Watson & Chalin Manufacturing, Inc. v. Boler Co.

229 F. Supp. 2d 630, 2002 WL 31453791
Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Watson & Chalin Manufacturing, Inc. v. Boler Co.. Read the opinion of the Court — 227 F. Supp. 2d 633
District Court, E.D. Texas·Decided October 31, 2002·No. 1:01-cr-00144·Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

LEONARD DAVIS, District Judge.

On September 10, 2002, the court conducted a claim construction hearing in this matter. After considering the submissions of the parties and arguments of counsel, the court issues the following order construing the claims of the patent-in-suit.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Watson and Chalin Manufacturing, Inc. (“Watson”) accuses Defendant The Boler Company (“Boler”) of infringing claims 17 and 18 contained in United States Patent 5,865,452 (“the '452 patent”). The abstract of the '452 patent states that the patent discloses “an improved steerable suspension system.” The abstract goes on to state that “[i]n a preferred embodiment, a steerable suspension system has a device attached to opposite ends of a tubular axle. The device includes a number of interconnected plates which cooperate to form an axle seat, and to which a king housing portion is attached.” Claims 17 and 18 read as follows:

17. A steerable suspension system, comprising:

a generally tubular axle having opposite ends; and

a device attached to each of said axle opposite ends, said device including a king pin housing configured for receipt of a king pin therein, an axle seat complementary shaped relative to said axle, and a plurality of interconnected plates, said plates being attached to said king pin housing and said axle.

18. The steerable suspension system according to claim 17, wherein said plurality of plates includes first and second side plates and an inner plate, said inner plate having a profile formed thereon, said profile being complimentarily (sic) shaped relative to said axle, and said first and second side plates and said profile cooperating- to form said axle seat.

The primary focus of the parties’ is on the proper interpretation of the term “axle *632 seat” and of claim limitations that depend on that term. Watson proposes that the appropriate definition of the term “axle seat” is “the portion of the device in contact with the outer surface of the axle.” 1 Watson argues that such an interpretation is consistent with the structure and context of the asserted claims. Boler contends that Watson’s proposed interpretation is inconsistent with, among other things, the specification of the '452 patent, the prosecution history of the '452 patent, the meaning of the term as understood in the trucking industry, and the deposition testimony of the inventor of the device disclosed in the '452 patent. Boler asserts that the ordinary meaning of the term “axle seat” is a “mounting member that is a component of the suspension system, and that connects the suspension system to the axle.” Boler proposes that the term be construed as “a portion of the suspension system for attaching the suspension components to the axle.”

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Claim construction is a question of law. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed.Cir.1995), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). In Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int’l, Inc., 222 F.3d 951 (Fed.Cir.2000), the Federal Circuit explained the parameters of claim construction analysis:

Proper claim construction entails an analysis of a patent record’s intrinsic evidence — the claim language, the written description and the prosecution history. If the meaning of a claim is unambiguous from the intrinsic evidence, then a court may not rely on extrinsic evidence for purposes of claim construction.
Claim construction analysis begins with the claim language itself. As a starting point, the court gives claim terms their ordinary and accustomed meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art.
The claim term’s ordinary and accustomed meaning initially serves as a default meaning because the patentee may act as a lexicographer and ascribe a different, or modified, meaning to the term. The court, therefore, must examine a patent’s specification and prosecution history to determine whether the patentee has given the term an unconventional meaning. If the patentee has not done so, the term’s ordinary and accustomed meaning controls.

Id. at 955.

THE MEANING OF THE TERM “AXLE SEAT”

The Claim Language

The court begins, as it must, with the claim language itself. Bell Comm’ns Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Comm’ns Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 619 (Fed.Cir.1995). To support its proposed definition of “axle seat,” Watson argues that the grammatical structure of claim 17 reveals that the “axle seat” is included in the device (a structure to be attached to the ends of the axle). Watson points out that there is no mention of any suspension system component to which this “axle seat” might be connected or a part of, such as a spring or suspension arm. Further, Watson contends that the claim describes the “axle seat” in terms of its shape relative to the axle, thus suggesting its connectivity to the axle. Watson also argues that the grammatical structure of claim 18 suggests the formation of the *633 “axle seat” through the cooperation of side plates and a profile shaped to form a connection with the axle. Watson asserts that no other component of the suspension system is mentioned as a limitation to this claim.

In response, Boler argues that Watson’s proposed definition is contrary to the definition one skilled in the art would attribute to the term. To support this contention, Boler cites expert affidavits and publications of organizations in the trucking industry. Boler contends, essentially, that while a patent applicant is free to define a term differently from how one skilled in the art would understand it, Watson failed to attribute a special definition to “axle seat” in the '452 patent. Thus, Boler’s argument continues, “axle seat” must be given its ordinary meaning: “a portion of the suspension system for attaching the suspension components to the axle.”

As Watson points out, however, the problem with Boler’s argument is that, rather than looking to the claim language first and then other intrinsic evidence to interpret the term, Boler looks first to extrinsic evidence for the meaning of a claim term and then imposes that meaning on the claims. “Relying on extrinsic evidence is ‘proper only when the claim language remains genuinely ambiguous after consideration of the intrinsic evidence.’ Such instances will rarely, if ever, occur.” Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed.Cir.2001) (quoting Bell & Howell Document Mgmt. Prods. Co. v. Altek Sys.,

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Watson & Chalin Manufacturing, Inc. v. Boler Co., 229 F. Supp. 2d 630, 2002 WL 31453791 (E.D. Tex. 2002).

229 F. Supp. 2d 630 (Watson & Chalin Manufacturing, Inc. v. Boler Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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