Watson v. John Doe 1

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMay 27, 2025
Docket1:24-cv-09765
StatusUnknown

This text of Watson v. John Doe 1 (Watson v. John Doe 1) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Watson v. John Doe 1, (S.D.N.Y. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK MARK WATSON, Plaintiff, 24-CV-9765 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND JOHN DOE #1; JOHN DOE #2 CORRECTION OFFICERS, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who currently is incarcerated in Elmira Correctional Facility, brings this action, pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, regarding an incident that occurred in the Bronx, while Plaintiff was in custody on Rikers Island.1 By order dated February 19, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.2 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

1 Plaintiff filed this complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, and that court transferred the matter here. See Watson v. Doe, No. 24-CV-7065 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2024). 2 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). BACKGROUND The complaint, naming two John Doe correction officers, sets forth the following facts regarding events occurring in the Bronx on September 23.3 (ECF 1 ¶ II.) On that day, New York

City Department of Correction (“DOC”) correction officers were driving Plaintiff in a van from Rikers Island to a Bronx County court. Without explaining exactly what happened, Plaintiff alleges that the van “came into contact” with another vehicle.4 (Id.) According to Plaintiff, in the aftermath of the collision, he suffered a “sprained” neck, injuries to his wrist and waist, and continues to experience “a lot of back aches when ever” he lays down or sits up. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks $150,000 in damages. (Id. ¶ III.) DISCUSSION A. Federal claim Plaintiff filed this complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A plaintiff proceeding under Section 1983 must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). The negligence of a correction official is not, however, a basis for a claim of a federal constitutional deprivation under Section 1983. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 335-36

3 Plaintiff does not provide the year, but the Court assumes that these events occurred in 2024. 4 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless noted otherwise. (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986). A commonplace vehicle accident may be actionable as a tort claim for negligence under state law, see Carrasquillo v. City of New York, 324 F. Supp. 2d 428, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), but such an event is not ordinarily the basis for a claim of a federal constitutional deprivation. See Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123, 145 (2d Cir.

2001) (“[M]ere negligence is insufficient as a matter of law to state a claim under section 1983.”); Carrasquillo, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 436 (“Auto accidents do not, in and of themselves, give rise to federal causes of action.”). Generally, “‘[a]llegations of a public official driving too fast . . . are grounded in negligence’ and are not actionable under Section 1983.” Cuffee v. City of New York, No. 15-CV-8916 (PGG) (DF), 2017 WL 1134768, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2017). To establish a due process violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution under Section 1983, a prisoner must show that a government official made a deliberate decision to deprive him of his life, liberty, or property. See Jabbar v. Fischer, 683 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing on Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 (1986)). To do so, a pretrial detainee must show that he faced an objectively serious risk of harm and that “the defendant-official acted

intentionally to impose the alleged condition, or recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the pretrial detainee even though the defendant- official knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to health or safety.” Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2017). “[T]he failure to provide an inmate with a seatbelt does not, standing alone, give rise to a constitutional claim.” Jabbar, 683 F.3d at 57-58. “[A]n in-custody plaintiff injured during transport may, however, state a deliberate-indifference claim if he alleges facts in addition to the absence of seatbelts and reckless driving, that, taken as a whole, suggest that the plaintiff was exposed to conditions posing an unreasonable risk of serious harm, and that the defendants were aware of those conditions.” Chapman v. Doe (One), No. 9:19-CV-1257 (GTS)(CFH), 2019 WL 6493971, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2019) (quoting Cuffee, 2017 WL 1134768, at *7). For example, “driving recklessly, at excessive speed, with knowledge that a detainee is being transported in the vehicle – not just without a seatbelt, but within a small steel cage, with

hands in handcuffs that are linked at the waist and thus cannot be used to brace or otherwise protect himself – could rise to the level of deliberate indifference to an excessive risk to that detainee’s safety.” Cuffee, 2017 WL 1232737, at *6; see also Torres v. Amato, 22 F. Supp. 3d 166, 176 (N.D.N.Y. 2014) (denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment because of evidence showing that officer refused to buckle seatbelts even though detainees were restrictively confined in handcuffs and ankle shackles and Defendants were aware that recklessly driving the transport van created a substantial risk of harm to them). Here, Plaintiff does not indicate whether he was wearing a seatbelt.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Daniels v. Williams
474 U.S. 327 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Davidson v. Cannon
474 U.S. 344 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill
484 U.S. 343 (Supreme Court, 1988)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Jabbar v. Fischer
683 F.3d 54 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Carrasquillo v. City of New York
324 F. Supp. 2d 428 (S.D. New York, 2004)
Darnell v. City of New York
849 F.3d 17 (Second Circuit, 2017)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Torres ex rel. Estate of Torres v. Amato
22 F. Supp. 3d 166 (N.D. New York, 2014)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)

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Bluebook (online)
Watson v. John Doe 1, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/watson-v-john-doe-1-nysd-2025.