Watson v. T. Smith & Son, Inc.

88 So. 2d 69, 1956 La. App. LEXIS 507
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMay 28, 1956
DocketNo. 20777
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 88 So. 2d 69 (Watson v. T. Smith & Son, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Watson v. T. Smith & Son, Inc., 88 So. 2d 69, 1956 La. App. LEXIS 507 (La. Ct. App. 1956).

Opinion

McBRIDE, Judge.

Plaintiff sustained an injury as the result of an accident while working for defendant as longshoreman on May 19, 1955, and he brings this suit for workmen’s compensation alleging that the accident rendered him totally and permanently disabled. That there had been some disability is not contested and the suit is defended on the ground that plaintiff is not now disabled to any extent and is fully competent to return to the duties of his employment, and, alternatively, if the court should find that plaintiff actually suffers a disability at present, it is limited to and results from a recurrent ganglion of the dorsum of the left wrist which condition can be completely eliminated by means of minor surgery which defendant has recommended, tendered, and offered to plaintiff but which he has arbitrarily and unreasonably refused.

The trial judge concluded, after hearing the evidence, that plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled from doing work of any reasonable character and he gave plaintiff a judgment for compensation at the rate of $30 per week for the period of his disability, however, not beyond 387 weeks. Thirteen weeks’ compensation had already been paid by the employer. Defendant has taken this appeal.

Plaintiff’s injury occurred when a large skid slipped and forced his left hand and wrist backwards or as one of the physicians put it “jammed his wrist in dorsiflexion.” On the fourth day after the accident he was sent to Owens Clinic in New Orleans and his condition was diagnosed as a ganglion in the left wrist. We understand a ganglion to be a cystic mass situated near a joint, the mass being elevated because its sac contains joint fluid. The medical testimony is to the effect that some ganglions are of a painful nature.

On May 30, 1955, plaintiff’s ganglion was removed by surgery performed by Dr. Mark Gorney under a general anesthetic, and Dr. Gorney continued post-operative treatment until June 14, 1955. He concluded then that nothing more could be done for plaintiff so he discharged him for return to work the following day. Plaintiff never attempted to resume his employment and his testimony is that the operation failed to improve his condition. Shortly afterward he reported back to Owens Clinic, making the same complaints as before, and was referred to Dr. Daniel C. Riordan for an orthopedic examination.

Plaintiff has received no medical care whatever since the termination of Dr. Gor-ney’s treatment in June of 1955. Dr. Rior-dan, to whom he had been sent by Owens Clinic, saw plaintiff twice but only for the purpose of examination. Drs. O. L. Pollin-gue and Harry D. Morris, both orthopedists, also examined but did not treat plaintiff.

Dr. Pollingue appeared as a witness on behalf of plaintiff while Drs. Gorney, Rior-dan and Morris testified as defense witnesses. Not only do there appear in the record the usual disagreements as between plaintiff’s expert and those appearing for the defense, but it appears that the defense experts sharply disagree amongst themselves as to what the present condition of plaintiff really is. Drs. Pollingue and Riordan are of the firm opinion that plaintiff has a recurring ganglion on his left wrist which should be removed by surgical means under a general anesthetic. Drs. Gorney and Morris are as equally positive there is no ganglion.

Dr. Pollingue thought there was a limitation in the motion of the wrist due to the strain-type of injury plaintiff has sustained as well as the ganglion. He admitted that sometimes it is possible for a person with a [71]*71ganglion to go to work and it could be that if plaintiff tried he might return to his long-shore duties, but he made it clear that plaintiff would experience pain as the result of the activities. However, his conclusion was that the ganglion called for surgical treatment. Dr. Riordan attributed plaintiff’s limitation of flexion of the wrist to the presence of the ganglion and because of the fact that the patient had been holding his wrist in an extended position and had not been actively exercising it. He believed that plaintiff could work and that while he might suffer discomfort at first, it would disappear altogether in due time. He and the other physicians are in accord that the duties of one’s work act as excellent physiotherapy. Dr. Gorney’s unqualified statement was that there was no reason at all why plaintiff could not pursue his occupational duties. He found no recurring ganglion and stated that there was good motion in plaintiff’s wrist and with finality dismissed plaintiff’s complaints of pain by saying that “it is of a subjective nature.” Dr. Morris thought plaintiff has some disability probably as the result of surgery and disuse of the hand and expressed the opinion that whatever limitation of movement there was would improve with actual use of the extremity.

An interesting aspect of the medical evidence is the extremely divergent views expressed by Dr. Pollingue and Dr. Gorney. They both examined plaintiff’s wrist in the courtroom during the course of the trial and under the eye of the judge. Dr. Pollingue could see the recurring ganglion while Dr. Gorney was certain there was not only no ganglion but that nothing at all was wrong with plaintiff. Dr. Pollingue perceived a limitation of the wrist and believed that plaintiff’s complaints of pain were genuine even though it did appear to him that plaintiff was “holding back” or exaggerating his condition to some extent during the examination.

Another feature of the case which we find odd is why Dr. Riordan would recommend the surgical removal of the ganglion despite his opinion that whatever defect there was in the wrist, including the ganglion, would entirely disappear in time as a result of plaintiff’s activities if only he would return to work. The doctor when interrogated about this made this statement:

“Occasionally one of those things will disappear with time, but I can’t say whether this would disappear or not.
* * * The reason that surgery was recommended on him was that I think that it would be the shortest way of getting the man over his pain which was the main thing he complained about.”

The quoted testimony is irreconcilable with a pertinent and emphatic statement Dr. Riordan had made previously. He first asserted he thought the ganglion would disappear with use of the wrist but subsequently he made the flat assertion that he is unable to say whether plaintiff’s ganglion “would disappear or not.”

There is another manifest inconsistency. Dr. Riordan estimated that it would require a period of from four to eight weeks’ time for plaintiff to attain the normal and free use of the wrist without pain if he returned to his employment, and his estimation of the time required for convalescence after removal of the ganglion by surgery would be “not less” than nine weeks. Thus, although Dr. Riordan suggested surgery because he believed it to be the “shortest way of getting the man over his pain,” it turns out that surgery would not be the “shortest way” after all. Frankly we are completely at a loss to follow Dr. Riordan’s line of reasoning.

We are certain there is a recurring ganglion on plaintiff’s wrist and we are equally as sure that plaintiff cannot do the heavy duties required of a longshoreman without pain unless his condition is corrected by the surgical operation recommended by Drs. Pollingue and Riordan.

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Bluebook (online)
88 So. 2d 69, 1956 La. App. LEXIS 507, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/watson-v-t-smith-son-inc-lactapp-1956.