Watson v. Ray

90 F.R.D. 143, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11810
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedApril 29, 1981
DocketCiv. No. 78-106-1
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 90 F.R.D. 143 (Watson v. Ray) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Watson v. Ray, 90 F.R.D. 143, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11810 (S.D. Ohio 1981).

Opinion

ORDER

STUART, Chief Judge.

The above-captioned class action was brought on behalf of all present and future general prison population inmates at the Iowa State Penitentiary, Fort Madison, Iowa, challenging the conditions of confinement at the institution. The plaintiff class in this action alleges that the totality of conditions of confinement as well as several specific conditions violate rights vested in them by the federal Constitution and laws of the State of Iowa.

The case at this time is before the Court in a unique posture. A three week trial to the Court has been conducted and the evidence has been closed. The reports of experts appointed by the Court on its own motion to examine the conditions of confinement have been filed. Following the filing of such reports, extensive settlement negotiations were entered into by counsel for the parties in this matter, and such negotiations resulted in a tentatively agreed upon proposed consent order. The proposed settlement documents were then submitted to the named representatives of the plaintiff class for their approval. Because questions and objections to the provisions of the proposal were raised by the named plaintiffs and other representatives, and since the Court believed that the difficulties might be resolved through its participation, the Court ordered and attended a final settlement conference at the penitentiary. Plaintiff class was represented at the conference by a committee of general prison population inmates which included the three named plaintiffs who were still class members, and their counsel. The defendants were represented by counsel and interested state officials. Without reviewing the settlement documents, the Court informally gave its view of the issues it would be called upon to decide if settlement was not consummated, and its opinion of the limitations upon the remedies it could provide if constitutional violations were in fact found.

At the conclusion of the conference, the inmate committee insisted upon taking the settlement proposal to “the yard” to obtain other class members’ opinions of the settlement. Additional negotiations were conducted thereafter. Ultimately, however, the inmate committee rejected the settlement proposal, and the Court took the case under advisement.

In considering the merits of the action, the Court first addressed only the issue of the totality of conditions of confinement at the penitentiary and held that such conditions did violate the plaintiff class’ rights secured by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (See Appendix, Order of February 27, 1981.) The Court was then faced with the responsibility of fashioning appropriate remedies to bring the conditions within the requirements of the Constitution. To assist it in making this decision, the Court ordered the proposed settlement documents filed and gave the parties an opportunity to comment on such from an adversarial as opposed to compromising perspective. (See Appendix, Order of February 27, 1981.)

After examining the settlement proposal submitted in the form of a proposed consent order in light of the prevailing case law, the experts’ reports, the evidentiary record, and the parties’ comments, the Court expressed the belief that the consent order if implemented would satisfy the constitutional objections to the conditions of confinement at the penitentiary and that the best interests of the class of present and future inmates would likely be served if the settlement was consummated and approved by the Court. (See Appendix, Order of March 17, 1981.) The Court was compelled to consider the merits of the proposed consent decree by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e).

[146]*146Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) requires the Court to act as a fiduciary preserving and guarding the right of absent class members when a settlement in a class suit is under consideration. Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 122 (8th Cir.), reh. denied en banc, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864, 96 S.Ct. 124, 46 L.Ed.2d 93 (1975); George v. Parry, 77 F.R.D. 421, 424 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d 578 F.2d 1367 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 439 U.S. 947, 99 S.Ct. 340, 58 L.Ed.2d 338 (1978). A court cannot assume a passive role when the issue of settlement of a class action is before it. Held v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 64 F.R.D. 346, 347-48 (S.D.Tex.1974).

Because of its fiduciary obligation and its belief that the class would benefit from the acceptance of the settlement proposal, the Court notified all identifiable class members — present general prison population inmates at the penitentiary — of the settlement proposal, and solicited their comments on the provisions of the settlement offer. (See Appendix, Order of March 17, 1981.) The Court also directed plaintiff class’ counsel to comment on whether the best interests of the class would be served by accepting the settlement. (See Appendix, Order of March 17, 1981.) The Court now must review the proposed consent order in light of the comments received to determine if it should, pursuant to its fiduciary obligation, accept the settlement on behalf of the class and approve its terms.

The circumstances of this case differ substantially from the usual situation involving a proposed settlement of a class action. Ordinarily, the Court is called upon to scrutinize a settlement arrived at by class representatives to determine if the settlement is fair and reasonable, in the best interest of the class, and that the interests of the absent class members are protected. Here, though the question to be determined is whether the named class representatives are acting in the best interests of the entire class, not in accepting a settlement, but in rejecting a proposed settlement.

The Court has found no cases in which a court under similar circumstances has taken it upon itself to approve a settlement on behalf of a class over the opposition of all named representatives. It clearly appears that the Court, to further the intent and purpose of Rule 23 and satisfy the direct mandate of subsection (e) to protect class members, should exercise its authority in this manner. The named plaintiffs do not have the final say as to what is in the best interest of the class. Further, a class can be as easily injured by the rejection of a favorable settlement as by the acceptance of an unfavorable settlement.

If the Court avoided taking these protective steps, the non-representative class members, especially the unidentifiable future general population inmates, would be left vulnerable to a decision made by the named representatives even if such decision was ill conceived or affected by circumstances outside the named representatives’ control. The representative plaintiffs, however, are bound to act as a fiduciary toward the class members and may not act in such a way as to prejudice the class’ interests or to further their own personal interests. Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1305 (4th Cir. 1978). Therefore, a court must have the authority to take the action contemplated herein not only to fulfill its own fiduciary obligation but also to prevent or cure the failure of the representatives to fulfill their fiduciary role.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
90 F.R.D. 143, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11810, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/watson-v-ray-ohsd-1981.