McAULIFFE, Judge.
Eric Lorenzo Watkins was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County of two counts each of unlawful shooting with intent to disable, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and battery in connection with a shooting in which Melvin and Ronald Brown were wounded. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed in an unreported opinion, holding that the trial court did not err when it prohibited defense counsel from questioning State’s witnesses regarding either their probationary status or the fact that there were criminal charges pending against them at the time of the shootings. We granted certiorari, and we affirm.
[98]*98I.
This case grew out of an early morning altercation which occurred when the defendant and Marlin Marshall encountered a group consisting of Ronald, Melvin, and Kelvin Brown, and Demetrius “Tony” Fultz. The defendant does not deny that he shot Melvin and Ronald. He contends, rather, that he shot them in self-defense. According to the defendant, the meeting was called to resolve a dispute over the quality of drugs which Marshall had delivered to Fultz earlier that evening. All other participants in the meeting denied that drugs were in any way involved.
The defendant testified that Fultz called Marshall’s pager at about midnight and that Marshall returned the call. The defendant said that Marshall and Fultz were arguing about the quality of the drugs Marshall had delivered to Fultz, and that at some point during the conversation the defendant took the telephone from Marshall and spoke briefly to Fultz and then to one of the Brown brothers. The defendant stated that following the telephone conversation he and Marshall went to meet Fultz and, as it turned out, the Brown brothers, to discuss what was to be done.
On the way to that meeting, Marshall told the defendant to take a gun from under the floor mat of the vehicle in which they were riding and to carry it to the meeting. The defendant said that after the parties met, he fired his weapon in self-defense because the Brown brothers and Fultz, whom he believed to be drug dealers and therefore probably armed, were walking toward him after expressing irritation that he had interjected himself into a conversation between Marshall and Fultz.
II.
The defendant argues that the trial judge improperly restricted his cross-examination of Fultz and of the Brown brothers. With respect to Fultz, the defendant sought to introduce evidence that Fultz had been convicted of unlawfully carrying a handgun on March 9, 1989, six days before [99]*99the incident involved in this case. The defendant offered documentary evidence of this conviction because Fultz had, on cross-examination, denied that he had a gun on March 9. Although the trial judge initially ruled that the evidence was inadmissible, he did permit further cross-examination of Fultz out of the presence of the jury. Fultz then admitted he had been in possession of a handgun on March 9, stating that he had originally been confused concerning the date. The trial judge then permitted additional cross-examination of Fultz in the presence of the jury, and Fultz again admitted to possession of the handgun on the day in question. Thus, the fact sought to be elicited was ultimately placed before the jury, and there was no error in connection with the court’s ruling concerning the cross-examination of Fultz.
During the cross-examination of Ronald Brown, defense counsel approached the bench to seek leave of court to question the witness concerning a pending theft charge. The entire discussion of this matter consisted of the following:
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Your Honor, I have information that Mr. Brown has a pending case that’s a theft charge and he goes to trial on April 3rd.
THE COURT: Don’t mention it.
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: The reason I’m saying that, I believe that I have a basis for thinking he may have been given some consideration in exchange for probation. I want to ask about the fact this happened. PROSECUTOR: Your Honor, of course, that’s exculpatory evidence and I certainly would have told [defense attorney] any deals that I had made with anybody that is testifying.
THE COURT: Alright.
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Thank you.
(In open court.)
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: That’s all I have.
[100]*100Defense counsel clearly accepted the prosecutor’s statement that no “deal” had been made with the witness, and acquiesced in the court’s ruling. Accordingly, there is no basis for appeal from this ruling.
The defendant attempted to show that Melvin and Kelvin Brown were on probation. This effort was grounded solely1 on the belief that Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), compels the admission of evidence that any State’s witness is on probation for any crime, if that evidence is offered by the defendant. The trial judge did not believe Davis painted with such a broad brush, and neither do we.
Concededly, some of the language of Davis is broad in scope, and appears to support the interpretation that evidence of the probationary status of a State’s witness is always admissible.
The accuracy and truthfulness of [the witness’s] testimony were key elements in the State’s case against petitioner. The claim of bias which the defense sought to develop was admissible to afford a basis for an inference of undue pressure because of [the witness’s] vulnerable status as a probationer, ... as well as of [the witness’s] possible concern that he might be a suspect in the investigation.
Id. at 415 U.S. 317-18, 94 S.Ct. at 1110-11 (citation omitted). The facts of Davis, and other language in the Court’s opinion, suggest, however, that the holding of that case was narrower.
In Davis, the evidence showed that a bar in Anchorage had been broken into and a safe weighing several hundred pounds had been removed. On the afternoon of the break-in the safe was discovered 26 miles from the site of the burglary, near the home of Richard Green. Green testified that at about noon on the day in question he had seen two [101]*101individuals near where the safe was later found. He identified Davis as one of those two individuals. Although there was some evidence tending to show that the safe may have been transported in a vehicle that had been rented by Davis, Green’s eyewitness testimony was critical to the success of the State’s case.
At the time of trial and at the time of the events in question, Green was on probation by order of juvenile court after having been adjudicated a delinquent for burglarizing two cabins. Before any testimony was taken at trial, the prosecutor requested a protective order to prohibit any reference to Green’s earlier adjudication or the fact that he was on probation. The trial judge granted the prosecutor’s request, citing an Alaska statute which generally barred the admission of juvenile adjudications. Davis objected, contending that because Green was on probation for burglary and the safe was found near his home, Green would have a special motive to identify someone else in order to divert suspicion from himself.
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McAULIFFE, Judge.
Eric Lorenzo Watkins was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County of two counts each of unlawful shooting with intent to disable, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and battery in connection with a shooting in which Melvin and Ronald Brown were wounded. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed in an unreported opinion, holding that the trial court did not err when it prohibited defense counsel from questioning State’s witnesses regarding either their probationary status or the fact that there were criminal charges pending against them at the time of the shootings. We granted certiorari, and we affirm.
[98]*98I.
This case grew out of an early morning altercation which occurred when the defendant and Marlin Marshall encountered a group consisting of Ronald, Melvin, and Kelvin Brown, and Demetrius “Tony” Fultz. The defendant does not deny that he shot Melvin and Ronald. He contends, rather, that he shot them in self-defense. According to the defendant, the meeting was called to resolve a dispute over the quality of drugs which Marshall had delivered to Fultz earlier that evening. All other participants in the meeting denied that drugs were in any way involved.
The defendant testified that Fultz called Marshall’s pager at about midnight and that Marshall returned the call. The defendant said that Marshall and Fultz were arguing about the quality of the drugs Marshall had delivered to Fultz, and that at some point during the conversation the defendant took the telephone from Marshall and spoke briefly to Fultz and then to one of the Brown brothers. The defendant stated that following the telephone conversation he and Marshall went to meet Fultz and, as it turned out, the Brown brothers, to discuss what was to be done.
On the way to that meeting, Marshall told the defendant to take a gun from under the floor mat of the vehicle in which they were riding and to carry it to the meeting. The defendant said that after the parties met, he fired his weapon in self-defense because the Brown brothers and Fultz, whom he believed to be drug dealers and therefore probably armed, were walking toward him after expressing irritation that he had interjected himself into a conversation between Marshall and Fultz.
II.
The defendant argues that the trial judge improperly restricted his cross-examination of Fultz and of the Brown brothers. With respect to Fultz, the defendant sought to introduce evidence that Fultz had been convicted of unlawfully carrying a handgun on March 9, 1989, six days before [99]*99the incident involved in this case. The defendant offered documentary evidence of this conviction because Fultz had, on cross-examination, denied that he had a gun on March 9. Although the trial judge initially ruled that the evidence was inadmissible, he did permit further cross-examination of Fultz out of the presence of the jury. Fultz then admitted he had been in possession of a handgun on March 9, stating that he had originally been confused concerning the date. The trial judge then permitted additional cross-examination of Fultz in the presence of the jury, and Fultz again admitted to possession of the handgun on the day in question. Thus, the fact sought to be elicited was ultimately placed before the jury, and there was no error in connection with the court’s ruling concerning the cross-examination of Fultz.
During the cross-examination of Ronald Brown, defense counsel approached the bench to seek leave of court to question the witness concerning a pending theft charge. The entire discussion of this matter consisted of the following:
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Your Honor, I have information that Mr. Brown has a pending case that’s a theft charge and he goes to trial on April 3rd.
THE COURT: Don’t mention it.
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: The reason I’m saying that, I believe that I have a basis for thinking he may have been given some consideration in exchange for probation. I want to ask about the fact this happened. PROSECUTOR: Your Honor, of course, that’s exculpatory evidence and I certainly would have told [defense attorney] any deals that I had made with anybody that is testifying.
THE COURT: Alright.
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Thank you.
(In open court.)
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: That’s all I have.
[100]*100Defense counsel clearly accepted the prosecutor’s statement that no “deal” had been made with the witness, and acquiesced in the court’s ruling. Accordingly, there is no basis for appeal from this ruling.
The defendant attempted to show that Melvin and Kelvin Brown were on probation. This effort was grounded solely1 on the belief that Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), compels the admission of evidence that any State’s witness is on probation for any crime, if that evidence is offered by the defendant. The trial judge did not believe Davis painted with such a broad brush, and neither do we.
Concededly, some of the language of Davis is broad in scope, and appears to support the interpretation that evidence of the probationary status of a State’s witness is always admissible.
The accuracy and truthfulness of [the witness’s] testimony were key elements in the State’s case against petitioner. The claim of bias which the defense sought to develop was admissible to afford a basis for an inference of undue pressure because of [the witness’s] vulnerable status as a probationer, ... as well as of [the witness’s] possible concern that he might be a suspect in the investigation.
Id. at 415 U.S. 317-18, 94 S.Ct. at 1110-11 (citation omitted). The facts of Davis, and other language in the Court’s opinion, suggest, however, that the holding of that case was narrower.
In Davis, the evidence showed that a bar in Anchorage had been broken into and a safe weighing several hundred pounds had been removed. On the afternoon of the break-in the safe was discovered 26 miles from the site of the burglary, near the home of Richard Green. Green testified that at about noon on the day in question he had seen two [101]*101individuals near where the safe was later found. He identified Davis as one of those two individuals. Although there was some evidence tending to show that the safe may have been transported in a vehicle that had been rented by Davis, Green’s eyewitness testimony was critical to the success of the State’s case.
At the time of trial and at the time of the events in question, Green was on probation by order of juvenile court after having been adjudicated a delinquent for burglarizing two cabins. Before any testimony was taken at trial, the prosecutor requested a protective order to prohibit any reference to Green’s earlier adjudication or the fact that he was on probation. The trial judge granted the prosecutor’s request, citing an Alaska statute which generally barred the admission of juvenile adjudications. Davis objected, contending that because Green was on probation for burglary and the safe was found near his home, Green would have a special motive to identify someone else in order to divert suspicion from himself. Davis’ counsel also argued that simply being on probation made Green more vulnerable to police suggestion, and more obliging to the State.
Bound by the protective order, Davis’ counsel nevertheless sought to disclose Green’s state of mind at the time Green discovered that the stolen safe had been found near his home. Green claimed to be unconcerned that the safe had been found on his property, although he admitted it had crossed his mind that the police might think he had something to do with the crime. In the course of his cross-examination of Green, Davis’ counsel also inquired about the police interrogation of Green. During the course of that line of questioning, Davis’ counsel asked Green: “Had you ever been questioned like that before by any law enforcement officers?” Green replied, “No.”
In holding that it was error to deny Davis the right to inquire into Green’s prior adjudication and probationary status under these circumstances, the Supreme Court said:
Since defense counsel was prohibited from making inquiry as to the witness’ being on probation under a juvenile [102]*102court adjudication, Green’s protestations of unconcern over possible police suspicion that he might have had a part in the Polar Bar burglary and his categorical denial of ever having been the subject of any similar law-enforcement interrogation went unchallenged. The tension between the right of confrontation and the State’s policy of protecting the witness with a juvenile record is particularly evident in the final answer given by the witness. Since it is probable that Green underwent some questioning by police when he was arrested for the burglaries on which his juvenile adjudication of delinquency rested, the answer can be regarded as highly suspect at the very least. The witness was in effect asserting, under protection of the trial court’s ruling, a right to give a questionably truthful answer to a cross-examiner pursuing a relevant line of inquiry; it is doubtful whether the bold “No” answer would have been given by Green absent a belief that he was shielded from traditional cross-examination. It would be difficult to conceive of a situation more clearly illustrating the need for cross-examination.
Id. 415 U.S. at 313-14, 94 S.Ct. at 1108-09.
In the case before us, there was no suggestion that Melvin or Kelvin Brown had committed any offense for which the defendant was charged. Rather, the defendant wished to show that the meeting of the parties had to do with drug distribution, thereby bolstering, according to the defendant, his claim of reasonable fear of the Browns. The defendant argues that the probationary status of the witnesses gave them some additional reason to deny any involvement with drugs,2 and thus evidence of their status should have been admitted. There is some merit in that [103]*103contention, and had the trial judge exercised his discretion to allow the evidence, that would not have constituted error.
After weighing the potential relevance of this information against the potential misuse of the evidence by the jurors in branding the witnesses with prior bad acts not otherwise admissible as bearing on credibility, and after considering that the jurors would understand that any witness would be reluctant to admit to illegal drug involvement because of the danger of being prosecuted for such involvement, and after assessing the potential collateral problems of explaining the underlying bases for the convictions that resulted in probations and the length of the suspended sentences so as to fairly judge the probable effect upon the witnesses, the trial judge could as well have determined, as he did, that under the circumstances of this case the limited probative value of the evidence was outweighed by other appropriate considerations. Accordingly, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in this case by excluding evidence that the Brown twins were on probation.
III.
Alternatively, any error in excluding evidence that the State’s witnesses had been charged with a crime or were on probation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The sole defense advanced by this defendant was self-defense. Even if the defendant had been able to prove that the meeting was drug-related, and that the events occurred just as he said they did, he would not have generated an issue of self-defense for consideration by the jury.
The defendant’s version of the facts is that Marshall supplied drugs to Fultz, who sold them for Marshall’s benefit. Earlier in the evening of the shooting, Fultz and Marshall had argued about the quality of crack cocaine Marshall had just delivered to Fultz — Fultz said the drugs were “bad” and that he had no intention of paying for them. The defendant interjected himself into a telephone conversation between the two, thereby irritating Fultz and one of [104]*104the Brown brothers. When the phone conversation ended, Marshall asked the defendant to accompany him to visit Fultz, apparently to collect the money Fultz owed Marshall for the drugs. Marshall drove. He carried a 38-caliber handgun in his belt, which the defendant saw. When they arrived in the neighborhood where Fultz “hustled” drugs, Marshall told the defendant to arm himself with a 32-caliber automatic weapon that he would find under the floor mat on the passenger side of the vehicle. Marshall said Fultz and his people “might have guns too.” The defendant retrieved the weapon and placed it in his pocket. Marshall and the defendant then left the vehicle and went in search of Fultz. When they found Fultz, he was in the company of the three Brown brothers. Marshall and Fultz began a discussion about payment for the drugs. In response to questions by his counsel, the defendant described the succeeding events as follows:
Q: Sir, what happened then? What happened?
A: That’s when I butted in and then that’s when I think that was Melvin that butted in and then said I didn’t have nothing to do with this. I said you’re right, and then I said but, you know, you can get somebody to test the drugs. That’s when Demetrius said what the fuck do I have to do with it. I said nothing. Then he said — then I said, I said — what did I say?
I said why don’t you give the man back his drugs. He said, I told you you don’t have a mother fucking thing to do with it.
Q: Who said that?
A: Demetrius. That’s when they all started coming towards me. That’s when Marlin put his hands up to say hold up, to stop the action. I took a couple steps back behind Marlin. They were still coming.
Q: When you took a couple of steps back, what happened?
A: That’s when they were still approaching me.
Q: Who is they, sir?
A: Melvin, Kelvin, Ronald and Demetrius.
[105]*105Q: What were you thinking at that time, sir?
A: They was going to hurt me.
Q: What did you do?
A: That’s when I received from my pocket a gun and started shooting.
The defendant said he aimed the gun at one of the four men, pulled the trigger once, and fired five shots. He explained why he shot at them.
Q: Now, sir, why did you fire the gun?
A: Because I felt that they was going to hurt me.
Q: Why did you feel they were going to hurt you?
A: Because that’s where Marlin told me they hustled at and I know from experience when people hustle that they normally carry weapons and stuff.
Q: Had you ever seen any of those other persons with weapons?
A: No. That was my first time seeing Kelvin, Ronald and Melvin.
The defendant stated that he had seen Fultz with a weapon on one prior occasion, when Fultz gave the weapon to Marshall. The defendant admitted he did not see any guns on the night in question, except those carried by Marshall and by the defendant.
In State v. Faulkner, 301 Md. 482, 485-86, 483 A.2d 759 (1984), this Court summarized the requirements that must be met in order to justify a homicide on the ground of self-defense:
(1) The accused must have had reasonable grounds to believe himself in apparent imminent or immediate danger of death or serious bodily harm from his assailant or potential assailant;
(2) The accused must have in fact believed himself in this danger;
(3) The accused claiming the right of self defense must not have been the aggressor or provoked the conflict; and
[106]*106(4) The force used must have not been unreasonable and excessive, that is, the force must not have been more force than the exigency demanded.
The defendant’s version of events is simply insufficient to show that at the time he fired his weapon he had reasonable grounds to believe himself in apparent imminent or immediate danger of serious bodily harm, or that the deadly force he employed was not excessive, but was reasonable and necessary under the circumstances.
The defendant said he was afraid that the Brown brothers, who were walking toward him, were going to hurt him because he had butted into a conversation that they felt was none of his business. No threats were made to the defendant, and no weapons were produced. Indeed Marshall, who was also armed, apparently did not feel it necessary to draw his weapon. Nevertheless, the defendant immediately pulled his gun and fired at Melvin Brown, striking him in the stomach or side, fired two shots into the back of Ronald Brown as he was attempting to run away, and fired additional shots which did not hit anyone. As a matter of law, this was not self-defense, i.e., a justifiable action exonerating the defendant from criminal liability.
Perhaps recognizing the weakness of his case for “perfect” self-defense, the defendant suggests that he at least generated a question of “imperfect” self-defense. See State v. Faulkner, supra, 301 Md. at 486-503, 483 A.2d 759 (generally discussing imperfect self-defense). That argument fails because the defense of imperfect self-defense does not apply to and is not available to mitigate any of the crimes of which the defendant was convicted.3 Thus, any error in the exclusion of evidence offered to support a [107]*107nonexistent defense must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.
RODOWSKY, J., joins in Parts I and III of the opinion and concurs in the judgment of the Court.