supreme court to create rules governing appeals from the appellate court (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §§ 4(c), 6)) and direct appeals from the circuit courts in cases other than those involving the death penalty (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 4(b)).
Collectively, these constitutional provisions define the subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit courts, the appellate court, and this court, and allow this court to establish procedural rules governing the exercise of that jurisdiction. The circuit courts and the appellate court have no discretion to excuse compliance with the rules this court establishes pursuant to its supervisory authority. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Fiat-Allis, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 143, 150 (1994) (“neither the trial court nor the appellate court has the ‘authority to excuse compliance with the filing requirements of the supreme court rules governing appeals’ ”), quoting In re Smith, 80 Ill. App. 3d 380, 382 (1980). In Mitchell, this court held the appellate court had no jurisdiction over an appeal where the initial 30-day period for filing notice of appeal under Rule 303(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)) had elapsed, and where the appellant failed to file a motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 303(e) (155 Ill. 2d R. 303(e)). Mitchell, 158 Ill. 2d at 148-49. This court also approved the appellate court’s reasoning that the circuit court lacked the authority to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal, because after 30 days had elapsed from the time the circuit court entered its final order, the circuit court lost jurisdiction over the matters resolved in that order. Mitchell, 158 Ill. 2d at 149-50. Similarly, in Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Barth, 103 Ill. 2d 536 (1984), this court held the appellate court had no jurisdiction over an appeal where the appellant’s notice of appeal was not timely filed because the appellant filed a motion to reconsider prior to the date on which judgment was formally entered by the circuit court, and the motion did not extend the time within which the appellant could file his notice of appeal. Archer Daniels, 103 Ill. 2d at 538-39. In short, as applied to the circuit courts and the appellate court, our rules are jurisdictional and must be strictly observed.
On the other hand, this court’s supervisory authority includes the discretion for this court to excuse compliance with the rules it establishes in accordance with that authority. While our rules govern the exercise of our jurisdiction, they do not place limitations upon it. Only the Illinois Constitution limits this court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Our rules thus do not require this court to automatically dismiss a matter when a litigant fails to strictly comply with their provisions.
We acknowledge that in A.J. Maggio we noted “[o]ur rules demand strict compliance in the timely filing of appeals or affidavits of intent as a matter of jurisdiction.” A.J. Maggio, 197 Ill. 2d at 403. We also acknowledge reaffirming this proposition in Roth. Roth, 202 Ill. 2d at 496-97. Indeed, we do expect litigants to comply with our rules. As we expressed in Roth, “our rules would have little force if the legal community perceived that we, as a court, do not enforce the rules or tailor them to fit the exigencies of the moment. *** [W]e must emphasize that the supreme court rules are rules of procedure and that it is incumbent upon litigants to follow them.” Roth, 202 Ill. 2d at 494-95. We do not, in any way, retreat from this position. We clarify, however, that our rules regarding the filing of appeals and affidavits require compliance “as a matter of jurisdiction” merely in the sense that we will, within our discretion, enforce the consequences of noncompliance to preserve the orderly exercise of our constitutionally defined jurisdiction. They are not a jurisdictional bar in the sense that a litigant’s noncompliance automatically deprives us of the power to adjudicate a matter brought before us. Therefore, we reject the District’s argument that we had no authority to allow the County to file its petition for leave to appeal after the 21-day filing period had elapsed. The extension was appropriate, and this case is now properly before this court.
We further note that this case is factually distinguishable from A.J. Maggio and Roth. Neither of those cases presented circumstances in which a litigant requested leave to file its petition for leave to appeal instanter after expiration of the filing deadline. In A.J. Maggio, the petitioner filed a second petition for rehearing with the appellate court without regard for the possibility the second petition would not stay the time period for filing a petition for leave to appeal. A.J. Maggio, 197 Ill. 2d at 399-400. Likewise, in Roth, the petitioner took no measures to inform this court its affidavit of intent was defective. Roth, 202 Ill. 2d at 492.
Moreover, this case is not one in which the County simply ignored the rules of this court. The County did not, for instance, allow the 3 5-day filing deadline to expire without filing its petition for leave to appeal and then file a motion to extend the time for petitioning for leave to appeal after the deadline. Here, to the contrary, the County filed its petition for leave to appeal within the 35-day period allowed after the filing of a valid affidavit of intent. Then, immediately upon discovering the defect in its “affidavit,” the County notified this court of its situation and requested relief.
II. The Meaning of “Municipalities” in Section 11
We now turn to the issue of whether the term “municipalities” in section 11 of the Fire Protection District Act includes counties. We review this statutory interpretation issue de novo. See Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (1996). The primary objective of statutory interpretation is to determine and effectuate the intent of the legislature. Yang v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 2d 96, 103 (2001). This inquiry properly begins by examining the language of the statute at issue. Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 392 (1996). In the absence of a statutory definition, a term within a statute must be given its ordinary and popularly understood meaning. In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 496 (2002).
The County argues that counties are “municipalities” for purposes of section 11 and that, as a result, the County’s fire prevention regulations, not those of the District, apply to Stonewall. The term “municipalities” is not defined in the Fire Protection District Act. Accordingly, the County argues this court should interpret section 11 in light of section 5 — 1063 of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/5 — 1063 (West 2002)) and the definition of “municipality” in the Municipal Adoption of Codes and Records Act (Codes and Records Act) (50 ILCS 220/l(a) (West 2002)). Section 5 — 1063 of the Counties Code grants counties the authority to adopt regulations governing building construction, including fire prevention regulations. The Codes and Records Act authorizes a municipality to adopt a national fire prevention code by reference and defines “[mjunicipality” as “any fire protection district or other political subdivision of the State of Illinois having power to legislate on the subject matters mentioned in this Act.” 50 ILCS 220/l(a) (West 2002). We find the Counties Code and the Codes and Records Act to be inapposite because of the direct applicability of the definition of “municipalities” in the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/1.27 (West 2002)) to this case.
The Statute on Statutes must be observed in interpreting a statute unless doing so “would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the General Assembly or repugnant to the context of the statute.” 5 ILCS 70/1 (West 2002). The Statute adopts the definition of “municipalities” set forth in the Illinois Constitution (5 ILCS 70/1.27 (West 2002)), which provides:
“ ‘Municipalities’ means cities, villages and incorporated towns. ‘Units of local government’ means counties, municipalities, townships, special districts, and units, designated as units of local government by law, which exercise limited governmental powers or powers in respect to limited governmental subjects, but does not include school districts.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 1.
This definition of “municipalities” excludes counties. Counties fall into the more general category of “units of local government,” which, notably, includes municipalities but treats them as distinct from counties.
In this case, applying the Statute on Statutes’ definition of “municipalities” to interpret the meaning of “municipalities” in section 11 is consistent with the manifest intent of the legislature. The purpose of the Fire Protection District Act is to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public by ensuring the provision of adequate fire prevention and control services. See 70 ILCS 705/1 (West 2002). Interpreting the exception in section 11 that exempts certain cities and municipalities from the coverage of the Act not to include counties comports with the legislature’s intent to ensure the provision of fire prevention and control services. Under this interpretation, in some unincorporated areas, both fire protection district and county fire protection regulations will apply, not simply one of the two. This potential double coverage is consistent with ensuring adequate fire protection.
Applying the Statute on Statutes’ definition of “municipalities” to interpret the meaning of “municipalities” in section 11 is also consistent with the context of the Fire Protection District Act. Various sections of the Act refer to municipalities and counties as distinct entities. See, e.g., 70 ILCS 705/1.02 (West 2002) (addressing apportionment between municipalities and counties of the costs of elections to organize fire protection districts); 70 ILCS 705/lle (West 2002) (distinguishing between county and municipal address number systems for fire protection districts); 70 ILCS 705/14.14 (West 2002) (distinguishing between counties and municipalities in addressing disconnection from one fire protection district and transfer to another). In addition, various sections of the Act use the word “municipality” to refer specifically to cities, villages, and incorporated towns. See, e.g., 70 ILCS 705/9 (West 2002) (addressing the subject of “[acquiring apparatus from a municipality” in terms of acquiring it from “any city or village or incorporated town”); 70 ILCS 705/lla (West 2002) (indicating a fire protection district may contract with any city, village, or incorporated town adjacent to it “for fire protection service to be furnished by *** such municipality”); 70 ILCS 705/18 (West 2002) (referring to a city, village, or incorporated town as a “municipality” in the context of disconnecting territory from a fire protection district); 70 ILCS 705/19 (West 2002) (referring to a city, village, or incorporated town as an “annexing municipality” in the context of disconnecting territory from a fire protection district); 70 ILCS 705/21 (West 2002) (referring to a city, village, or incorporated town as “such municipality” in the context of disconnecting territory from a fire protection district). Taken together, these sections of the Fire Protection District Act provide strong evidence the legislature did not intend to categorize counties as “municipalities” for purposes of the Act, but rather intended “municipalities” to include cities, villages, and incorporated towns. Therefore, the Statute’s definition of “municipalities” as cities, villages, and incorporated towns is consistent with the context of the Act itself.
In sum, we agree with the District and the appellate court that section ll’s reference to “municipalities” does not include counties. For purposes of section 11, “municipalities” refers to cities, villages, and incorporated towns, not counties. Under this interpretation, the County is not a municipality, and the District’s sprinkler ordinance is enforceable against Stonewall.
III. Equal Protection
The County further argues that interpreting “municipalities” to exclude counties creates a classification that violates the equal protection guarantee of the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const., amend. XIV Specifically, the County asserts that this interpretation creates two classes of property owners treated unequally on the basis of where they reside. Individuals and businesses whose property is located in cities, villages, and incorporated towns are not obligated to comply with a fire protection district’s regulations as long as their municipality has adopted its own fire prevention code. On the contrary, individuals and businesses whose property is located in the unincorporated areas of a county are obligated to comply with a fire protection district’s regulations, even if, as in this case, the county in which they reside has adopted a comprehensive fire prevention code. The County reasons that, under this interpretation of the statute, residents of unincorporated areas that must comply with fire protection district regulations are forced to bear a greater economic burden than residents of cities, villages, and incorporated towns.
In conducting an equal protection analysis, we apply the same standards under both the United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution. Nevitt v. Langfelder, 157 Ill. 2d 116, 124 (1993). The guarantee of equal protection requires the government to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar fashion. Jacobson v. Department of Public Aid, 171 Ill. 2d 314, 322 (1996). It does not prevent the government from drawing distinctions between different categories of people in enacting legislation, but it does prohibit the government from doing so on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the legislation’s purpose. Jacobson, 171 Ill. 2d at 322. Where legislation does not affect a fundamental right or involve a suspect or quasi-suspect classification, the appropriate level of scrutiny is the rational basis test. Nevitt, 157 Ill. 2d at 125. Under the rational basis test, a court’s review of a classification is limited and deferential. Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, 174 Ill. 2d 1, 37 (1996). The court simply inquires whether the means the statute employs to achieve its purpose are rationally related to that purpose. Jacobson, 171 Ill. 2d at 323. If any set of facts can reasonably be conceived to justify the classification, it will not be construed as violating the equal protection guarantee. Miller, 196 Ill. 2d at 59.
Section 11 of the Fire Protection District Act does not affect a fundamental right or involve a suspect or quasi-suspect classification. Therefore, section 11 is subject to the rational basis test. The purpose of the Fire Protection District Act, as mentioned, is to protect the public by ensuring the provision of adequate fire prevention and control services. See 70 ILCS 705/1 (West 2002). If the term “municipalities” is interpreted to mean cities, villages, and incorporated towns, then section 11 creates a residency classification, in that residents of cities, villages, and incorporated towns with fire protection codes are not obligated to bear the cost of complying with a fire protection district’s regulations, but residents of the unincorporated areas of a county are obligated to do so. Our inquiry is thus whether this residency classification is rationally related to the purpose of protecting the health, welfare, and safety of the public by providing adequate fire prevention and control services. We find it is.
In distinguishing between counties and municipalities in section 11, the legislature could reasonably have concluded that, as a general matter, counties are less likely than municipalities to have comprehensive fire prevention regulations in place, and that, as a result, the residents of unincorporated areas run a greater risk of being inadequately protected from fire-related hazards than the residents of municipalities. To minimize the risk of inadequate protection, it was reasonable for the legislature to devise a fire protection plan that, in some instances, requires residents of unincorporated areas to comply with both fire protection district and county fire prevention regulations. Accordingly, the legislature’s decision to exempt only cities, villages, and incorporated towns with fire prevention codes from the authority of fire protection districts — and thereby require unincorporated area residents, but not municipal residents, to comply with fire protection district regulations — was reasonably related to the legitimate purpose of protecting the health, welfare, and safety of the public by providing adequate fire prevention and control services. Therefore, interpreting “municipalities” to exclude counties does not raise any doubt as to the constitutionality of section 11.
IV Injunctive Relief
We have determined conclusively that, for purposes of section 11, “municipalities” does not include counties. As a result, the District had the authority to enact its sprinkler ordinance within unincorporated Lake County, and the ordinance is enforceable against Stonewall. There remains to be decided the remedial issue of whether the circuit court correctly denied the District’s request to enjoin the County from granting a certificate of occupancy to Stonewall. Neither party explicitly addressed this issue in the briefs submitted to this court, and we see no reason to disturb the conclusion of the circuit court and the appellate court that issuing an injunction against the County would be inappropriate in this case. If the County has determined the clubhouse meets the requirements for obtaining a certificate of occupancy, then it has the authority to issue the certificate. See 55 ILCS 5/5 — 1063 (West 2002) (county board may require occupants of commercial buildings outside limits of cities, villages, and incorporated towns to obtain occupancy permits from county). The District can enforce its sprinkler ordinance on its own accord without interfering with the County’s enforcement of its fire prevention regulations.
The issue of injunctive relief might be different if this case presented a situation in which a fire protection district regulation conflicted with a county regulation. We note, however, that it does not. Both regulations at issue here can be applied without conflict. The District’s ordinance requires the installation of a sprinkler system in the clubhouse, because the clubhouse falls within the set of use groups listed in the ordinance. See Wauconda Fire Protection District Fire Sprinkler Ordinance No. 98 — 0—5 (eff. November 27, 1998). The County’s building code, on the other hand, does not require a sprinkler system, because the clubhouse does not exceed 10,000 square feet in area. See BOCA National Building Code 1999, § 904.2, as amended by Lake County Ordinance Adopting the BOCA National Building Code 1999 (eff. August 8, 2000). The regulations establish different fire protection standards for buildings falling within the same “Assembly” use group. In this instance, however, the District’s regulation is simply more stringent than that of the County. We need not resolve the question of what happens if a fire protection district regulation and a county regulation conflict.
CONCLUSION
We hold that the District’s ordinance is enforceable against Stonewall. The reference to “municipalities” in section 11 does not include counties, and this interpretation of the statute does not raise any doubt as to its constitutionality. The circuit court, however, was correct to deny the District’s request to enjoin the County from issuing a certificate of occupancy to Stonewall. Accordingly, we affirm the appellate court’s judgment, which remanded this matter to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Appellate court judgment affirmed.