Waters v. United States

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: April 5, 2021
• Docket: 3:20-cv-00370
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Case No. 3:17-cr-00009-HDM-VPC 6 Case No. 3:20-cv-00370-HDM Plaintiff, 7 v. ORDER 8 JUSTIN CEDRIC WATERS,

9 Defendant.

10 Before the court is defendant Justin Cedric Waters’ motion to 11 vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (ECF No. 27). The government 12 has responded (ECF No. 29), and Waters has replied (ECF No. 30). 13 On February 1, 2017, Waters was charged by way of indictment 14 with one count of felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 15 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). (ECF No. 1). Pursuant to an agreement, Waters 16 entered a plea of guilty to the charge. (ECF Nos. 15 & 17). The 17 court thereafter sentenced Waters to 78 months in prison. (ECF 18 Nos. 24 & 25. 19 Section 922(g) prohibits the possession of a firearm by 20 several categories of persons, including any person who has been 21 convicted in any court of a crime punishable by a term of more 22 than one year in prison. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At the time of his 23 conviction, Waters had several prior felony convictions, including 24 assault with a deadly weapon and unlawful driving or taking of a 25 vehicle. When Waters was charged and entered his plea in this case, 26 the government was not required to prove that he knew he was a 27 felon. United States v. Enslin, 327 F.3d 788, 798 (9th Cir. 2003). 28 1 But after Waters was sentenced, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded 2 that a defendant may be convicted under § 922(g) only if the 3 government proves that the defendant “knew he belonged to the 4 relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” 5 Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019). On the basis 6 of Rehaif and the government’s failure to charge his knowledge of 7 status, Waters now moves to vacate his conviction. 8 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal inmate may move to 9 vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence if: (1) the sentence 10 was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 11 States; (2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose the 12 sentence; (3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized 13 by law; or (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral 14 attack. Id. § 2255(a). 15 Waters argues that the omission of the Rehaif element from 16 the indictment violated his Fifth Amendment rights guaranteeing 17 that a grand jury find probable cause to support all the necessary 18 elements of the crime and to not be tried on a fatally defective 19 indictment and his Sixth Amendment rights to notice of the 20 charges.1 He also alleges that the defective indictment deprived 21 the court of jurisdiction. The government asserts that Waters has 22 waived his right to bring these claims, that his claims are 23 procedurally defaulted, and that the government is not required to 24 prove the defendant knew his possession of firearms was unlawful. 25

26 1 Although Waters’ motion also alleges violation of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, Waters 27 clarifies in his reply that he alleges deprivation of counsel only to show the prejudice that resulted from the defect in the 28 indictment and not as a standalone claim. 1 2 As part of his plea, Waters “knowingly and expressly waive[d] 3 all collateral challenges, including any claims under 28 U.S.C. § 4 2255, to his conviction, sentence, and the procedure by which the 5 Court adjudicated guilt and imposed sentence, except non-waivable 6 claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (ECF No. 15 at 11). 7 Such “[a]n unconditional guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional 8 defenses and cures all antecedent constitutional defects, allowing 9 only an attack on the voluntary and intelligent character of the 10 plea.” United States v. Brizan, 709 F.3d 864, 866–67 (9th Cir. 11 2013); see also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); 12 United States v. Espinoza, 816 Fed. App’x 82, 85 (9th Cir. June 1, 13 2020) (unpublished disposition) (unconditional plea waiver 14 precludes all Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims except to the extent 15 they contest the court’s jurisdiction or the voluntariness of the 16 plea). Thus, except to the extent Water attacks the jurisdiction 17 of the court,2 his claims are waived.3 18 Waters’ jurisdictional argument is without merit. The 19 omission of an element from the indictment does not affect the 20 court’s jurisdiction. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 21 (2002); United States v. Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957, 962–63 (9th Cir. 22 2003); see also United States v. Jackson, 2020 WL 7624842, at *1 23 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 2020) (unpublished disposition) (rejecting the 24 defendant’s argument that omission of the Rehaif element deprived 25 26 2 Waters does not attack the voluntariness of his plea.

27 3 c ouT rh te s c to hu ar tt noa ng er e oe fs tw hi et eh x ct eh pe t iw oe nl sl u- nr de ea rs o Tn oe ld l eo tp ti n ti oo n ts h e o cf o ls le av te er ra al l

28 c Kh ea ll bl ce hn ,g e 2 0w 2a 1i v We Lr 9a 6p 2p 4l 2i ,e s a ti n * 2t h (i Ds . c Na es ve .. JS ae ne ., 7e ,. g 2. 0, 2 1U )n .i ted States v. 1 the district court of jurisdiction); , 2 2020 WL 4218317, at *1 (July 23, 2020) (unpublished disposition) 3 (same); Espinoza, 2020 WL 2844542, at *1 (same); United States v. 4 Moore, 954 F.3d 1322, 1332 (11th Cir. 2020); United States v. 5 Hobbs, 953 F.3d 853, 856 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Balde, 6 943 F.3d 73, 88-92 (2d Cir. 2019); United States v. Burghardt, 939 7 F.3d 397, 402 (1st Cir. 2019). Cf. United States v. Singh, 979 8 F.3d 697, 730 (9th Cir. 2020) (on direct appeal, reviewing omission 9 of Rehaif element from indictment for plain error). The indictment 10 otherwise sufficiently states a criminal offense: possession of a 11 firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 12 Moreover, to the extent they are not otherwise waived, Waters’ 13 claims are procedurally defaulted. 14 “If a criminal defendant could have raised a claim of error 15 on direct appeal but nonetheless failed to do so, he must 16 demonstrate” either “cause excusing his procedural default, and 17 actual prejudice resulting from the claim of error,” United States 18 v. Johnson, 988 F.2d 941, 945 (9th Cir. 1993), or that he is 19 actually innocent of the offense, Bousley v. United States, 523 20 U.S. 614, 622 (1998). “[C]ause for a procedural default on appeal 21 ordinarily requires a showing of some external impediment 22 preventing counsel from constructing or raising the claim.” Murray 23 v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492 (1986). Actual prejudice “requires 24 the petitioner to establish ‘not merely that the errors at ... 25 trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to 26 his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire 27 trial with error of constitutional dimensions.’” Bradford v. 28 1 , 923 F.3d 599, 613 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal citation 2 omitted). 3 Waters could have raised his claims on direct appeal but did 4 not do so. They are therefore procedurally defaulted. It is 5 unnecessary to resolve whether Waters can demonstrate cause for 6 the default, because even if he could, he cannot demonstrate 7 prejudice.4 8 Waters committed the instant offense after receiving a 24- to 9 72-month sentence for assault with a deadly weapon, and he actually 10 served more than two years of this sentence. (PSR ¶ 38). Further, 11 Waters acknowledged in his plea agreement that he had been 12 previously convicted of a felony. (ECF No. 16 at 3 & 6). Finally, 13 and most importantly, Waters acknowledged during his plea colloquy 14 both that he possessed the firearm after having sustained a prior 15 felony conviction – specifically, he said, assault with a deadly 16 weapon -- and that he was aware at the time of his offense that he 17 was not allowed to possess a firearm.5 In light of Waters’ 18 admissions that he knew he was a convicted felon and that he was 19 prohibited from possessing firearms, the court is not persuaded 20 that the outcome of the proceedings would have been any different 21 had the grand jury been presented with, and the indictment had 22 alleged, the Rehaif element. Waters thus suffered no prejudice 23 from the omission of the Rehaif element. 24

25 4 Waters does not argue actual innocence.

26 5 Waters also noted a prior conviction for receiving stolen property. The court presumes this was in reference to his other 27 felony conviction, which was for unlawful driving or taking of a motor vehicle. Per the PSR, the vehicle in that case had been 28 previously reported stolen. (PSR ¶ 36). 1 Waters argues that he suffered prejudice because he was 2 convicted by a court lacking jurisdiction. For the reasons 3 previously discussed, this argument is without merit because the 4 errors Waters complains of did not deprive the court of 5 jurisdiction. Waters additionally argues that he was prejudiced 6 because the defect deprived him of effective assistance of counsel. 7 For the reasons already discussed, he cannot show a reasonable 8 probability of a different outcome had the Rehaif element been 9 included in the indictment, and thus he has not established 10 prejudice on this basis. 11 Waters alternatively argues that he is not required to 12 demonstrate prejudice to obtain relief because the omission is 13 structural error. 14 “[C]ertain errors, termed structural errors, might affect 15 substantial rights regardless of their actual impact on an 16 appellant’s trial.” United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 263 17 (2010) (internal punctuation and citations omitted). Thus, 18 structural error “warrant[s] habeas relief without a showing of 19 specific prejudice.” United States v. Withers, 638 F.3d 1055, 1063– 20 64 (9th Cir. 2011). “But structural errors are a very limited class 21 of errors that affect the framework within which the trial 22 proceeds, such that it is often difficult to assess the effect of 23 the error.” Marcus, 560 U.S. at 263 (internal punctuation and 24 citations omitted). Cases in which the Supreme Court has found 25 structural error include total deprivation of counsel, lack of an 26 impartial trial judge, violation of the right to a public trial 27 and an erroneous reasonable-doubt instruction. See id. (discussing 28 cases). In contrast, errors that have been found to be non- 1 structural include where the court instructed on an invalid 2 alternative theory of guilt, gave an instruction omitting an 3 element of the offense, or erroneously instructed the jury on an 4 element. Id. at 264 (discussing cases). 5 The Ninth Circuit has not yet addressed in a published opinion 6 whether omission of the Rehaif element from the indictment is 7 structural error. But it has held that the error is not structural 8 in at least one unpublished decision. See United States v. Jackson, 9 2020 WL 7624842, at *1 n.1 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 2020). And the First, 10 Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have concluded 11 that Rehaif errors are not structural. United States v. Patrone, 12 985 F.3d 81, 86 (1st Cir. 2021); United States v. Nasir, 982 F.3d. 13 144, 171 n.30 (3d Cir. Dec. 1, 2020); United States v. Lavalais, 14 960 F.3d 180, 187 (5th Cir. 2020); United States v. Payne, 964 15 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 2020); United United States v. Coleman, 16 961 F.3d 1024, 1030 (8th Cir. 2020); States v. Trujillo, 960 F.3d 17 1196, 1207 (10th Cir. 2020); see also United States v. Hill, 2020 18 WL 7258551, at *2 n.3 (3d Cir. Dec. 10, 2020) (unpublished 19 disposition); United States v. Watson, 820 Fed. App’x 397, 400 20 (6th Cir. 2020) (unpublished disposition). But see United States 21 v. Gary, 954 F.3d 194, 206 (4th Cir. 2020). This court agrees with 22 the well-reasoned opinions of these courts and concludes that a 23 Rehaif error does not fall within the limited class of errors the 24 Supreme Court has found to be structural.6

25 6 While there is some case law holding that defects in the 26 i cn ld ai ic mt m ie sn t t ia mr ee l ys t rr au ic st eu dr .a l Se er er ,o r e, . gt .h ,o s Ue n ic ta es de s S ta ap tp el sy o vn .l y D uw h Be or ,e 1t 8h 6e 27 F.3d 1177, 1179 & 1180 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999) (“We hold that, if properly challenged prior to trial, an indictment's complete 28 failure to recite an essential element of the charged offense is not a minor or technical flaw subject to harmless error analysis, 1 Finally, Waters argues that Rehaif requires the government to 2|| prove not only that he knew that he was a convicted felon but also that he knew he was barred from possessing firearms. 4|| Notwithstanding the fact that Waters admitted to the court that he 5|| knew he was barred from possessing a firearm, Waters’ legal argument is also without merit. United States v. Singh, 979 F.3d 697, 727 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[The defendant] contends that Rehaif 8]| requires the Government to prove he knew not only his status, but also that he knew his status prohibited him from owning a firearm. But this interpretation is not supported by Rehaif ... □□□ 11 Accordingly, because the claims raised in Waters’ § 2255 12|| motion are waived, procedurally defaulted and/or without merit, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion to vacate, set aside or 14|| correct sentence (ECF No. 27) is hereby DENIED. 15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Waters is DENIED a certificate of 16|| appealability, as jurists of reason would not find the court’s 17|| denial of the motion to be debatable or wrong. 18 The Clerk of Court shall enter final judgment accordingly. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 DATED: This 5th day of April, 2021. 21 © 99 burns” D fll Shhh 23 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 24 25 but a fatal flaw requiring dismissal of the indictment. .. . 26 Untimely challenges to the sufficiency of an indictment are reviewed under a more liberal standard.”). Waters argues that he raised his argument at the earliest possible opportunity and so the timeliness limitation does not apply. The court does not agree. 28 Waters could have challenged the indictment well before now. The claim 18S not timely raised.