IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
MALIK WASHINGTON, § § No. 302, 2024 Defendant Below, § Appellant, § Court Below—Superior Court § of the State of Delaware v. § § Cr. ID No. 2308003678(K) STATE OF DELAWARE, § § Appellee. § Submitted: May 7, 2025 Decided: July 2, 2025
Before VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and GRIFFITHS, Justices.
ORDER
After consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, it appears
to the Court that:
(1) A jury convicted Appellant Malik Washington of carrying a concealed
deadly weapon (“CCDW”) and possession of a firearm by a person prohibited
(“PFBPP”). On appeal, Washington contends that the State presented insufficient
evidence to convict him of CCDW. We disagree and affirm.
(2) On August 7, 2023, the Dover Police Department received a 911 call
concerning a man, with no shirt on, wielding a firearm in the vicinity of State and Reed Streets in Dover, Delaware.1 The dispatcher sent Detective Dale Starke of the
Dover Police to the identified area.2 Once there, Detective Starke found an
individual matching the description given by the caller.3 The individual would later
be identified as the Appellant—Malik Washington.4
(3) According to Detective Starke, he saw Washington running south down
State Street in front of the Presbyterian Church of Dover, just past the church’s
courtyard.5 Bordering the church and courtyard is a low-in-height brick wall.6
Washington sat on the brick wall after he stopped running.7 Given the information
from the 911 caller and what he had just witnessed, Detective Starke took
Washington into custody.8 After the arrest, Detective Starke searched Washington
but did not find the reported firearm.9
1 App. to Opening Br. at A24–25; State’s Trial Exhibits 1 & 2. The recording of the 911 telephone call and certification was entered into evidence without objection under the business records exception to the hearsay rule and authentication rule. See D.R.E. 803(6) and 902(11). 2 App. to Opening Br. at A26–27. 3 Id. at A27. 4 Id. 5 Id. at A27, A31. 6 Id. at A29. 7 Id. at A27. 8 Id. 9 Id.
2 (4) The police immediately began a search of the area. Behind the church,
Dover Police found a firearm stowed in a black bag.10 The bag was hidden from
view by several bushes.11 With the firearm recovered, the police transported
Washington to the police station. There, Detective Brandyn Clancy of the Dover
Police interviewed Washington.12 During the interview, Washington confessed to
carrying the bag that contained the firearm.13 Washington was charged with PFBPP
and CCDW. Washington’s case proceeded to trial where a jury convicted him of
both charges.
(5) On appeal, Washington claims that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to sustain his conviction for CCDW. Washington argues that no
reasonable juror could have found that he carried a concealed firearm at the time of,
or at any time prior to, his arrest. In furtherance of this argument, Washington asks
this Court to disregard the statements he made to Detective Clancy (and vacate his
conviction) under the common law rule of corpus delicti. This rule requires the State
10 Id. at A28. 11 Id. at A28, A30–32. 12 Id. at A38–39. 13 State Exhibit # 6 at 1:55–2:05 (“The gun was in the bag that I had . . . the [gun] that they found.”); id. at 2:15–2:24 (Q: “Did you ever display the handgun to anyone today?” A: “Yeah . . . my girlfriend.”).
3 to present some evidence independent of a confession to show a crime was
committed.14
(6) Because Washington did not move for judgment of acquittal based on
insufficiency of the evidence,15 his claim is reviewed for plain error.16 For an error
to be plain it “must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the
fairness and integrity of the trial process.”17
(7) We find no plain error here. A person is guilty of CCDW if “the person
carries concealed a deadly weapon upon or about the person without a license to do
so.”18 A weapon is “about” the person if it is “immediate[ly] availab[le] and
accessib[le] . . . to the person.”19
(8) The State presented sufficient evidence to the jury to sustain the
conviction for CCDW. Washington argues that there was insufficient evidence to
establish that he carried a concealed firearm at the time of his arrest—but that
14 See Wright v. State, 953 A.2d 188, 192 (Del. 2008) (citations omitted). 15 We review corpus delicti challenges under the same standard of review as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Id. at 193. 16 Monroe v. State, 652 A.2d 560, 563 (Del. 1995). 17 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986) (citing Dutton v. State, 452 A.2d 127, 146 (Del. 1982)). 18 11 Del. C. § 1442(a). 19 Gallman v. State, 14 A.3d 502, 504 (Del. 2011) (citing Dubin v. State, 397 A.2d 132, 134 (Del. 1979)). Factors that are considered include: “(1) whether the defendant had to change her position appreciably to reach the weapon, (2) whether the defendant could reach the weapon while driving, and (3) the amount of time it would take for the defendant to reach the weapon, if the defendant were provoked.” Id.
4 argument is not wholly dispositive. The evidence presented to the jury showed that
Washington carried a concealed firearm in the period immediately preceding his
arrest. By focusing on that evidence, a reasonable juror could have found sufficient
evidence to find Washington guilty of CCDW.
(9) Washington next contends, in support of his insufficiency of the
evidence claim, that his statements to Detective Clancy—that he was holding the
bag containing the firearm—should be excluded under the common law rule of
corpus delicti. According to Washington’s theory, these statements are the only
evidence that show the firearm was concealed, and without the statements, there
would be insufficient evidence to convict him of CCDW. We find no merit to
Washington’s claim.
(10) To sustain a conviction based on a defendant’s confession, the corpus
delicti rule requires “some evidence of the existence of a crime, independent of the
defendant’s confession.”20 The rule protects “those defendants who may be
pressured to confess to crimes that they either did not commit or crimes that did not
20 Wright, 953 A.2d at 192 (citations omitted); see also Johnson v. State, 338 A.2d 124, 125 (Del. 1975) (rejecting requirement for “substantial” independent evidence and instead finding that “some proof” suffices) (emphasis not in original).
5 occur.”21 The rule does not require independent evidence proving every element of
the crime charged.22
(11) Here, the State presented sufficient evidence, independent of
Washington’s statement, that a firearm was available and accessible to him just prior
to his arrest. Although the details received from the 911 caller did not establish that
Washington carried a bag, the caller did note that Washington possessed a firearm.
This call, coupled with the evidence that a bag containing a firearm was found in the
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
MALIK WASHINGTON, § § No. 302, 2024 Defendant Below, § Appellant, § Court Below—Superior Court § of the State of Delaware v. § § Cr. ID No. 2308003678(K) STATE OF DELAWARE, § § Appellee. § Submitted: May 7, 2025 Decided: July 2, 2025
Before VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and GRIFFITHS, Justices.
ORDER
After consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, it appears
to the Court that:
(1) A jury convicted Appellant Malik Washington of carrying a concealed
deadly weapon (“CCDW”) and possession of a firearm by a person prohibited
(“PFBPP”). On appeal, Washington contends that the State presented insufficient
evidence to convict him of CCDW. We disagree and affirm.
(2) On August 7, 2023, the Dover Police Department received a 911 call
concerning a man, with no shirt on, wielding a firearm in the vicinity of State and Reed Streets in Dover, Delaware.1 The dispatcher sent Detective Dale Starke of the
Dover Police to the identified area.2 Once there, Detective Starke found an
individual matching the description given by the caller.3 The individual would later
be identified as the Appellant—Malik Washington.4
(3) According to Detective Starke, he saw Washington running south down
State Street in front of the Presbyterian Church of Dover, just past the church’s
courtyard.5 Bordering the church and courtyard is a low-in-height brick wall.6
Washington sat on the brick wall after he stopped running.7 Given the information
from the 911 caller and what he had just witnessed, Detective Starke took
Washington into custody.8 After the arrest, Detective Starke searched Washington
but did not find the reported firearm.9
1 App. to Opening Br. at A24–25; State’s Trial Exhibits 1 & 2. The recording of the 911 telephone call and certification was entered into evidence without objection under the business records exception to the hearsay rule and authentication rule. See D.R.E. 803(6) and 902(11). 2 App. to Opening Br. at A26–27. 3 Id. at A27. 4 Id. 5 Id. at A27, A31. 6 Id. at A29. 7 Id. at A27. 8 Id. 9 Id.
2 (4) The police immediately began a search of the area. Behind the church,
Dover Police found a firearm stowed in a black bag.10 The bag was hidden from
view by several bushes.11 With the firearm recovered, the police transported
Washington to the police station. There, Detective Brandyn Clancy of the Dover
Police interviewed Washington.12 During the interview, Washington confessed to
carrying the bag that contained the firearm.13 Washington was charged with PFBPP
and CCDW. Washington’s case proceeded to trial where a jury convicted him of
both charges.
(5) On appeal, Washington claims that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to sustain his conviction for CCDW. Washington argues that no
reasonable juror could have found that he carried a concealed firearm at the time of,
or at any time prior to, his arrest. In furtherance of this argument, Washington asks
this Court to disregard the statements he made to Detective Clancy (and vacate his
conviction) under the common law rule of corpus delicti. This rule requires the State
10 Id. at A28. 11 Id. at A28, A30–32. 12 Id. at A38–39. 13 State Exhibit # 6 at 1:55–2:05 (“The gun was in the bag that I had . . . the [gun] that they found.”); id. at 2:15–2:24 (Q: “Did you ever display the handgun to anyone today?” A: “Yeah . . . my girlfriend.”).
3 to present some evidence independent of a confession to show a crime was
committed.14
(6) Because Washington did not move for judgment of acquittal based on
insufficiency of the evidence,15 his claim is reviewed for plain error.16 For an error
to be plain it “must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the
fairness and integrity of the trial process.”17
(7) We find no plain error here. A person is guilty of CCDW if “the person
carries concealed a deadly weapon upon or about the person without a license to do
so.”18 A weapon is “about” the person if it is “immediate[ly] availab[le] and
accessib[le] . . . to the person.”19
(8) The State presented sufficient evidence to the jury to sustain the
conviction for CCDW. Washington argues that there was insufficient evidence to
establish that he carried a concealed firearm at the time of his arrest—but that
14 See Wright v. State, 953 A.2d 188, 192 (Del. 2008) (citations omitted). 15 We review corpus delicti challenges under the same standard of review as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Id. at 193. 16 Monroe v. State, 652 A.2d 560, 563 (Del. 1995). 17 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986) (citing Dutton v. State, 452 A.2d 127, 146 (Del. 1982)). 18 11 Del. C. § 1442(a). 19 Gallman v. State, 14 A.3d 502, 504 (Del. 2011) (citing Dubin v. State, 397 A.2d 132, 134 (Del. 1979)). Factors that are considered include: “(1) whether the defendant had to change her position appreciably to reach the weapon, (2) whether the defendant could reach the weapon while driving, and (3) the amount of time it would take for the defendant to reach the weapon, if the defendant were provoked.” Id.
4 argument is not wholly dispositive. The evidence presented to the jury showed that
Washington carried a concealed firearm in the period immediately preceding his
arrest. By focusing on that evidence, a reasonable juror could have found sufficient
evidence to find Washington guilty of CCDW.
(9) Washington next contends, in support of his insufficiency of the
evidence claim, that his statements to Detective Clancy—that he was holding the
bag containing the firearm—should be excluded under the common law rule of
corpus delicti. According to Washington’s theory, these statements are the only
evidence that show the firearm was concealed, and without the statements, there
would be insufficient evidence to convict him of CCDW. We find no merit to
Washington’s claim.
(10) To sustain a conviction based on a defendant’s confession, the corpus
delicti rule requires “some evidence of the existence of a crime, independent of the
defendant’s confession.”20 The rule protects “those defendants who may be
pressured to confess to crimes that they either did not commit or crimes that did not
20 Wright, 953 A.2d at 192 (citations omitted); see also Johnson v. State, 338 A.2d 124, 125 (Del. 1975) (rejecting requirement for “substantial” independent evidence and instead finding that “some proof” suffices) (emphasis not in original).
5 occur.”21 The rule does not require independent evidence proving every element of
the crime charged.22
(11) Here, the State presented sufficient evidence, independent of
Washington’s statement, that a firearm was available and accessible to him just prior
to his arrest. Although the details received from the 911 caller did not establish that
Washington carried a bag, the caller did note that Washington possessed a firearm.
This call, coupled with the evidence that a bag containing a firearm was found in the
vicinity of where Detective Starke witnessed Washington fleeing, independently
corroborates Washington’s statements to Detective Clancy. Altogether, the
evidence presented at trial was sufficient for the jury to find that Washington
possessed and concealed a firearm.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths Justice
21 Bailey v. State, 925 A.2d 503, 2007 WL 1041748, at *3 (Del. 2007) (TABLE) (citation omitted). The corpus delicti rule does not apply to proving the underlying felony of a compound crime such as felony murder. See Wright, 953 A.2d at 191 (citing 11 Del. C. § 301). 22 Bailey, 925 A.2d 503, 2007 WL 1041748, at *3.