[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED ________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 98-4163 05/28/99 ________________________ THOMAS K. KAHN CLERK D. C. Docket No. 96-2281-CIV-DMM
WILLIAM WATSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF MIAMI BEACH,
Defendant-Appellee .
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida _________________________ (May 28, 1999)
Before TJOFLAT, BLACK and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
BLACK, Circuit Judge: Appellant William Watson, a police officer for the City of Miami Beach (the
City), brought this action against his employer under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. Watson challenges the district court’s grant
of summary judgment in favor of the City on his claims that: (1) the City
discriminated against him by relieving him from duty pending a fitness for duty
examination; (2) the City violated the ADA’s medical examination and inquiries
prohibitions by ordering him to complete a fitness for duty examination; and (3) the
City violated the ADA’s medical examination and inquiries prohibitions by requiring
him to undergo a tuberculosis examination and disclose his HIV/AIDS status as part
of a mandatory department-wide tuberculosis testing program.1 As to the first claim,
the district court reasoned Watson failed to present sufficient evidence to show he was
an individual with a disability within the meaning of the Act. As to the second and
third claims, the court reasoned Watson failed to present evidence from which a
reasonable juror could reject the City’s evidence that the fitness for duty and
tuberculosis examinations were job-related and consistent with business necessity.
We affirm.
1 Watson does not appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City on his claim that the City violated the ADA by disclosing his fitness for duty examination to other police officers.
2 I. BACKGROUND
Appellant Watson has been a police officer with the City of Miami Beach since
1984. In May or June 1995, Major Steve Robbins, then the Commander of the
Administration Bureau, became increasingly concerned about what he perceived to
be Watson’s display of unusually defensive and antagonistic behavior towards his
co-workers and supervisors. As a result, he began an investigation. Major Robbins’
investigation revealed 10 Internal Affairs’ investigations of complaints by and against
Watson, as well as 11 incidents from 1992 to 1995 including a disciplinary action and
various grievances by Watson against the Police Department.
In July 1995, another incident occurred at Mount Sinai Hospital (Mount Sinai).
At that time, Mount Sinai Hospital was conducting a mandatory, department-wide
tuberculosis testing program for the Police Department due to police contact with high
risk individuals. As part of the tuberculosis examination, Mount Sinai required an
individual to disclose his or her HIV/AIDS status because diagnosis and treatment of
tuberculosis differ for those individuals with HIV/AIDS. On July 24, 1995, Watson
went to Mount Sinai, but refused to take the examination because it required him to
disclose his HIV/AIDS status. Watson complained the City was out to get him. Nurse
Tibbits, the manager of employee health services at Mount Sinai, found his behavior
3 to be rude and unreasonable. Nurse Tibbits informed Major Robbins of Watson’s
behavior and suggested a fitness for duty examination.
Based on Major Robbins’ investigation of Watson’s pattern of conduct and
confrontation with Nurse Tibbits, the City relieved Watson of duty with pay on
October 9, 1995 and required him to undergo a fitness for duty evaluation with Dr.
Axelbred. Dr. Axelbred found Watson was “somewhat obsessional in style and
experiencing symptoms typically associated with stress.” Dr. Axelbred recommended
Watson return to work with appropriate stress management counseling. Watson
returned to work eight days later and continues to work as a police officer for the City.
II. ANALYSIS
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Mayfield v.
Patterson Pump Co., 101 F.3d 1371, 1374 (11th Cir. 1996). Summary judgment is
appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits show there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986) (quoting
Fed.R.Civ.P 56(c)). In making this assessment, we must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Welch v. Celotex Corp., 951 F.2d 1235, 1237
(11th Cir. 1992).
4 A. Disability Discrimination
Watson contends the City discriminated against him by relieving him from
duty pending a fitness for duty examination, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To
state a case of unlawful discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must first prove he
has a disability as defined by the Act. Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Associates, Inc., 100
F.3d 907, 910 (11th Cir. 1996). Watson alleges he is disabled under § 12102(2)(C).
Under that provision, an individual is deemed to be disabled if he is regarded as
having a mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life
activities. Standard v. A.B.E.L. Services, Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1327 (11th Cir. 1998).
Watson failed to present any evidence from which a rational juror could find
he was regarded as having a mental impairment. Watson points to evidence which
shows other officers regarded him as “paranoid,” “disgruntled,” “oppositional,”
“difficult to interact with,” “unusual,” “suspicious,” “threatening,” and “distrustful.”
These characterizations of Watson’s behavior merely show he had serious personality
conflicts with members of his department. Such conflicts do not rise to the level of
a mental impairment under the ADA. See Stewart v. County of Brown, 86 F.3d 107,
111 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that an excitable, emotionally imbalanced individual is
not disabled under the ADA). We affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the City under § 12112(a).
5 B. Prohibited Medical Examination and Inquiries
Watson alleges the fitness for duty and tuberculosis examinations were
prohibited medical inquiries, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). That
provision states:
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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED ________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 98-4163 05/28/99 ________________________ THOMAS K. KAHN CLERK D. C. Docket No. 96-2281-CIV-DMM
WILLIAM WATSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF MIAMI BEACH,
Defendant-Appellee .
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida _________________________ (May 28, 1999)
Before TJOFLAT, BLACK and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
BLACK, Circuit Judge: Appellant William Watson, a police officer for the City of Miami Beach (the
City), brought this action against his employer under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. Watson challenges the district court’s grant
of summary judgment in favor of the City on his claims that: (1) the City
discriminated against him by relieving him from duty pending a fitness for duty
examination; (2) the City violated the ADA’s medical examination and inquiries
prohibitions by ordering him to complete a fitness for duty examination; and (3) the
City violated the ADA’s medical examination and inquiries prohibitions by requiring
him to undergo a tuberculosis examination and disclose his HIV/AIDS status as part
of a mandatory department-wide tuberculosis testing program.1 As to the first claim,
the district court reasoned Watson failed to present sufficient evidence to show he was
an individual with a disability within the meaning of the Act. As to the second and
third claims, the court reasoned Watson failed to present evidence from which a
reasonable juror could reject the City’s evidence that the fitness for duty and
tuberculosis examinations were job-related and consistent with business necessity.
We affirm.
1 Watson does not appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City on his claim that the City violated the ADA by disclosing his fitness for duty examination to other police officers.
2 I. BACKGROUND
Appellant Watson has been a police officer with the City of Miami Beach since
1984. In May or June 1995, Major Steve Robbins, then the Commander of the
Administration Bureau, became increasingly concerned about what he perceived to
be Watson’s display of unusually defensive and antagonistic behavior towards his
co-workers and supervisors. As a result, he began an investigation. Major Robbins’
investigation revealed 10 Internal Affairs’ investigations of complaints by and against
Watson, as well as 11 incidents from 1992 to 1995 including a disciplinary action and
various grievances by Watson against the Police Department.
In July 1995, another incident occurred at Mount Sinai Hospital (Mount Sinai).
At that time, Mount Sinai Hospital was conducting a mandatory, department-wide
tuberculosis testing program for the Police Department due to police contact with high
risk individuals. As part of the tuberculosis examination, Mount Sinai required an
individual to disclose his or her HIV/AIDS status because diagnosis and treatment of
tuberculosis differ for those individuals with HIV/AIDS. On July 24, 1995, Watson
went to Mount Sinai, but refused to take the examination because it required him to
disclose his HIV/AIDS status. Watson complained the City was out to get him. Nurse
Tibbits, the manager of employee health services at Mount Sinai, found his behavior
3 to be rude and unreasonable. Nurse Tibbits informed Major Robbins of Watson’s
behavior and suggested a fitness for duty examination.
Based on Major Robbins’ investigation of Watson’s pattern of conduct and
confrontation with Nurse Tibbits, the City relieved Watson of duty with pay on
October 9, 1995 and required him to undergo a fitness for duty evaluation with Dr.
Axelbred. Dr. Axelbred found Watson was “somewhat obsessional in style and
experiencing symptoms typically associated with stress.” Dr. Axelbred recommended
Watson return to work with appropriate stress management counseling. Watson
returned to work eight days later and continues to work as a police officer for the City.
II. ANALYSIS
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Mayfield v.
Patterson Pump Co., 101 F.3d 1371, 1374 (11th Cir. 1996). Summary judgment is
appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits show there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986) (quoting
Fed.R.Civ.P 56(c)). In making this assessment, we must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Welch v. Celotex Corp., 951 F.2d 1235, 1237
(11th Cir. 1992).
4 A. Disability Discrimination
Watson contends the City discriminated against him by relieving him from
duty pending a fitness for duty examination, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To
state a case of unlawful discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must first prove he
has a disability as defined by the Act. Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Associates, Inc., 100
F.3d 907, 910 (11th Cir. 1996). Watson alleges he is disabled under § 12102(2)(C).
Under that provision, an individual is deemed to be disabled if he is regarded as
having a mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life
activities. Standard v. A.B.E.L. Services, Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1327 (11th Cir. 1998).
Watson failed to present any evidence from which a rational juror could find
he was regarded as having a mental impairment. Watson points to evidence which
shows other officers regarded him as “paranoid,” “disgruntled,” “oppositional,”
“difficult to interact with,” “unusual,” “suspicious,” “threatening,” and “distrustful.”
These characterizations of Watson’s behavior merely show he had serious personality
conflicts with members of his department. Such conflicts do not rise to the level of
a mental impairment under the ADA. See Stewart v. County of Brown, 86 F.3d 107,
111 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that an excitable, emotionally imbalanced individual is
not disabled under the ADA). We affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the City under § 12112(a).
5 B. Prohibited Medical Examination and Inquiries
Watson alleges the fitness for duty and tuberculosis examinations were
prohibited medical inquiries, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). That
provision states:
A covered entity shall not require a medical examination and shall not make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity.
This Court has not addressed whether this provision applies to a non-disabled
employee. We need not resolve this issue because we conclude the fitness for duty
and tuberculosis examinations were job-related and consistent with business necessity.
Cf. Armstrong v. Turner Industries, Inc., 141 F.3d 554, 558 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding
plaintiff did not have standing rather than addressing the difficult issue whether the
medical examination and inquiries prohibitions apply to non-disabled employees).
1. Fitness for Duty Examination
In any case where a police department reasonably perceives an officer to be
even mildly paranoid, hostile, or oppositional, a fitness for duty examination is job-
related and consistent with business necessity. Police departments place armed
officers in positions where they can do tremendous harm if they act irrationally.
Contrary to Watson’s contention, the ADA does not, indeed cannot, require a police
6 department to forgo a fitness for duty examination to wait until a perceived threat
becomes real or questionable behavior results in injuries.
The evidence shows the City had good cause for concern as to whether Watson
was fit to be a police officer. Watson had overreacted in many situations and his
colleagues worried he might be paranoid. On this basis, we conclude there is no
evidence from which a rational juror could find the City acted improperly by ordering
Watson to undergo the fitness for duty examination.
2. Tuberculosis Examination
The EEOC Compliance Manual, which is helpful in a situation such as this,
explains that “periodic medical examinations for public safety positions that are
narrowly tailored to address specific job-related concerns and are shown to be
consistent with business necessity would be permissible.” EEOC Enforcement
Guidance: Psychiatric Disabilities and the Americans With Disabilities Act (March
25, 1997), reprinted in 3 EEOC Compliance Manual No. 222: 2336 n.41 (BNA 1998).
The evidence presented showed that the tuberculosis examination required by the City
in this case addressed unrefuted health concerns regarding officer safety.
Additionally, the evidence showed that disclosing one’s HIV/AIDS status as part of
the examination is necessary to properly diagnose and treat an individual with
7 tuberculosis.2 Accordingly, there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could
find the City acted improperly in testing for tuberculosis and requiring Watson to
disclose his HIV/AIDS status as part of the examination.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the record in this case, Watson is not an individual with a disability
as defined by the ADA, and the fitness for duty and tuberculosis examinations
were job-related and consistent with business necessity. Accordingly, we affirm
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City.
AFFIRMED.
2 On appeal, Watson argues for the first time no additional burden would be placed on the City if it were required to alter the timing of the HIV/AIDS inquiry until after the examination. We do not address this argument because Watson failed to present it to the district court. See Narey v. Dean, 32 F.3d 1521, 1526-27 (11th Cir.1994).